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Abstract
This study sets out to examine how the genre o f  court judgments is translated under 
certain conditions relating to the legal systems o f  the source and target texts as well 
as to the languages/language varieties concerned. The study looks in particular at 
two aspects o f  judgments: macrostructures and lexical incongruencies. These 
features are analysed using a text corpus o f  judgments and their translations specially 
compiled for this study (about 1,200,763 words), in two different scenarios. The first 
scenario involves two countries in which different legal systems are in force with 
two official languages; the second concerns plurilingual countries with a mixed legal 
system. These two different scenarios are intended to sharpen the research focus o f  
earlier studies so that a more nuanced picture o f  shifts in legal translation can 
emerge. A further contribution is made to the role o f  context in shaping translation 
decisions through consideration o f  the purpose o f  the translations studied. The 
corpus has been studied manually as a semi-automatic analysis was not practicable 
given the nature o f  the research questions which looked at the translation o f  
macrostructures and lexical items in context. The analysis o f  the corpus proceeds by 
sub-dividing the corpus into so-called 'case studies' according to the two main 
features studied and the two scenarios outlined. The macrostructure o f  selected 
judgments is analysed using case studies o f  French judgments into English, French 
Canadian into English and English Canadian into French. This last case study 
analyses judgments "translated" as summaries. Lexical incongruencies are studied 
through the translation o f  the names o f  a number o f  courts: two Italian courts into 
English, one Canadian federal court from French into English and one Canadian 
provincial court from English into French. Qualitative and quantitative analyses 
confirm that the translation o f  the moves can be problematic as the significance o f  
certain linguistic cues in the Source Text is not always identified and conveyed in 
translation, especially in the first scenario. When it is identified, a translation 
strategy o f  explicitation is observed. The second scenario is found to be less 
problematic for the translation o f  macrostructures, at least as far as the situation in 
Canada is concerned. With regard to the second area o f  enquiry, namely lexical 
incongruencies, the study confirms that the search for equivalence in the translation 
o f  lexical items is problematic, especially in the first scenario o f  translating between  
the legal systems o f  two different countries. The case studies belonging to the second 
scenario seem again to be less problematic, at least for Canada. The study ends with 
some proposals for future research.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
As a professional translator who has often been required to translate legal documents, 
I have encountered special difficulties which, no doubt, have confronted others too. 
One legal system is different from the other: so how can one translate a legal concept 
from one language into another, when not only the languages but also the legal 
systems are different, and sometimes radically so? What happens to typical, 
conventionalised patterns in a legal text when translated?
These thoughts created an interest in investigating how other legal translators have 
faced these very challenges. Within the general framework o f  legal translation, this 
thesis focuses on the translation o f  one particular genre, namely court judgments. A  
judgment -  according to a standard English legal textbook, Zega/
-  can be defined as "a reasoned decision in which the judge w ill normally set 
out the facts o f  the case as he or she has decided, and give the conclusions on the law 
applicable to them" (Bailey, Ching, Gunn & Ormerod, 2002:1041). This definition 
can be generalised to other legal systems since it relates to the function o f  the genre, 
not the way in which it is constructed.
There are three main reasons behind my decision to focus on judgments:
i) the difficulties posed by the translation o f  legal texts are challenging, as different 
conceptual systems (relating to different legal systems) are involved, which is not 
necessarily the case -  or at least not the case to such an extent -  in the translation o f  
other specialised subject domains such as science and technology;
ii) judgments touch on different aspects o f  the legal system, which makes them  
potentially more challenging than other legal genres as far as their scope is concerned. 
Judgments can, for instance, contain references to (and extracts Ifom) statute laws, 
previous judgments and legal doctrine;
iii) little research has been conducted to date on the translation o f  this particular genre.
Following this introductory chapter. Chapter 2, the Literature Review begins by 
looking at relevant aspects o f  Translation Studies relating to legal translation in 
particular. This provides a crucial perspective for the translations which form the
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materials on which the present study is based. Two particular aspects emerge from this 
review: one concerned with textual structures, namely macrostructures, and the other 
-  more conventionally tor legal translation -  with the lexicon.
The research questions w hich emerge from this review are:
a) What happens to the macrostructures o f  judgments in different translation 
scenarios? Judgments often exhibit conventionalised moves: are these kept in the 
target texts (TTs)?
b) What happens if  a particular legal concept expressed in the source texts (STs) has 
no corresponding concept in the legal system o f  the target culture? How are 
lexical gaps dealt with in the context o f  judgments in different translation 
scenarios?
The themes o f  macrostructures in translation and lexical incongruency will be looked 
at within two scenarios that a translator can face. The translating scenarios have been 
devised in this research project following a number o f  studies performed by 
comparatist lawyers and jurilinguists ( c f  Gémar, 2002), who analysed different types 
o f  legal systems in different countries and studies which have dealt with plurilingual 
countries ( c f  Sarcevic 1997:14). These are the chosen scenarios here:
1. Two countries in which different legal systems are in force and two 
different languages are spoken: language A  into language B, legal system 1 
to legal system 2.
2. Plurilingual countries with a mixed legal system: language A into language 
B, legal system la  to legal system lb.
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology chosen to investigate these research questions, 
including the reasons for building a parallel corpus o f  judgments. It also describes 
how the different sub-corpora -  related to the different research questions and 
scenarios -  were gathered and from which sources. The analytical approach used to 
study each research question/scenario is then described, including both qualitative and 
quantitative perspectives.
The corpus is comprised o f  six sub-corpora or 'case studies' o f  judgments and their 
translations. These are analysed in Chapters 4 and 5. Case studies 1, 2 and 3 are
analysed in Chapter 4 and are related to the first Research Question concerning 
macrostructures in translation. Each section o f  the chapter begins with a qualitative 
analysis and presentation o f  individual examples and then proceeds to a quantitative 
analysis o f  the relevant case study.
7." macrostructures o f  French judgments in English translation -  FR > EN  
(Scenario 1). The sub-corpora used for this case study consist o f  French judgments: 
issued by the Cowz- (n=247) and by the Cowz- (n=28), together
with translations published by two academic institutions, the Institute for Translational 
Law and the Queen Mary Case Translation Programme. This case study looks at four 
locutions which represent important cohesive ties within the French judgments, the 
first two in the judgments issued by the Cowr aKg and the remaining two in
the judgments issued by the Cowr g'wc; grwe; ce and
2: macrostructures o f  French Canadian judgments in English translation -  
FR > EN (Scenario 2). The sub-corpus for this case study consists o f  90 judgments 
issued by the Court o f  Quebec and taken from the website o f  the ^oczc/c grwc6ccoz.yc 
yzznWẑ zzc.
Cajc 3: Macrostructures o f  judgments issued by Canadian courts in
"translation" (as a summary) - EN >  FR (Scenario 2). The sub-corpus consists o f  14 
summaries taken from the website o f  the yf^yjoczafrozz (7'cxprcj ĵ ẑozz
yrz3Mçazjc (7c /a  AbzzvcZ/c-Æ'co.y.yc (TÆF7VE) and 7 taken from the website o f  the 
CozzjczV (7zz ĵ /rz/wr zTc /z3 yczM/zzc. These producers produce summaries rather than full 
TTs according to the translation brief.
The case studies which deal with the second Research Question are discussed in 
Chapter 5. It was decided to look at how the names o f  a number o f  courts are 
translated. The translation o f  the names o f  particular courts can be useful to analyse 
how translators overcome some o f  the inter-systemic challenges in context and o f  
course courts have a central role in legal systems and in judgments, so their translation 
is crucial The case studies are the Ibllowing:
4: Translation o f  and frc/w m , two names o f  Italian courts, into
English - IT > EN (Scenario 1). The sub-corpus consists o f  21 judgments issued by an 
Italian or by Italian appellate courts, i.e. Corfc or CozTc (7/
The sub-corpus is taken from the Queen Mary Case Translation
Program m e.
Ca.yc Translation o f  Cowr afw CazzWa, name o f  a Canadian frderal
court, into English - FR > EN (Scenario 2). 50 judgments issued by the Supreme 
Court o f  Canada constitute the sub-corpus; they are taken from a website called 
"Judgments o f  the Supreme Court o f  Canada".
Case study 6: Translation o f  "The Supreme Court o f  British Columbia", name o f  a 
Canadian provincial court - EN > FR (Scenario 2). The sub-corpus consists o f  1 
judgment issued by The Supreme Court o f  British Columbia, taken from the website 
o f  the rTg 7ayè/M/Me.
A  conclusion sums up the Endings o f  the research and discusses the new perspectives 
on the translation o f  judgments introduced by this thesis.
Chapter 2 - Literature review
Many translation theoreticians, translators and legal experts have written about legal 
translation. Some o f  their books and articles deal -  to a greater or lesser extent -  with 
judgments.
This literature review w ill start by describing how legal texts and Judgments have 
been deEned and classiEed by different authors for translation purposes (2.1). Some 
different theoretical perspectives which deal directly with legal texts and judgments 
will then be discussed in the context o f  a brief orientation introducing approaches o f  
potential interest to this work (2.2). This network o f  deEnitions, classiEcations and 
theories -  sometimes overlapping, sometimes clashing -  have been helpful in building 
an informed perspective for analysing the translated judgments which form the corpus 
o f  this research. The corpus analysis (in chapters 4 and 5) w ill also link back to these 
classiEcations and theoretical perspectives.
Two main themes emerge in (2.4) macrostructures and (2.5) the lexicon. The 
conventionalised macrostructures o f  judgments -  at least in some countries -  require 
critical choices by the translators, when creating a text which w ill be read in another 
country and within another legal system which uses different conventionalised 
macrostructures. Moreover, judgments may contain the typical lexical pitfalls with 
which a translator is confronted when dealing with any legal genres because 
judgments often contain extracts o f  texts belonging to other genres -  statutes, 
contracts, legal doctrine, etc. The TT can be different according to its purpose, 
whether the translation is for information about the source culture or intended to serve 
as a legal instrument elsewhere.
2.1. D efinitions and classifications o f legal texts and judgm ents
There is no common agreement on what a "legal text" is and on how to classify it in
relation to translation.
According to Sarcevic (1997:9), language used in legal texts is a special-purpose 
communication used between law specialists. Harvey (2002:178) challenges this
claim, suggesting that this definition would disqualify many "text types, which make 
up a large part o f  the translator's workload: contracts, judgments, correspondence with 
lawyers and legal authorities, etc."', one o f  the hallmarks o f  legal discourse being 
"arguably that it is not restricted to specialists, but is (at least in theory) intended for 
the lay citizen". The difference in perspective can perhaps be related to the fact that 
Sarcevic is responding to a definition given by Sager and his colleagues, who saw 
special languages as "the means o f  linguistic communication required for conveying 
special subject inform ation am ong specialists in the same subject" (Sager, Dungworth 
and M cDonald 1980:210).
Sarcevic (1997) focuses on parallel texts o f  statutes, treaties and judicial opinions, 
but, again according to Harvey:
a more inclusive definition of what constitutes a legal text would cover 
documents which are, or may become, part of the judicial process: for 
instance, contracts, wills, court documents, witness statements and expert 
reports, which are 'bread and butter' activities for lawyers and legal 
translators. (Harvey, 2002:178)
In fact, contrary to Sarcevic's and Harvey's opinions, it could be argued that most 
legal documents are actually aimed at the public. This is the case for statutes, as well 
as for a great number o f  judgments. Judgments may w ell be interpreted and explained 
to the client by a lawyer, but ultimately they are aimed at the parties involved in the 
case rather than at specialists, with some notable exceptions^.
Sarcevic divides legal documents into prescriptive and descriptive documents (plus 
hybrid texts combining both, for instance judicial decisions, petitions). Prescriptive 
texts include laws and regulations, prescribing "a specific course o f  action that an 
individual ought to conform to" (1997:11). Hybrid texts are primarily descriptive, but 
also contain prescriptive parts, and this category includes judicial decisions, pleadings, 
appeals, petitions, etc. The third group -  purely descriptive -  includes texts written by
' This use o f  ZexZ zype by Harvey should not be confused with the concept o f  as described in
the following pages, particularly with reference to Katharina Reiss. C ew e in this thesis indicates those 
conventional forms o f  text associated with particular communicative events (Hatim & Munday 
2004:340).
 ̂ Some higher Courts, like the Cowr (Te in France, may address specific points o f  law and so
write for other judges and not members o f  the public.
legal scholars, i,e. law textbooks, articles, etc. But, according to Harvey (2002:179) 
this classification overlooks the expressive or persuasive function, inevitable "in a 
form o f  discourse founded on rhetoric". He concedes that this "function arises mainly 
in communication between lawyer and layperson (e.g. counsel addressing a jury)"  ̂
which according to some theorists would not be a legal discourse (2002:179). But -  
Harvey claims -  there are also examples o f  "persuasive communication between 
lawyers, e.g. the explanatory parts o f  a judicial decision, or a scholarly article 
explaining why a change is needed (or was misguided)" (2002:179). Harvey argues 
strongly that the function o f  a document depends on its situation^, rather than on its 
inherent nature, differentiating between primary and secondary readers:
A statute is prescriptive in the eyes of the citizen compelled to abide by it but 
it is merely informative to the person with a potential interest (e.g. a person 
researching company law with a view to setting up a business). Similarly, a 
contract is binding on the parties involved, but simply a source of information 
to a third-party observer consulting it for future use. In legal as in other forms 
of communication, pragmatic considerations are the most reliable way of 
determining function. (Harvey, 2002:179)
Harvey is convincing when he stresses the importance o f  the persuasive function o f  
some legal texts, even those very texts which Sarcevic labels as "purely descriptive", 
such as legal articles written by scholars. Parts o f  these texts may advocate a change in 
legislation, and aim at persuading readers that such changes are needed.
Harvey's more nuanced view that the function o f  a certain text may depend on the 
situation (reader's purpose) rather than on its nature will also be considered in the 
context o f  Skopos theory, which suggests that this change o f  perspective (the purpose 
rather than the nature o f  the source text (ST)) can play a role in the translation process 
by shaping the TT according to the translation brief.
For purposes o f  clarity, two remarks should be made at this point with reference to the 
above view s on the nature o f  "legal texts". Legal language is sometimes described as 
if  it were uniform but, as already indicated above, different genres (e.g. statutes.
It could be objected that this is spoken communication and so does not constitute a text. 
Probably meaning the reader's purpose.
contracts, Judgments) have different "fbrms"^ and sometimes a different vocabulary 
(Gémar 2002:166) and there is no legal discourse as such, but "a set o f  related legal 
discourses" (M ayley 1994:3). Besides, there is not a universal legal language: legal 
languages change according to different legal cultures, as will be seen later, 
particularly in judgments.
Secondly, it should be remembered that language is a system which is then used in 
texts. In some o f  the above classifications, system and use are used almost 
interchangeably, but they should not be confused. This thesis has to do with acts o f  
communication: text producers use systems in order to communicate and it is texts
which are relevant here.
The analysis o f  this thesis (chapters 4 and 5) deals in particular with a particular genre 
o f  legal texts, court judgments. Judgments can be defined in English law as "a 
reasoned decision in which the judge w ill normally set out the facts o f  the case as he 
or she has decided, and give the conclusions on the law applicable to them" (Bailey, 
Ching, Gunn & Ormerod, 2002:1041). The text o f  the judgment is a public written 
record o f  the decision.
Judgments can vary according to jurisdiction, instance, country, language - they can 
resolve civil or criminal proceedings, but can also interpret a statute (for example, 
judgments issued by the Cowr in France or the Corre (7z in
Italy) or determine if  a statute has been promulgated in accordance with or in violation  
o f  the Constitution (judgments issued by the Cozzr CoMĵ 7zYw7zoM?7g//g in France or the 
Co/Tc Co6̂ /zYzzzzoMa/c in Italy or the .8zzMù ĵvgz;yaj ĵzzMg.yggrzc/zr in Germany).
Judgments are written by a judge or a panel o f  judges. Usually, the higher the court, 
the greater the probability that there is more than one judge. According to the legal 
system o f  the country or region concerned, judges base their decisions on and make 
reference to statute laws, precedents, doctrine. In England and Wales, for example, 
judges base their decisions on previous judgments, while in legal systems derived 
from Roman law decisions are taken mainly with reference to statutes and -  at least in
Gémar writes aboutyb/'zzzg.y (in French).
order to interpret statutes -  also with reference to academic works. Also, in the case o f  
appeals, judges can review (and so make reference to) a case already examined by a 
lower court.
The first section o f  this chapter aimed at defining and classifying legal texts and 
judgments. The next sections will focus more on the process o f  translation, by giving 
account o f  some crucial approaches to texts for translation purpose.
2.2 The text as the unit o f  translation
Text linguistics and other disciplines have shown that texts are not just strings o f  
sentences but that they are coherent wholes, that they normally include cohesive 
elements and that they have a macrostructure. Textual structures, amount o f  cohesion  
etc. vary according to text type and genre, and across languages -  hence translation 
problems. It is therefore interesting to analyse judgments as a specific genre in terms 
o f  their m acrostructure and cohesion. In section 2.3 relevant m odels will be presented 
which will be then used (in Ch. 4 and 5) for the analysis.
A  text, according to Halliday and Hasan, is not simply a string o f  sentences:
A text is best thought of not as a grammatical unit at all, but rather as a unit of a 
different kind: a semantic unit. The unity that it has is a unity of meaning in 
context, a texture that expresses the fact that it relates as a whole to the 
environment in which it is placed. (Halliday and Hasan, 1976:294)
Given this unity o f  meaning, discourse analysis has expanded the unit o f  translation -  
the linguistic unit which translators focus on -  to the whole text. This entails 
considering the genre, the type (or types) and the function o f  a text before and during 
the translation, because these are all factors that inform the choices o f  translators and 
so can influence the translation process. Sections 2.2.1 looks at text genres, 2.2.2 at 
text types, 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 at the translation brief and the audience. Section 2.2.5 will 
look at some features o f  textuality.
2.2.1 Text genres and legal texts
Text gg/zrc and (ype are important aspects o f  text classification from two different 
perspectives, both o f  which are important for the analysis o f  "legal texts", more
specifically judgments and provide a context (functional; socially conventionalised) 
for the analysis o f  more detailed realisations o f  textuality.
There is no agreement on the definition o f  genre and sometimes, at least within 
linguistics, genre is used a synonym o f  register. According to Trosborg, genres are 
texts used in a particular situation for a particular purpose which “m ay be classified  
using everyday labels such as a guidebook, a nursery rhyme, a poem, a business letter, 
a newspaper article, a radio play, an advertisement, etc." (1997:6). While “registers 
comprise an open-ended set o f  varieties (or styles) o f  language typical o f  occupational 
fields, such as the language o f  religion, the language o f  legal documents" (Trosborg, 
1997:5), etc., genres are oAen considered a sub-division o f  registers (Trosborg, 
1997:6)^. Therefore, the
legal register may comprise the language of the law in legal documents 
(legislative texts, contracts, deed, wills), the language of the courtroom (e.g. the 
judge declaring the law, judge/counsel interchanges, counsel/witness 
interchanges), the language o f legal textbooks, and various types of lawyer's 
communication with other lawyers and with laymen. (Trosborg 1991:4)
The question remains, however, w hich criteria to use in order to identify a particular 
genre. Texts can be analysed on the basis o f  their structure, style, content and intended 
audience, but, according to Swales, texts are “communicative vehicles for the 
achievem ent o f  goals" (1990:46):
A genre comprises a class of communicative events, the members of which share 
some set o f communicative purposes. These purposes are recognized by the 
expert members of the parent discourse community and thereby constitute the 
rationale for the genre. This rationale shapes the schematic structure o f the 
discourse and influences and constrains choice of content and style. (Swales, 
1990:58)
Establishing the gezirg or /ex/ o f  a ST, i.e. the classification o f  a given text
according to the “specifically structured socio-cultural patterns o f  communication 
belonging to specific language communities" (Reiss 1981:173) is an important part, 
according to Reiss, o f  achieving a functionally equivalent TT (1981:168). Reiss is
 ̂ Trosborg challenges the view that genre is always subordinated to register: "Genres are subordinated 
to registers only in the sense that one register may be realized through various genres. Conversely, one 
genre may be realized through a number o f  registers just as a genre constrains the ways in which 
register variables o f field, tenor and mode can be combined in a particular society ( 1997:10).
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aware that /ex/ vanefy, just as (ype, is used to denote “the most variegated textual 
phenomena" (1981:173) and so defines text variety as:
super-individual acts of speech of writing, which are linked to recurrent actions 
of communications and in which particular patterns of language and structure 
have developed because of their recurrence in similar communicative 
constellations. The of text variety is not confined to one language.
The various kinds of text variety are partly not confined to one language or one 
culture, but the habits of textualization, the patterns of language and structure 
often differ from one another to a considerable extent. Hence, the establishment 
of the text variety is of decisive importance for the translator, so that he may not 
endanger the functional equivalence of the [translation language] (TL) text by 
naively adopting [source language] [SL] conventions. (Reiss, 1981:173; emphasis 
in the original)
Sections 2.3-2.3.4 will look at some of these habits of textualization and patterns of language
and structure.
2.2.2 Text types and legal texts
The classification o f  texts according to genres and types for translation purposes is 
part o f  the analysis o f  the whole text that should be made before translation according 
to a number o f  theorists, although practitioners find that often impracticable. Section
2.2.1 has briefly presented some o f  the theories on genre. Text types often cut through 
genre classifications and can be defined on the basis o f  cognitive categories 
(Trosborg, 1997:16) as shown by the classifications described below in this section. 
While classifying genres has to do with the the context o f  whole texts, categorizing 
text types normally does not “apply to a whole text but rather to parts o f  it" (Baker, 
1992:114) and takes into account factors such as “the nature o f  the message involved 
and/or the addresser/addressee relationship" (Baker, 1992:114). Biber's view  seems to 
be different, in that he develops a text typology “based on sets o f  syntactic and lexical 
features that co-occur frequently in texts, rather than assuming sets o f  features defined 
on a priori functional grounds" (Biber, 1989:5). According to Biber, types should be 
identified according to their “linguistic characteristics and only subsequently 
interpreted functionally" (1989:5).
Biber and many other scholars (Bühler, Jakobson, Hatim and Mason, among others) 
have attempted to classify texts according to their functions or “type" in various ways.
One o f  the earliest in relation to translation is Katharina Reiss' classification. 
Borrowing from Bühler, her well-known classification established three different text 
types as the basis for translation decisions:
a) “The communication o f  content -  informative type"
b. “The communication o f  artistically organized content -  expressive type"
c. “The com m unication o f  content with a persuasive character -  operative type" (Reiss 
1981:171).
To avoid any potential terminological confusion, it may be useful to describe 
Jakobson's functions o f  language, again based on Bühler. The Russian scholar 
established six language functions: expressive, informative, vocative, aesthetic, phatic, 
metalingual and poetic. The expressive (or emotive) function can be relevant for 
judgments, given that it “aims a direct expression o f  the speaker's attitude toward 
what he is speaking about" (Jakobson, 1987:66). Jakobson, however, considered 
functions o f  language rather than texts.
Texts, o f  course, are often not realized in their “pure form", but have mixed, hybrid 
forms, as indicated by Reiss. Examples Reiss gives include a sales promotion in verse 
form, which is an “operative text with elements o f  poetic language" (Reiss 1981:172), 
so a hybrid between operative and expressive functions, and sports coverage, which  
may be both informative and expressive, containing poetic or pompous or high-flown  
language elements.
This multifunctionality o f  texts is, according to Hatim and Mason (1990:138), the 
rule rather than the exception, and “any useful typology o f  texts will have to be able to 
accommodate such diversity" (1990:138). They argue that all attempts to set up a 
typology o f  texts presents the same problems: classifying texts “according to criteria 
such as 'fields o f  discourse' alone amounts to little more than a statement o f  subject 
matter [...] . Defined in this way, text type, like register, is so broad as to have no 
predictive value [for translation]" (1990:138). At the same time, when trying to 
“narrow the focus o f  description, w e run the risk o f  ending up with virtually as many 
text types as there are texts" (1990:138). In order to overcome these issues, Hatim and
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Mason look at text types from the translator's point o f  view and examine “the ways in 
which context determines the focus o f  any given text" (1990:138). A text type is then 
a “conceptual framework which enables us to classify texts in terms o f  communicative 
intentions serving an overall rhetorical purpose" (1990:140). Given this idea, Hatim 
and Mason -  borrowing from Werlich^ -  propose this classification:
a) the argumentative text type, having as a contextual focus the evaluation o f  
relations betw een concepts;
b) the expository text type, having as a contextual focus either the 
“decomposition (analysis) into constituent elements o f  given concepts, or their 
composition (synthesis) from constituent elements" (1990:154-5). There are 
two important variants o f  this conceptual exposition: descriptive and narrative 
texts. Description deals with 'objects' or 'situations', “while narrative texts 
arrange 'actions' and 'events' in a particular order" (1990:155);
c) the instructional text type, having as a focus the formation o f  future behaviour. 
Two sub-types emerge here: instruction with option and instruction without 
options. Among the former are advertising and consumer advice and among 
the latter contracts and treaties.
According to Reiss, a classification o f  text types is the starting point o f  a process 
towards a functionally equivalent TT. In the phase o f  “verbalization" -  which follows 
the phase o f  analysis -  functional equivalence is usually sought. According to Reiss 
“the text type determines the general method o f  translating; the text variety demands 
consideration for language and text structure conventions" (Reiss 1981:175). Two 
objections can be made here: the first from the point o f  view o f  purpose (or as
will be discussed in section 2.2.3). The general method o f  translating can be 
determined by the text type only if  constancy o f  functions is assumed. Secondly, 
hybrid texts -  which are the “norm" -  do not seem to be accommodated in this 
perspective.
As far as informative texts are concerned, the contents conveyed in the ST should also 
be conveyed in the TT. “To this end it may be necessary that what is conveyed
 ̂ Werlich (1976) had outlined five text types: descriptive, narrative, explanatory, argumentative and 
instructive.
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implicitly in the SL text should be explicated in the TL and vice versa" (Reiss 
1981:175). This need may arise from structural differences in the languages involved 
and “from differences in the collective pragmatics o f  the two language communities 
involved" (Reiss 1981:175). The example Reiss gives for this explication is a French 
report by a French press agency about the presidential elections in France: “seulement 
huit départements français votèrent en majorité pour Poher". As put by Reiss, a /frera/ 
Germ an translation could be “N ur acht aller franzôsischen Départements stim m ten in 
ihrer Mehrheit fur Poher". But, an eg'wzva/gMr rmWafroM could be: “Nur acht (Ter 
hundert franzôsischen Départements stimmten in ihrer M ehrheit fur Poher” (Reiss 
1981:175; emphasis in the original).
Given the focus o f  this study, Reiss' prescriptions for the expressive type o f  language
have no relevance here and will be om itted.
As far as operative STs are concerned, “the contents conveyed in the TL must be 
capable o f  triggering o f f  in the TL reader impulses o f  behaviour analogous to those  
triggered in the ST reader (Reiss 1981:178). This triggering o f  behaviour can apply to 
those legal texts with persuasive elements (c f  section 2.1 above). In the section 
below, legal texts are set in the perspective o f  text types and genre.
Texf (ypgj" (ZM(7 m re/art'oM /o /gga/
Nida argued that identity o f  responses in ST and TT readers is never achievable, for 
“interlingual communication always implies some differences in cultural setting, with 
accompanying diversities in value systems, conceptual presuppositions, and historical 
antecedents" (1976:64). Legal texts are bound to their own cultures, in that they 
belong to a legal framework which has very often developed over centuries and can 
present the translators with the problem o f  transmitting the intended information in an 
adequate way for a reader o f  (possibly) another culture, according to the purpose o f  
translation. In chapters 4 and 5 whether and how some translators solve such problems 
by adopting a functional strategy will be analysed. A s a first step, this section focuses 
on text type and genre in relation to legal texts, and to judgments in particular.
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Reiss includes laws and contracts in her informative text group (Reiss 1976:9-10; 
Reiss and Vermeer 1984:208-9), but is challenged on this by Sarcevic, who queries 
whether all special-purpose texts are informative (Sarcevic 1997:7). According to 
Sarcevic, regulatory instruments (laws and contracts) are conative (also known as 
operative) and make frequent use o f  the imperative (1997:10). Regarding judgments, 
Way-Yee (2006:558) writes that the language o f  a judgment “is characterized by a 
straightforward description o f  facts and arguments o f  points o f  law" where the use o f  
archaic or metaphorical expressions is inappropriate. He probably refers to Common 
Law judgments. W ay-Yee argues that the language used in judgments is mainly 
expressive and informative in function (2006:558), probably making reference to 
Jakobson's “expressive" function rather than to Reiss' classification: as noted above, 
the Russian scholar calls expressive (or emotive) the function o f  language which aims 
a direct expression o f  the speaker's attitude toward what he is speaking about" 
(Jakobson, 1987:66), while Reiss calls “expressive" the text type wich communicates 
artistically organized content.
In Section 2.1 a descriptive-prescriptive classification o f  legal texts was mentioned. A  
parallel can be drawn, as far as legal texts are concerned, between the purpose o f  
descriptive texts and the function o f  informative texts (the reader is informed), and 
between the purpose o f  prescriptive texts and the function o f  the operative ones (the 
reader is urged or required to do something).
2.2.3 Translation typology and Skopos
Whilst functional equivalence is normally sought between ST and TT, there can be, 
Reiss points out, cases in which a “translation typology" replaces a “text typology", in 
other words, where the aim and the recipient o f  a translation is different from those o f  
the ST : “the criteria [for translation] are not to be derived from the question 'to what 
end and for whom has the text been wr/rte»', but from the question 'to what end and 
for whom is the text (Reiss 1981:178; emphasis in the original). This
question has been analysed by Vermeer -  and then by Reiss and Vermeer in 1984 -  
who introduced the term purpose, in relation to translation.
15
However, Nida had already (1976) underlined the importance o f  the purpose for 
which a translation is intended, particularly in relation to what he calls its adequacy: 
“the relative adequacy o f  different translations o f  the same text can only be 
determined in terms o f  the extent to which each translation successfully fulfils the 
purpose for which it was intended" (Nida, 1976:64). Following on his own “dynamic 
equivalence"^, Nida claims that the “relative validity" o f  each translation should be 
judged on the response that the receptor has to its message (in terms o f  both form and 
content) in comparison with the author's intended response by the original audience 
and the latter's actual response (Nida, 1976:64). Reiss also proposes her typology and 
associated translation approaches as a means o f  evaluating TTs. As noted above, Nida 
claims that identity o f  responses is never achievable because o f  “differences in 
cultural setting, with accompanying diversities in value systems, conceptual 
presuppositions, and historical antecedents" (1976:64). We will return to these 
differences in cultural setting when dealing with lexicon, especially in section 2.5.
Introducing a perspective into translation studies beyond the textual level, Vermeer 
developed further the idea o f  purpose: translation is an action and as all actions it has 
an aim, a purpose (1989/2004:227). Skopos and mode o f  realization should be agreed 
with the client who commissions the translation and the result is what he calls a 
rmWartzzM, i.e. “the resulting translated text, as a particular variety o f  target text" 
(Vermeer 1989/2004:228). The “pn/MûTAy aim ('skopos') o f  translating is to design a 
target text capable o f  functioning optimally [...] in the target culture" (Vermeer 
1998:50; emphasis in the original). The optimum result depends on the translator's 
subjective estimate. If the translation should convey information, “there is no sense in 
translating a text (almost) literally/'faithfully' in the traditional sense if  this procedure 
prevents an adequate way o f  transmitting the intended information" (1998:51). It is 
the translator who should determine what is considered adequate according to the 
function o f  the translator.
With the functional perspective, attention has turned towards the explanation o f  
translation decisions; consequently, the “expertise and ethical responsibility o f  the
D ynamic equivalence describes “the principle o f equivalent effect” as “the relationship between 
receptor and message should be substantially the same as that which existed between the original 
receptors and the message” (Nida, 1964:159).
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translator have come to the fore. Translators have come to be viewed as target-text 
authors and have been released from the limitations and restrictions imposed by a 
narrowly defined concept o f  loyalty to the source text alone" (Schaffher, 1998:238). 
Apparently sharing the view o f  an enhanced role for the translator, Garzone argues 
that the translator “is no longer considered as a passive mediator, but rather an 
intercuhural operator, whose choices are increasingly recipient-oriented, being based 
not only on strictly linguistic criteria but also on extra-linguistic considerations, first 
and forem ost the function o f  the translated text in the target culture" (2000:1-2).
The functionalist approach is not universally welcom e, however. N ew m ark 
(1990:106), perceiving the risk o f  restricting the range o f  interpretation o f  the TT in 
relation to the ST, argues that if  a translator has a purpose, this may limit the 
translation procedures. According to Mason (2000), the skopos theory does not 
describe satisfactorily the relationship existing between the various participants in the 
act o f  com m unication that translation represents, i.e. the producer, translator and 
target text receiver. How he looks at this relationship and widens the idea o f  skopos 
are analysed in the next section.
2.2.4 A udience design in translation
Mason (2000) adds a pragmatics perspective to the skopos theory and redefines it. In 
order to do so, he starts from tw o “premises". The first one derives from  G rice’s 
Cooperative Principle, according to which people communicating make assumptions 
on each other’s behaviours in order to have an effective and efficient com m unication. 
In similar ways, a TT reader m akes assum ptions about the ST, “including the expected 
and the unexpected, adherence to norms and motivated departures from norms, and so 
on" (2000:2), given that translation is nothing else than a communication act, as 
purported by skopos theorists. “Receivers o f  a translation w ill assume, in the absence 
o f  evidence to the contrary, that what is communicated is rooted in a source text in 
some principled way" (2000:2).
The second premise is the difference which Toury makes between the “use" o f  the TT 
in the target environment and the “function" it w ill have in the same environment in 
semiotic terms, “by virtue o f  the network o f  relations it enters into" (1995:12).
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According to Mason, “Tonry’s view  o f  the status o f  the target text as a sign, 
interacting with other target language signs, is loosely related to the notion o f  socio- 
textual practices the intertextually recognizable genres, discourses and text types 
sanctioned by a given cultural community" (2000:2). Given these premises, he 
suggests a wider view  o f  the translator’s skopos:
* action in relation to the end-user (^o/zdrgMz) and end-use;
* action in relation to the other (or participants in the
professional activity), also governed by the co-operative principle;
* action in relation to socio-textual practices prevalent in both the source and target 
language communities. (Mason, 2000:2-3; emphasis in the original)
The problem  that rem ains to  be solved is establishing for w hom  the TT is intended 
and tor what purpose (2000:4). The notion o f  audience design (Bell, 1984) can -  
always according to Mason -  help examine the various categories o f  text receivers. 
The speaker (T' person) is the primary participant at the moment o f  speech (Bell, 
1984:159) and designs his/her style for his/her audience. The 2"  ̂ person is the 
addressee, the 3"̂  ̂ persons are the auditor, the overhearer and the eavesdropper. 
Speakers “design their style for their audience" (Bell, 1984:159), and their style will 
be influenced by the addressee more than by the auditor, by the auditor more than by 
the overhearer and not at all by the eavesdropper. Audience roles can be distinguished 
“according to whether or not the persons are known, ratified or addressed by the 
speaker" (1984:159). The is known, ratified and addressed. are
present but not directly addressed; they are known and ratified though. Overhearers 
are known to be there by the speaker, but are not ratified participants. Eavesdroppers 
are not known to be present.
In translation, the categories do not change, but o f  course the identities o f  the text 
receivers can change radically. The translator will adopt a style which he/she 
considers adequate for his/her addressee, but his/her translation style w ill be highly 
unlikely to be influenced by an unexpected category o f  receiver (Mason, 2000:5). The 
problem with this model o f  audience design, though, is that it is more appropriate for 
speech events. Building on Bell (1991), Mason points out that “whereas audience 
design in face-to-face communication is largely responsive (we accommodate to 
addressees on the basis o f  feedback received from them), in forms o f  remote
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communication such as broadcasting and writing the design will be in itiative (we 
make assumptions about the likely needs, responses, etc. o f  our readership)" (2000:6; 
em phasis in the original). In the latter case, audience design will involve adopting a 
stance and then assumptions which underlie such a stance. Mason suggests to add 
another group to the categories o f  receiver, the referee group, defined as "any third- 
party group (or discourse community) whose attributes, including their speech/writing 
style, are valued by either the addresser or the addressee or both" (2000:6). This 
referee group "may be a social group to which the addresser (and/or addressee) either 
belongs (in-group) or does not belong (out-group)" (Mason, 2000:6). I f  a wider- 
defined Skopos includes audience design as interaction between participants, 
including reader response, then "the brief for the job and the translator's perception o f  
the role the target text is to play within a target textual world" will play an essential 
part (Mason, 2000:6). This is how Mason sees the translator' design in this new, 
wider, skopos:
The translator's overall design -  as distinct from that of the producer o f the 
source text -  will normally consist of judgements concerning how the target text 
is to position itself vis-à-vis the socio-textual practices of the target culture and/or 
judgements concerning values from the source text, especially those which are 
unexpected/marked and which are deemed relevant to the communicative event 
in which he or she is involved. In sum, therefore, while audience design will 
regulate the interpersonal dimension of meaning, socio-textual practices (genre, 
discourse and text type) will regulate the intertextual dimension. (Mason, 2000:6)
Often, "according to their skopos, translators will wish their output to conform to the 
expectations o f  users; in others the skopos will seek to preserve elements o f  source 
language cultural and socio-textual practices (Mason, 2000:18). Always according to 
Mason, this new model applies to "diverse text forms and a diversity o f  translation 
situation" (2000:19). The translation situation depends on the translation brief: 
according to Christiane Nord (2006) the purpose o f  the TT should inform the 
translation process and the brief should "contain as much information as possible 
about the stuational factors o f  the prospective TT reception, such as the addressees(s) 
or possible receivers, time and place o f  reception, intended medium, etc." (Nord,
2006:11). Particularly important is the "information about the addressees (socio­
cultural background, expectations towards the text, the extent to which they may be 
influenced, etc.)" (Nord, 2006:11).
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Text genre and types for translation purposes, Vermeer's skopos and M ason's wider 
perspective on skopos have been the subject o f  the last sections. Cohesion and 
explicitation are important aspects o f  "textuality" and will be useful to analyse 
judgments. They will be discussed in the next section.
2.2.5 Translation, cohesion and explicitation
Cohesion, defined by Blum-Kulka as "an overt relationship holding between parts o f  
the text, expressed by language specific markers" (1986:291). According to Halliday 
and Hasan (1976) cohesion can be realized through the grammar or through the 
vocabulary by a number o f  ties that bind a text: reference, substitution, ellipsis, 
conjunction and lexical cohesion. These ties are not merely formal relations, but rather 
create a semantic relation which creates unity in the text and which in turn contribute 
to the coherence o f  the text (Halliday and Hasan, 1976:6).
Equally important for this research are changes in cohesive patterns or "shifts" in 
cohesion from ST to TT, which can produce explicitness, or explicitation, another 
feature o f  some translated judgments in the corpus, as w ill be detailed in Chapter 4. 
When a translator makes explicit in the TT what is only implicit in the ST performs a 
technique called explicitation. The "process o f  introducing information [ ...]  present 
only implicitly in the source language, but which can be derived h"om the context or 
the situation" (Vinay & Darbelnet 1958:8). The same concept is later explored by 
Nida (1964), who does not use the term "explicitation", but "addition". There a 
number o f  additions, according to Nida, among which are "amplification from implicit 
to explicit status". Amplification occurs when "important semantic elements carried 
implicitly in the source language may require explicit identification in the receptor 
language" (1964:228).
Blum-Kulka writes that shiAs in types o f  cohesive markers used by translators can 
affect translations in one or both o f  the following directions:
a. ShiAs in levels of explicitness; i.e. the general level of the target texts' textual 
explicitness is higher or lower than that of the source text.
b. ShiAs in text meaning(s); i.e. the explicit and implicit meaning potential of the 
source text changes through translations. (Blum-Kulka, 1986:291)
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As iàr as the first shiAs are concerned, according to Blum-Kulka (1986), these can be 
dictated by grammar differences between SL and target language TL, by stylistic 
preferences for types o f  cohesive markers in the two languages or by constraints 
imposed by the translation process itself
The process of interpretation performed by the translator on the source text might 
lead to a TL text which is more redundant than the SL text. This redundancy can 
be expressed by a rise in the level of cohesive explicitness in the TL text. [...]
This argument may be stated as V/ze exp/zczra/zoM which postulates
an observed cohesive explicitness Aom SL to TL texts regardless of the increase 
traceable to differences between the two linguistic and textual systems involved. 
(Blum-Kulka, 1986:292; emphasis in the original)
According to Seguinot (1988), Blum-Kulka's thesis is useful, but there are several 
problems with it: first o f  all, the definition is too narrow because "explicitness does 
not necessarily mean redundancy" (Seguinot, 1988:106). Besides, always according to 
Seguinot, "languages are inherently explicit or implicit in the kinds o f  information 
they convey" (1988:108): the term "explicitation" should therefore "be reserved in 
translation studies for additions in a translated text which cannot be explained by 
structural, stylistic, or rhetorical differences between the two languages" (1998:108). 
So, there is explicitation in a translation only if  there is the possibility o f  a 
grammatically correct but less explicit or less precise version. "This is the only way to 
distinguish between choices that can be accounted for in the language system, and 
choices that come about because o f  the nature o f  the translation process" (1998:108), 
for example in connection with the readers' assumed knowledge and/or purpose o f  
translation. Explicitation in Seguinot's sense (not system-induced shiA) will form an 
important part o f  the analysis o f  Chapter 4.
The fact that cohesion creates the semantic unity o f  the text is particularly relevant for 
this research, in so far as it w ill be shown to interlink with "moves" in the 
macrostructures o f  judgments as highly conventionalised texts. Among the types o f  
cohesion, it may be useful to concentrate on ellipsis Aom a grammatical point o f  view. 
Ellipsis is in fact one o f  the cohesive ties used in French judgments. Halliday and 
Hasan describe ellipsis as "something leA unsaid" (1976:142). However, this does not 
imply that what is "unsaid is not understood; on the contrary, 'unsaid' implies 'but 
understood nevertheless', and another way o f  referring to ellipsis is in fact as
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SOMETHING UNDERSTOOD, where understood is used in the special sense o f  
'going without saying'" (Halliday and Hasan, 1976:142; capital letters and emphasis 
in the original). H ere again H alliday and Hasan underline how language "does not 
function in isolation; it functions as TEXT, in actual situations o f  use. There is always 
a great deal more evidence available to the hearer for interpreting a sentence than is 
contained in the sentence i t s e l f  (1976:142; capital letters in original). How translators 
react to ellipses and whether the "unsaid" is indeed always "understood" across 
languages will be one o f  the objects o f  this study, in particular in relation to the sub- 
corpus o f  French judgm ents in C hapter 4.
Explicitation has been referred to as a shiA above. The term "shiAs" was used for the 
first time in translation studies in Catfbrd's seminal 1965 study TTzeoz}; q /
TTürWaAoM. At the basis o f  Catfbrd's idea o f  translation shiAs is his distinction 
between fbrmal correspondence and textual equivalence: a fbrmal correspondent is 
"any TL category (unit, class, element o f  structure, etc.) which can be said to occupy, 
as nearly as possible, the 'same' place in the 'econom y' o f  the TL as the given SL 
category occupies in the SL" (1965:27), while a textual equivalent is "any TL text or 
portion o f  text which is observed on a particular occasion [ ...]  to be the equivalent o f  
a given SL text or portion o f  text" (1965:27). This distinction is important because it 
underlines the difference between system  and use.
Catfbrd's classification o f  shiA types (level shiAs and category shiAs) deals mainly 
with systemic differences between SL and TL. Other definitions and studies on shiAs 
seem to be more relevant to this thesis.
Popovic subsequently distinguishes betw een constitutive and individual shiAs: the 
fbrmer is described as an "inevitable shiA that takes place in the translation as a 
consequence o f  differences between the two languages, the two poetics and the two 
styles o f  original and translation" (1976:16), while individual shiAs can be considered 
as "deviations motivated by the translator's expressive propensities and his subjective 
idiolect" (1976:16). Popovic deals mainly with literature, but his definition o f  shiAs as 
"all that appears as new with respect to the original, or fails to appear when and where 
it might have been expected" (1970:79) can be applied to the corpus analysed in 
Chapter 4.
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Bakker, Koster & Van Leuven-Zwart (1998:228) found two relationships in Popovic's 
definition: one between the ST and TT (what is new in the TT with respect to the 
original) and one between the TT and its reception in the target system ("where it 
might have been expected"), where a "zero-shiA established at specific textual and 
linguistic levels in the source/target-text relationship (i.e. an instance o f  invariance, 
where nothing new appears) may still be interpreted as a shiA in terms o f  [ ...]  [the 
second relationship]" (1998:228), because "by violating the expectations o f  the target 
system, a target text may acquire a function other than that fulfilled by the source text 
in the source system" (1998:228). So-called "new" elements in the TTs with respect to 
the STs will also feature in the corpus analysis in Chapter 4.
Another seminal work dealing with translation shiAs is Vinay and Darbelnet's ^  
q/TreMc/z (1958). Although they did not use the term
"shiA", their translation "procedures" have had a big influence in translation studies 
and will be discussed in section 2.5.4.
2.3 M oves and m acrostructures o f judgm ents
As stated by Reiss, the patterns o f  language and conventions can vary substantially in 
different countries (see Reiss above on text variety). This is what happens in 
judgments, as w ill be illustrated later, because judgments are Fachtexte, as defined by 
Stolze: "Neben streng konventionalisierten Textfbrmen sind Axierte Makrostrukturen, 
wiederkehrende Textbausteine oder Standardfbrmeln zu beachten, denn sie erfullen 
die Erwartungsnormen seitens der Adressaten" (Stolze 1999:133) ("As well as 
rigorously conventionalized text fbrms. Axed macrostructures, recurring "text building 
blocks" or standard fbrmulas should be observed, because they satisfy the norms 
expected by the addressees")^.
Befbre looking at the macrostructure o f  judgments in the countries which are relevant 
fbr the corpus analysed in chapters 4 and 5, it can be useful to introduce Swale's 
moves. Swales (1981, 1990) analysed introductions to academic articles in order "to 
account fbr the rhetorical movement" (1990:140) in that genre. He detected some
 ̂ All back translations o f quoted material are mine, unless otherwise indicated.
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structural units, i.e. blocks o f  text, typical o f  that particular genre, each o f  which 
serves a particular communicative function. Swales called these discourse "moves", 
and also detected a number o f  "steps" within each move. He created a 4-m ove model 
(1981), which he then modiAed (1990) to a 3 -move model called CARS (Create a 
Research Space). The CARS model illustrates the typical cognitive structure o f  
introductions to research articles. The following Agure reproduces the 3 -move model.
Move 1 : Establishing a Territory
Step 1 : Claiming Centrality 
and/or
Step 2: Making Topic Generalisations 
and/or
Step 3: Reviewing Items of Previous Research
Move 2: Establishing a Niche
Step lA: Counter-claiming 
or
Step IB: Indicating a Gap 
or
Step 1C: Question Raising 
or
Step ID: Continuing a Tradition
Move 3 : Occupying the Niche
Step lA: Outlining Purposes 
or
Step IB: Announcing Present Research
Step 2: Announcing Principal Findings
Step 3: Indicating Research Article Structure
Figure 2.1 Swales’ CARS model for article introductions
The model proved to be inAuential and the moves have been used by other scholars to 
identify discourse units in other genres. Particularly interesting fbr this research is the 
study by Bhatia (1993:118-36), who analysed the m oves o f  English legal cases, as w ill 
be discussed in the relevant sections below (2.4.2 and 2.4.4). In Chapter 4 the typical 
m oves o f  French and Canadian judgments in translation will be identiAed.
The fbllowing table, taken Aom Stolze (1999), gives some examples o f  different 
macrostructures in judgments pronounced in different countries.
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T able 2.1 Typical macrostructures found in French, Italian, German and English judgments 
(Stolze 1999:170).
French judgments
a. Preamble; b. Elements of facts; c. Reasons 
fbr judgments; d. Decision.
Italian judgments
a. Preamble; b. Findings; c. Summary of the 
proceeding; d. Reasons for the judgment; e. 
Decision.
German judgments
a. Preamble; b. Decision; c. Elements of facts; 
d. Reasons for the judgment.
English judgments (England and Wales) 
AAer a preamble there is no typical 
structure. The Court is not obliged to give 
reasons fbr the judgment. The decision is at 
the end (conclusions), as in French and 
Italian judgments and unlike in German 
judgments.
French judgments show a particular macrostructure, also used in Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Finland, Portugal and Spain" (Sarcevic, 1997:123): judgments are 
form ulated in one sentence, in a form o f  a syllogism  (m ajor prem ise + m inor prem ise 
+ conclusion). Each point o f  the reasons is introduced by the conjunction aAeWzz grwe 
in the higher courts and qzze in the lower courts. The judgments issued in
France will be the subject o f  the next section (2.3.1). The fbllowing sections w ill deal 
with judgments issued in other countries.
2.3.1. The m acrostructure o f  French judgm ents
A judgment is an elaborated monologue, a written expression o f  the judge's thought 
(Cornu, 2005:335). There are as many types o f  discourse in judgments as there are 
courts issuing such judgments: Cozzr Cozzr Caxj^a/zbzz, Cozz.yez/ etc.
But there is a common model in those judgments where there is a decision on a 
dispute, w here le juge tranche en fait et en droit le litige de deux adversaires 
présents" (Cornu, 2005:336; emphasis in the original) ("the judge rules on the 
dispute betw een the tw o involved parties as far as the facts and the law are 
concerned"). The judges' language is a meeting between facts and law:
Dans le discours du juge, viennent aussi nécessairement au contact l'un de 
l'autre, le fait et le droit, le particulier et le général, le concret et l'abstrait. Le 
jugement est le lieu de leur rencontre : c'est un passage, et même un va et
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vient, de l'un à l'autre. Son caractère composite [...] met [...] à rude épreuve la 
concision de l'énoncé. La nécessité de se justiAer en fait et en droit y introduit 
plusieurs langages, celui du fait, celui de la preuve, celui du droit et celui de 
la logique. (Cornu, 2005:334; emphasis in the original)
(In the discourse of the judge the fbrmer and the latter come into contact with 
each other - facts and law, the particular and the general, the concrete and the 
abstract. A judgement is where they meet: it is a passage, backward and 
forward, from the one to the other. Its composite character [...] puts the 
concision of the utterance to the test. The need to give justiAcations on facts and 
law introduces different languages, that of fact, that of evidence, that of law 
and that of logics.)
There is a difference between those parts o f  a judgment in which facts are examined -
i.e. evidence, veriAcation o f  documents, accounts -  and those in which the court 
examines the legal arguments. The language is different: the fbrmer will be made o f  
common language, while the latter will be more specialised, closer to the language o f  
(French) statute laws. And indeed this latter part will include quotations o f  statutes. 
The judge will write, conventionally: “attendu qu ’il résulte des dispositions de l'article 
X ..."  and so will “say^°" which is the applicable rule fbr the fact which (s)he has 
ascertained among the facts/evidence/documents put befbre him/her by the parties. In 
other cases, the court may have to interpret the law.
So, a judgment is a monologue, but has a dialogic function as an answer to the parties' 
requests. The answer is o f  course written by the judge, but so are the parties' questions 
(claims, counterclaims, etc.), in a way, because they are incorporated in the judge's 
answer (Cornu, 2005:336). In the recent judgments (aAer the Aowveaw Co&  
fmcéüfwrg C/v/7g was adopted), the distinction between question and answer is 
clearer, highlighted by titles: “I. -  Faits de la cause; IL -  Etat de la procédure ; III. 
Prétentions et moyens des parties; suivent ensuite le raisonnement de la juridiction 
('Sur quoi', 'le tribunal ou la Cour') et le d ispositif ('par ces motifs')" (Cornu, 
2005:336). In parts I and II verbs are at the past indicative (paxxé z/Mpa/ybA)
(Cornu, 2005:337). In tradAional judgments the structure is less clear, even though the 
question usually com es befbre the answer.
This is the meaning o f  the French expression /e
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The parties' answers are reformulated by the judge, so that (s)he can sum up the 
arguments on which (s)he w ill give his/her judgment, the essence o f  the dispute, “c'est 
l'énoncé du problème à résoudre, l'exposé de l'objet du litige" (Cornu, 2005:339).
Thus, aAer the parties' questions, there is the judge's answer, introduced by “sur quoi, 
la Cour....". The answer is composed o f  the reasons fbr the decision (zMorf/x) and the 
decision itself ((/zjpoxAz/). The fbrmer justify the laAer. The latter -  introduced by the 
fbrmula f a r  -  completes the reasoning (Cornu, 2005:341).
To go back brieAy to Reiss' text types (see 2.2.2 above), according to Cornu, the 
mo/z/ÿ aim at explaining and persuading, so they can be classiAed as infbrmative and 
operative. But they also narrate action and events, so can be considered to be 
expository in nature (Hatim and Mason, 1990).
As already explained above, the zMo/z/ÿ are introduced by aAeWzz qzze or cozzĵ zùfez-aM/
que. Each one o f  them introduces “a unit o f  thought" (Cornu, 2005:342) within the 
line o f  reasoning which leads to the decision.
One important signal is the aAezzz/zz preceded by the mazx (“but"). The zMaz.y aAezẑ /zz 
qzze introduces the court's argument, as opposed to the questions by the parties. 
Everything which fbllows contains the judge's thought (Cornu, 2005:344). In Chapter 
4 the translation o f  these signals w ill be analysed.
In the final part, the dispositif, all verbs are at the present indicative, third person (the 
subject being always the CouA), in the active voice (Cornu, 2005:348). Here the Court 
applies the general (the statute laws) to the particular (the case put befbre the Court) 
(Cornu, 2005:349).
As already discussed, the judgment is organised as a syllogism: the premises are the 
main elements o f  the case and the law which applies to them. The conclusion is the 
decision.
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2.3.2. The m acrostructure o f  English judgm ents
Just as in France, the English judge gives his/her decision and explains how and why 
(s)he has reached that decision. But (s)he has to follow no structure o f  the kind which  
Courts use in France. Indeed, the judicial language is “the closest approximation to 
everyday speech o f  all public legal discourse, [ ...]  is usually reasonably Aexible and 
varied but nonetheless containing recognizably legal meanings, in predictable patterns 
o f  lexicogrammar" (Maley, 1994:13). There are different premises or bases on which  
legal arguments are developed, sometimes pressed by counsel. “A number o f  judges 
may com e to the same conclusion, but by different reasoning processes; or they may 
come to entirely different conclusions. [ . ..]  One shared tradition o f  com m on law 
judgments, whatever their jurisdiction, is the zWzvWW tenor o f  judgments^'" (Maley, 
1994:44; emphasis in the original).
It should be born in mind that the Common law systems are largely based on 
precedent judicial decisions, so judges who pronounce a judgment, particularly 
appellate judges, “have in mind a wider audience than the individual litigant in the 
case befbre them" (Maley, 1994:44). What they write can and w ill be read by fellow  
judges, sometimes fbr centuries, so judges want to be careful and explicit. When they 
decide which principle o f  law should be applied they also reveal “the reasoning 
processes by which they have com e to that decision. Judgments serve both a 
declaratory and a justiAcatory function" (1994:44).
Bhatia sees in English judgments more than a “structure potential" (Maley, 1994:44);
he identifies a “typical cognitive structuring which accounts for the structural 
interpretation o f  the case" with the fbllowing moves and sub-moves:
1. Identifying the case
2. Establishing facts of the case
3. Arguing the case
(a) Stating history of the case
(b) Presenting arguments
(c) Deriving ratio decidendi
4. Pronouncing judgment (Bhatia 1993:127)
11 “W hat the individual tenor means in practice, is that there may be as many as five full, i.e. lengthy 
judgments delivered fbr a case on which a bench o f  five judges has sat, usually as a higher appellate 
court. Each judge gives his opinion as to what the correct principle o f law is fbr the case, as well as an 
account o f  his reasoning; a majority verdict prevails" (Maley, 1994:44).
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This cognitive structuring will be applied to some judgments in the corpus in Chapter 
4 in order to detect their moves.
Maley indirectly agrees with Bhatia in recognising that, even i f  English judges do not 
have to follow Axed structures, none the less “all judgments share a set o f  structural
elements, and therefore can be said to have a generic structure potential
[...]”(1994;44), which he summarises as:
Facts, an account of events and/or the relevant history o f the case;
Issued, either of fact or of law or both;
Reasoning;
Conclusion, the principle or rule declared applicable fbr the instant case;
Order or Finding (Maley 1994:44)
M aley writes that all these elements are obligatory, partially contradicting what was 
stated by Stolze (see Table 2.1 above).
2.3.3. The m acrostructure o f  Italian judgm ents
The Code o f  Civil Procedure, section 132, prescribe the elements which judgments 
must have in civil proceedings. B elow  is the original section in Italian with an English 
translation:
La sentenza è pronunciata in nome del popolo italiano e reca Pintestazione:
Repubblica Italiana.
Essa deve contenere:
1) f  indicazione del giudice che Pha pronunciata;
2) Pindicazione delle parti e dei loro difensori;
3) le conclusioni del pubblico ministero e quelle delle parti;
4) la concisa esposizione delle ragioni di fatto e di diritto della decisione; (2)
5) il dispositivo, la data della deliberazione e la sottoscrizione del giudice.
The English translation reads
Judgments are pronounced “In the name of the Italian people" and shall have the 
heading “Italian Republic".
A judgment shall include:
1) the name of the judge who pronounced it;
2 ) the names of the parties and their counsel;
29
3) the closing arguments by the public prosecutor and the parties;
4) a succinct exposition of the decision's reasons (facts and points of law);
5) the decision, the date of the decision and the signature of the judge.
In criminal proceedings, a similar prescription is given in section 546, Code o f
Crim inal Procedure:
1. La sentenza contiene:
a) I'intestazione “in nome del popolo italiano" e I'indicazione dell'autorità che I'ha 
pronunciata;
b) le generalità dell'imputato o le altre indicazioni personali che valgono a 
identiAcarlo nonché le generalità delle altre parti private;
c) I'imputazione;
d) I'indicazione delle conclusioni delle parti;
e) la concisa esposizione dei motivi di fatto e di diritto su cui la decisione è 
fbndata, con I'indicazione delle prove poste a base della decisione stessa e 
I'enunciazione delle ragioni per le quali il giudice ritiene non attendibili le prove
contrarie;
f) il dispositivo, con I'indicazione degli articoli di legge applicati;
g) la data e la sottoscrizione del giudice.
The English translation reads
The judgment shall contain:
a) the heading “In the name of the Italian people" and shall mention the authority 
which has pronounced it;
b) the personal particulars regarding the defendant or other personal indications 
that can identify him/her and the personal particulars of the other private parties;
c) the charge;
d) the closing arguments by the parties;
e) a succinct exposition of the reasons (facts and points of law) on which the 
decision is based with the indication of the evidence on which the decision is 
based and the reasons why the judge does not consider reliable the evidence to 
the contrary;
f) the decision, with the indication of the statute laws' sections which have been 
applied;
g) the date and the signature of the judge.
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2.3.4 The m acrostructure o f  Canadian judgm ents
Over the last 25 years the electronic publication o f  Canadian case law has become 
increasingly widespread. According to the Canadian Citation Committee:
the electronic publication of judgments offers clear advantages to courts, publishers, lawyers
and the public. It is characterized by:
Wider distribution;
More timely publication;
Reduced reproduction, distribution and storage costs;
Better information (better structured and with search and hypertext functions);
Facilitated citation.
[...] In order to make the most of these advantages, Canadian courts have adopted shared 
standards fbr preparing their judgments. Documents prepared in accordance with these 
standards will be easier to publish, and the courts, like others, will beneAt Aom reduced 
costs".
For these reasons, the Canadian Citation CommiAee (an ad hoc formed group) was entrusted 
by the Canadian Judicial Council and the Judges Technology Advisory CommiAee to prepare 
a “Canadian Guide to the Uniform Preparation of Judgments".
In the guide, “the data elements, e.g. judgment date, docket number, name of judge, are to be 
identiAed not by tags, but by a consistent set of signiAcant labels placed before them. Labels 
are natural words or expressions that allow any reader to recognize information. Many of 
these labels are already used by courts, but the lack o f uniformity compromises their 
effectiveness" (2 0 0 0 ).
The Guide (now at its second edition) has been published in English and French. It 
states that there are mandatory and optional elements in a judgment. In the tables 
below these elements are listed: tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the mandatory and optional 
elements respectively.
Table 2.2 Mandatory elements in Canadian judgments, taken from the Canadian Guide to the 
Uniform Preparation of Judgments (2002).
7,1 Najneofc©®* (none)
Cour Supérieure 
Canada
Province de Québec
7.2 Citation:/Référence : Citation: ÏJSCÀ 4Û2 orCitation; R v, Van M m m . 3002 NBCA 402
7.3 Datei/Date ;
7.4 Docket Dock9t:©ossier : Docket: C983U9
7.5 Re^tryi/OrefTe : Registry: Vancouver
7.6 Full style of cause
Between ;/Entre :o r 
Parties :iParties : 0 Î 
In the Matter of/Dans raffaire de
Between;
Her Majesty the Qmeen, Respondent 
-and—
Lang V an H guyen, Appelkni
7.7
Tramlalâm Fbtûe
(maïidâîoîy otdy if 
appBcabk)
[Official English transMbng 
/[Traduction française offick Be]
[Official English translation]
Translation certified true on thk 17* day of 
Februaiy 2000.
Maria Klein, revisor.
7,S
Publkftib» mtAWo*
nelke (mwWwy only 
ifap p i^ fe )
Restiiction on publication: 
/Publication restreinte :
Restriction on pübïkËion: The ptïbïïcation of these 
masons is prohibited until fW W  order and these 
: reasons are not to be delivered in open court.
7.9
ConectbmiMtkci
(mmdatotyonlyif
applicable)
Cone cted judgment:
/Jugement corrigé: or 
Revised judgment: 
/Jugement rectifié :
Revised Judgment;
The text of the judgment t e  been corrected
accordingly to the appended corrigendum (released 
Ncn/ember29,2001).
7.10 Nsmiek)hearijig Ike laafter
(any consistent W  m e m m ^ lè e l  
deemed appropriate by the court, e.g. 
“Judge “Coram:’̂
7u%e; W(J. Quinn, Maskr in Chmnlkrs or 
Coram; Justices Morden, Cartly and Moldaver 
JJ.A.
Table 2.3 Optional elements in Canadian judgments, taken from the Canadian Guide to the 
Uniform Preparation of Judgments (2002).
Sectr î2êmtn1’sN iw ft Label (EnglisMRteRch)
8.1
Dates a M flte e  of
heaA i^aM oA er
dates
(any label that differentiates it from 
the judgment date)
Appeal heard on October 6, 7 and 19^% in 
Vancouver, B.C.
Written reasons: January 11,19%
8.2 Case O l iv e r  judteial Mstei)
On appeal from J in  appel (il :
or
On judicial review from:
/En révis ion j udiciah'e de :
On appeal from; A convkton for first degree 
murder by Justice James M. Doamly, with a jury, 
dated January 31, 2001 (2001 BCSC 34, Docket: 
CC981332, Registry: Vamrowei).
8.3 DiqiBsîëom
Held:/Arrêt :
; or
‘ Disposition:/Diflposftif ;
Held: For the reasons given, the appeal is dismissed 
with costs.
(any consistent # d  meaningful Reasons for iud?ment
8.4 Reasons heading deemed appropriate by the 
court)
|or
1 By the Court:
8.5 Names of ceuwel
Appearances:/©»! comparu. : or 
Solkitors:/Procureure : or 
Counsel :/Avo cats ;
: Appearances:
: Mr, Robert W. Smith, For the Appbcwt
: Mr. Marcel Trudel For the îtepondent
8.6 Appendices ; Appendix M:/Annexe : 
or Schedule M :
: Appendix A: RxJribit #3
8.7
Coi'er and baekinf 
sheets (none)
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The labels in these tables help identify the m oves and submoves in Canadian 
judgments, which will be helpful in the analysis o f  the sub-corpus o f  Canadian 
judgments in Chapter 4.
After discussing the m acro structural m oves o f  judgments issued in countries relevant 
to this research, w e now look at judgments in translation.
2.4 Translating judgm ents
Poon W ay-Yee suggests that translators o f  legal texts, in addition to the contextual 
meaning, should keep the “grammatical and stylistic pattern o f  the source text as 
closely as the semantic and syntactic structures o f  the target language allow" 
(2006:560). The literal approach, according to the Chinese scholar, “is still the 
guideline fbr the translation o f  the legal argument and the rules o f  law in a judgment. 
Ambiguities must be retained fbr accuracy and flexible interpretation. The facts o f  a 
case is a more direct part that resembles everyday language, and a more idiomatic 
approach can be used [ ...] . [In this case,] plain language should be used" (Poon Way- 
Yee, 2006:566). One can argue that whereas the literal approach can be effective in 
certain contexts, it cannot be applied universally, as the fbrmal correspondence that a 
literal approach involves may not reveal to the TT reader what can be implicitly 
transmitted to the ST reader when reading the text, as discussed above when dealing 
with explicitation.
The transmission o f  meaning does not depend solely on the TT, but also on the TT 
reader. Gémar (2002) discusses how the legal knowledge o f  the reader will affect his 
understanding o f  the text and how the text will “speak to him" (2002:168) and gives a 
description o f  fbur different readers' pro Ales:
1) le lecteur profane peu ou prou lettré ; 2) le lecteur lettré (« l'honnête homme 
ou femme » du xviiie siècle) ; 3) le juriste praticien (les gens de loi) ; 4) le savant 
(théoricien, comparatiste, entre autres).
Selon que le texte juridique sera lu par l'une ou par l'autre personne de telle ou 
telle catégorie, sa teneur juridique sera plus ou moins bien saisie, mais le 
fondement culturel (ou socio culturel), sauf exception, en échappera en quasi- 
totalité au lecteur de la première catégorie ou en partie au lecteur de la deuxième 
catégorie, voire de la troisième (Gémar, 2002:168).
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(1) the hardly literate or illiterate reader; 2) the literate reader (the xviii century 
“honest man or woman") ; 3) the law practitioner (the law people) ; 4) the wise 
man (theoretician, comparatist, among others).
Depending on whether the legal text will be read by one or the other person 
belonging to one of these categories, its legal content will be more or less 
grasped, but its cultural (or socio-cultural) basis, without exception, will be 
almost completely missed by the readers in the Arst category, partially by the 
readers in the second category and even in the third.)
Also, the “category" o f  target reader in the TT can be different Aom that o f  the TT. A  
text originally written fbr a solicitor can be translated fbr a layman. Although it w ill 
still be a legal genre, the register will change. Stolze calls these two types o f  
communication “fachinterne Kommunikation" and “fachexteme Kommunikation" 
(Stolze 1999:131). In the first case, the skopos o f  the translation is to keep the same 
communicative function in a similar situation^^; in the second type o f  communication, 
the “interested layman" will beneAt Aom a transfer o f  knowledge, once the language 
barrier has been overcome'^. The importance o f  the translation purpose is also 
underlined by Margaret Marks -  herself a translation teacher -  in an essay about 
translation courses taught at German universities. Marks (1997) argues that more 
infbrmation should be given to students translating judgments. Is the client British or 
American? Is the client familiar with the case, the German Court system? Is the text 
fbr an English-language legal periodical? She argues that
Such information would affect the wording of the translation, the amount of 
explanation given, the formality of the language. As it stands, the usual practice 
is to translate into fairly fbrmal legal English, but in such a way than an English 
reader with no knowledge of German law can understand the text (Marks 
1997:online).
The same kinds o f  briefs would also inAuence o f  course a translation process o f  a 
professional. We will see in Chapters 4 and 5 how the purpose o f  the TT, sometimes 
different Aom the purpose o f  the original judgment, can inAuence the translation.
“Bei der fachinternen Komm unikation unter Experten eines Faclis w ird eine Ûbersetzung meist zu 
dem Zweck angefertigt, dass sie in der Zielsprache die gleiche (oder eine ahnliche) kom m unikative 
Funktion in einer vergleichbaren Situation erfullen soil w ie der Ausgangstext Flier dient die 
Ûbersetzung nur zur Uberwindung der Sprachbarriere zwischen AS-Textsender und ZS- 
Textempfanger, zwischen denen sich die Kommunikation abspielt" (Stolze 1999:126).
“Hier sind adaquate Û bersetzung gefordet, wenn die Inform ationslücke zwischen Fachwelt und 
interessierten Laien im Sinne eines Wissenstransfers und itber Sprachbarrieren hinweg geschlossen  
w erden soil. W enn die Forder un g nach V erstandlichkeit von Texten erhoben wird, geht es m eist um 
fachexteme Kommunikation" (Stolze 1999:131).
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This first part o f  the Literature Review has dealt with macrostructure, the theme o f  the 
first Research Question o f  this thesis, i.e.: what happens to the macrostructures o f  
judgments in different translation scenarios? Judgments often exhibit conventionalised  
moves: are these kept in the target texts (TTs)? The second part o f  this chapter deals 
with lexical incongruency, the theme o f  the second Research Question and introduces 
the two scenarios which will help to And an answer to both Research Questions.
2.5 Culture and lexical incongruency
M ost o f  the literature on legal translation deals with lexicon. The reason fbr this 
interest is that legal systems often do not match and so terms which in one language 
express certain legal concepts do not have a lexical equivalent in another language to 
express similar concepts.
According to Eco (2003:40), a “language associates different fbrms o f  expression to 
different fbrms o f  content". Sometimes, he writes, the different languages (and 
cultures) partition the continuum -  everything which is thinkable and classiAable -  in 
different ways, which are “incommensurable" (2003:40), as shown in Table 2.3, in 
which Eco borrows and adapts a Agure o f  Hjelmslev's (1961:54)
T able 2.3 illustrates an example o f lexical incongruency across fbur languages given by Eco 
(2003:40).
albero arbre Baum tree
legno bois Holz timber
bosco
Wald
wood
fbresta fbrêt fbrest
In explaining this lack o f  one-to-one correspondence, Eco writes:
It is difAcult to translate the French “hois". In English it could be “wood" 
(corresponding to the Italian “legno" and to the Italian “bosco"), “timber" or even 
“woods", as in “walk in the woods". In Italian “legno" is both “wood" and 
“timber", although “legname" could be used for “timber". In German the French 
“bois" can be “Holz" or “Wald", but the same “Wald" translates “fbrest", 
“fbresta" and “fbrêt". (Eco 2003:41)
Eco adds that such realities are incommensurable, but comparable, “otherwise we 
could not draw" the diagram at all (Eco 2003:41). In describing this 
incommensurability, Hjelmslev and Eco elaborate on Saussure's m ge/zem/
Hjelmslev used the same example (wood) with different languages -  Danish, French and German.
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(1916). According to Sassure, intact, “la pensée est comme une nébuleuse 
où rien n'est nécessairement délimité. Il n'y a pas d'idées préétablies, et rien n'est 
distinct avant l'apparition de la langue" (1916/1968:155). So, according to Hjelmslev, 
language sets limits and boundaries along a continuum o f  thought which would 
otherwise be indistinguishable. For many different reasons, each culture and the 
language produced by such culture Ands its own way to do this and stresses different 
factors in what Hjelmslev calls the “thought-mass" (1961:52) “in different 
arrangements, puts the centers o f  gravity in different places and gives them different 
emphases. It is like one and the same handful o f  sand that is formed in quite different 
patterns, or like the cloud in the heavens that changes shape in Hamlet's view" 
(Hjelmslev, 1961:52). On the same lines, Sapir warns that “no two languages are ever 
sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The 
worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world 
w ith different labels attached" (1949:162). The “conceptual fields w hich reAect the 
divisions imposed by a given linguistic community on the continuum o f  experience" 
(Baker, 1992:286) are often called semantic Aelds.
The presence o f  two distinct worlds, as suggested by Sapir, is one reason why  
translators And that there may be a lack o f  lexical counterparts^^ when translating. 
Differently put, there may be a lack o f  lexical equivalence when translating Aom a SL 
to a TL because the two cultures which have produced those languages are different. 
One difAculty, however, is that culture itself is difAcult to deAne, or rather that there 
are so many different deAnitions o f  it, as discussed by Katan (2004), who quotes one 
o f  the most famous o f  these deAnitions, given by English anthropologist Edward 
Barnett Tylor: “Culture is that com plex whole which includes knowledge, belief^ art, 
morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a 
member o f  society" (1871/1920:1), and indeed the interest o f  this discussion fbr this 
research is o f  course that law can be considered an integral part o f  culture. When 
Katan proposes his own deAnition, he does it in terms o f  a shared model or map o f  the 
world, with a main fbcus on “'what goes without being said' and the 'normal'. This 
'normal' model o f  the world is a system o f  congruent and interrelated beliefs, values, 
strategies and cognitive environments which guide the shared basis o f  behaviour. Each
As used by Peter Newmark (1988:94): there is a “lexical counterpart" when there is a one-to-one 
equivalent in the TL fbr a SL word.
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aspect o f  culture is linked in a system to form a unifying context o f  culture, which 
then identiAes a person and his or her culture" (2004:26). The competing deAnitions 
o f  culture can be represented as “hierarchical Aames or levels, each one (to some 
extent) embedded within larger Aames" (2009b:70). The levels are based on Hall's 
Iceberg Theory (1952/1990) and -  just like an iceberg -  include visible and invisible 
parts. From the tip o f  the iceberg downwards, there are different logical levels, 
dividing what is visible, sem i-visible and visible (Katan, 2009a:78). What is not 
visible is “progressively closer to our unquestioned assumptions about the world and 
our own (cultural) identities" (Katan, 2004:78-9). The levels also represent the 
different ways in which culture is learnt: “technically, through explicit instruction; 
formally, through trial-and-error modelling; and informally, through the unconsciuous 
inculcation o f  principles and world views". (Katan, 2009b:70). In the Arst “technical" 
level or Aame, at the tip o f  the iceberg, the fbcus is on the text and “language signs 
have a clear WYSIWYG (what you see is what you get) referential function, and any 
associated hidden values are 'universal'. [ ...]  [The translator should] transfer the 
terms and concepts in the source text abroad with minimum loss [ . ..]  so that 'what 
you see' in the source text is equivalent to 'what you see' in the target text (Katan, 
2009a:79). At this level, the main concern fbr translators is the translation o f  “culture- 
bound" terms or “culturemes", i.e. “fbrmalized, socially and juridically embedded 
phenom ena that exist in a particular form or function in only one o f  the tw o cultures 
being compared" (2009a:79). The second level, the “fbrmal" one, fbcuses on what is 
normal or appropriate. The notion o f  culture here is that o f  a “predictable pattern o f  
shared practices which guide actual (technical level) language use, fbr example 
culture-speciAc genre preferences, prototypes and schemata, or even simply 'good  
style' (2009b:72). The third level is called “infbrmal" or “out-of^awareness": here 
“there are no fbrmal guides to practice but instead unquestioned core values and 
beliefs, or stories about se lf and the world. As such, culture, inculcated, fbr example, 
though family, school and the media, becomes a relatively Axed internal 
representation o f  reality [ ...]  which then both guides and constrains an individual's 
orientation in the real world" (Katan, 2009a:83-4). This is a shared map or view o f  the 
world, a which “orients individual and community ways o f
perceiving and doing things" (2009a:84). This level o f  culture inAuences the relations 
between the individual and the group. The translator should mediate between different
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perceptions, because in translating “a new text will be created which will be read 
according to a map or model o f  the world, through a series o f  different set o f
perception Alters" (Katan, 2009a:78-9; emphasis in the original).
According to Bassnett, even a global product such as “butter" can be perceived very 
differently across different cultures:
Following Saussure, the structural relationship between the signiAed or
concept of butter and the signiAer (iyzgMz/zaMZ) or the sound-image made by the 
word constitutes the linguistic sign 6 wZZgr. And since language is perceived 
as a system of interdependent relations, it fbllows that ùzzZZgr operates within 
English as a noun in a particular structural relationship. But Saussure also 
distinguished between the syntagmatic (or horizontal) relations that a word has 
with the words that surround it in a sentence and the associative (or vertical) 
relations it has with the language structure as a whole, [...j 6 wZZgr in British 
English carries with it a set of associations of whole-someness, purity and high 
status (in comparison to margarine, once perceived only as second rate butter 
though now marketed also as practical because it does not set hard under 
reAigeration).
When translating into Italian there is a straightforward word-for-word
substitution: butter— Both /iMZZgr and describe the product made
Aom milk and marketed as a creamy coloured slab o f edible grease for human 
consumption. And yet within their separate cultural contexts 6 wZZgr and 
cannot be considered as signifying the same. In Italy, ùw/ro, normally light 
coloured and unsalted, is used primarily for cooking, and carries no associations 
of high status, whilst in Britain ùz/ZZcr, most often bright yellow and salted, is 
used fbr spreading on bread and less Aequently in cooking. Because of the high 
status of ùwZZer, the phrase aW  ÙMZZgr is the accepted usage even where the 
product used is actually margarine. So there is a distinction both between the 
signiAed by 6 wZZer and and between the/wMcZzoM va/zze of those 
objects in their cultural context. The problem of equivalence here involves the 
utilization and perception of the object in a given context. The 6 wZZgr— 
translation, whilst perfectly adequate on one level, also serves as a reminder of 
the validity o f Sapir's statement that each language represents a separate reality 
(1980/2002:28; emphases in the original).
For this reason Bassnet warns that just as the surgeon who operates on the heart
“cannot neglect the body that surrounds it, so the translator treats the text in isolation
Aom the culture at his peril" (1980/2002:23).
The reason why translators are faced with the two different maps o f  the world when 
dealing with legal texts is that those different values and perceptions described by 
Katan can feed into legal systems. An example could help clarify how culture can help 
shape law and so legal language. In an interview broadcast on Italian television
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(Gratteri, 2010), an Italian public prosecutor dealing in particular with the maAa, 
Nicola Gratteri, spoke about maAa “inAltrations" into Germany. Some Italian 
criminals were “exporting" typical maAa criminal behaviours into Germany. Mr. 
Gratteri gave an account o f  a meeting he had had with a German colleague, in which 
he suggested Germany adopt telephone tapping, a measure which had proved very 
effective in Italy to investigate those kinds o f  crimes. The Italian police were able to 
arrest a conspicuous number o f  criminals after over-hearing their telephone 
conversations. The German colleague said that although he could understand the logic 
o f  telephone tapping, it was not possible to adopt such a measure in Germany: the 
German people had still sad memories o f  the Third Reich first and the GDR later, 
when many people were spied upon. They were aAaid o f  an Orwellian, Big Brother- 
style society and could never accept that the police could listen to their conversations. 
This can be considered a good example o f  how a particular PFe/ZaMj'c/zawMMg (infbrmal 
level o f  culture) -  w hich orients individual and com m on ways o f  perceiving things -  
can inAuence legal systems.
Legal systems regulate the lives o f  people in a community and aim at avoiding and 
settling conAicts w ithin that com m unity. The differences in the ways these system s 
are organised constitute cultural gaps. Gémar (2002:165) stresses how cultural gaps 
are challenging fbr translators, in that “on pense, et cette intuition est souvent avérée, 
que plus une culture est éloignée de celle du traducteur, plus celui-ci aura de la 
difAculté à la faire passer dans son texte d'arrivée" (“It is thought, and this intuition 
often proves to be the case, that the further a particular culture is Aom that o f  the 
translator, the more the translator will struggle to convey this culture in the target 
text").
Lexical incongruency -  with which translators are conAonted when dealing with 
incommensurability and with lack o f  lexical counterparts -  is in fact one o f  the biggest 
challenges o f  legal translation, although certainly not the only one.
2.5.1. Functionality - A useful concept
One can wonder, however, whether this idea o f  incommensurable but comparable 
entities is indeed applicable to legal systems, which most o f  the time are a product o f  a
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country's culture'^. It seems unlikely then that we could consider that different legal 
systems partition a continuum -  the sam e continuum -  just as different languages do, 
as in the example o f  wood/bois/H olz/etc. given in table 2.3 above, because law and 
the organisation o f  social relationships is a human construct, unlike trees or clouds.
However, a concept developed in comparative law,^McZzoMa/z(y, seems to form a link 
between the two constructs. The concept o f  functionality, described by Zweigert and 
Kotz in their Zo CozMpamZzve Taw, is “at the basis o f  the creation o f
comparative law. [ ...] .  Incomparables cannot usefully be compared, and in law the 
only things which are comparable are those which fulAl the same function" (Zweigert 
and K otz 1998:34). Accordingly, the starting point o f  this concept is what every 
comparatist learns: the legal system o f  every society has to deal essentially with “the 
same problems, and solves these problems by quite diffèrent means though very often 
with similar results" (Zweigert and Kotz 1998:34). So, legal concepts which could be 
dissimilar in different legal systems or peculiar to a system can actually be compared 
i f  “posed in purely functional terms" (Zweigert and Kotz, 1998:34). Rather than trying 
to investigate if  a particular legal system has a particular concept such as those which 
in German are referred to by the terms Tarez-ùj^cAq/z and Adc/zez-ùj^c/zq/Z or how the 
same legal system regulates these matters, “one should try to And out how the foreign 
law sets about satisfying the wish o f  a testator to control his estate long after his 
death" (Zweigert and Kotz, 1998:34-35).
Another example given by Zweigert and Kotz o f  how comparatists should look at 
concepts in different legal systems relates to another German concept, namely PFeg/a// 
(Tez' ĝz"ezc/zez%zzzg (§818 par.3 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch). Although this is a concept 
which is unique to the German legal system according to Zweigert and Kotz, “all 
systems must resolve the conAict which arises when a person who is bound to restore 
a thing received under an invalid contract no longer has the thing to restore. One must 
never allow one's vision to be clouded by the concepts o f  one's national system, 
always in comparative law one must fbcus on the concrete problem" (1998:35). The 
expert comparatist should not, they maintain, look fbr “the rule they want only in the
They are not -  for instance -  when they are “im ported" from or imposed by a different country or in 
cases in which bodies o f  legislation are adopted at a supranational level.
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place in the foreign system where their experience o f  their own system leads them to 
expect it", or they would be unconsciously looking at the problem “with the eyes o f  
their own system" (1998:35).
In the two examples above, fbr instance, a comparatist should apply the principle o f  
functionality by adopting a negative and a positive tactic: the negative to eradicate the 
preconceptions o f  his native legal system and the positive, which tells us which areas 
o f  the fbreign legal system to investigate in order to And the analogue to the solution 
which interests him and And in a fbreign system the rules which are 
eqw/va/ezzZ to those which interest him in his native law (Zweigert and Kotz, 1998:35; 
em phasis added). A nother exam ple w hich springs to m ind is the concept o f  
“reasonableness" in English Law, which is not easily translatable in, say, Italian Law. 
But Italian Law has a concept which can probably be used as a functional equivalent, 
i.e. the Dz/zgezzza zfe/ ùzzozz jpazfz-e z/zyhzzzzg/za, derived Aom Roman Law (Bozzzz.y jpaZez- 
ẑzzzVzaj )̂, the diligence a good father would use in a range o f  circumstances. We w ill 
come back to functional equivalents later, on a different level.
A third example chosen by Zweigert and Kotz to illustrate how a comparatist should 
study different legal systems can help us to identify another aspect o f  lexical 
equivalence. The example they give is “statutory representative", which is a concept 
developed in Civil Law countries. Civil Law being a general term fbr those legal 
systems drawing a substantial part o f  their principles Aom Rom an law. The “statutory 
representative" is someone who helps “persons incapable o f  acting fbr themselves 
(minors, lunatics, persons under interdict) to participate in legal affairs" (Zweigert and 
Kotz, 1998:37) Aom the day a child is born. Common Law know s no such institution. 
I f  an infant needs make a claim, “he does so through a person appointed by the court 
fbr this purpose, called his next Aiend" (1998:37). I f  a child is sued, in the same way  
the Court appoints a guardian W  /zZezzz. If a minor becomes entitled to an estate, the 
court may appoint an “administrator zfzzz-azzZe aeZaZe". In other circumstances, the court 
itself “assumes powers o f  representation which in the normal case it later transfers to 
others" (Zweigert and Kotz, 1998:37).
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In the above example we see that the conceptual Aeld which in Civil Law is referred 
to by the term “statutory representative" is partitioned by Common Law into separate 
concepts. It could be argued that the continuum is the same, and statutory 
representative seems to be the lexical counterpart o f  different institutions o f  the 
Common Law, as illustrated in the fbllowing Table 2.4:
T ab le  2.4 illustrates how  Civil Law  and Comm on Law  partition the concept o f  “statutory 
representative” in different ways (based on Zweigert and Kotz, 1998:37).
Civil Law Com m on Law
statutory representative
his next Aiend
guardian az/ /zZezzz
administrator zfzzrazzZe aeZaZe
court has powers o f  representation
What the consequences fbr translators are, how lexical incongruencies can be 
classiAed and what solutions can be fbund to these incongruencies w ill be the subject 
o f  the next sections.
2.5.2 C lassification o f incongruencies according to different scenarios 
As already discussed, translators o f  legal texts face the challenge o f  lexical 
incongruencies because, just as in Hjelm slev's analysis “the boundaries between the 
meanings o f  concepts o f  different legal systems are incongruent"(Sarcevic, 1997:232). 
In law objects, relations, acts, etc. are peculiar to a particular legal system. So, legal 
terminology o f  different systems is conceptually incongruent (Sarcevic, 1997:231-2).
Such lexical incongruencies can be classiAed according to two different scenarios 
faced by translators. They w ill also be useful fbr the analysis o f  the corpus in chapters 
4 and 5.
In this scenario a translator has to translate a ST written in a SL (A) spoken in a given  
country in which a legal system (1) is in place. The translator has to produce a TT 
written in a TL (B) spoken in a different country in which a different legal system (2) 
is in fbrce. Each national law has “its own terminological apparatus and underlying 
conceptual structure, its own rules o f  classification, sources o f  law, methodological
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approaches and socio-econom ic principles, makes it extremely difAcult -  in some 
cases impossible -  to achieve uniform interpretation and application in practice" 
(2000:5). Hence the lexical incongruencies, which can be divided into different types:
i) those fbr which a concept designated by a term in a SL corresponds to two or more 
concepts in the TL. For example, the French corresponds to two, more
specific concepts in German law, and (Sarcevic, 1997:232)
and the Italian avvocato encompasses the concepts o f  “solicitor" and “barrister" in 
English law;
ii) etymological equivalents (cognates) such as the French e/m/Z coMĵ ZzZzzZzoMzze/ and 
(7mzZ az/zMzzzzlyZraZz/̂  which do not correspond exactly to the English “constitutional 
law" and “administrative law" but which are usually translated as such, because any 
other translation “is simply unthinkable" (Weston, 1991:57);
iii) “system-bound" terms, such as “equitable estate" in England or aj .̂yoczazzoMe 
zMo/zoĵ a in Italian law: these do not have “comparable counterparts in other legal 
systems or families. This is because the actual object, relationship, action, or 
procedure does not exist in other legal systems. [ . ..]  System-bounds terms are 
Aequently regarded as untranslatable" (Sarcevic 1997:233). This position is indAectly 
challenged by Newmark, according to whom “everything without exception is 
translatable; the translator cannot affbrd the luxury o f  saying that something cannot be 
translated. [ ...]  ‘F oreign’ communities have their own language structures and their 
own cultures, ‘fbreign’ individuals have their own way o f  thinking and therefbre o f  
expressing themselves, but all these can be explained, and as a last resort the 
explanation is the translation" (Newmark, 1998:6). We will see an example o f  
explanation in 2.5.7 below, when some possible solutions to these incongruencies will 
be discussed;
iv) the case o f  some countries which have adopted parts o f  fbreign legal systems in 
what could be called transplants. These transplants, once in a fbreign legal system, 
seem to change or to adapt to the local law. Legal transplants have been defined as 
“the moving o f  a rule or a system o f  law Aom one country to another, Aom one people 
to another" (Watson, 1974:21). Turkey fbr example adopted and translated the Swiss 
5 "c/zwezzgnj^c/7e3  ̂Zzvz7ggj êZz6zzc/z (ZGB, Swiss Civil Code) almost word fbr word Aom 
German, but the interpretation o f  the Code in Turkish courts is different (Sarcevic, 
1997:232). In the same way, English legal concepts such as family, land, person, wife.
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child, provocation and reasonable changed their effective meaning -  that is to say the 
effects they produced -  when transposed from England to the developing systems o f  
Ah-ica(Sarcevic, 1997:232-3);
v) there are a number o f  "indefinite or vague terms, such as "the best interest o f  the 
child", "due care and attention" and good faith", which are easily translated and 
already exist in most legal systems, but are interpreted differently by courts o f  
different jurisdictions" (Sarcevic, 1997:232-3). The English "good faith", for example, 
do not correspond exactly to bona fides  in French and Germ an. A lthough they both 
contain the notion o f  fair dealing, they are different on a number o f  points (D e Cruz, 
1999:260):
(a) The English notion excludes negligence, but the continental view often regards 
gross negligence as the equivalent o f bad faith;
(b) The continental concept covers a wider field than the English version and 
includes confidential relationships and minimal standards of conduct expected of 
parties engaging in commercial transactions.
This means that a translator has probably no problems whatsoever in translating them, 
but the TT reader will certainly understand them  in a different w ay from the ST 
reader. In this category, Sarcevic includes some terms with high ideological content, 
such as "democracy" and "human rights", which may have different connotations in 
different countries. In the same category could be mrercerraz/oMz rg/e/ÔM/c/ze and 
(both "telephone tapping") which are perceived differently in 
different cultures (see 2.5 above).
Some o f  these types o f  issues can overlap: "solicitor" and "barrister", for example, can 
be said to be system-bound terms and transplanted terms can become cognates o f  
dissimilar meaning vis-vis the original terms. The second scenario offers some similar 
problems from a very different perspective.
In this scenario a translator has to translate a ST written in a SL (A) spoken in a given  
country in which a mixed legal system is in place. A mixed legal system means that 
the country is a federal state and that the different political territories (say, provinces)
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within the state have a different legal system in force. But the two systems are 
interconnected in the higher instances o f  justice, as typically happens in federal states, 
where higher courts have federal jurisdiction; so, for example, a judgment issued in a 
court having provincial jurisdiction (say, the Cowr rfg can be appealed in a
court having federal jurisdiction (the Supreme Court o f  Canada). In this scenario, the 
ST has been produced by a territory within the first legal system (la ) and the 
translator has to produce a TT written in a TL (B) spoken in a second territory in 
which a different legal system (lb ) is in force. This is the case o f  Canada, which is a 
federal state, is officially bilingual and is a two-system country. English is spoken in 
the majority o f  Canadian provinces; one. N ew  Brunswick, is officially bilingual 
(English- and French-speaking) and in one, Quebec, French is spoken. Quebec is 
different from the other provinces not only for the language, but also because it has 
adopted the so-called Civil Law, unlike the rest o f  Canada, which follows the 
Common Law.
Since 1969 the Canadian Parlament has given an equal status to the two official 
languages within the federal institutions. Since then the federal government, but also 
four provinces, Ontario, Manitoba, N ew  Brunswick and Quebec, translate all their 
laws and publish them in English and French. This means that some typical terms o f  
the common law have to be translated into French and some typical terms o f  the Civil 
Law have to be translated into English (Bergeron, 2000). This creates some problems 
when the conceptual fields do not match, as in the case o f  mortgage/Aypor/zgg'Mg and 
trust//?<7Mc/g (Bergeron, 2000:3). Gémar (2002:169) underlines a different issue: the 
term "personal property" can have five different normalised equivalents, according to 
location (Quebec, Ontario, Ottawa, New-Brunswick) and time (before or after a 
certain date).
Some theorists have tried to classify these incongruency problems by measuring the 
degree o f  equivalence o f  concepts across languages. In the next section w e w ill deal 
with some o f  these studies.
2.5.3 Identifying the problem s
The Internationales Institut fur Rechts- und Verwaltungssprache, a Berlin institute 
which is no longer active, suggested making a conceptual analysis o f  particular
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concepts in order to identity their characteristics and classifying them as either 
essential (essentialia) or accidental (accidentalia)^^. The same process is then applied 
to analyse the chosen corresponding concept in the target legal system. The final 
evaluation aims at matching up the characteristics o f  the two concepts. Alexander 
Lane, then Director o f  the Berlin W/frwr, explained that:
According to the definition given in the German standard DIN 2330, a concept is 
a unit of thought which combines within itself the properties and relationships of 
things (material and immaterial objects, situations and circumstances, events, 
actions, procedures, etc.). The properties and the relationships are called the 
characteristics of the concept. In the sphere of language a concept is identified by 
a term which may consist o f a single word or of a group of words or even of 
letters or graphical symbols (1982:par. 7).
In order to clarify the Institute's conceptual analysis. Lane gives the example o f  the 
concept o f  "appeal" in E n g l a n d ^ A  terminologist should analyse its conceptual
characteristics and then check w hether the same characteristics can also be assigned, 
say, to in Germany, in French and qpe/ac/oM in Spain (Lane 1982:par.
7). This is the method recom m ended in term inology to compare concepts w ithin and 
between languages. Also, it can be used in standardisation.
Distinction originally created by Dahlberg and discussed by Picht and Draskau (1985). According to 
Picht and Draskau, the classification o f the concepts' characteristics as and acc/dlg/iW/a is
flexible:
this classification permits greater flexibility, and there is no obstacle to the characteristic's altering 
status; for example, the concept "lawful wedded wife" has in marital law certain essential 
characteristics, which become accidental in the law o f inheritance, although the concept remains the 
same.
Lawful wedded wife (as heir) -  laws o f inheritance = essential
M arital laws =  accidental
(Picht and Draskau, 1985:48)
According to Lane, the conceptual characteristics o f APPEAL in English law are:
A. Legal proceedings aim ed at bringing about a complete or partial annulm ent or am endm ent 
o f  a judgment delivered by a court.
B. The effect o f  an appeal once it has been duly lodged is to
a. postpone the coming into force o f the judgment (suspensive effect), or
b. have the case sent to a higher court for a decision (devolutionary effect).
C. An appeal is directed against the actual findings and the legal conclusions o f  judgment.
D. To be valid, an appeal m ust adhere to certain formal requirem ents (it must be subm itted in 
writing to the proper court within a specified period o f  time: judex a quo or judex ad 
quem).
The entire case is tried again, both from the factual and the legal standpoint, in the court o f  appeal.
(1982:par.7)
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According to Lane, three cases can result from such an analysis:
a) all the essential features o f  the source concept match up with those o f  the 
chosen target concept and only a few o f  the accidental ones do not: the 
concepts are considered identical (labelled as in the bilingual dictionary). 
An example given by Lane is = "by(e) law" (Lane 1982:par.7);
b) most o f  the essential and only some o f  the accidental characteristics are the 
same: the concepts are considered similar (labelled as "±"). An example given  
by Lane is Ffr/MgMMa/Mg ±  "business name" (Lane 1982:par. 7);
c) the essential characteristics do not coincide: the two concepts are not 
equivalent (labelled as "9̂ "). An example given by Lane is
"third party cover". The terminologist, in this case, cannot limit her/h im self 
to telling the translator that a certain concept "in the source language does not 
exist in the target language, but [. . . ] must also tell him what word he should 
use instead, i.e. [. . . ] must at least suggest a translation. This provides the 
comparative terminologist with the opportunity not only to be analytical and 
descriptive but also prescriptive" (1982:par. 7)
This classification is challenged by Sarcevic (1997:238). Although she considers the 
Berlin Institu te’s guidelines to be valuable, Sarcevic does not accept the symbol =, as 
it is misleading, "since not all characteristics o f  the two concepts coincide" 
(1997:238). She uses the concepts o f  intersection and inclusion. Intersection occurs 
when A and B (being the source concept and the target concept) "contain common  
characteristics but also additional ones not shared by the other concept; inclusion 
occurs when concept A contains all o f  the characteristics o f  concept B plus one or 
more additional features" (Sarcevic 1997:238).
Based on the concepts o f  intersection and inclusion, Sarcevic proposes the following 
categories o f  equivalence for legal translators: "near equivalence, partial equivalence 
and non-equivalence, each o f  which includes both intersection and inclusion" 
(1997:238)'^. The maximum degree o f  equivalence is named near equivalence (- ) .
Felber (1984:152-6) had already enumerated different degrees o f  equivalency when comparing 
concepts for the purpose o f  preparing multilingual specialised vocabularies or thesauri: 1) exact concept 
equivalence: the individual objects have the same parts; 2) intersection: the individual objects A and B 
have only some parts in common; 3) superordination: the individual object A has at least one more part
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Near equivalence designates the relationship between two concepts sharing "all o f  
their essential and most o f  their accidental characteristics (intersection)" or the case in 
which concept A contains all o f  the characteristics o f  concept B and concept B all o f  
the essential and most o f  the accidental characteristics o f  concept A (inclusion)" 
(Sarcevic 1997:238). Near equivalence is illustrated in Figure 2.2 below:
Intel \ccuon Inclusion 
Figure 2.2 - N e a r  equivalence o f concepts (from Sarcevic 1997:238)
Very oAen (the majority o f  cases, according to Sarcevic), functional equivalents are 
only partially equivalent (±), i.e. when "concepts A and B share most o f  their essential 
and some o f  their accidental characteristics (intersection) or when concept A contains 
all o f  the characteristics o f  concept B but concept B only most o f  the essential and 
some o f  the accidental characteristics o f  concept A (inclusion)" (1997:238). To avoid 
any potential confusions, some specifications may be needed: in section 2.3 the 
functionalist perspective o f  Reiss and V erm eer and the related concept o f  functional 
equivalence were discussed, together with the concept o f  functionality by Zweigert 
and Kotz (section 2.5.3). Sarcevic defines "functional equivalent" in legal translation 
as "a term designating a concept or institution o f  the target legal system having the 
same function as a particular concept o f  the source legal system" (1997:236). For 
example, "if the translator is searching for the common law equivalent for the French 
concept o f  he/she should investigate how security is pledged for the
payment o f  a debt on land in the target legal system. This w ill bring him/her to the 
concept o f  mortgage. and mortgage are functional equivalents"
(1997:236). Partial equivalence is illustrated in Figure 2.3 below:
than B and 4) concept non-equivalence: the individual objects A and B have different parts. Felber had 
presented a graphical representation o f  the four degrees o f equivalence, quite similar to those prepared 
by Sarcevic and shown below. Comparison was based -  as in Sarcevic -  on the concepts' 
characteristics, the aggregate o f which is called intension.
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Intersecücm Inclusion
Figure 2.3 -  Partial equivalence (from Sarcevic 1997:238^°)
Finally, "if only a few or none o f  the essential features o f  concepts A and B coincide 
(intersection) or if  concept A contains all o f  the characteristics o f  concept B but 
concept B only a few or none o f  the essential features o f  concept A (inclusion), then 
the functional equivalent can no longer be considered acceptable” . This is w hat she 
calls non-equivalence (9 )̂, which can also designate cases o f  lack o f  functional 
equivalence "in the target legal system  for a particular source concept” , in w hich case 
there is an exclusion (Sarcevic 1997:239). Non equivalence is illustrated in Figure 2.4  
below:
ImersccdMi loclusiom Exclusion
Figure 2.4 -  Non equivalence (from Sarcevic 1997:239)
Most functional equivalents fall into the category o f  partial equivalents, which -  
according to Sarcevic (1997:241) is required for minimum acceptability^^ as 
translation equivalents.
Acceptability o f  a partial equivalent usually depends on context, may not be reciprocal 
(A may be acceptable to translate B, but B may be not acceptable to translate A)^  ̂ and
Figure 2.3 - as figures 2.2 and 2.5 - is taken from the quoted Sarcevic's book, but probably contains 
an error, in that the shading in the intersection is missing.
In that some “functional equivalents are always acceptable (near equivalence) or never acceptable 
(non-equivalence)" (Sarcevic, 1997:241)
It would be interesting to have an example o f  this, but unfortunately Sarcevic does not provide any. 
On the dangers o f bi-directionality o f  the entries in bilingual legal dictionaries De Groot & Van Lear 
warn that “because complete equivalence between terms o f  the source and the target legal system is 
rare, source terms and their proposed translations are very often not suited to reverse use. Reversing the 
functions o f  source terms and their partial equivalents, descriptions or neologisms will create false 
translation suggestions. Nevertheless there are some bilingual and multilingual dictionaries where (at 
least a part of) the translation suggestions and source terms are reversed in order to create a list o f  
translation suggestions for the original target language terms. This is a deadly sin for compilers o f  
bilingual legal dictimaries. The result is that these word lists are very dangerous to use because they 
contain words which are not used at all as legal terms in the legal system involved. This is because they 
began in the dictionary as neologisms in the original target language for terms o f the original source 
language" (2008:11-2).
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has to be judged upon "structure/ classification, scope o f  application and legal effects 
o f  both the functional equivalent and its source term" (Sarcevic 1997:242). 
Structure/classification means here the organisation o f  a given legal system. When a 
lawyer is confronted with a particular legal problem, (s)he automatically classifies the 
problem "as a matter o f  contract law, property law, procedure law e tc .. .[ .. .j  
classification serves as a catalyst to put the lawyers’ mind on the right track, calling up 
the related concepts and institutions involved in solving the particular problem" 
(1997:242-3). That is why terminologists "should not deal w ith isolated concepts but 
need to compare the conceptual structures o f  the functional equivalent and its source 
term by analysing the conceptual hierarchies to which each belongs" (Sarcevic, 
1997:243).
It is sometimes difficult to draw a line between the translator’s and the terminologist’s 
work. As translators rarely have the time to "do the research necessary to make 
reliable decisions about the degree o f  equivalence o f  functional equivalents [...], they 
should be assisted by a group or department o f  terminologists, preferably lawyer 
linguists who are able to conduct comparative law studies" (Sarcevic, 1997:237), but 
it is always the context which should guide the eventual translation choices after 
terminological research. And so it is the translator who has the last word in choosing 
the right term for an adequate translation.
Once again, the purpose o f  the TT is important to assess adequacy. I f  for instance, 
"divorce" has to be translated into another language, a solicitor may be interested to 
know what the differences are between the concept o f  "divorce" in English law and, 
say, that o f  in Italian law, maybe because (s)he has to prepare an appeal
against a divorce decree. So, in this case, a comparison o f  the two concepts’ 
characteristics may be useful. I f  the same concept is translated by that solicitor to 
his/her client, there will be not the need to establish such subtle distinctions.
2.5.4 Trying to solve the problem s
When a functional equivalent is inadequate (i.e., when one or more o f  its essential 
characteristics differ from those o f  the source term in all or some contexts), translators 
can sometimes compensate for the incongruency by using a number o f  strategies.
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Baker (1992:26-42) looks at different examples o f  these strategies in context. Among 
the solutions she describes are: a) Translation by a more general word (superordinate), 
very common for dealing with many types o f  non-equivalence; b) translation by a 
more neutral/less expressive word; c) translation by cultural substitution, choosing a 
target-language item which w ill have a similar impact on the target reader; d) 
translation using a loan word or loan w ord plus explanation: “Follow ing the loan 
word with an explanation is very useful when the word in question is repeated several 
times in the text. Once explained, the loan word can then be used on its own; the 
reader can understand it and is not distracted by further lengthy explanations" 
(1992:34). Different solutions are suggested by Sarcevic (1997:250): lexical 
expansion, descriptive paraphrases and definitions, borrowing and literal equivalents. 
As far as lexical expansion is concerned, Sarcevic explains how functional equivalents 
w hose sense is broader or narrow er than that o f  the source term may be extended with 
this technique: she gives the example o f  and “mortgage". As
applies only to immovables, there would not be an adequate equivalent for the 
common law term chattel mortgage. The solution in this case would be to add 
and have moBzYzèrg (1997:250-1).
Descriptive paraphrases and definitions are used mainly in the parallel texts o f  
multilateral instruments o f  international law. Famous is the case o f  originally 
translated into English as w z ^ /  z/zzj^coWwcr in Article 25 o f  the Warsaw Aviation  
Convention. The incongruency between dol and w z ^ / originated
conflicting judicial decisions in different countries and was later amended (Sarcevic, 
1997:150).
The original French version o f  the text was:
Le transporteur n’aura pas le droit de se prévaloir des dispositions de la présente 
convention qui excluent ou limitent sa responsabilité, si le dommage ofg .yozz üfo/ 
ou d’une autre faute qui, d’après la loi du tribunal saisi, est considérée cozzzme 
égzzzva/gMfe azz
It was originally translated into English as
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The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this 
Convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused Afr 
/MfrcoMofz/cf or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of 
the Court seized of the case, is considered to be ro
With the approval o f  the Hague Protocol o f  1955, lexical congruency was achieved by 
discarding both terms and mz\ycoWwc/) and explaining the concept o f  DOL 
in each version, i.e.:
Les limites de responsabilité prévues à The limits o f  liability specified in Article
l’article 22 ne s ’appliquent pas s ’il est 22 shall not apply if  it is proved that the
prouvé que le dommage résulte d ’un acte damage resulted from an act or omission
ou d’une omission du transporteur ou de o f  the carrier, his servants or agents
ses préposés fait, .yoz/ avgc / ’zfrrgAzrzoM ùfe wfr/z mrezi/ ro caẑ .yg &f/zzage or
provogfwer ẑ zz û ẑzz/zzagg, .yozY ozzûf wzY/z r/ze A?zow/eû^e r/zor c/ozzzage
/ézzzémzrezzzezzr er ovgc cozzjczezzcg ĝ zz wzz wozzM rgĵ zzfr; provided that, in
z/ozzz/zzogg ezz reâ zzfrez'o ĵ zz'oZzoB/ezzzezzr, the case o f  such an act or omission o f  a
pour autant que, dans le cas d ’un acte ou servant or agent, it is also proved that he
d’une omission de préposés la preuve soit was acting in the scope o f  his
également apportée que ceux-ci ont agi employment
dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions.
According to Sarcevic, examples o f  borrowing and literal equivalents are “trust’’ and 
“National A ssem bly’’ (for the French vf ĵ ĵ ezzzB/de Aafrozza/e), respectively (1997:150). 
But “trust’’ is not always left as it is in translations as a borrowing, as explained by 
Schwab (1982), who describes how the Common Law concept o f  “trust" was adopted 
in 1879 by Quebec, the French-speaking province o f  Canada regulated by Civil Law. 
The introduction o f  a Common law concept in a Civil Law legal system created an 
assimilation problem, because the concepts o f  “property" and /zz-opz-zéré are very 
different. The process o f  “naturalisation" also required the creation o f  an adequate 
lexicon, also because Civil Law already had its own institutions (such as “usufruit" 
and “substitution") which partially covered the semantic field^^ o f  trust. Schwab
See 2.5 above
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proposes some neologisms, derived from y?6/zzcze (for trust), such as /zz/wczer, yzz/zzczd, 
y/z/zzcfg/' and yzz/wczaMre.
Gémar goes back to the classic seven translation procedures by Vinay and Darbelnet 
(1958) and gives some examples o f  each: borrowing (e.g. 'Trust’, 'Common law ’, 
'equity’), caique ('Tribunal de première instance’/'Court o f  first instance’), literal 
translation^'^ ('Connaître d ’une requite’/'Take cognizance o f  an action’), transposition 
('in consideration o f / 'e n  contrepartie d e’), modulation ('Statuer, toutes affaires 
cessantes’/'postpone all other cases and give a decision’), equivalence ('siéger dans 
une affaire’/'sit in a case’) and adaptation ('statut d’une personne morale de droit 
privé’/ ' instruments constituting and regulating a legal person governed by private 
law ’).
2.6 Sum m ing up
The second part o f  the Literature Review has looked at lexical incongruency, the 
theme related to the second Research Question o f  this thesis: What happens if  a 
particular legal concept expressed in the source texts (STs) has no corresponding 
concept in the legal system o f  the target culture? H ow are lexical gaps dealt with in 
the context o f  judgments in different translation scenarios?
The translation challenges involved in the two Research Questions w ill serve as a 
basis to build the corpus o f  judgments to be analysed. The analysis w ill in turn try to 
answer the Research Questions. The processes o f  choosing the criteria for the corpus, 
building the sub-corpora and the methodology used for the analysis are described in
Chapter 3.
The difference between caique and literal translation is that the first introduces a new term into the 
TL, while literal translation chooses an existing term.
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Chapter 3 - M ethodology and Corpus material
This chapter describes the research questions and the rationale behind the design o f  
the study, including the structure o f  the corpus (3.1); the case studies and the way in 
which the sub-corpora were built (3.2) and the way in which the corpus was analysed 
(3.3).
3.1 The research questions and approach and the design o f the corpus 
This research project on the translation o f  judgments focuses on two main themes: 
macrostructures in translation and lexical incongruency. These themes are related to 
the research questions o f  the thesis:
a) What happens to the macrostructures o f  judgments in different translation 
scenarios? Judgments often exhibit conventionalised moves: are these kept in the 
TTs?
b) What happens if  a particular legal concept expressed in the ST has no 
corresponding concept in the legal system o f  the target culture? H ow are lexical 
gaps dealt with in the context o f  judgments in different translation scenarios?
The two scenarios investigated here are:
1. Two countries in which different legal systems are in force and two  
different languages are spoken: language A  into language B, legal system 1 
to legal system 2.
2. Plurilingual countries with a mixed legal system: language A  into language 
B, legal system la  to legal system lb.
More details about the scenarios and the languages presented in each case study w ill 
be given in section 3.3.
Pure"^  ̂translation research, according to Holmes, has two main objectives:
(1) To describe the phenomena of translating and translation(s) as they manifest 
themselves in the world of our experience, and (2) to establish general principles 
by means of which these phenomena can be explained and predicted. The two
Without any practical application outside its own terrain (Holmes, 1972:184)
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branches o f pure translation studies concerning themselves with these objectives 
can be designated descriptive translation studies (DTS) or translation description 
(TD) and theoretical translation studies (ThTS) or translation theory (TTh). 
(1972/2004:184)
Descriptive translation studies (DTS) follows an empirical approach, that is it 
observes and describes. According to Holmes, there are three major kinds o f  research 
in DTS: product-oriented DTS, function-oriented DTS^^ and process-oriented DTS^^ 
(1972/2004:184). Product-oriented DTS describes existing, individual translations, 
resulting in a text-focused translation description. This is the approach adopted for this 
thesis, which poses empirical questions about existing translation practice/products. 
The material on which this approach is based is a text corpus o f  judgments, designed 
to match the two scenarios outlined above in terms o f  genre and language 
combinations. Only “authentic data, as attested in texts, that is, instances o f  [ ...]  
written [ ...]  behaviour" (Kenny, 2009:59) are considered in this study: the analysis 
looks at the various translation challenges in context and with regard to the translation 
brief In order to answer the questions posed, a parallel corpus (Baker 1995) was built, 
i.e. a corpus o f  texts originally written in a language A together with their translations 
into language B in order to compare the STs and the TTs. A comparative approach -  
analysing several translations o f  the same ST (Holmes 1972:184) is not possible 
owing to a lack o f  sources.
3.2 Case Studies and the Design o f the corpus
The corpus has been designed following three criteria. The basic criterion is the genre 
o f  texts included: judgments and their translations. The second is the two scenarios 
already discussed in 3.1. For the first scenario, the judgments had to be issued by 
national courts and targeted through the translation at a different country; for the 
second scenario, the judgments had to be issued again by a national court and through 
the translation targeted at the same country. The third criterion concerns the languages 
chosen: the SL and the TL o f  the corpus had to be among the ones I can read more 
easily (Italian, English and French).
Interested in the description o f the function o f  translations “in the recipient socio-cultural situation: it 
is a study o f  contexts rather than texts" (Holmes, 1972:185).
Interested in the process or act o f translation itself, thus in w hat happens in the translator’s mind 
(Holmes, 1972:185).
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Each research question is looked at from the perspective o f  the two scenarios 
described in 3.1, leading to three sub-corpora for each research question i.e. a total o f  
six sub-corpora.
Each sub-corpus corresponds to what is here called a case study. Case study here 
means a given sub-corpus which is analysed in order to find which solutions have 
been found by the translators to a particular translation challenge already described in 
C hapter 2 and highlighted in the research questions. W hile the Literature Review 
describes how a translation challenge has been analysed in translation studies 
(sometimes with possible solutions), chapters 4 and 5 o f  this thesis focus on empirical 
data, showing how translators faced those particular challenges in a certain context 
and according to a certain translation brief Thus the analysis o f  the TTs takes into 
consideration the purpose o f  the TTs and the target readers. The advantages o f  small 
corpora, which allow whole-text reading have often been emphasised in pedagogical 
contexts, e.g. Ghadessy, A lex & Roberts (2001): given the comparatively small 
corpus, it was decided to perform a manual -  rather than a computerised -  processing 
o f  the data. The size o f  the corpus allowed a combination o f  a qualitative analysis and 
a quantitative analysis.
In order to build the corpus according to the chosen criteria, library- and Internet- 
based searches were the obvious starting points to gather judgments and their 
translations. It was soon apparent that most o f  the translated judgments remain in 
private drawers, on dusty shelves or rather on private hard disks: individuals or 
companies -  or their lawyers -  ask translators to translate judgments for different but 
almost always private reasons, so they do not have any interest in publishing the TTs, 
which o f  course can be costly. However, the Internet not only makes published 
translations more widely available, but also makes publication much cheaper, and so 
encourages people to post their translations on the WWW. But there must be a reason 
for doing so. The common reason for publishing the translated judgments which make 
up the corpus o f  this research is to inform a certain target readership which does not 
necessarily have linguistic access to to the original document o f  the judges’ decisions. 
The reason to inform people about these decisions and the target readers varies 
however, as will be detailed in the following section.
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Internet searches and crowd-sourcing (through proz.com in particular) were the most 
useful tools to gather information on the availability o f  translated judgments.
Figure 3.1 below details the case studies which are analysed in chapters 4 and 5 and 
the related sub-corpora. Also included are the sources o f  the sub-corpora, which are 
later described in more detail.
First Research Question
Case Study 1 (Scenario 1) 
M acrostructures of 
French judgm ents in 
translation F R — ► EN
Sub-corpora:
247 judgm ents issued by 
the C o u r  d e  C a s s a t io n  
(228 are taken from the 
Institute for T ranslational 
Law’s website and 19 are taken 
from the Queen Mary Case 
Translation Programme)
28 judgm ents issued by 
the C o u r  d 'A p p e l  
(taken from the Q ueen M ary 
Case Translation Programme)
Case Study 2 (Scenario 2) 
M acrostructures of 
judgm ents issued by the 
Court o f Q uebec in 
translation  
FR EN
Sub-corpus:
90 judgm ents issued by 
the Court of Quebec taken 
from the w ebsite o f  the Société
C ase Study 4 (Scenario 1) 
Translation o f T r ib u n a le  
and Pretura  
IT — ^^EN
Sub-corpus:
21 judgm ents issued by 
an Italian T r ib u n a le  or by 
Italian appellate courts, 
i.e. C o r te  d 'A p p e l l o  or 
C o r te  d i  C a s s a z io n e  
taken from the Queen Mary 
Case Translation Programme
C ase Study 5 (Scenario 2) 
Translation o f “Cour 
Suprêm e du Canada"
F R  ►EN
Sub-corpus:
50 judgm ents issued by 
The Supreme Court of 
Canada, taken from  a 
website called "Judgments of 
the Supreme Court of Canada’’
Case Study 3 (Scenario 2) 
M acrostructures of 
judgm ents issued by 
Canadian courts in 
translation (as a 
sum m ary)
E N — ► FR
Sub-corpus:
14 sum m aries taken from 
the website of the /tfsocfaZ/oM
TraMfOffg c/g /a Â oz/vg//g-
1 sum m ary taken from the 
website of the Cowg// afw 
staZwZ ( /g  / a  yg/M/Mg
Case Study 6 (Scenario 2) 
Translation o f “The 
Suprem e Court of British  
Columbia"
E N — ► FR
Sub-corpus:
1 judgm ent issued by The 
Suprem e Court of British 
Colum bia, taken from the 
website of the Cowg;/ (/w
ù(g /<3 /g/M/Mg
Second Research Question
Figure 3.1 The corpus
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As noted above, each case study/sub-corpus provides material for the analysis o f  two 
different translation challenges embedded in the research questions: macrostructures 
in translation and lexical incongruency. A s far as the first challenge is concerned, case 
study 1 covers the first scenario, while case studies 2 and 3 cover the second scenario. 
French (case study 1) and Canadian French (case study 2) judgments are analysed in 
English translation. Case study 3 does not deal with full TTs, but rather with French 
summaries o f  Canadian English judgments: during the search for the sub-corpus o f  
Canadian English judgments in translation, two different websites containing the 
French translation o f  some Canadian English judgments in the form o f  summary were 
found. The producers o f  the summaries (with whom contact was established) said that 
the b rie f had been to produce a sum m ary because -  it was thought -  a condensed TT 
would be more accessible and thus would have a bigger impact on a lay readership. 
The revised structure was thought to serve the purpose o f  disseminating knowledge 
more widely in the community.
The other three case studies -  4, 5 and 6 -  have to do with lexical incongruency. One 
common feature o f  the three studies is that they all focus on the names o f  courts. Case 
study 4 deals with the English translation o f  the name o f  two Italian courts; case 
studies 5 and 6 deal with the translation o f  the name o f  two Canadian courts (French 
into English for case study 5 and English into French for case study 6).
Two o f  the sources for the corpus are academic (The Queen Mary Case Translation 
Programme and The Institute for Translational Law), one is judicial (the Supreme 
Court o f  Canada), one is parliamentary (the National Assem bly o f  Quebec), one has 
been created by a lawyers’ association and the last one has been created by a Canadian 
association, the Cozzjgz/ z/w Azz/wr z/e /a  Fem/zze. Below are some details about the six 
sources o f  the sub-corpora.
T T z e  ^ z z e e z z  M c z z y  T r a z z j ^ / a / z o z z  F r o g r a z z z z z z e
The website o f  the Pace Law School Institute o f  International Commercial Law 
(http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/) has a database on the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale o f  Goods (CISG). The database contains many
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documents, including the text o f  the Convention itself in different languages, the name 
o f  the contracting parties and many more subsections.
An important part o f  the database, and certainly the most important for this research, 
is the Queen Mary Case Translation Programme, a transatlantic joint venture between 
the Institute o f  International Commercial Law at the Pace University School o f  Law 
and the Centre for Commercial Law Studies at Queen Mary, University o f  London. 
The reasons behind this project are explained in the next two paragraphs.
With a uniform international sales law in place (the CISG), jurisdictions around the 
world have felt the need to take into account sister ju risd ic tions’ rulings with a view to 
making Court rulings more uniform. Since 1996, the decisions o f  sister jurisdictions 
have been cited and taken into account in judgments all over the world, starting from a 
ruling by the TnBwzza/g Czvz/e c/z Czzzzeo, Italy, on 31 January 1996 in the case o f  
“Sport d'Hiver di G enevieve Culet v. Ets. Louys et Fils", which acknowledged two 
previous rulings, one by a Swiss judge and another by a German Court.
The inspiring principle o f  this translation project is that in order to consider decisions 
o f  other jurisdictions, courts must be able to access them. The I.I.C.L. o f  the Pace 
University School o f  Law, in collaboration with the C.C.L.S. o f  Queen Mary College 
o f  the University o f  London have thus decided to create the Queen Mary Case 
Translation Programme, which provides professional translations into English o f  
foreign case law relating to the CISG and UNIDROIT (International Institute for the 
Unification o f  Private Law) principles. The judgments are translated by lawyers from 
all over the world and translations are edited by Dr Loukas Mistelis, Clive M 
Schmitthoff Lecturers in International Commercial Law, C.C.L.S., Queen Mary, 
University o f  London, and Albert H. Kritzer, Executive Secretary, Pace University 
Institute o f  International Commercial Law.
Email contact was made with Dr Loukas Mistelis to ask about the purpose o f  the 
translations and whether any translation brief was given to the translators and the 
following answers were received: the purpose and the target readers o f  the translations 
were clearly explained on the website and no particular brief was given to translators. 
As far as the purpose o f  the TTs is concerned, it is certainly informative, while the
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target readers are certainly those judges who take decisions in their own jurisdictions 
and who wish to consider what fellow judges have decided in the past on similar
m atters in sister jurisdictions.
The website o f  the Queen Mary Case Translation Programme includes a link to the 
original judgment for each translation, providing access to the STs.
TTze /Mj-rfrzz/e ybr Trzzzzĵ Wzozza/ Taw
The Institute for Translational Law’s site
(http://w w w .utexas.edu/law /academ ics/centers/transnational/w ork_new /) contains the 
English translation o f  French, German, Austrian and Israeli legal materials in the 
fields o f  constitutional, administrative, contract and tort law. The French translated
decisions are the focus o f  case study 1.
On the website, mention is made that the
# The translations and other documents included in this site were prepared to 
assist students and teachers interested in foreign law. The collection makes no 
claim of being either complete or current, and should not be relied upon for the 
basis of a legal opinion or course of action without careful review of current 
applicable authority. Law changes rapidly. Cases and statutes may be modified, 
abrogated, overruled, or interpreted in a way that makes the posted cases out-of- 
date and legally incorrect.
# The translations have been made by various specialists in the field. There has 
been no attempt to create a uniform terminology or style throughout. In rendering 
the texts into English, the emphasis has been on readability, which means that the 
texts reproduced here could be described as 'free’ translations.
The purpose o f  these translations is therefore less clear than that o f  the translations 
posted in the Q.M ./Pace website. Email contact was made with Sir Basil Markesinis 
QC, Chairman o f  the Institute o f  Transnational Law and the person responsible for the 
website to ask about the purpose o f  the translations and whether any brief was given  
to the translators, but no reply was received. It can be assum ed neverthless that the 
purpose is informative; the target readers are students and teachers interested in 
foreign law, as mentioned on the website.
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There were no links to the STs, so the original judgments had to be searched one by 
one on the French website o f  the French Cour de Cassation 
(http://www.courdecassation.lf/).
.yoc/g/g zF/M/brzMa/zoMyzzẑ zf/zĝ zze
The 5'oczgré ĝ zzg/zecozĵ g z/Vzz/bz-zzzarzozz yzznWzg'zzg (http://soquii.qc.ca/) is an 
organisation promoted by the National Assem bly o f  Quebec. The website inlbrms
that:
The Court of Appeal of Quebec, the Superior Court of Quebec, the Court o f 
Quebec, the Human Rights Tribunal, the Professions Tribunal, the Ministère de la 
Justice of Quebec and the Société québécoise d'information juridique are pleased 
to offer unofficial English translations o f their selected judgments.
Any or all of these translated judgments may have been the subject of an appeal 
or judicial review. Further research is recommended to ensure that the legal 
information you obtain is accurate and up-to-date.
The purpose o f  the translation is assumed to be informative as w ell, because the 
translations are said to be unofficial. Email contact was attempted with the 5"oczgfg,
but no reply w as received.
The website includes judgments in both French (original) and English (translation), so 
it was easy to gather the STs and the TTs.
T W.yĵ oczarzozz yzzn.yrgj zFg:^rgj^Jzoz7yfazzçazj^g z/g /a /Vozzvg//g-Fcoj^j^g (AJEFNE)
AJEFNE aims at promoting legal knowledge among the Acadian and other French- 
speaking communities in Canada and to make these minorities more aware o f  their 
rights. In this perspective, the association has published a range o f  material on their 
website (www.ajefhe.ns.ca): statute laws, documents explaining different legal 
procedures and citizens’ rights and summaries o f  20 judgments. A total o f  14 o f  these 
20 summaries were analysed^^. Email contact was established with the producers o f  
the summaries, Nathalie Bordeau and Jeanne-Françoise Caillaud, who reported that 
the judgments were selected because they dealt with the rights o f  minorities. The 
purpose o f  the translation was to inform French-speaking minorities o f  their rights.
In section 4.2.2 the reason for omitting the remaining 6 Judgments is explained.
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The translation brief lor the TT producers was to produce summaries o f  the judgments 
rather than full translations because, as noted earlier, condensed translations were 
thought to better serve the purpose o f  disseminating knowledge in this case, especially 
to a largely lay audience.
The AJEFNE website did not include links to the original judgments, so the STs had 
to be searched one by one on the websites o f  the respective issuing courts.
Cozz.ygz7 z/w z/g /zz/gzMZMg
The CzzzMg/Z z/w .yrzz/zzr zfg /zz ygzMzzzg (http://w ww .csfgouv.qc.ca/) is a government 
consultation and study council aiming at promoting and defending the rights and 
interests o f  women in Quebec. The Czzzzĵ g// asked a translator to write a summary (in 
French) o f  a judgment issued in English by the Supreme Court o f  British Columbia. 
This judgment was analysed together with the summaries on the website o f  AJEFNE. 
Email contact was established with the producer o f  the French summary, Vincent 
Rochette, who reported that the translation brief from the Cozzĵ gz/ z/zz ĵ Wzzr z/g /zz 
femme was to produce a sum m ary rather than a full translation again because a 
condensed TT would in the Council’s view  help disseminate the information to a 
larger audience. The French translation o f  the judgment (as a summary) served to 
publicise a legal victory.
The website included a link to the original judgment.
Jzzẑ zzzgzzfĵ  zz/̂ f/zg 5'zzprgzzzg Czzzzr/ z:̂ Czzzzzzz/zz
The Supreme Court o f  Canada and the LexUM  laboratory at the University o f  
Montreal’s Faculty o f  Law together created a website where all decisions rendered by 
the Supreme Court o f  Canada since 1948 (and many rendered before 1948) are 
published (http://csc.lexum .um ontreal.ca/en/index.htm l). Decisions published in the 
Supreme Court Reports from 1970 to date are available in both English and French. 
Decisions published prior to 1970 are available in the language o f  publication only. 
Attempts to contact the TT producers were not successful.
The website includes original judgments (which can be in English or French) and their 
translation (into either English or French), so it was easy to gather STs and TTs.
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3.3 Analysis o f the data
Following Gile 1998 and Hempel (1952, cited in Toury 1995), Williams and 
Chesterman (2002:61) describe some key principles in empirical research:
1) Description o f  some particular instances o f  phenomena and then generalisation 
to understand the larger picture.
2) Description and explanations. The explaining can be done in different ways: 
explain why, explain how or explain what something is for. Explaining entails 
understanding the phenom ena under scrutiny or how  they w ork or 
understanding their functions. A certain phenomenon can be understood if  it 
can be related to some general familiar principle or if  it can analysed down to 
its most detailed parts. Or, it is possible to explain the significance o f  that 
phenomenon.
3) Prediction. Given certain conditions, it is possible to predict that most
translators will adopt a certain solution or a certain kind o f  solution to a 
translation challenge.
4) Making hypotheses: tentative claims, attempts at a generalisation.
Within empirical research, (or observational) studies are those that
investigate a phenomenon or a process as it takes place in real life in its natural 
setting" (W illiams and Chesterman, 2002:62; emphasis in the original). The observer 
observes and takes note o f  the phenomena without interfering with them. The purpose 
can be to find an answer to a particular question or questions. In the analysis contained 
in chapters 4 and 5 an attempt has been made to perform the four actions described 
above, all typical o f  empirical research, from the description o f  data to the formulation 
o f  hypotheses. The six case studies -  which revolve around the two scenarios -  are 
analysed in order to explore possible answers to the two research questions. For each 
case study, a qualitative and a qualitative analysis are performed. The goal o f  
g'wa/zWzvg research is
the description of the quality of some phenomena in some enlightening way. 
More strictly, qualitative research can lead to conclusions about what is possible, 
what can happen, or what can happen at least sometimes; it does not allow
The other subtype o f  empirical research, are not o f interest here.
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conclusions about what is probable, general or universal. (Williams and 
Chesterman, 2002:64)
The goals of^waM/frafrvg research are different:
the aim is to be able to say something about the generality of a given 
phenomenon or feature, about how typical or widespread it is, how much of it 
there is; about regularities, tendencies, frequencies, distributions [...]. 
Quantitative research seeks to measure things, to count, and to compare 
statistically. Corpus-based studies are an obvious example. (Williams and 
Chesterman, 2002:64-5)
The next sections describe the methodology followed to analyse three case studies -  1, 
2 and 3 -  to research whether the TTs reproduce the macrostructures found in the STs. 
These are the cases linked to the first Research Question.
M a c r o m  / r a W a / z o M . '  F r c z z c / z y  -  F B  >  F V  ( C z z .y c  & z z z f y  7)
The analysis o f  this case study is part o f  the first scenario o f  this thesis. It aims at 
detecting the key characteristics o f  French judgments as a basis o f  comparison 
between the English^^ translations in the corpus and the French STs. In Chapter 2 
French judgments and their moves were examined and this study aims at analysing 
whether the moves remain the same in translation and are signalled in the same way in 
the TTs. In particular, there are some locutions which have been identified in the 
Literature Review that will be further investigated and analysed in translation in order 
to see whether the TTs exhibit a formal correspondence for these expressions and so 
whether the TT reflects the original French macro structure.
Once the solutions are identified in the TTs, they are commented as far as their 
adequacy in relation to the purpose o f  the translations is concerned. The evaluation o f  
the adequacy o f  the solutions requires detecting what the purpose o f  the ST and the 
TT are. As far as the TT is concerned, three ways are attempted to give an answer to
As noted above, the TTs are taken from two different sub-corpora, one from the USA and the other 
from a transatlantic (England/USA) translation project, so it is not easy to detect whether the TL is 
English in England/Wales or USA. In Chapter 4, however, some attempts are made to detect the target 
culture o f  some o f  the TTs in the sub-corpus.
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this. The first is to read any paratext which can give an indication in that respect. The 
second is to make contact with the producers o f  the TT as described above. Failing the 
first two, the third is to make reasonable assumptions based on the general purpose o f  
the websites from which the sub-corpora are taken.
Particular attention is given to some signals which in French judgments help to detect 
some moves in order to analyse whether there are instances o f  explicitation o f  these 
signals in the TTs. Also in this respect, reference is made to some o f  the literature 
mentioned in Chapter 2 when this seems appropriate in order to interpret the 
translation solutions or to judge their adequacy.
Macrostructures in translation: Canadian judgments - FR > EN and EN > FR 
Frwz/zgj 2 zzMz/ 3)
Case studies 2 and 3 belong to the second scenario o f  this thesis. The analysis o f  the 
first case study aims at registering any change o f  macrostructure in the translation 
(into English) o f  judgments issued in French by the Cowr zfg gweBgc, a provincial 
Canadian court. In this scenario the TT is targeted at a different (English-speaking) 
province within the same country, Canada.
The second case study is a sub-corpus o f  fifteen^' (English) Canadian judgments 
“transferred" into French as summaries. In the case o f  summaries, the macrostructure 
o f  the ST and TT is analysed from the perspective o f  whether the TTs keep the same 
moves as those in the ST (and if  yes, whether exactly in the same sequence) and 
whether the purpose has influenced at all the condensation o f  the sections o f  the 
different judgments. In other words, whether the purpose o f  the translation has pushed 
the translators to highlight those parts deemed important for the TT purpose and/or to 
leave aside some parts o f  the judgments deemed to be less important for that purpose. 
The target culture is any French-speaking community in Canada.
14 o f  these 15 are taken from the website o f  the /tÆFTVE and 1 from the website o f  the z/w
z/g /zz
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wzY/z /exzca/ 7T > FzVzzMz/ FF  > F V  (Caj^g F/wz/zgĵ  4, 3 zzMz? 6)
Case study 4 belongs to the first scenario o f  this thesis, while case studies 5 and 6 
belong to the second. A ll three are analysed to see how translators deal with the lack
o f  lexical equivalents across languages w hen the target culture does not have a 
particular legal concept and so does not provide any term which is fully equivalent to
a certain term  in the ST.
The choice o f  the terms to analyse in the translations represented a critical challenge. 
There is an abundance o f  vocabulary to choose from in the two scenarios. Many 
studies have dealt with lexical incongruency and many terms with “uneasy" 
translations are discussed there. The choice to look at the names o f  courts was made 
because it represents a category o f  terms which are especially linked to the legal 
systems being discussed, so that when analysing the solutions fr)und in the corpus for 
these terms, there would be the chance to reflect on the legal systems as well. Two 
Italian courts in case study 4, one Canadian court in case study 5 and another 
Canadian court in case study 6 are analysed.
In order to evaluate the adequacy o f  the translation o f  the nam es o f  the Italian courts 
into English^^, a two-step analysis is carried out: firstly, a contrastive componential 
analysis is completed. The meaning components o f  the source terms and the most 
frequent translation solutions are detailed and compared with the help o f  a table. 
Reference is made to Felber and Sarcevic to assess the degree o f  equivalence o f  the 
two names. The second step is to assess the adequacy o f  the target terms at text level. 
This is done from a contextual point o f  view, taking into account the targeted 
readership and the purpose o f  the TT. The same two-step analysis is then applied to 
some o f  the other translations solutions for the terms being analysed, although in less 
detail.
The other case studies focus on the names o f  two Canadian courts, one federal (case 
study 5) and one provincial (case study 6). The focus is on the different degrees o f
The TTs are taken from the Queen Mary Case Translation Programmes, as already noted. Given that 
it is a transatlantic (England/USA) translation project, it is not easy to detect whether the TL is English 
in England/Wales or USA. In Chapter 5, however, it is assumed that the target culture is the USA for
case study 4, for the reasons that will be detailed there.
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equivalence achievable and on the purpose o f  the texts containing these terms and 
how the purpose influences the chosen TT term. The target culture o f  case study 5 is 
any English-speaking Canadian province and that o f  case study 6 is French-speaking 
Quebec.
It can be noted that there are 2 cases for the first scenario and 4 cases for the second. 
The reason is that while Canada offered a richness o f  data which made language 
bidirectionality possible (English into French and French into English) within the 
second scenario for both Research Questions, there were no enough data available for 
the first scenario in order to have, say, a case study from English into French for the 
first Research Question and, say, English into Italian for the second Research 
Question.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter a description o f  the methodology used to analyse the case studies o f  
this thesis has been made. Also, a description o f  the sub-corpora used in these case 
studies and o f  the sources o f  these sub-corpora has been given. The next two chapters 
present the analysis o f  the corpus.
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Chapter 4 -  Corpus analysis 1: M acrostructures in translation
In section 2.4, the importance o f  macrostructures and their relevance to the research 
proposed here was discussed. This section now deals with the use o f  such 
macrostructures in translated judgments. The three case studies chosen for this
analysis will cover the two scenarios o f  this thesis.
Section 4.1 deals with French judgments and their translations into English, a case o f  
the first scenario. Section 4.2 analyses two different translations o f  some Canadian 
judgments, a case o f  the second scenario.
4.1 Scenario 1 - M acrostructure o f  French judgm ents in translation (C ase study  
1) -  French — ►English
At the centre o f  this case study is the m acro structure o f  French judgments, which was 
analysed in detail in Chapter 2 (section 2.3.1). French judgments exhibit a 
macrostructure with very rigid patterns o f  language and “streng konventionalisierte[n] 
Textfbrmen" (Stolze 1999:133) and can be described as one o f  those “super-individual 
acts o f  speech or writing" described by Reiss (1981:173).
As w e have seen in Chapter 2 (sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2), Reiss underlines how  
conventions are often different across languages and how decisive the establishment 
o f  the text variety -  or genre -  is for the translator, so that the functional equivalence 
o f  the TL is not endangered by naively adopting SL conventions (1981:173). With a 
view to trying to answer the first research question (scenario 1), the aim o f  this case 
study is to see whether, and if  so how, translators keep the ST’s macrostructure in the 
English translations contained in the corpus. The main perspective o f  this analysis is 
the change o f  purpose between ST and TT. In particular, the translation o f  four 
locutions w ill be analysed -  ar/eWw gwe (“given that"), (“but, given
that"), ce (“on this") and cc.y (“for these reasons") within the judgments
o f  the Cour de Cassation (the first two) and the Ccwr (the last two). These
locutions were selected because they play a crucial cohesive and semantic role within 
the macrostructure o f  French judgments: they signal some o f  the different moves in 
French judgments. A s discussed in Chapter 2 (2.3), moves are structural units, typical 
o f  a particular genre. Each move serves a particular communicative function. It will be
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interesting to see whether the translators kept a formal correspondence for the above 
locutions in the TT and whether the sequence o f  the moves o f  the ST is reflected in 
the TT.
As noted in Chapter 3, the subcorpora used for this case study consist o f  French 
judgments: 247 issued by the Cowr &  and 28 by the Cowr together
with their translations published by two academic institutions. Each section begins 
with a qualitative analysis and presentation o f  individual examples and then proceeds 
to a quantitative analysis o f  the relevant sub-corpus. This case study is divided into 
three parts: the first part deals w ith the first locution: attendu que.
4.1.1 Attendu que...
Usually judgments present the arguments put forward by the parties and those 
elaborated by the Court draAing the judgment. In judgments written by the upper 
courts (in France, Cowr and Cowr Ca&yar/oM) the decision o f  the lower
court -  which has ruled on the same matter -  is also mentioned. Such decisions 
include both facts (as established by lower courts) and legal arguments.
French judgments have a traditional way o f  giving account o f  such arguments and 
decisions (cfr. section 2.3.1). The parties’ arguments and w here applicable the lower 
courts’ decisions are all introduced by atteWw gfwc or gfwe ("given that"),
(the latter being used in the lower courts)^^. There is an explicit indication o f  which  
party is putting which argument or whether arfeWw grwe is introducing the lower 
court’s arguments or facts (as established by the same court). In total, 247 judgments 
were examined to see how translators dealt with the locution Four
extracts from these judgments have been selected for closer analysis.
The macrostructure is illustrated in [la ] below, an extract from a judgment issued by 
the Cowr the supreme court o f  appeal in France. As in France there are
two degrees o f  appeal (the first is the Cowr and the second the
when a case is before the Cowr &  it means that is has already been tried
twice. In the first trial all the relevant facts are examined and the relevant legal
The expression is only used by first instance courts (i.e., courts in which cases are
first tried), which cannot o f  course mention lower courts' decisions.
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provisions are applied to these facts; in the first appeal only the main facts are re­
examined and the relevant legal provisions are applied to them; finally, in the second 
appeal (before the Cowr ûfg the facts are not re-examined (i.e. they are
considered to be already established by the Cowr and so only the legal
provisions will be re-considered.
In this particular judgment, the Coz/r r/c gives an answer to a series o f
claims made by one o f  the parties at the trial, a company called Logicom. According 
to Logicom, in an earlier judgment on the same matter the French Cowr 
wrongly found that the Vienna Convention on the international sale o f  goods should 
not apply to the territory o f  Hong Kong. Logicom asks the Coz/r to
review this decision. The Cowr aflg gives an answer to this and other claims
(which are not in the above extract o f  the ST) and the parties must adhere to the 
court’s decision and so the text is legally binding. The readers o f  this judgment will 
certainly include the parties at the trial and the parties’ lawyers, but also other French 
judges, who in the future will follow  the Cow/- c/g Câ ÂYznoM’s interpretation o f  the law. 
The appeal in this case is dismissed.
Conventionally, and example [la ] below is no exception, the occurrences o f  
grwe introduce facts and arguments. Lines 9-16 describe the facts established by the 
lower court (the Cowr in this case) as expressed in the appealed judgment
("j-g/oM af^agrwe"): w e learn that the French company Logicom  ordered some
products Aom the Hong-Kong based company CCT Marketing Ltd. (lines 9-11); that 
the delivered equipment did not work and that the parties agreed that it should be sent 
back to the manufacturer and then to the buyer (lines 11-13); that CCT did not carry 
out the agreed repairs and Logicom  sued for damages (lines 15-16).
Lines 18-42 contain the party’s arguments (the party in this case is /a 
Logfcom) put forward to appeal the Cowr üF/4;)j9e/’s decision to limit the awarded 
damages to US$7995. Here follows [la ] (the whole judgment is reproduced in 
Appendix la; emphasis in the original; line numbers added to judgments in 
Appendices are kept here and in the following extracts for ease o f  reference; 
occurrences o f  are underlined):
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[la]
9. Attendu, selon Tarrêt attaqué (Aix-en-Provence, 1er avril 2004), que la société de
10. droit Aançais Logicom a commandé des produits de téléphonie à la société CCT
11. Marketing Ltd (la société CCT), dont le siège est à Hong-Kong ; qu’après qu’il
12. eut été constaté que des appareils livrés ne fonctionnaient pas, les parties sont
13. convenues qu’ils seraient retournés au fabricant puis renvoyés à l’acheteur, à
14. charge pour ce dernier de payer 30 % du prix FOB avant que les réparations ne
15. soient entreprises ; que la société CCT n’ayant pas procédé aux réparations
16. convenues, la société Logicom l’a assignée en indemnisation de ses prgudices ;
17. Sur le prem ier m oyen, pris en ses deux prem ières branches :
18. Attendu que la société Logicom fait grief à l’arrêt de limiter, sur le fondement du
19. droit de Hong-Kong, la réparation de son dommage à la somme de
20. 7 995 dollars US et de rejeter toutes ses autres demandes, alors, selon le moyen :
21. 1°/ que la Convention de Vienne du 11 avril 1980, relative à la vente
22. (7g marc/7aM(7z.9gj .y .yz/r /g /g/r;/oAg <7g 7/oMg-KoMg, gwi
23. n ’gyf g«'MMg région ocfminiyfroiivg ypgcio/g <7on& Z’or(7rg znfgrng (7g Zo 7( îz6ZigMg
24. (7g CAzng ng (7iypo.y(3nW(3wcwng ow/ono/nzg gn (Trozi znfgrn(3iion(3/ /7w6/zc, 7(3
25. T̂ ŵẐ /zg'z/g (7g C/zzng n (zw (7g/»gwr(3ni g/nz.y (zwcwng rg.ygrvg ow rgyirzorzon,
26. 7or.y (7g /(Z rgfrogg.y.yzon (7g TTbng-Kong à goznpfgr (7zz 7gryzzzZ/gi 7PP7 gzz(zni à
27. 7 '(ÿzp7zg(z/zon z7g ggifg convgnizon zn/grn(zZzon(37g fzzr 7g fgrrziozrg (7g cgifg région 
2& inigrng, ẑz 'gn (7éci(7(zni ĝ wg 7(Z(7iig Convgniion (7g Fzgnng ng y ’(zpp7i ẑzgr(zii à
29. TTong-Kong (zzz .ygzz7 /noii/"gzz 77 y ogiroii (7'zzng région (Z(7zniniyir(3fivg ypéci(z7g, 7(Z
30. cozzr (7'(ÿzpg7 (Z vio7é 7g.y ̂ rincipg.y (7w (7roii in/grn(3/ion(z7, gnfgzn67g 7(z Convgniion
31. de Vienne du 23 mai 1969 et la Convention de Vienne du 11 avril 1980 ;
32. 2°/ qu’une Convention internationale est applicable selon les indications que
33. /zorigni 7g.y inyirzzzngni.y in/grnzziionzzzzx 7(z concgrnzzni, g'zz 'gn rg/gnzzni g'zzg 7(z
34. .yociéié Logicozn (7gv(zii (zpporigr 7(z /zrgzzvg (7g 7 (zp;p7ig(ziion (Z TTong-ATong (7g 7(z
35. Convgniion (7g Fzgnng (7zz 77 (zvri7 79^0, rg7(ziivg (z 7(z vgnig inigrn(ziion(z7g (7g
36. /n(zrg7z(zn(7i.yg.y, (zzz j'gzz7 znoiif gzz'i7 rgy.yori(zzV (7'zzn cgrii/zg(zi (7g cozziwnzg jDro(7zzii
37. ^(zr 7(Z fociéié CCT gzzg 7(Z(7i/g Convgnizon inigrn(ziion(z7g ng y '(zpp7ig'zzgr(ziZ' p(zj (z 
3& 776ng-Æong, gzz(zn(7 7(Z(7iig Convgniion y 'iznpoĵ (zii (zzz jzzgg yr(znç(zij gzzi (7gv(zii gn
39. yôirg (zpp7ic(zfion (7zz znozngni gzzg 7(z yociéié Logico/n (zv(zif rgvgn(7i ẑzé
40. gxprg.yyé/ngni (z iitrg /zrincip(z7 jon (zpp7ic(Ziion, y '(zgif.y(zni (7g /zofigj ié7^/zonigzzgy
47. ^^rigz/éj à 776ng-Kong à zzn (7zyiri6zzigzzr̂ (zn(T(zij', 7 '(zrréi (zii(zgzzé (z vio7é 7gf
42. (zriig7gf 7gr gi .yzziv(zniy (7g 7(z Convgniion (7g Fzgnng (7zz 77 (zvri7 79^0
An argument is a remark addressed by counsel to judge or jury on the merits o f  case 
or on points o f  law (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1990:107). Each argument (two in [la ]  
above), no matter which party or court is "speaking", is introduced by (z77gn(7zz ĝ zzg. 
Thus, each occurrence o f  attendu que signals a new fact or a new argument. v477gn(7zz 
and ẑzg are sometimes separated, as in line 19 above: "̂ 77gn(7zz. jg7on 7'(zrrg7 (z77(zgzzé 
(Wzx-gn-frovgncg, 7gr(zvrz7 200'^, (/zzg 7(z j^oczé/é... '. yf77gn(7zz is oAen ellipsed and 
each o f  the subsequent occurrences o f  ẑzg links back to the previous use o f  (z77gnz7zz 
(see (z77gn(7zz on line 9 followed by a series o f  ẑzg on lines 9, 11, 15 and (z77g»(7zz on 
line 20 followed by two occurences o f  gzzg on lines 21 and 32).
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More will be said about this ellipsis later, but for the moment let us analyse the 
translation o f  the above extract. The TT has been produced within the Aamework o f  
the Queen Mary Case Translation Programme, a project aimed at promoting 
uniformity in international sales law. In order to do so, a large number o f  judgments 
on international commercial law issued in different languages by different courts in 
different countries have been translated into English. In order to reach their decisions, 
judges in different countries have been making reference to  judgm ents issued in other 
countries and a uniform  international sales law is indeed being ereated^'^. Thus, the 
readers o f  this TT are judges in countries other than France (and, probably other than 
French-speaking countries), but also companies (and their lawyers) operating at an 
international level, who would be interested to see what the likely outcome o f  an 
international dispute on a similar matter could be in the future^^. So, the TT is 
certainly not binding, but inform ative. The same can be said about all the following 
translated judgments in section 4.1 and its subsections. The purpose o f  those translated 
judgments in the corpus which are taken Aom the website o f  the Institute for 
Translational Law at the School o f  Law, University o f  Texas at Austin is not expressly 
mentioned, but it can be assumed to be informative. In Chapter 2 (section 2.4) it was 
noted that the purpose o f  the TT can influence the translating process. In particular, 
Hatim and Mason chose the translation o f  a judgment Aom Arabic to English 
(1990:189-190) to show that if  a translation is for information only, the translator is 
allowed more Aeedom to make greater structural modifications to suit particular 
needs, while i f  "a translated text is to be legally binding, minimal changes may be 
allowed" (1990:190). The above TT is for information only, so the translator has 
modified the ST structure and made explicit some o f  its implicit elements by adding 
some headings, as w ill be described below. The translated version^^ is shown in [lb] 
below (the whole judgment is reproduced in Appendix lb; emphasis in the original; 
square brackets are in the original translation):
See the website o f  the Queen Mary Case Translation Programme for examples o f this uniformity, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/queenmary.html
Such companies (and their lawyers) may be helped in this respect by the fact that all the translations 
included in this Programme -  including [lb ] and other translations in this chapter -  do not report the 
parties' names, but simply [Buyer] and [Seller] in order to identify more easily the two parties to the 
sale agreement which led to the commercial dispute.
Translation by Nathalie Hofmann, taken from the Queen Mary Case Translation Programme.
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[lb]
7. I. IFacts]
8. The French Company L... [Buyer] ordered telecommunication products Aom
9. Company C... M... Ltd [Seller] of Hong Kong. AAer discovering that the delivered
10. equipment did not work, the parties agreed that it should be sent back to the [Seller]
11. and then returned to the [Buyer] with the [Buyer] bearing 30 % of the FOB price until
12. the repairs had taken place. Since [Seller] has not carried out the agreed repairs,
13. [Buyer] sued for damages.
14. II. IProceedings before the Court of Appeal (Aix-en-Provence, 1 April 2004)|
15. The Court of Appeal awarded damages to [Buyer] limited to US $7,995 according to
16. the law of Hong Kong and rejected all other claims. [Buyer] appeals to the Supreme
17. Court.
18. III. [Appeal before the Supreme Court]
19. On the first ground of appeal concerning the first two submissions:
20. A [Arguments put forward by the Buyer]
21. Buyer alleges that:
22. 1. The Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods of 11 April 1980
23. (hereinaAer CISG or the Convention ) applies to the territory of Hong Kong, which is
24. only a special administrative region under the sovereignty of the Republic of China
25. without any autonomy under public international law. Besides, the Republic of China
26. has not declared any reservation or restriction concerning the application of this
27. international convention to the territory of this internal region since the retrocession of
28. Hong Kong on 1 July 1997. In deciding that the CISG did not apply to Hong Kong on
29. the sole ground that it is a special administrative region, the Court of Appeal violated
30. the principles of international law, i.e., both the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969
31. on the Law of Treaties and the CISG.
32. 2. An international convention is applicable according to the indications o f the
33. relevant international instruments. In ruling that the [Buyer] would have to prove
34. the applicability of the CISG only because of a CertiAcat de Coutume [*] produced by
35. the [Seller] whereAom resulted a ruling that the CISG was not applicable to Hong
36. Kong even though the Convention required the French judge to apply it, given that the
37. [Buyer] expressly demanded its application in its main submission and given that the
38. telephone sets were produced in Hong Kong for a French retailer, the appealed
39. decision violated articles 1 et seq. CISG.
A comparison o f  the ST and the TT reveals a different macrostructure in the above 
English translation. In the translation extract above, rather than keeping the French 
macrostructure by translating azreWw or each time, the translator prefers to 
add some headings to indicate whose arguments the Cozzr is quoting.
The added headings are: I. [Facts]; II. [Proceedings before the Court o f  Appeal (A ix- 
en-Provence, 1 April 2004)]; III. [Appeal before the Supreme Court]; A  [Arguments 
put forward by the Buyer]. Section 2.2.5 deals with cohesion and the shiAs in levels o f  
explicitness which can happen in translation. According to Blum-Kulka (1986:291) a 
shiA in the cohesive markers in the SL and the TL can make the textual explicitness o f  
the target text higher or lower than that o f  the source text. The translation above is a
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clear example o f  a higher explicitness (or explicitation) due to a shiA in the cohesive 
ties: it can be assumed that the translator has added the above headings (such as "A 
[Arguments put A)rward by the Buyer]" on line 20) to indicate whose arguments the 
Cowr (7e is quoting because a literal translation o f  the original judgment’s
cohesive elements has not been considered to be clear enough A)r the purpose o f  
translation. Blum-Kulka seemed to equate explicitness to redundancy (see 2.2.5), but 
this explicitation certainly cannot be considered to be redundant, and so Seguinot’s 
criticism  (1988:106) o f  B lum -K ulka already mentioned in 2.2.5 seems justified.
Quite different is the translation o f  the occurences o f  ar/eWzz in [2a] (the whole 
original judgment and the whole English translation are reproduced in Appendix 2a 
and 2b respectively; occurrences o f  are underlined for ease o f  reference):
[2a]
37. Attendu que l'importation en France en provenance du Québec, le 7 novembre
38. 1993, de viande &  cheval, qui s'est révélée contaminée, a provoqué une épidémie
39. de trichinellose; que, sur l'action de victimes de cette épidémie, l'arrêt attaqué a
40. condamné l'importateur, la société Aançaise Boucherie D ..., le distributeur, la
41. société française B ... , et le fournisseur, la société québécoise C ... , ce dernier par
42. application de l'article 35, 1 , de la Convention de Vienne du 11 avril 1980 sur les
43. contrats de vente internationale de marchandises, à indemniser les victimes ;
44. Sur le second moyen, pris en ses quatre branches, ci-après annexé :
45. Attendu que, s'agissant d'un contrat de vente internationale conclu entre des
46. ressortissants d'Etats parties à la Convention de Vienne du 11 avril 1980 sur les
47. contrats de vente internationale de marchandises, la cour d'appel a justement
48. énoncé que la vente litigieuse était régie par cette convention en application de
49. son article 1, 1, a) ; que ce seul motif justiAe la décision attaquée quant au droit
50. applicable, indépendamment des motifs surabondants critiqués par le moyen ;
In this case, the translator^^ has reproduced the French macrostructure, by translating 
the (zrreWzz grwe each time, as ""whereas", as shown in [2b] (capital letters in original):
[2b]
39. WHEREAS, the importation into France Aom Québec, on 7 November 1993, of
40. horse Aesh, which proved to be contaminated, provoked ah epidemic of
41. trichinosis; that, on the action of victims of that epidemic, the challenged ruling
42. ordered the importer, the French company Boucherie Debeaux, the distributor,
43. the French company Barbaud, and the supplier, the Quebec company CoAanca,
44. this latter by application of Article 35(1) of the Vienna Convention on Contracts
45. for the International Sale of Goods of 11 April 1980 [CISG], to indemnify the
46. victims;
Translation by Charles Sant'Elia, taken Aom Queen Mary Case Translation Programme.
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47. On the second grounds, taken in its four branches, hereaAer annexed:
48. WHEREAS, one is dealing with an international sales contract formed between
49. nationals of States parties to the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the
50. International Sale of Goods of 11 April 1980 [CISG], the Court of Appeals has
51. rightly held that the disputed sale was governed by that Convention by operation
52. of its Articles 1 and 2(a); that this sole reason justiAes the challenged decision as
53. far as regards the applicable law, independently of the superabundant reasons
54. criticized in the appeal ;
Tt should be pointed out that "whereas" is usually and traditionally found in English- 
language^^ agreements and contracts rather than in judgments. In agreements and 
contracts, just as the French affeWzz "whereas" means "given the fact that" or 
"as" and does not indicate contrast (Cao, 2007:86)^^. Taw Dzc/mMaz}; deAnes
the "whereas" clause as an "introductory or prefatory statement meaning 'considering 
that’ or 'that being the case’, and is not an essential part o f  the operating portions o f  
the contract" (1990:1596). Thus, both the "whereas" clause in an agreement and the 
information introduced by the series o f  grzze in a French judgment represent the
premises and the reasons on which a transaction in the Arst case and a decision in the 
second case are founded. Given these premises, the transaction is introduced by "now, 
therefore" in English agreements and the decision is introduced by "par in
French judgments. So, the translation seems to be semantically adequate, although the 
"whereas" would not follow the genre conventions o f  a judgment in English or 
American law.
But there is something more striking in the above translation. As already indicated, 
is oAen ellipsed as a cohesion device. The occurrences o f  ("that") are 
linked to a/reWw and can only be understood if  the reader reads the Arst utterance. If  
the translator has chosen to keep the elliptical construction but the link is lost in 
translation, the ellipsis has no sense. Two examples o f  the ellipsis o f  atrcMcfw are found 
in [2a] in lines 39 Tac/foM (7g and 49 (^we ce
/a (7ccz.yzoM ar/agrwcc...), where the two occurrences o f  g'wc are 
related to the previous aAcWzz (line 37) and -  once the link is made -  can be 
interpreted as: a77cWw grzzc, .yw?" /'ac7zoM (7c vzcrzmcj  ̂ (7c cc77c ^ /(/cm fc... (line 39) and 
a/7cM(7M ^wc cc .9cw7 y^7z/zc 7(z (7ccfJzoM (z77(z^wcc... (line 49). However, the 
translator has translated the two occurrences o f  (z77cM(7w ĝ zzc (lines 37 and 45 in the
Both in the UK and the USA
The '\vhereas" clause is also called "recital".
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original) as "whereas" (lines 39 and 48 in translation) and the two occurrences o f  
(with arrcWw being ellipsed) on lines 39 and 49 as "that" (on lines 41 and 52 in the 
translation). The original cohesive link (a77cWw + ĝ wc) is missing in the TT, because 
the complementiser "that" cannot link back to "whereas". "Whereas" should have 
been repeated in order to reproduce the cohesive effect o f  the occurrences o f  in 
the ST as the original pattern o f  ellipsis cannot be reproduced in English.
Before analysing how another translator dealt -  in a different way -  with the same 
cohesive ties in another French judgment, let us recall (see section 2.2), that the focus 
o f  translation scholars has increasingly become the whole text rather than the word or 
the sentence. The translation extracts included in this section -  dealing with the typical 
cohesive ties in French judgments -  offer support for such an approach: if  the 
translator does not focus on the whole text, on the full ST, he/she would miss the 
ellipsis and the link which are essential to grasp the ST’s meaning. The following  
translation illustrates this textual perspective even more.
In extract [3a] the translator has found a different solution for the translation o f  the 
French cohesive ties (whole judgment in appendix 3a, translation in appendix 3b; 
capital letters in original; occurrences o f  a%Ww are underlined for ease o f  
reference):
[3a]
28. ATTENDU QUE POUR FAIRE DROIT A CETTE DEMANDE L'ARRET
29. RETIENT QUE L'OPERATION PUBLICITAIRE QUE CONSTITUAIT
30. L'EXPOSITION A ETE DES L'ORIGINE CONÇUE, AVEC LE CONCOURS
31. DE LA SOCIETE LA REGION, QUI PRENAIT LA CHARGE DES CHALETS,
32. ENTRE LA S O S E R, QUI METTAIT A LA DISPOSITION DE LA REGION,
33. AVEC SES ENTREPRISES DE RESTAURATION LA PLATEFORME DU
34. 1ER ETAGE DE LA TOUR EIFFEL, ET CHASTAGNOL QUI PRENAIT LE
35. TITRE DE COMMISSAIRE GENERAL ;
36. QUE CE DERNIER A EN FAIT ASSUME CE ROLE QUI LUI CONFERAIT
37. AUX YEUX DE TOUS LA RESPONSABILITE AU PREMIER CHEF DE
38. L'ENSEMBLE DE L'OPERATION ET QU'A L'EGARD DU PUBLIC ET DES
39. TIERS SON CENTRE D'INFORMATION ETAIT PLACE SOUS L'EGIDE A
40. LA FOIS DE LA SOCIETE LA REGION ET DU GUIDE DES LOISIRS EN
41. MONTAGNES DE FRANCE, DONT, DANS LA BROCHURE
42. PUBLICITAIRE, IL S'EST DECLARE LE DIRECTEUR ;
43. QUE GRAMA FIGURE LUI AUSSI DANS CETTE BROCHURE COMME
44. L'UN DES ANIMATEURS ET PRESENTATEURS DU CENTRE
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45. D'INFORMATION DES MONTAGNES DE FRANCE ET QU'IL A LUI-
46. MEME RECONNU SA QUALITE D'ORGANISATEUR DANS LE PROJET
47. DE CONVENTION DU 27 FEVRIER 1970 QU'IL A SIGNE AVEC
48. SAILLOFEST ET LE GERANT DE LA SOCIETE LA REGION ;
49. QUE LES DIFFERENTS DOMAINES INTERESSES A L'OPERATION
50. PUBLICITAIRE SONT RAPPELES, AU MEME TITRE QUE LES CHALETS,
51. EN TETE DE CETTE BROCHURE EDITEE PAR LE SERVICE DE PRESSE
52. DE S O S E R SOUS LES RUBRIQUES : PATINOIRE, BRASSERIE, CAFE
53. CONCERT, URBANISME EN MONTAGNE ;
54. QUE MALGRE L'ABSENCE DE PRODUCTION PAR LES PARTIES DU
55. BILAN DE L'OPERATION IL EST CONSTANT QUE SA REALISATION A
56. NECESSITE DES DEPENSES ET PROCURE DES RECETTES, ET QUE SUR
57. LE PLAN DE LA PUBLICITE SES PARTICIPANTS ETAIENT
58. SUSCEPTIBLES, SOUS UNE FORME QUELCONQUE, ET A PLUS OU
59. MOINS LONGUE ECHEANCE, D'EN TIRER UN BENEFICE ;
60. QUE L'ARRET DECLARE QU'EST AINSI ETABLIE L'EXISTENCE DE LA
61. SOCIETE DE FAIT ALLEGUEE PAR SAILLOFEST, CREEE EN VUE DE LA
62. DELIBERATION DE L'OPERATION PUBLICITAIRE PRECITEE ET DONT
63. CHACUN DES QUATRE PARTICIPANTS SE PROPOSAIT DE TIRER UN
64. BENEFICE ;
65. ATTENDU CEPENDANT QUIL NE RESULTE D'AUCUNE DE CES
66. CONSTATATIONS ET APPRECIATIONS LA VOLONTE NON
67. EQUIVOQUE DE CHASSAGNOL, GRAMA ET DE LA S O S E R , DE
68. METTRE EN COMMUN AVEC LA SOCIETE LA REGION LES BIENS ET
69. ACTIVITES RELATES PAR L'ARRET, D'ATTENDRE LEUR BENEFICE
70. D'UNE EXPLOITATION COMMUNE DONT LES RESULTATS
71. DEVRAIENT ETRE PARTAGES, ET, EN CAS DE DEFICIT, DE
72. CONTRIBUER AUX PERTES ;
73. OUE. DES LORS, EN STATUANT COMME ELLE L'A FAIT LA COUR
74. D'APPEL N'A PAS DONNE DE BASE LEGALE A SA DECISION ;
As can be seen from the following translation [3b], the translators'^® have decided to 
translate ar/eWw as "whereas" and then to enumerate all the points which in 
French follow the ensuing occurrences o f  grwe: (1), (2), (3) and so on. In this way, the 
TT reader can make the link between the different arguments and "whereas", just as 
the informed ST reader knows that the series o f  point back to This
solution shows clarity, which was lacking in the previous extract ([2b]), where the 
series o f  arguments were introduced by "that", which could not create a link to 
"whereas". The translation o f  the extract o f  judgment 3 follows ([3b], occurrences o f  
"whereas" and numbers are underlined for ease o f  reference):
Translation by Trevor Brown and Ann Yazikov, taken from the Institute for Transnational Law's 
website (The University o f  Texas at Austin).
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[3b]
16. Whereas in order to admit this claim the judgement finds that [1] the exhibition,
17. which was a publicity campaign, was conceived from the beginning, with the
18. participation of the Region, which took on the cost of the chalets, by S.O.S.E.R.,
19. which made available to the Region its catering businesses and the platform of
20. the first floor o f the Eiffel Tower, and Chastagnol, who took the title of general
21. organiser; (2) the latter in fact assumed this role, which publicly gave him the
22. prime responsibility for the entire operation; (3) as far as the public and third
23. parties were concerned his information centre was under the patronage of both
24. the Region and the Guide to French Leisure and Mountains, of which, in the
25. publicity brochure, he claimed to be the director; (4) Grama also appears in this
26. brochure as one of the persons who animate and present the Centre of
27. Information for French Mountains and himself recognised his role as organiser in
28. the draff agreement of 27 February 1970 which he signed with Saillofest and the
29. manager of the Region; the various areas involved in the publicity operation
30. are set out, in the same way as the chalets, at the head of this brochure, edited by
31. the press service of S.O.S.E.R., under the titles: skating rink, restaurant, cafe-
32. concert, planning regulations in the mountains; despite the failure by the
33. parties to produce accounts of the operation, it is evident that its realisation
34. necessitated expenses and produced receipts and because of the publicity the
35. parties were likely, in one way or another, and sooner or later, to earn profits; (7)
36. the judgement finds that there is thus established the existence of the de facto
37. company as claimed by Saillofest, which was crated for the publicity operation
38. set out above, and from which each of the four participants expected to earn
39. profits;
40. But whereas f 1 ) there is no evidence from any of these findings and
41. interpretations of a clear intention on the part of Chassagnol, Grama and
42. S.O.S.E.R. to share in common with the Region the property and activities set out
43. in the judgement, to expect profit from a joint enterprise whose results were to be
44. shared, and, in case of a deficit, to contribute to the losses; (2) by finding as it
45. did, the court of appeal did not give legal basis to its decision;.
Although this reference would be a very clear solution -  because the TT reader would 
understand that there is a series o f  argum ents starting from (1) and continuing 
sequentially -  a potential problem occurs in the first lines o f  [3b], namely in line 16:
16. Whereas in order to admit this claim the judgement finds that f l j  the exhibition,
17. which was a publicity campaign, was conceived from the beginning, with the
18. participation of the Region [...]
The (1) in line 16 above -  signalling the first argument -  is in the wrong place: the 
first argument in the ST starts with "QUE POUR FAIRE DROIT A CETTE 
DEMANDE L'ARRET RETIENT" on lines 28-29, corresponding to the English "in 
order to admit this claim the judgment finds" rather than with "L'EXPOSITION" in 
line 30 o f  the ST, corresponding to "the exhibition" in line 16 o f  the TT.
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In order to respect the meaning o f  the ST, the translation would have been:
16. Whereas (1) in order to admit this claim the judgement finds that the exhibition,
17. which was a publicity campaign, was conceived from the beginning, with the
18. participation of the Region [...]
The rest o f  the numerical sequence is correct (lines 21-35), as is also the second series 
o f  numbers on lines 40-44.
Unlike [Ib], [2b] and [3b], the last translation to be analysed in this section (original 
in [4a] and translation in [4b]) does not reproduce the typical macrostructure o f  
French judgments: it is not "visible" in the English translation, i.e. the TT does not 
reproduce a formal correspondence with the occurrences o f  qf/ze.
An extract from the French original is presented in [4a]below (the whole judgment is 
reproduced in Appendix 4a, occurrences o f  ar/eWw grwg are underlined for ease o f  
reference):
[4a]
22. Attendu que néanmoins le Tribunal se doit de constater que, pour sa part, la
23. société F... A... I... SARL verse aux débats différents courriers qui lui ont été
24. adressés par certains de ses clients, desquels il résulte clairement que les
25. chaussures litigieuses souffraient de défauts, trouvant notamment leur
26. manifestation dans leur décollement.
27. Attendu que, pour ce faire, la société F... A... I... SARL se réfère notamment à
28. des courriers en date des 24 octobre 2001, 15 novembre 2001, 17 décembre 2001,
29. 21 décembre 2001 et 3 janvier 2002.
30. Attendu que par ailleurs elle verse encore aux débats un document émanant de la
31. société C... C... SL daté du 28 novembre 2001, duquel il résulte que ladite société
32. a mentionné l'existence de paires de chaussures défectueuses dans les
33. marchandises qu'elle a livrées à la société F... A... 1... SARL.
34. Attendu qu'enfin cette dernière verse également aux débats une lettre émanant de
35. Monsieur F... T..., représentant de la société C... C... SL datée du 21 juin 2002, de
36. laquelle il résulte qu'effectivement une partie des marchandises n'était pas
37. conforme à la commande.
The conventional French structure consisting o f  occurrences o f  a77gM(7w to mark 
each new argument is translated as follows:
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[4b]
6. [Buyer] refers to documents concerning different deliveries sent to the company
7. by certain clients, which clearly show that the shoes in dispute had defects, i.e.,
8. that they fell apart.
9. [Buyer] specifically refers to deliveries on 24 October 2001, 15 November 2001,
10. 17 December 2001, 21 December 2001 and 3 January 2002.
11. In addition, [Buyer] presented a document from [Seller] dated 28 November
12. 2001, which shows that the said company mentioned that some pairs of shoes in
13. the delivery to [Buyer] were defective.
14. [Buyer] also referred to a letter from Mr. F.T., the representative o f [Seller], dated
15.21 June 2002, which includes the statement that that some of the goods did not
16. conform to the order.
In this translation (the whole judgment is reproduced in Appendix 4b), the translator'^  ̂
has presented the facts and the legal argum ents avoiding the series o f  prem ises w hich 
precede the C ourt’s decision in the French original. Attendu que occurs four times in 
the ST extract and signals four different points which the Court has considered to 
reach its decision. The TT presents the same arguments in a way which is closer to the 
genre conventions o f  English and U.S. law, given that in these countries judgments do 
not have as rigid a m acrostructure as in French, as noted in C hapter 2.
The fr)cus o f  this section has been the typical macrostructure o f  French judgments, 
structured around several occurrences o f  a locution, ar/eWw g'wg. Four extracts o f  
French judgments show four different solutions for translating this macrostructure: in 
[lb ] some headings have been added to signal the different facts or arguments to the 
reader; in [2b] the original macrostructure has been reproduced by replacing arreWw 
with "whereas" and the occurences o f  with "that"; [3b] shows again a 
macrostructure which is similar to the original French one, but this time the translators 
have chosen to link "whereas" (which has replaced g'we) to a series o f  numbers
(which replace the occurrences o f  que)-, finally, in [4b] the original French 
macrostructure is not visible anymore: the facts and arguments are not presented as 
premises, as in the conventional French manner. In table 4.2 below, a list o f  the 
different translation solutions found in the 247 judgments constituting the sub-corpus 
containing the locution a/reWzz grwe is given, together with some statistical data on the 
occurrences o f  such solutions. What is noteworthy is that each solution has been 
adopted consistently within each judgment.
Translation by Andrea Vincze, taken from the Queen Mary Case Translation Programme.
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Table 4.2 Translations o f attendu que in the corpus o f  French judgm ents (N = 247)
attendu que Number o f judgm ents in 
which solution appears f
Relative frequency j/N
Given that 216 87.44%
W hereas (+ num bers) 11 4.45%
Explanatory headings and
rewording
6 2.42%
N o specific lexical translation. 
Rewording
6 2.42%
Whereas (repeated to translate 
each gwg)
5 2.02%
W liereas (+ “that” to link back 
to “w hereas”)
2 0.80%
Considering that 1 0.40%
247 100%
As can be seen in the table above, in the overwhelming majority o f  judgments, the 
occurrences o f  afreWw (in 216 out o f  247 judgments) have been translated a& 
"given that". It should be noted that all o f  these 216 judgments were translated by the 
Institute for Translational Law at the School o f  Law, University o f  Texas and are 
posted on its website. The translators (or rather, the overwhelming majority ofthem'^^) 
apparently followed the translation given on the same website, which contains a 
French legal glossary with the following entry for ar/eWzz g'we (emphasis in the 
original)
Attendu que
given that (sometimes translated as "whereas").
In 235 out o f  247 the French macrostructure has been kept, although with different 
solutions, while in the remaining 12 judgments the structure has been abandoned, as in 
[4b] above.
Having analysed how the argument marker a77eM(7zz is translated in the corpus o f  
judgments, in the next section a different marker will be analysed. Although quite 
similar to a%Ww -  except for the adversative junction ("but") -  the locution 
plays a very different role in French judgments. What this role is and 
how it is translated into English in the corpus is the subject o f  the next part o f  this case 
study.
The total number o f  judgments taken from the website o f  the Institute for Translational Law is 229.
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4.1,2 . ..  mais attendu que
As already mentioned in Chapter 2 (section 2.3.1), some conventionalised expressions 
give a semantic signal to the reader, serving also as markers o f  the text 
macrostructure. Within a French judgment, following the arguments put by the parties 
and introduced by a series o f  attendu que, there is another typical locution, mais 
arreWw grwe which introduces the Cowr Ca.yĵ a7zoM’s argument or a point o f  law
made by the judges. In other words, it is a semantic signal which helps the reader 
understand that it is the Cowr (7e Caĵ ĵ a/zoM’s arguments that follow  it, i.e. not that o f  
the parties involved. Maẑ  ̂ ("but") in zzzazĵ  af/eWzz grzzg does not have any adversative 
role. In total, 247 judgments were examined to see how translators dealt with the 
locution m ais attendu que. The locution w as found in 170 judgm ents only. Four 
extracts from these judgments have been selected for closer analysis.
The following extract [5a] (the whole judgment is reproduced in Appendix la) 
contains one occurrence o f  zM(zz.y afreWzz (underlined for ease o f  reference):
[5a]
43. Mais attendu qu'aux termes de l'article 93 de la Convention de Vienne du
44. 11 avril 1980 (CVIM), tout Etat contractant peut décider que ce traité
45. s'appliquera à l'une ou plusieurs de ses unités territoriales, dans lesquelles des
46. systèmes de droit différents sont en vigueur dans les matières qu'elle régit, par
47. une déclaration faite au secrétaire général des Nations Unies désignant
48. expressément les unités territoriales auxquelles elle s'appliquera ; qu'il résulte
49. des pièces versées aux débats, et, notamment de la note du ministre des affaires
50. étrangères et européennes du 18 janvier 2008, qui a interrogé les autorités
51. chinoises sur le point en litige, que la République populaire de Chine a déposé, le
52. 20 juin 1997, auprès du secrétaire général des Nations Unies, une déclaration
53. énonçant, pour les conventions auxquelles la Chine était partie à cette date, celles
54. devant s'appliquer au territoire de Hong-Kong ; que la CVIM, qui ne figure pas
55. sur cette liste, n'a fait l'objet d'aucune déclaration à cette fin par la Chine alors
56. qu'avant la rétrocession à cet Etat par le Royaume-Uni de ce territoire, cette
57. Convention ne s'y appliquait pas ; qu'ainsi, la République populaire de Chine a
58. accompli auprès du dépositaire de la Convention, une formalité équivalente à
59. celle prévue par son article 93 de sorte que, ce traité n'étant pas applicable à la
60. région administrative spéciale de Hong-Kong, l'arrêt se trouve légalement justifié
61. de ce chef
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The translato/^ in this case ([5b]) has decided to add a heading to clarity that that 
which follows is indeed the Court’s reasoning (the whole translation is reproduced in 
Appendix lb, emphasis in the original):
[5b]
40. B [Ruling of the Supreme Courtl
41. According to Art. 93 CISG, any Contracting State in which different systems of
42. law are applicable in relation to the matters dealt with in the Convention may
43. declare that the Convention is to extend only to one or more of its territorial units
44. by way of notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations stating
45. expressly the territorial units to which the Convention extends. From the
46. documents supplied during the pleadings and notably from the note of the
47. Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of 18 January 2008, who questioned
48. the Chinese authorities on this point, results that the People's Republic o f China
49. deposited with the Secretary General o f the United Nations a declaration
50. announcing the conventions to which China was a party at that date which should
51. apply to Hong Kong. The CISG did not figure on that list, nor had the CISG
52. applied to Hong Kong before the retrocession of this territory to the People's
53. Republic of China by the United Kingdom. Thereby, the People's Republic of
54. China has effectuated with the depositary of the Convention a formality
55. equivalent to what is provided for in Art. 93 CISG. Consequently, the CISG is
56. not applicable to the special administrative region of Hong Kong. For this reason,
57. the decision of the Court of Appeal is legally justified.
The translator has decided not to translate ("but’’) literally, but to explain its 
semantic value: ar/eWw g'we on line 43, but also the series o f  g'we on lines 48, 54
and 57 in the original judgment indicate that these are the Court’s arguments, i.e the 
basis for the Court’s ruling. The translator has made this explicit by adding the 
heading on line 40: [Ruling o f  the Supreme Court]. We can recall here the shifts in 
cohesion analysed by Blum-Kulka (1986:291), according to whom different types o f  
cohesive markers in the ST and the TT can affect translations. Here the shifts in 
cohesion (Maz.y ar/eWw and the following series o f  gwg/gw' in the ST translated as 
the heading "Ruling o f  the Supreme Court’’ in the TT) between the ST and the 
translation produce a higher level o f  explicitness in the TT and the implicit meaning 
potential in the ST changes and becomes explicit, just as proposed by Blum-Kulka 
(1986:291). As already noted in Chapter 2, Nida (1964) does not use the term 
"explicitness’’ or "explicitation’’, but rather describes different instances o f  
"additions’’. His description o f  one o f  the "additions’’, "amplification", seems to fit the 
above translation: amplification takes place when "important semantic elements
Translation by Nathalie Hofmann, taken from the Queen Mary Case Translation Programme.
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carried implicitly in the source language may require explicit identification in the 
receptor language" (1964:228). The heading [Ruling o f  the Supreme Court] added on 
line 40 is an example o f  amplification, in N ida’s terms.
A different choice was m ade in the translation o f  [6a] (full text in A ppendix 2a; mais 
[ ...]  arreWw underlined for ease o f  reference; capital letters in the original):
[6a]
51. Mais sur le premier moyen :
52. Vu l'article 16 du nouveau Code de procédure civile ;
53. Attendu que la cour d'appel a fait application d'office de la Convention de Vienne
54. du 11 avril 1980, sans inviter les parties à un débat contradictoire sur ce point ;
55. En quoi elle a violé le texte susvisé ;
56. PAR CES MOTIFS :
Once again, the reader should link Mazj: on line 51 to on line 53. It is the
Court which says that that section ("arfrc/e") 16 o f  the N ew  Code o f  Civil Procedure 
applies to the facts being judged and that the Court o f  Appeal applied the Vienna
Convention w ithout inviting the parties to a hearing on that point.
The translation' '̂  ̂ reads ([6b], full text in Appendix 2b):
[6b]
55. But on the first grounds, in light of Article 16 o f the new Code of Civil
56. Procedure:
57. WHEREAS, the Court of Appeals made sua sponte application of the Vienna
58. Convention of 11 April 1980 [CISG], without inviting the parties to a hearing and
59. argument on that point ;
60. by which it violated the abovementioned text ;
61. FOR THESE REASONS:
The translation does not give an indication o f  who is "speaking" and so ignores the 
semantic signal [ ...]  ar/eWzz g'zze (lines 51 and 53) which clearly signals in 
French that the court is "speaking". It gives an adversative role by translating it 
as "but" (line 55) and gives no explanation, unlike the translation o f  extract 5b above, 
which explicitâtes the meaning o f  the cohesive tie ar/gWzz g'we with a heading, 
[Ruling o f  the Supreme Court]. Therefore, this solution is confusing, as it could lead 
the reader think that it is a party which is interpreting Article 16 o f  the Code (see line
Translation by Charles Sant'Elia, taken from the Queen Mary Case Translation Programme.
84
55 in [6b] above).
Quite different and particularly interesting is the translation o f  arreMz/w g'we in 
[7a] (Appendix 5a for the full text; occurrences o f  a77eM(7w grwe underlined for 
ease o f  reference):
[7a]
49. Mais attendu que la cour d'appel n'a fait qu'user de son pouvoir souverain
50. d'appréciation en retenant, après avoir rappelé la chronologie des faits, que
51. l'acheteur avait fait vérifier la marchandise dans un délai rapide et normal
52. compte tenu de la manipulation lourde que les plaques nécessitaient et
53. avait avisé son vendeur des non-conformités dans un délai raisonnable au
54. sens de l'article 39, alinéa 1, CVIM ; que le moyen ne peut être accueilli ;
In this case the translator'*  ̂ has used "whereas" to translate af/eWzz but also used 
the expression "we find that..." to give a translation o f  a/reWw which 
conforms to the genre convention in English law as will be discussed later. Thus, "we" 
here means the judges o f  the Cowr (7e [7b] follows (Appendix 5b for the
full text; W H EREA S underlined for ease o f  reference; capital letters in the original):
[7b]
50. - WHEREAS we find that the Court of Appeals only used its sovereign discretion
51. in maintaining, after having recalled the chronology o f the facts, that the buyer
52. had inspected the goods in a prompt and normal period of time, bearing in mind
53. the handling that the [goods] required and that [buyer] had alerted [seller] of the
54. non-conformities within a reasonable time in the meaning of Article 39(1) CISG;
In English judgments, judges sitting in panel oAen refer to them selves as "we", as can 
be seen in the following extracts from an English (original) judgment (Appendix 6 for 
the full judgment): "It is w e think important to note that actions are only brought 
against adults" (lines 117-8); "We return to this below because it strikes us as a 
curious distinction w hich has not been fully explained on behalf o f  the council" (lines 
120-1); "We note in passing that no problem arose in this case by reason o f  the fact 
that the defendants were not told who was the source o f  the information given to or 
obtained by the police" (lines 157-9); "As w e read his judgment, the judge accepted 
the council's description o f  the underlying situation and the problems presented by the 
gangs described above" (lines 160-1); "We have quoted them above" (lines 220), etc.
Translation by Nathalie Hofrnann, taken from the Queen Mary Case Translation Programme.
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French judgments, on the other hand (see also section 2.3.1), have always one 
grammatical subject: 7a Cow/- (third person) as a metonym for the judges, as opposed 
to "We" (first plural person).
Sometimes the Cowr (7c may decide to alternate its ow n arguments with
those o f  the parties in the case, especially when the judgment has been attacked on 
many counts, as in [8a] (see appendix 7a for the full text) below. As we can see, the 
Court’s arguments are in lines 120-1; 141-9; 175-184, preceded by ar/eWw 
(occurrences o f  ar/eWw underlined for ease o f  reference). The other lines 
contain the arguments put by one o f  the parties.
[8a]
120. Mais attendu que la cour d'appel n'a pas rejeté les demandes de la société
121. Ge... ; que le moyen manque en fait ;
122. Sur le premier moyen du pourvoi n° J 05-10.424 :
123. Attendu que la S...TC fait grief à l'arrêt d'avoir rejeté sa demande en
124. restitution du prix des machines défectueuses formée à rencontre du
125. fabricant, la société Ge..., et du vendeur intermédiaire, la société No... ga...,
126. alors, selon le moyen :
127. 1 / que, selon l'article 81.2 de la Convention de Vienne, la partie qui a
128. exécuté le contrat totalement ou partiellement peut réclamer restitution à
129. l'autre partie de ce qu'elle a fourni ou payé en exécution du travail ; qu'a privé
130. sa décision de base légale au regard de ce texte la cour d'appel qui a
131. condamné le seul vendeur français à restituer le prix payé par la S...TC et
132. débouté cette dernière à l'égard du fabricant et du revendeur allemand, après
133. avoir pourtant constaté que la Convention de Vienne s'appliquait dans leurs
134. rapports et retenu les manquements de ces deux derniers à l'égard de
135. l'acquéreur;
136. 2 / qu'en ne répondant pas au moyen fondé sur les dispositions de la
137. Convention de Vienne et selon lequel le fabricant qui fournit une
138. marchandise non conforme est tenu, comme le vendeur intermédiaire, de
139. toutes les conséquences qui résultent de cette non-conformité, la cour d'appel
140. a violé l'article 455 du nouveau code de procédure civile ;
141. Mais attendu qu'avant relevé que la S...TC réclame le remboursement des
142. sommes qu'elle a dû verser à la société P... service au titre du contrat pour les
143. livraisons de matériel et qu'en conséquence la société P... service doit être
144. condamnée à payer à la S...TC la somme de 1 105 177,64 francs, soit 160
145. 860,70 euros, en restitution de ces sommes, la cour d'appel a fait ressortir que
146. la demande de la S...TC n'était pas dirigée contre l'autre partie au contrat de
147. vente et a ainsi implicitement mais nécessairement écarté le moyen de la
148. S...TC fondé sur la nécessaire condamnation in solidum des sociétés ayant
149. concouru à la réalisation du dommage ; que le moyen n'est pas fondé ;
150. Et sur le second moyen du pourvoi n° J 05-10.424 :
151. Attendu que la S...TC reproche encore à l'arrêt d'avoir rejeté sa demande au
152. titre du pr^udice dû pour mauvaise exécution du contrat à l'encontre du
153. vendeur intermédiaire, la société No... ga..., et du fabricant, la société Ge...,
154. alors, selon le moyen :
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155. 1 / que l'application de la Convention de Vienne aux relations entre deux ou
156. plusieurs parties implique l'exclusion du droit français ; qu'en reprochant à la
157. S...TC de ne pas avoir fondé sa demande de dommages-intérêts dirigée à
158. rencontre des sociétés No... ga... et Ge... sur le terrain quasidélictuel tout en
159. admettant par ailleurs que la Convention de Vienne s'appliquait dans leurs
160. rapports, la cour d'appel a violé par refus d'application des dispositions des
161. articles 45 b) et 74 à 77 de la Convention de Vienne ;
162. 2 / que dès lors qu'elle constatait que la S...TC était bien fondée à solliciter
163. réparation des pr^udices subis par elle du fait des manquements commis par
164. les sociétés allemandes en application de la Convention de Vienne à son
165. égard, la cour d'appel n'a pas tiré les conséquences légales de ses
166. constatations en déboutant la S...TC de sa demande, en violation des
167. dispositions des articles 45 b) et 74 à 77 de la Convention de Vienne ;
168. 3 / que le juge tranche le litige conformément aux règles de droit qui lui sont
169. applicables ; qu'à supposer l'action de l'acquéreur quasidélictuelle, a méconnu
170. l'article 12 du nouveau code de procédure civile la cour d'appel qui, pour
171. rejeter la demande de dommages-intérêts pour retard dans l'exécution du
172. contrat, a retenu que l'acquéreur n'avait pas fondé son action sur le fondement
173. quasidélictuel lorsqu'il lui appartenait de statuer après avoir donné elle-même
174. ce fondement juridique à la demande ;
175. Mais attendu, en premier lieu, que la cour d'appel, devant laquelle la S...TC
176. sollicitait l'application de l'article 10 du marché prévoyant expressément la
177. sanction de retards pris dans l'exécution, a pu retenir, sans encourir les griefs
178. des deux premières branches, que cette réclamation ne pouvait être faite qu'à
179. la société P... service avec laquelle elle était seule liée par le contrat en vertu
180. de la clause pénale convenue ;
181. Attendu, en second lieu, que la cour d'appel, si elle pouvait rechercher elle-
182. meme la règle de droit applicable au litige, n'en avait pas l'obligation dès lors
183. que le demandeur avait précisé le fondement juridique de sa prétention ;
184. D'où il suit que le moyen n'est fondé en aucune de ses branches ;
As w e can see below in the English version ([8b]), the translator*^ highlights the Cowr 
(7g Ca.ÿĵ arzoM’s arguments by inserting "Ruling" (emphasis in the original, lines 113 
and 135) or "Ruling: The Cour de Cassation rules that" (emphasis in the original, line
169) and the party’s arguments by inserting "[Buyer]" (lines 1 15, 130, 144 and 145)
or "[Buyer]'s grounds for complaint are" (line 120) or "[Buyer]'s grounds for this 
aspect o f  the appeal are" (line 150). A lso, on lines 170 and 175, the translator makes 
explicit that there are two points which the Court is making, by writing "First" and 
"Second" respectively; also because the semantic signal in the French version 
"yfr/eWw, gM /few, g'Mg"... (line 181, above) is not very easy to detect, as the
(always line 181 in the extract above) links back to appearing six lines 
above (line 175 in the extract above). There follows the English translation o f  the 
above extract (Full text in Appendix 7b):
Translation by Nathalie Hofmann, taken from the Queen Mary Case Translation Programme.
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[8b]
113. Ruling: The claims of Company Ge... are lacking in fact because the Court of
114. Appeal has not, as alleged, rejected the claims of Company Ge...
115. |B] The first ground of IBuyerj's Appeal no. J 05-10.424
116. [Buyer] has complained about the decision of the Court of Appeal having
117. rejected its claim for restitution of the price of the defective machines against
118. Company Ge... [the Manufacturer of the machines], and against the
119. intermediary. Company No... GA...
120. [Buyer]'s grounds for complaint are:
121. 1. Citing Art. 81 (2) CISG which provides that a party who has performed the
122. contract either wholly or in part may claim restitution from the other party of
123. whatever the first party has supplied or paid under the contract, [Buyer]
124. alleges that the Court of Appeal has deprived its decision of a legal basis
125. when it ordered only the French seller to restitute the price paid by [Buyer]
126. while dismissing the claims against the manufacturer [Company Ge...] and
127. the German intermediary [Company GA], after having found the CISG to be
128. applicable to their relations and having established the breaches by the last
129. mentioned companies towards the buyer.
130. 2. [Buyer] alleges that, in not addressing the claim based on the provisions of
131. the CISG according to which the producer who delivers a non-conforming
132. machine must bear all the resulting consequences just like the intermediary,
133. the Court of Appeal has violated Art. 455 of the new Code of Civil
134. Procedure.
135. Ruling: When finding that [Buyer] claims the restitution of the sums that it
136. had to pay to [Seller] on the basis of the contract for the delivery of material
137. and that in consequence [Seller] would have to pay 1,105,177.64 Ff, coming
138. to 160,860.70 Euros, to [Buyer] in restitution of these sums, the Court of
139. Appeal has pointed out that the claim of [Buyer] was not against the other
140. party to the sales contract and has therefore implicitly but necessarily rejected
141. the claim of [Buyer] which was based on the necessary condemnation in
142. solidum [...] of the companies which have concurred in the realization of the
143. damage.
144. [Buyer]'s claim is unfounded.
145. |C] The second ground of IBuyerfs Appeal no. J 05-10.424
146. The [Buyer] has also appealed the decision o f the Court of Appeal that
147. rejected its claim for damages for defective performance against the
148. intermediary. Company No. GA..., and against Company Ge... [the
149. Manufacturer of the machines].
150. [Buyer]'s grounds for this aspect of the appeal are:
151. 1. The application o f the CISG to the relations between two or more parties
152. implies the exclusion of French law; that in reproaching the [Buyer] for not
153. having based its claim for damages against companies No...GA... and Ge on
154. quasi-tortious liability while at the same time admitting that the CISG was
155. applicable to their relations, the Court of Appeal has violated the provisions
156. of Art. 45(b) and Art. 74 to 77 CISG by refusing to apply them.
157. 2. After having found, in applying the CISG, that [Buyer] was justified in
158. seeking reparation of the damage incurred caused by the breaches committed
159. by the German companies, the Court of Appeal has not drawn the proper
160. legal consequences from its findings by rejecting the claim of [Buyer] in
161. violation o f the provisions of Art. 45(b) and Arts. 74 to 77 CISG.
162. 3. A judge is to decide a dispute in conformity with the rules of the applicable
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163. law. Even assuming the claim of the buyer to be quasi-tortious, the Court of
164. Appeal misconceived Art. 12 of the new Code of Civil Procedure by
165. concluding that, in order to reject the claim for damages for delayed contract
166. execution, the buyer has not founded its claim on a quasi-tortious basis
167. although it should have decided the claim after having found the legal basis
168. itself.
169. The Cour de Cassation rules that:
170. the Court of Appeal before which [Buyer] sought the application of
171. Art. 10 of the agreement, which provides explicitly for the sanction of delay
172. in the execution, could find without facing the first two complaints that such
173. a claim could only be made against the [Seller] which is the only one obliged
174. by the contract with regards to the penalty clause agreed on;
175. the Court of Appeal, although it could itself have looked for the rule
176. of law applicable to the dispute, did not have the obligation to do so since the
177. claimant specified the legal basis of its claim.
In [8b], just as in extracts [5b] and [7b] above, the translator has made the role o f  maẑ y 
attendu que explicit for the TT reader. In extracts [5b], [7b] and [8b] shifts in levels o f  
explicitness and in text meanings observed by Blum-Kulka can be detected. These 
shifts make the textual explicitness o f  the TT higher than that o f  the source text, and 
the explicit and the implicit meaning potential o f  the ST changes through translation 
(1986:291)".
Shifts'** have been defined by Popovic as “all that appears as new with respect to the 
original, or fails to appear when and where it might have been expected" (1970:79). It 
can be recalled from Chapter 2 (2.2.5) that Bakker, Koster & Van Leuven-Zwart 
(1998:228) found two relationships in Popovic’s definition: one between the ST and 
TT (what is new in the TT with respect to the original) and one between the TT and its 
reception in the target system ("where it might have been expected"). As a result, a 
"zero-shift established at specific textual and linguistic levels in the source/target-text 
relationship (i.e. an instance o f  invariance, where nothing new appears) may still be 
interpreted as a shift in terms o f  [ ...]  [the second relationship]" (1998:228), because 
"by violating the expectations o f  the target system, a target text may acquire a 
function other than that fulfilled by the source text in the source system" (1998:228). 
In the above extracts, there are some instances o f  "new" elements in the TT with 
respect to the ST: headings in [lb ], [5b], [8b]; the added "we" in [7b] to bring the text 
closer to the genre conventions o f  the English courts, just as the translator did by
For a more detailed description o f  these shifts, see Chapter 2 (section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2)
The term "shifts” was used tor the first time in relation to translation in Catfbrd's /t T/zco/y
but his shifts o f  level and shifts o f category do not seem relevant here.
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abandoning the French macrostructure in [4b]. On the second point made by Bakker, 
Koster & Van Leuven-Zwart, there are some elements which are new with respect to 
readers’ expectations ([2b], [3b] and [6b]), where the French structure was kept in the 
TT, although in different forms. Invariance in [6b], in which the textual surface only is 
translated (M3z.y a/reWw translated as "But ( . . .)  whereas’’, hides the function 
which the source text has in the source system (Bakker, Koster & Van Leuven-Zwart, 
1998:228).
The added headings ("Ruling o f  the Supreme Court’’ in [5b]; "Ruling’’ in [8b]) signal
the different m oves in the translation, ju s t as the different French locutions {attendu 
que or mais attendu que) signal the same moves in the original. We w ill com e back to 
[8a] and [8b] later, when dealing m ore specifically w ith m oves in translation in 
section 4.1.4. The above examples w ere am ong the solutions found in the 170 
judgments*^ which have been analysed to see how the translators have dealt with 
afreWw Table 4.3 below contains a descriptions o f  these solutions and their 
relative frequency^®:
Table 4.3 Translations o f  mais attendu que in the corpus o f French judgm ents (N = 170)
m ais attendu que N um ber o f judgm ents in 
which solution appears f
Relative frequency J7N
But given that 146 85.88%
But w hereas 12 7.05%
Given, however, that 3 1.76%
H owever 2 1.17%
R ew ording, no adversative, no 
explicitation
2 1.17%
But since 1 0.58%
Ruling [added heading] 1 0.58%
Ruling o f  the Cour de Cassation
[added heading]
1 0.58%
Ruling o f the Supreme Court 
[added heading]
1 0.58%
W hereas we find that 1 0.58%
170 100%
It can be seen from the above table that in 164 o f  these 170 judgments only the 
superficial meaning o f  affeWw grzze was translated, in different ways: "but, given 
th a t...’’; "but, w hereas...’’; "however, given th at...’’. In only four judgments o f  the
Those 170 judgments in the sub-corpus which contain occurrences o f  a/rcMz/w They 
constitute 68,82% o f the total o f the sub-corpus.
"Split” locutions (in which is not immediately followed by afreWzz are also included in the
table.
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cases under scrutiny^^ was the signal made explicit, with a title "Ruling o f  the Cour de 
Cassation" or -  as we have seen in section 4.1.2 above -  with the expression "we find 
that...".
It can be considered that in the four judgments in which the locution afrcMzfzz 
was explicated, translators sought to achieve functional equivalence. That is, they kept 
the function o f  the French (implicit) semantic signal /zzazx arreWw g'we (which signals 
the arguments o f  the drafting Court) in the ST with an explicitation ("Ruling o f  the 
Cour de Cassation" or "we find that") in the TT. As already noted in Chapter 2, Reiss 
considers that in some cases, what is conveyed im plicitly in the SL text needs to be 
explicated in the TL and vice versa (Reiss 1981:175). On the same line o f  argument 
(and as recalled in section 4.1.1 above), Hatim and Mason argue that if  a translation is 
not legally binding but merely informative, the translator is freer to make greater 
structural modifications for a particular need. This is what has been done in the four 
mentioned judgments. After all, as V erm eer argues, if  the translation should convey 
information, "there is no sense in translating a text (almost) literally/'faithfully’ in the 
traditional sense if  this procedure prevents an adequate way o f  transmitting the 
intended information" (Vermeer 1998:51). The next section, the third and final part o f  
this case study (macrostructures o f  French judgments in translation) w ill first o f  all 
feature another semantic signal appearing in French judgments.
4.1.3 Sur ce ... Par ces motifs
In the previous section the semantic signal af/eWw given by the Cowr (7e 
was analysed in translation. There is another semantic signal which has a 
similar role in the Cowr (7W ^ e/’s judgments: ce (or, ce, 7a Cowr). Together
with another locution, f a r  ?Ma77/̂ , it is the subject o f  this section. The two 
locutions signal two moves in the judgments issued by the Cawr (7W^e7. As noted 
above, judgments mention the parties’ pleadings, specifying which party is putting 
forward which argument. These can be the reconstructions o f  facts, as in [9] (whole 
text in Appendix 8a):
Produced bv three different translators.
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[9]
4. La société de droit allemand dénommée "H. H... GmbH & Co" (société H.)
5. estime avoir vendu 100.000 mètres linéaires de tissu à la SARL française
6. MG... (société MG), laquelle n'en a pris que partiellement livraison
Or they can be points o f  law, as in [10] (whole text in Appendix 8a):
[10]
98. La société MG fait valoir :
108. [ . . .] qu'en application de l'article 18 de la Convention internationale précitée,
109. le silence ou l'inaction ne peuvent pas valoir à eux seuls acceptation[...]
After such arguments and before the Court gives its decision, the Cowr 
presents its own arguments on which such a decision is based: points o f  law, but also 
facts, as ascertained by the Court (which can o f  course be different from those 
presented by the parties). These arguments o f  the Court are preceded by ce or 5"%/̂  
ce, /a Ccwz- ("On this" or "On this, the Court"). For instance ([11], whole text in 
Appendix 8a):
[1 1 ]
144. SUR CE,
145. Considérant qu'en application de l'article 1315 du Code civil, il appartient
146. à la société H. de prouver l'obligation qu'elle allègue, qui aurait été
147. souscrite à son profit, par la société MG ;
Afrer these arguments, the Court gives its decision, usually writing: f a r  ccĵ  zMa/z/ÿ, /a  
Cawr ("For these reasons, the Court"). So, 5"wr cc introduces the marz/iÿ ("reasons") on 
which the Court’s decision is based and f a r  ccĵ  z?za7z/ÿ introduces the decision.
Twenty-eight^^ judgments and their translations were analysed to see how the 
occurrences o f  5"zzr cc and f a r  cĉ  ̂ zzza7z/ÿ were translated (within the same judgment):
As already noted in Chapter 3, these 28 judgments are not taken from the same sub-corpus as those 
containing the locutions aZZeMz/w Qrz/e and aZZeWw These 28 judgments are all issued by the 
Cozz/' z/Wppg/, unlike the previous ones analysed in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, which are issued by the 
Cozzz" Jg C(z.9ĵ (zZ;on.
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the locutions have been found in thirteen judgments. Two extracts from these 
judgments have been selected for closer analysis.
The fifteen judgments in which these two locutions were not found signal the same 
moves in different ways: [ ...]  f a r  (in 3 judgments); Afbrz/} (7c /a
(7ccz.9zaM [...]  f a r  zzza/z/  ̂ (zM 2 '̂zzd̂ z?zcM7ĵ ; Mo7z/^ (7c 7'arrc7 [ ...]  f a r  cc.y Z7za7z/ÿ (in 
2 judgments); ATa/z/} [ ...]  f a r  ccĵ  z?zafz/y; ATaẑ  ̂ a77cM(7zz ^zzc [ ...]  f a r  ccĵ  zTzo/z/̂ , 
reminiscent o f  the moves o f  the judgments o f  the Cazzr (7c Ca6̂ .yarzaM already analysed 
in the previous section; 5"zzr ĝ zzaz [ ...]  f a r  ccĵ  zzzarz/y; Cc7a cxpa^^c [ ...]  f a r  cc.y ma7z/^; 
ATo/z/  ̂ c7 (7ccz.yzaM [ ...]  f a r  cc j /Mo7z/̂ . In the remaining three judgments, the first o f  
the two moves was introduced by 5"zzr, followed by a description o f  what the Court had 
to rule on. For example: 5"zzr 7a cazzzpc/czzcc (Tcĵ ywrz(7zc7zaMyrazzçaz.ycj  ̂ [ ...]  5"zzr 7cybzz(7; 
6"zzr 7a rcccva6z7z7c (7c 7 '(^ c7  [ ...]  5"zzr 7cybW; 5"zzr 7a (7cz?zaM(7c (7c r^c7 (7cĵ  (7c6a7ĵ  [ . . . j 
.S'zzr 7'(zp|p7zca6z7z7c (7c 7a CaMvcM7zazz (7c fzcMMC [...]  6"zzr 7a rcccva6z7z7c (7cj- (7cmaM(7c.y 
(7c 7a .yaczc7c 4̂ [ . ..]  ,5'zzr 7ĉ  ̂ (^c7j^ czz garazz7zc; etc. In these last three judgments, the 
competence o f  the Court was put into question, so the Court had to rule on its disputed 
jurisdiction and on the question at stake between the parties. The second move was 
always f a r  cĉ  ̂z?za7z/̂  in these last three judgments.
Extracts [13b] and [14b] below represent two o f  the most popular translation solutions
for the two locutions, as illustrated in Table 4.4. Extract [13a] below is taken from one 
o f  the judgments in which the two moves described above were signalled by 5"wr cc 
and f a r  ccĵ  zMa7z/y (whole text in Appendix 8a):
[13a]
144. SUR CE,
145. Considérant qu'en application de l'article 1315 du Code civil, il appartient
146. à la société H. de prouver l'obligation qu'elle allègue, qui aurait été
147. souscrite à son profit, par la société MG ;
148. Que la société allemande soutient qu'un contrat de vente de 100.000 mètres
149. de tissu aurait été verbalement conclu entre elle-même et la société
150. française, ce que cette dernière conteste formellement ;
[ • ■ • ]
227. PAR CES MOTIFS,
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228. Confirme le jugement entrepris en toutes ses dispositions,
229. Y ajoutant,
230. Condamne la société "H. H... GmbH & Co" aux dépens d'appel et à verser
231. à la SARL MG, 3.000 euros de frais irrépétibles,
232. Admet Maître P... au bénéfice de l'article 699 du nouveau Code de
233. procédure civile.
This is the English translation^^ ([13b], whole judgment in Appendix 8b, emphasis in 
the original):
[13b]
155 IRULING OF THE COURT]
156. Whereas in accordance with Article 1315 of the Civil Code, it is for
157. [Seller] to prove the obligation that it alleges was undertaken by [Buyer];
158. The [Seller] maintains that a contract for sale for 100,000 meters of
159. material had been verbally concluded between itself and the [Buyer],
160. which the latter formally contests;
236 FOR THESE REASONS,
237. The Court affirms all provisions of the judgment, and orders [Seller] to pay
238. costs of appeal and to pay to the [Buyer] 3,000 in legal costs to
239. Master P... in accordance with Article 699 of the new Code of Civil
240. Procedure.
"[RULING OF THE COURT]" in [13b] is a heading added to make explicit what 
follows in the judgment and help the TT reader understand the moves o f  the text better 
than a literal translation would have done. An attempt to explain why there can be the 
need to add these headings w ill be made below. However, "Ruling o f  the Court" here 
seems to anticipate what would be a suitable heading for the section following f a r
i.e. the decision. "For these reasons" signals quite clearly the move which in 
the original French judgment is signalled by f a r  The same heading, "For
these reasons", is used again in the translation o f  following extract ([14a]) from 
another judgment (whole judgment in Appendix 9a):
Translation by Melody Matthews.
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[14a]
193. SUR CE, LA COUR:
194. Attendu que le présent litige porte, d'une part, sur des questions
195. relatives à une vente de marchandises dont la conformité est critiquée
196. par l'acheteur, d'autre part, à une brusque rupture de rapports
197. contractuels entre vendeur et acheteur, en troisième lieu, aux relations
198. entre une entreprise d'affacturage, cessionnaire successif d'une autre
199. entreprise d'af^cturage, et le débiteur cédé, en quatrième lieu, à la
200. responsabilité de la S.F.F. dans un préjudice commercial dont
201. Monsieur C... serait victime :
464. PAR CES MOTIFS :
465. LA COUR :
466. Statuant publiquement et par arrêt contradictoire,
467. Après en avoir délibéré conformément à la loi,
468. INFIRME le jugement déféré;
469. DEBOUTE la SOCIETE FRANÇAISE DE F... INTERNATIONAL
470. F... F... de l'ensemble de ses demandes ;
471. LA CONDAMNE à payer à Monsieur C... 3 000 F au titre de l'article
472. 700 du Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile ;
473. LA CONDAMNE aux dépens dont distraction au profit de Madame le
474. Président RAMILLON, Avoué, conformément à l'article 699 du
475. Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile ;
476. PRONONCE publiquement par Monsieur le Président BERAUDO,
477. qui a signé avec Madame COMBE, Greffier.
We can see in the translation^'^ below [14b] that "For these reasons" is used twice, to 
translate ce and f a r  ccj (whole judgment in Appendix 9b; emphasis in the 
original):
[14b]
192. For these reasons, the Court:
193. CONSIDERING THAT this dispute concerns questions relating, on the one
194. hand, to a sale of goods in which the conformity of the goods is contested by
195. the buyer, and on the other hand, to an abrupt discontinuance of the
196. contractual relations between the seller and the buyer, as well as to the
54 Translation by Annabel Telling, edited by Yvonne Salmon.
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] 97. relations between a factoring company, the successive assignee of another
198. factoring company, and the assigned &btor, and finally to the responsibility
199. of SFF for a commercial loss in which the [buyer] would be the victim;
[...]
436. For these reasons;
437. THE COURT: Publicly stating and by contradictory ruling, after having
438. deliberated in conformity with the law:
439. REVERSES the deferred judgment;
440. NONSUITS the Société Française de Factoring International Factor France of
441. all its demands;
442. ORDERS IT to pay to the [buyer] 3,000 /  under Article 100 of the New Code
443. of Civil procedure;
444. ORDERS IT to pay the costs, with a deduction for the costs incurred to the
445. President Mrs. Ramillon, in accordance with Article 699 of the New Code of
446. Civil Procedure;
447. PRONOUNCED publicly by the president Mr. Beraudo, who signed with
448. Mme. Combe, the clerk.
It is puzzling the fact that ce and are both translated as "For these
reasons". As noted when commenting translation [13b], "For these reasons" signals 
quite clearly the move which in the original French judgment is signalled by fa /-  
TMorf/ÿ. As far as the translation o f  ce in [14b] is concerned, "For these reasons" is 
inadequate: the Court does not base its decision on the parties' arguments which  
appear in the judgment before “Sur ce". Rather, it gives its reasons only after Sur ce, 
to explain its decision, which appears aAer ̂ ar ccĵ
In Table 4.4 below are the different solutions used by translators for the translation o f  
' .S'wr cc " and " far ccĵ  ma/z/ÿ " (each within the same judgment):
Table 4.4 Translations o f Sur ce [ ...]  Par ces motifs in the corpus o f French judgm ents (n = 13)
S u r  c e  \ . . . \  P a r  c e s  m o t i f s Num ber o f judgm ents in w hich solution  
appears
On this, the Court [...]  For these reasons, the Court 2
R easoning o f the Court [...]  Ruling o f the Court 2
[Ruling o f  the Court] [. . .] For these reasons, the 
Court
2
For these reasons, the Court [.. .]  For these 
reasons, the Court
2
On this, the Court [ . . .] [Ruling o f the Court] 1
Ruling o f  the Court f . . .] On this ground, the Court 1
On this, the Appelate Court [.. .]  For these reasons,
the A ppelate Court
1
On the above [ ...]  For these reasons, the Court 1
[Decision o f  the Court o f  Appeal] [ ...]  On these 
grounds, the Court o f Appeal
1
13
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Given the limited number o f  judgments analysed, it was decided to omit relative 
frequencies.
"On this" and "On the above" are the closest words to the original French, "On this" 
being the literal translation o f  ce. "Reasoning o f  the Court" and "Appellate Court's 
reasoning" (translations o f  cc) clearly indicate that the section o f  the judgment 
under the heading contains the Cowr 6/L4jc^c/'s ("reasons") behind the decision.
"Decisions o f  the Court o f  Appeal", as "Ruling o f  the Court" in [13b], seem to 
anticipate what would be a suitable heading for the section fallowing f a r  ccĵ  /Morz/}, 
i.e. the decision. "Appelate Court's reasoning" and "Appelate Court's ruling" reflect 
more clearly the moves o f  the ST.
In this and the previous analyses o f  the macrostructures o f  French judgments in 
translation, some shiAs and explicitation were observed. These may have been 
deemed necessary by the translators to clarify for the TT readership what was implicit 
in the ST. One can wonder why this happens, why explicitations are sometimes added 
to improve clarity for the TT reader if  that need to explain and clarify was not felt 
when the text producer wrote the ST. One possible explanation to understanding these 
reasons is the illocutionary force in context: the production and reception o f  utterances 
can be influenced by a system o f  social relations and so
the "meaning" of an utterance cannot be limited to what is expressed on the
surface o f the text. Pragmatic values are not attached to linguistic forms but
accrue from the intentions of the speaker/writer within a given social setting.
(Hatim& Mason, 1990:91)
Hatim & Mason argue that there is a writer meaning and a reader meaning and that 
what is "inferrable or situationally evoked for a ST reader may not be so for a TT 
reader" (1990:93) because the two readers operate in two different cognitive 
environments and so "are not equally equipped for the task o f  inferencing" (1990:93). 
That is why the translators o f  some o f  the judgments may have felt the necessity to 
add new elements and so change the level o f  explicitation in the TT, as already 
analysed in these last sections. These pragmatic considerations interact with the
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knowledge o f  the genre conventions. Across languages, explicitation can be a solution 
when the TT reader is not familiar with the SL genre conventions which -  i f  translated 
literally -  would not trigger the same reaction in the TT reader, resulting in the loss o f  
those semantic signals which have been analysed in the last two sections (as in [6b] 
above) and which introduce m oves which pinpoint the diseourse in the ST.
Having analysed a number o f  locutions in these last three sections, and noted the close 
relationships in some cases with macrostructural moves, let us look more closely at 
the sequence o f  moves in French judgments issued by the Cowz" and how
the sequence is reflected in translation. This is the subject o f  the next section.
4.1.4 M oves in French judgm ents
In order to assess whether the sequence o f  moves in the STs remain unchanged in the 
TTs it is necessary to look at whole judgments. In [15a] below the sequence o f  moves 
in a judgment which has already (although partially) been examined in extracts [la] 
and [5a] above w ill be looked at. It can be seen that moves 1 and 3 in the above text 
are split in two. There is an anticipation ("T^^ef") o f  the decision early in the text, 
preceded and followed by some information on the case.
As can be seen in [15a], three moves^^ have been identified in the above judgment:
M ove 1: Identifying the case 
M ove 2: Pronouncing judgm ent 
M ove 3: Arguing the case
Sub-move (a): Giving a history o f  the case 
Sub-move (b): Facts as established by the Cowr 
Sub-move (c): Presenting the appellant's arguments 
Sub-move (d): Deriving ratm (/gczWeWz
The names o f  the three moves and the four sub-moves follow  closely the ones given by Bhatia 
( 1993:118-36) in the analysis o f  English legal cases:
1. Identifying the case
2. Establishing facts o f  the case
3. Arguing the case
(a) Giving a history o f  the case
(b) Presenting arguments
(c) Deriving raZ/o
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Cour de cassation - Première Chambre civile 
26 mai 1999
Société K... S... GmbH
Contre
Société Th .. D... Service et autres
Audience publique du 26 mai 1999
Rejet
M. LCMONTEY, président
Arrêt n° 994 D 
Pourvoi n° P 97-14.315
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE AU NOM DU PEUPLE FRANÇAIS
LA COUR DE CASSATION. PREMIÈRE CHAMBRE CIVILE, a 
rendu l'arrêt suivant :
Sur le pourvoi formé par la société K... S... GMBH, dont le siège 
social est (...). Neunkirchen (Allemagne), en cassation d'un arrêt 
rendu le 21 novembre 1996 par la cour d appel d'Aix-en-Provence 
(2ème chambre), au profit :
]° /d e  la société StsTh... D... Service, dont le siège est (...), Toulon, 
2°/ de la société Da... France, dont le siège est (...), Fontenay-aux- 
Roses,
3°/ de la société La L... de Banque, dont le siège est (...), Lyon, 
défenderesses à la cassation :
La demanderesse invoque, à l'appui de son pourvoi, le moyen 
unique de cassation annexé au présent arrêt ;
LA COUR, composée selon l'article L. 131-6, alinéa 2. du Code de 
l'organisation judiciaire, en l'audience publique du 7 avril 1999, où 
étaient présents - M. Lemontey, président. M. Durieux, conseiller 
rapporteur. M. Renard-Payen, conseiller. M. Gaunet, avocat général, 
Mme Aydalot, greffier de chambre ;
Sur le rapport de M. Durieux, conseiller, les observations de la SCP 
B... et D... . avocat de la société K... S... GMBH, de Me C h .... 
avocat de la société Sts Th .. D... Service, les conclusions de M. 
Gaunet, avocat général, et après en avoir délibéré conformément à la 
loi :
Donne acte à la société K... S... du désistement de son pourvoi à 
l'égard des sociétés Da... France et L... de banque ;
Sur le moyen unique :
Attendu que la société Th .. D... Service (STS) a commandé, le 5 
août 1992, 196 tôles laminées à la société de droit allemand K... S...
; que la livraison a eu lieu entre le 28 octobre 1992 et. pour la plus 
grosse partie, le 4 décembre 1992 ; que la STS a dénoncé le contrat 
par lettre du 1er décembre 1992 au motif notamment que les produits 
n'étaient conformes à la commande ni en quantités, ni en qualité ; 
que. par acte du 15 décembre 1992. elle a assigné en résolution de la 
vente :
M ove 1: Identifying the case
M ove 2: Pronouncing judgm ent
M ove 3: Arguing the case
Sub-m ove (a): Giving a history o f
the case
Suh-m ove (h): Facts as established
by the Cour d ’A ppel
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Attendu que la société K... S... fait grief à l'arrêt attaqué (Aix-en- 
Provence, 21 novembre 1996) d'avoir écarté la fin de non-recevoir 
par elle invoquée sur le fondement des articles 38 et 39 de la 
convention de Vienne du 11 avril 1980 alors, selon le moyen, que la 
cour d'appel, qui a établi le délai entre les contrôles effectués par la 
STS les 9 et 11 novembre 1992 et la dénonciation imprécise de la 
"non-conformité en qualité, dimensions et quantités prévues " faite 
par cette société le 1 er décembre 1992, n'a pas tiré les conséquences 
légales de ses propres constatations en violation des textes susvisés ;
Mais attendu que la cour d'appel n'a fait qu'user de son pouvoir 
souverain d'appréciation en retenant, après avoir rappelé la 
chronologie des faits, que l'acheteur avait fait vérifier la 
marchandise dans un délai rapide et normal compte tenu de la 
manipulation lourde que les plaques nécessitaient et avait avisé son 
vendeur des non-conformités dans un délai raisonnable au sens de 
l'article 39, alinéa 1, CVIM  ; que le moyen ne peut être accueilli ;
Sub-m ove (c): Presenting the
appellant’s arguments
Sub-m ove (d): Deriving ratio
decidendi
PAR CES MOTIFS :
REJETTE le pourvoi ;
Condamne la Société K... S... GmbH aux dépens ;
Ainsi fait et jugé par la Cour de Cassation, Première chambre civile, 
et prononcé par le président en son audience publique du vingt-six 
mai mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-dix-neuf.
M ove 2: Pronouncing judgm ent
[15b] below shows the English translation o f  [15a]. It can be seen above that the 
sequence o f  m oves in [15b] is quite sim ilar to that noticed in [15a]. There are two 
differences, however. (first part o f  move 2 in [15a]) is not translated in [15b], so 
move 2 is not split. The second difference is in the paratext in [15b], included both 
early in the text and in the footnotes. Both kinds o f  paratext are very common in the 
translation o f  the sub-corpus (French judgm ents) and is the only main shift in the 
moves between STs and TTs, which are otherwise very similar throughout the sub­
corpus.
;i5b ]
Cour de Cassation - Première Chambre Civile 26 mai 1999 
[Supreme Court - First Civil Part 26 May 1999]
Aar/ Gmiô// v. TTier/MO Serv/ce et a/.
Translation £fl by Charles Sant' Elia 1**1
M ove 1: Identifying the case
CIV. I D.G
COUR DE CASSATION  
Public Hearing o f  26 May 1999 
M. LEMONTEY, Chief Justice 
Appeal No. P97-14.315
M ove 4: Paratext
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French Republic 
In the Name o f the French People
The SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS. First Civil Part, has
rendered the following judgment.
On the appeal brought by the company Karl Schreiber GmbH 
[seller], whose principal office is Postrach, 1540 5908 Neunkirchen 
(Germany), appealing a judgment entered on 21 November 1996 by 
the Court o f Appeals o f  Aix-en-Provence (2nd chamber), in favor
of:
- Therm o Dynamique Service company [buyer], whose principal 
office is 215 Route de Marseille, 83000 Toulon,
- Damstahl France company, whose principal office is 28, avenu 
Maréchal Foch, 92260 Fontenay-aux-Roses, and
- Lyonnaise de Banque company, whose principal office is 8 rue de 
la République, 69001 Lyon, respondents to the appeal.
[Seller] invokes, in support o f  its appeal, the sole grounds for setting 
aside the judgment, annexed to the present judgment.
The COURT, assembled pursuant to article L. 131-6, paragraph 2, o f  
the Code o f  Judicial Organization, at the public hearing o f  7 April 
1999, where were present, M. Lemontey, C hief Justice, M. Durieux, 
Rapporteur Appellate Judge, M. Renard-Payen, Appellate Judge, M. 
Gaunet, Attorney General, Mme Aydalot, Clerk o f  the Chamber.
By the report o f M. Durieux, Appellate Judge, the observations o f  
SCP Baraduc and Duhamel, attorney for [seller], o f  Maître 
Choucroy, attorney for [buyer], the conclusions o f  M. Gaunet,
Attorney General, and after having deliberated pursuant to the law.
Informs [seller] o f  the discontinuance o f  its appeal with respect to 
DAMSTAHL FRANCE and LYONNAISE DE BANQUE.
On the sole grounds o f appeal:
- WHEREAS [buyer] had ordered, on 5 August 1992, 196 rolled 
metal sheets from [seller]; delivery took place between 28 October 
1992 and, for the greater part, 4 December 1992; [buyer] revoked 
the contract by letter o f  1 December 1992 principally for the reason 
that the goods did not conform to the order, neither in quantity, nor 
in quality; by its behavior on 15 December 1992 it had established 
an avoidance o f the sale;
M ove 2: Arguing the case 
Sub-m ove (a): Giving a history o f
the case
Sub-m ove (b): Facts as established
by the Cour d 'A ppel
- WHEREAS [seller] challenges the judgment o f  the Court o f  
Appeals o f  Aix-en-Provence, 21 November 1996, for having set 
aside the plea invoked by [seller] on the basis o f  Articles 38 and 39 
CISG, according to [seller's] grounds, that the Court o f  Appeals, 
which found the time between inspection tests performed by [buyer] 
on 9 and 11 November 1992 and the imprecise reporting o f  the 
"non-conformity in the agreed quality, dimensions and quantities" 
made by the [buyer] on 1 December 1992, did not draw the proper 
legal conclusions from its own assertions, in violation o f  the 
aforementioned provisions;
Sub-m ove (c): Presenting the
appellant’s argum ents
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- WHEREAS we find that the Court o f  Appeals only used its 
sovereign discretion in maintaining, after having recalled the 
chronology o f  the facts, that the buyer Aar/ inspected the goods in a 
prompt and normal period o f time, bearing in mind the handling that 
the [goods] required and that [buyer] had  alerted [seller] o f the non- 
conformities within a reasonable time in the meaning o f  Article 
39(1) CISC;
- NOW THEREFORE the grounds for appeal cannot be accepted. 
FOR THESE REASONS:
- REJECTS the appeal; and
- Orders [seller] to pay the costs.
So done and adjudged by the SUPREME COURT o f APPEALS, 
First Civil Part, and pronounced by the presiding Chief Justice
during its public hearing on the twenty-sixth May nineteen hundred 
ninety-nine.
FOOTNOTE
* All translations should be verified by cross-checking against the 
original text. For purposes o f this translation, the Plaintiff- 
Respondent o f  France is referred to as [buyer]; the Defendant- 
Appellant o f  Germany is referred to as [seller]. Amounts in French 
currency (FFeMcA/raMCj) are indicated as [/].
** Charles Sant Elia has a B.A. in Political Science and Italian 
Literature from New York University and studied Political Science 
at the Université degli Studi di Firenze. He received his J.D. from 
Pace University School o f  Law and is admitted to the Bar o f  the 
States o fN ew  York and Connecticut.
Sub-m ove (d): Deriving ratio
decidendi
M ove 3: Pronouncing judgm ent
M ove 4: paratext
Sometimes, as w e have seen in [8a], French judgments present the m oves in a two- 
part interactive cognitive structuring rather than in a linear organization (Bhatia, 
1993:116-7), i.e. tw o moves interact with each other. In [8a] there w ere tw o different 
sub-moves interacting. These sub-moves are presented in [16a] below. "Sub-moves" 
are "Presenting the appellant's arguments" and "Deriving m/zo c/eczc^Wz^':
[16a]
Sur le premier moyen du pourvoi h° 
10.424:
05-
Attendu que la S. ..TC fait grief à l'arrêt d'avoir 
rejeté sa demande en restitution du prix des 
machines défectueuses formée à rencontre du 
fabricant, la société Ge..., et du vendeur 
intermédiaire, la société No... ga..., alors, selon 
le moyen :
1 / que, selon l'article 81.2 de la Convention de
Presenting the
appellant’s argum ents
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Vienne, la partie qui a exécuté le contrat 
totalement ou partiellement peut réclamer 
restitution à l'autre partie de ce qu'elle a fourni 
ou payé en exécution du travail ; qu'a privé sa 
décision de base légale au regard de ce texte la 
cour d'appel qui a condamné le seul vendeur 
français à restituer le prix payé par la S...TC et 
débouté cette dernière à l'égard du fabricant et 
du revendeur allemand, après avoir pourtant 
constaté que la Convention de Vienne 
s'appliquait dans leurs rapports et retenu les 
manquements de ces deux derniers à l'égard de 
l'acquéreur ;
2 / qu'en ne répondant pas au moyen fondé sur 
les dispositions de la Convention de Vienne et 
selon lequel le fabricant qui fournit une
marchandise non conforme est tenu, comme le 
vendeur intermédiaire, de toutes les 
conséquences qui résultent de cette non- 
conformité, la cour d'appel a violé l'article 455 
du nouveau code de procédure civile ;
Et sur le second moyen du pourvoi n° J 05- 
10.424 :
Mais attendu qu'ayant relevé que la S...TC 
réclame le remboursement des sommes 
qu'elle a dû verser à la société P... service 
au titre du contrat pour les livraisons de 
matériel et qu'en conséquence la société 
P... service doit être condamnée à payer à 
la S...TC la somme de 1 105 177,64 
&ancs, soit 160 860,70 euros, en
restitution de ces sommes, la cour d'appel 
a fait ressortir que la demande de la S.. .TC 
n'était pas dirigée contre l'autre partie au 
contrat de vente et a ainsi implicitement 
mais nécessairement écarté le moyen de la 
S...TC fondé sur la nécessaire 
condamnation in solidum des sociétés 
ayant concouru à la réalisation du 
dommage ; que le moyen n'est pas fondé ;
Deriving ratio decidendi
Attendu que la S. ..TC reproche encore à l'arrêt
d'avoir rejeté sa demande au titre du préjudice 
dû pour mauvaise exécution du contrat à 
rencontre du vendeur intermédiaire, la société 
No... ga..., et du fabricant, la société Ge..., 
alors, selon le moyen :
1 / que l'application de la Convention de 
Vienne aux relations entre deux ou plusieurs 
parties implique l'exclusion du droit Rinçais ; 
qu'en reprochant à la S ...TC de ne pas avoir 
fondé sa demande de dommages-intérêts 
dirigée à l'encontre des sociétés No... ga... et 
Ge... sur le terrain quasidélictuel tout en 
admettant par ailleurs que la Convention de 
Vienne s'appliquait dans leurs rapports, la cour 
d'appel a violé par refus d'application des 
dispositions des articles 45 b) et 74 à 77 de la 
Convention de Vienne :
Presenting the
appellant’s arguments
2 / que dès lors qu'elle constatait que la S...TC 
était bien fondée à solliciter réparation des 
préjudices subis par elle du fait des 
manquements commis par les sociétés 
allemandes en application de la Convention de 
Vienne à son égard, la cour d'appel n'a pas tiré 
les conséquences légales de ses constatations
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en déboutant la S...TC de sa demande, en 
violation des dispositions des articles 45 b) et 
74 à 77 de la Convention de Vienne ;
3 / que le juge tranche le litige conformément 
aux règles de droit qui lui sont applicables ; 
qu'à supposer l'action de l'acquéreur
quasidélictuelle, a méconnu l'article 12 du 
nouveau code de procédure civile la cour 
d'appel qui, pour rejeter la demande de 
dommages-intérêts pour retard dans 
l'exécution du contrat, a retenu que l'acquéreur 
n'avait pas fondé son action sur le fondement
quasidélictuel lorsqu'il lui appartenait 
statuer après avoir donné elle-même 
fondement juridique à la demande ;
de
Mais attendu, en premier lieu, que la cour 
d'appel, devant laquelle la S...TC sollicitait 
l'application de l'article 10 du marché 
prévoyant expressément la sanction de 
retards pris dans l'exécution, a pu retenir, 
sans encourir les griefs des deux premières 
branches, que cette réclamation ne pouvait 
être faite qu'à la société P... service avec 
laquelle elle était seule liée par le contrat 
en vertu de la clause pénale convenue ;
Deriving ratio decidendi
Attendu, en second lieu, que la cour
d'appel, si elle pouvait rechercher elle- 
même la règle de droit applicable au litige, 
n'en avait pas l'obligation dès lors que le 
demandeur avait précisé le fondement 
juridique de sa prétention ;
The sub-moves "Presenting the appellant's arguments" and "Deriving rarzo 
é/ecWeWz" alternate each other. The Court answers to each o f  the appellant's 
arguments and so derives the rafzo aKgczY/gWz on which its decision w ill be based after
each argum ent. The interactive move-structure is kept in the translation, in [16b]:
[16b]
|B] The first ground o f  |Buyer]'s Appeal 
no. J 05-10.424
[Buyer] has complained about the decision o f  
the Court o f Appeal having rejected its claim
for restitution o f the price o f the defective 
machines against Company Ge... [the 
M anufacturer o f the machines], and against 
the intermediary. Company No... GA...
[Buyer]'s grounds for complaint are:
1. Citing Art. 81(2) CISG which provides that 
a party who has performed the contract either 
wholly or in part may claim restitution from 
the other party o f  whatever the first party has 
supplied or paid under the contract, [Buyer] 
alleges that the Court o f Appeal has deprived 
its decision o f  a legal basis when it ordered 
only the French seller to restitute the price 
paid by [Buyer] while dismissing the claims 
against the manufacturer [Company Ge...] and
Presenting the appellant’s 
arguments
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the German intermediary [Company GA], 
aRer having found the CISG to be applicable 
to their relations and having established the 
breaches by the last mentioned companies 
towards the buyer.
2. [Buyer] alleges that, in not addressing the 
claim based on the provisions o f the CISG 
according to which the producer who delivers 
a non-conforming machine must bear all the 
resulting consequences just like the 
intermediary, the Court o f  Appeal has 
violated Art. 455 o f the new Code o f Civil 
Procedure.
Ruling: W hen finding that [Buyer] claims 
the restitution o f the sums that it had to pay 
to [Seller] on the basis o f the contract for 
the delivery o f  material and that in 
consequence [Seller] would have to pay 
1,105,177.64 F f coming to 160,860.70 
Euros, to [Buyer] in restitution o f these 
sums, the Court o f Appeal has pointed out 
that the claim o f [Buyer] was not against 
the other party to the sales contract and has 
therefore implicitly but necessarily rejected 
the claim o f  [Buyer] which was based on 
the necessary condem nation in solidum [*] 
o f the companies which have concurred in 
the realization o f the damage.
Deriving ratio decidendi
[Buyer]'s claim is unfounded.
[C] The second ground o f  [Buyer]'s Appeal 
no. J 05-10.424
The [Buyer] has also appealed the decision o f  
the Court o f Appeal that rejected its claim for 
damages for defective performance against
the intermediary. Company No. GA..., and 
against Company Ge... [the M anufacturer o f 
the machines].
[Buyer]'s grounds for this aspect o f the appeal
1. The application o f the CISG to the relations 
between two or more parties implies the 
exclusion o f French law; that in reproaching 
the [Buyer] for not having based its claim  for 
damages against companies No...GA... and 
Ge on quasi-tortious liability while at the 
same time admitting that the CISG was 
applicable to their relations, the Court o f  
Appeal has violated the provisions o f Art. 
45(b) and Art. 74 to 77 CISG by refusing to 
apply them.
Presenting the appellant’s 
arguments
2. After having found, in applying the CISG, 
that [Buyer] was justified in seeking
reparation o f the damage incurred caused by 
the breaches committed by the German 
companies, the Court o f  Appeal has not 
drawn the proper legal consequences from its 
findings by rejecting the claim o f [Buyer] in 
violation o f  the provisions o f  Art. 45(b) and 
Arts. 74 to 77 CISG.
3. A judge is to decide a dispute in conformity 
with the rules o f the applicable law. Even
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assuming the claim o f the buyer to be quasi- 
tortious, the Court o f Appeal misconceived 
Art. 12 o f  the new Code o f  Civil Procedure by 
concluding that, in order to reject the claim 
for damages for delayed contract execution, 
the buyer has not founded its claim on a 
quasi-tortious basis although it should have 
decided the claim after having found the legal 
basis itself
Deriving ratio decidendiRating: The Cour de Cassation rules that:
f/r jf , the Court o f Appeal before which 
[Buyer] sought the application o f  Art. 10 o f  
the agreement, which provides explicitly 
for the sanction o f  delay in the execution, 
could find without facing the first two 
complaints that such a claim could only be 
made against the [Seller] which is the only 
one obliged by the contract with regards to 
the penalty clause agreed on;
SecoMc/, the Court o f Appeal, although it 
could itself have looked for the rule o f law 
applicable to the dispute, did not have the 
obligation to do so since the claimant 
specified the legal basis o f its claim.
It can be noted above that the m oves rem ain the sam e, only the m eans o f  expression to 
signal the moves change (as discussed in previous sections). The judgments in [15a/b] 
and [16a/b] are representative o f  the translation o f  the moves in the corpus, which do 
not shift in translation, although they can be signalled in a different way, as in [16  
a/b]̂ *̂  or can "lose" their signal as in [6b] above.
The next section shows a different kind o f  shift which occurs in som e judgments o f  
the corpus: a change o f  purpose between the ST and the TT can lead the translator to 
make a different kind o f  shift: to update an outdated original text.
4.1.5 Paratext used to update the ST
If a TT is produced to inform the readers and its ST is outdated, the latter may need 
some updating when translated for a particular informative purpose. An extract from 
an article published in the Pakistani newspaper T/ze 7rz6zzzze on 20 October
2010 by George Fulton [17a] and its French translation, published in a French weekly, 
CozzzTzer zzzferzzafzozza/ [17b] dated 18-24 November 2010 can help illustrate what is 
meant by updating here:
The different ways to signal moves in the ST/TT of this judgment has been dealt above, when 
analysing [8a] and [8b] in section 4.1.2.
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17al
My recent brush with Death was so close I practically saw his cloak and scythe. 
After passing the Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine I heard a loud, dull thud. Twin 
suicide bombers had blown themselves up by the entrance, killing at least 10 
people and injuring 60.
The French translation follows (brackets in original, emphasis added):
[17b]
J'ai récemment ftôlé la mort de si près que j'ai pratiquement vu sa cape et sa 
faux. Je venais de passer le mausolée d'Adbullah Shah Ghazi quand j'ai entendu 
une énorme explosion. Deux kamikazes s'étaient fait sauter à l'entrée, faisant au 
m o in s d ix  m o rts  e t so ix an te  b le ssés . [C’était le 7 octobre 2010. Depuis, le 
mausolée de Baba Farid, un important centre soufi, a également été attaquée 
le 25 octobre ]
The French translation in [ 17b] contains un updating on the situation: ("That happened
on 7 O ctober 2010. Since then, the Baba Farid shrine, an im portant Sufi centre, was 
also attacked on 25 October"). The translator or the magazine editors felt the need to 
update the reader on the situation in Pakistan, writing about an event happened 
between the moment in w hich the original article w as w ritten and the m om ent in 
w hich the translation w as drafted.
A striking example o f  updating o f  a similar kind taken ft"om the corpus is given below  
in [18], where the informative need pursued in the TT has required some updating o f  
the ST. There is in fact a time lapse between the issuing o f  a judgment and its 
translation. This lapse can be o f  several months or even years in the judgments which  
constitute the sub-corpus in the first scenario. There is o f  course the possibility that an 
informative TT is intended as a kind o f  "facsimile" o f  the original ST, in which case 
these kinds o f  "update" would be outside the translation brief However, the purpose 
o f  the translation here is different: the reader is to be informed on how national courts 
in a number o f  countries settle certain commercial disputes, so there is no point in 
keeping a formal correspondence between ST and TT if the original text is outdated or 
lacks some subsequent information considered important for the purpose o f  the
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translation, "subsequent" here meaning an event which originated between the date 
on which the TT was produced and the moment at which the ST was written. 
Examples o f  such "updates" can be found in many o f  the translations making up the 
sub-corpus for the first scenario, that o f  two countries in which different legal systems 
are in force and two different languages are spoken. The majority o f  the translated 
judgments which have been analysed show some new informative elements when 
compared to the ST. Three exam ples o f  "new" elem ents in the TT  are given in this 
section.
In the case o f  judgments by lower courts, this new information can include a later 
judgment by a Cowr which has upheld or reversed those judgments. An
example o f  this can be found in [18] below, taken from a translated judgment 
originally issued in French by the z/g cozM/Mercg in Aix-en-Provence. The
judgment, issued on 7 December 2003, was subsequently reversed by the Cowr 
in Aix-en-Provence on 1 July 2005.
The new information included in the TT is what Genette calls "paratext", i.e. some 
productions which accompany the text, such as an author’s name, a title, a preface, 
illustrations which surround and extend the text (Genette 1997:1). The function o f  the 
paratext is "to [ ...]  [the text], in the usuai sense o f  this verb but also in the
strongest sense: to zzza^ to ensure the text’s presence in the world, its
'reception’ and consumption" (Genette 1997:1, emphasis in the original). The extract 
below contains some o f  the paratext appearing on the same page as the TT but before 
the translation proper o f  the judgment; this kind o f  metadata always introduces the 
database o f  translated judgments published on the website o f  the Queen Mary Case 
Translation Programme:
[18]
Case Identification
DATE OF DECISION: 20030107 (7 January 2003)
JURISDICTION: France
TRIBUNAL: T rib u n a l de c o m m erce  [C o m m erc ia l C o u rt] d’Aix-en-Provence
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JUDGE(S): M. Joseph Brissac (president); M. Patrice Caillat, MM. Nathalie Robin 
(juges); Me. Elisabeth Andre (greffier)
CASE NUMBERmOCKET NUMBER: 2002 005972
CASE NAME: U n av a ilab le
CASE HISTORY: 2d instance Cour d’appel d'Aix-en-Provence 1 Julv 2005 
[reversing]
SELLER'S COUNTRY: Spain (plaintiff)
BUYER'S COUNTRY: France (defendant)
GOODS INVOLVED: Footwear
As can be seen above, the short case history mentions that since the Tribunal de 
cozMZMgrce zC/^zx-gzz-fz-ovgzzcg issued the judgment on 7 January 2003, the case has 
been tried again by the Cowz- <7Wz%-gzz-fz'ovgzzcg on 1 July 2005 and that the
decision has been reversed. A lso, there is a hyperlink to that second judgment on the 
case.
Following a similar pattern, a judgment by the Cowz" &  Caĵ ĵ a/zozz issued on 7 
February 1986, translated and posted by the University o f  Texas at Austin, mentions
the subsequent judicial decisions which are linked to the translated judgment ([19] 
below, Appendix 10 for the full judgment):
[19]
Subsequent Developments
This note on subsequent developments reflects the legal situation as of October 2004.
Assemblée plénière, 7 February 1986 : S ev era l ju d g m e n ts  d e liv e red  su b seq u en tly , 
principally by the third civil chamber, have confirmed and even extended this 
solution: Civ 3, 14 November 1991, Bull no 271 (contractual nature o f the action by a 
site owner against the manufacturers and the sellers of materials used for a 
development), 26 May 1992, Bull no 168 ("a sub-purchaser has all the rights and 
rights of action attached to a thing which belonged to its creator and has a right of 
action in contract against the contractors founded on a breach of their obligations 
towards the site owner") or, more recently, Civ 3, 12 December 2001 (pourvoi no 00- 
14.671), which repeats exactly the solution put forward in 1986.
The above text is posted after the translation proper o f  the judgment, on the same 
page.
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Information o f  a different nature is provided in another translated judgment. After 
informing the reader that there are no further decisions issued by the Cowr z/g 
confirming or contradicting the translated judgment, the reader is informed 
that the French doctrine on the matter is different ftom the American one, gives some 
details on these differences and provides a commentary on the matter. Example [20] 
below contains the relevant part (Appendix 11 for the full judgment):
[20]
Subsequent Developments
As at the 1st August 2007, there has been no judgment by the Cour de cassation to 
confirm or contradict this judgment.
Contrary to American doctrine, the Cour de cassation does not accept the principle of 
total immunity of the arbitrator. The arbitrator is subject to two different regimes, one 
characterising his function as a judge (immunity) and the other (regime of the 
co/MZMzzM) that of a party to an arbitration contract. It is in respect of this role of the 
arbitrator that the Cour de cassation has just made a determination and recognised 
civil responsibility on the part of an arbitrator for breach o f a strict duty.
The arbitrator has a general obligation of diligence in the exercise of his commission, 
and this obligation can only be a duty of care (o6%afzoM z/g zwoygziy), but it implies 
secondary obligations, one of which is a strict duty to deliver the arbitration award 
during the initial period.
But the preceding case law seems to indicate that the arbitrator's exercise of his 
commission ought not to be unduly disturbed by the fear that liability on his part will 
arise too easily.
Certain French legal writers have regretted that no mention is made of the role played 
by the parties who sometimes dissociate themselves from the procedure, or tacitly 
want to suspend it.
This is a clear example o f  how a particular purpose can influence translation. In the 
extract above the relationship between the TT and its reception in the target system  
(the USA in this case) is emphasised, in that a US perspective is used to "read" the 
French judicial doctrine regarding the arbitrator and so a comparative perspective is 
adopted. The reason for this is that this translation is posted on a US website lor 
information purpose and the translator may have considered it useful to add a 
comparative note between American and French doctrine for American readers. So the 
change o f  purpose between ST and TT has clearly alfected the inclusion o f  paratext 
here.
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The three extracts o f  this section are examples o f  shifts, in Popovic’s terms (1970:79): 
the TTs contain new elements if  compared with their STs.
This case study belongs to the first scenario o f  this thesis: that o f  two countries in 
which two different languages are spoken and in which two different legal systems are 
in force. The case study has aimed at analysing whether the macrostructure o f  STs has 
been kept in translation. In particular, the English translations o f  four locutions which 
are crucial for the cohesion o f  the macrostructure o f  French judgments were analysed: 
arfgWzz grwg (in 247 judgments), a/rezzz/w g'wg (in 170 judgments), .ywr eg and par  
ggj zzzarz/̂  (these last two analysed together in 13 judgments). The m^ority o f  
translators kept the ST’s macrostructure in their TTs. A  minority, however, changed it, 
mainly for one o f  three reasons: i) some translators found solutions which were 
similar to the genre conventions in place in the countries where the TL is spoken -  in 
this respect, given the origin o f  the corpus sources (described in Chapter 3), it was not 
possible to make a sharp distinction between American and English conventions, but 
some comments were made on a case-by-case basis; ii) to make some semantic signals 
understandable across languages given the differences in the genre conventions 
between the source and the target cultures, and iii) to give new information to the T T ’s 
reader which was not available when the ST was produced. The m acrostructure o f  the 
judgments was also analysed in translation: the sequence o f  the m oves remained 
virtually unchanged. The next section aims at analysing Canadian judgments to 
analyse similar issues in the secondo scenario, that o f  a plurilingual country (English  
and French in this case), with a mixed legal system.
I l l
4.2 Scenario 2 - Structure o f  Canadian judgm ents in translation -  
French <— ► English
In the previous section, French judgments were the focus o f  analysis. This section will 
focus on Canada. Unlike France, Canada has two official languages. The majority o f  
Canadian provinces are English-speaking; one. N ew  Brunswick, is officially bilingual 
(English- and French-speaking) and one, Quebec, is French-speaking. Quebec is also 
different in another respect: unlike the rest o f  Canada -  which follows the Common 
Law -  justice in Quebec is governed according to the so-called Civil Law.
Each Canadian province has its own law and each province has its own judicial 
jurisdiction. At federal level, however, law is uniform in that federal legislation 
applies to all provinces. Also, federal courts (Supreme Court o f  Canada, Federal Court 
o f  Canada, Federal Court o f  Appeal) have jurisdiction over the whole o f  Canada. This 
means that a judgment issued by a provincial court can be appealed and brought 
before a federal court. That is why Canada belongs to the second scenario o f  this 
thesis: it has one common legal system (at federal level), but also different legal 
systems (at provincial level) and o f  course is bilingual, so it represents a mixed legal 
system. Two case studies are the focus o f  this section: in the first one an analysis is 
presented o f  the macrostructure o f  judgments issued in Quebec by the provincial court 
and translated (from French) into English; the second analyses some judgments issued 
in English at both federal and provincial level and translated into French as 
summaries. For the first case study it can be expected that the macrostructure o f  the 
ST remains similar in the TT because there are some guidelines on the drafting o f  
judgments which are similar all over Canada. For the second study, condensation is 
expected to happen in the TT, with the possible exclusion o f  some parts which are not 
important for the translation purpose.
4.2.1 Judgm ents from Q uebec (C ase study 2)
Justice in Quebec is administered in French and its judgments are issued almost 
exclusively in French. The website o f  the z/'zM/brma/zoMyzznWzgfzzc
(http://s0 quii.qc.ca/ff/en2 lish) contains a number o f  unofficial English translations o f  
these judgments. The website does not give details on the identities o f  the translators. 
In order to try to give an answer to the first research question (scenario 2), ninety
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translations found on this website and issued by the Cowr &  a provincial
court, have been analysed and compared with their respective STs to detect any 
change o f  macrostructure between STs and TTs, but no variation has been observed.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the macro structures o f  tw o judgm ents and that o f  their 
respective TTs. These judgments share common features with the macrostructure o f  
other decisions by the Cowr z/g (apart ftom some headings such as "Za
frcMve", "5'zYwarzoz7 Cozpoz-a/^zve" or "Za Zzèce D-22, Dec/az-afzozz c/c /'ac/zbzzzzazz"c 
unique de Inter”, w hich are peculiar to the case A llard c. M yhill). In both tables bold 
characters reproduce headings as they are in the judgments. Normal characters are a 
description o f  different moves o f  the judgments.
Table 4.5 M acrostructures o f a judgm ent (R. v. K airouz) issued by the Cour de Québec (a Canadian 
provincial court) and its translation into English.
O riginal judgm ent Translation into English
Unofficial English Translation —  Not V erified  
by the Court of Q uebec
Name o f  court Name o f  court
Citation Citation
Place Place
Docket no. Case number
Judgm ent Date Judgment Date
Name o f  judge Name o f  judge
Name o f  parties Name o f  parties
V erdict V erdict
129 numbered paragraphs containing: 129 num bered paragraphs containing:
Les Faits The facts
Les dispositions législatives Legislative provisions
Les prétentions des parties Contentions o f the parties
L 'analyse A nalysis
PO U R  CES M O TIFS, LA COUR
Decision
T H EREFO R E, THE COURT
Decision
As can be noted, there is an absolute formal correspondence in terms o f  
macrostructure between STs and TTs, save for the paratext "Unofficial English 
translation".
13
Table 4.6 M acrostructures o f a judgm ent (A llard 
translation into English.
c. Myhill) issued by the Cour de Quebec and its
Original judgm ent Translation into English
Unofficial English Translation
N am e o f court Name o f court
Place Place
Docket no. Docket no.
Judgment Date Judgment Date
Name o f  judge Name o f  judge
Name o f  parties Name o f  parties
Jugem ent Judgm ent
225 numbered paragraphs containing: 225 numbered paragraphs containing:
Préam bule Pream ble
Les Faits The facts
Q uestions en litige Issues
La Preuve The Evidence
Situation Corporative Corporate Situation
La Pièce D-22, Déclaration de l'actionnaire  
unique de Inter
Exhibit D-22, D eclaration by the single 
shareholder o f Inter
D octrine et Jurisprudence soum ise par les 
Dem andeurs
Authorities subm itted by the Plaintiffs
D octrine et Jurisprudence soum ise par les 
Défendeurs
Authorities subm itted by the Defendants
La Loi The CBCA
Discussion et Analyse Discussion and A nalysis
Conclusion Conclusion
D ispositif Disposition
PO U R  CES M OTIFS, LA C O UR
Decision
FOR THESE REASO NS, THE COURT  
Decision
D octrine et jurisprudence soumise par les 
dem andeurs
A uthorities Subm itted by the Plaintiffs
D octrine et jurisprudence soum ise par les 
défendeurs A uthorities Subm itted by the Defendants
Before trying to suggest a reason for this correspondence it is worth recalling the 
production by the Canadian Citation Committee o f  a "Canadian Guide to the Uniform  
Preparation o f  Judgments", already mentioned in Chapter 2 (2.3.4). The guide deals 
with many different points, from file names to inclusion o f  graphics, ftom corrections 
to typesetting, but what is relevant for this thesis is the judgment structure and content. 
The Guide states that there are mandatory and optional elements in a judgment and 
that most o f  them should be preceded by a label in order to be recognized. The Guide 
applies to all courts, federal and provincial. The locutions identified in French 
judgments and discussed in section 4.1 are not present in Canadian judgments, so 
m oves are signalled otherwise. The mandatory and optional elements are listed in the 
Ibllowing tables 4.7 and 4.8 respectively, taken from the Canadian Guide to the 
Uniform Preparation o f  Judgments:
T ab le  4.7 M andatory elem ents in Canadian judgments, taken from the Canadian G uide to the Uniform 
Preparation o f Judgm ents, English version (2002).
Mandatory elements 
(mandatory presence and sequence)
7,1 (ïlOîlô)
_ a m - ,
Cour Supérieure 
Canada
Province de Québec
7.2 Neutral Citatbn Citation:/Piféte nee : Citation: 2 002 NBCÂ 402 orCitation: R v. Van MmMn. 3003 NBCA 402
7.3 Date:JDate ; Date;it)02042l
7,4 DotWtnwAer Docket :DossW : Docket: C983H9
7,5
Eegjatiy (mmdalory 
oidyifspplic^le) Registry:/GreiTe :
Re gist jy: Vancouver
7,6 sf  cause
Between:/Entie : or 
Parties:/?aities : or 
In the Matter oflDans Tafiaiffi de
Between:
Her Majesty the Queen, Resj®ndent 
-a n d -  
Lang V an N guyen, Ap^Omt
7,7
Translation Notice
(mmdatoiy cmly if 
applk«fele)
[Official English trassktkai] 
/[traduction française officiefle]
[Offre ial English transJatbrO
Transktbn certified true on thas 17^ day of
February 2000.
Maria Klein, revisor.
7.8
FubBcaüD» rw UW en 
iw>&« (muddory only 
ifftpptobk)
Restriction o n publication: 
/Publicationrastteinte;
Restriction on publicatbn; The p*hcation of these 
reasons is prohibited until fW W  or&r emd these 
reasons are not to be deliveted m open court.
7,9
Cdnectbni^tke
(nwudatojyonlyif
applk«ble)
Com cted judgment:
/Jugement corrigé: or 
Revised judgment: 
/Jugement rectifié :
Refrised Judgment:
The text of the judgment has boen corrected
accordingly to the appended comgmwkm (released 
No /̂ember 29,2001).
7.10 N am e# o f j i^ < s )  
hean ig  &e matter
(any consistent and mcanmgfrd label 
deemed appropriate by the court, e.g. 
“Judge “Coram:”)
Jm%e: W.J, Quinn, Master in Chambers or 
Coram: Jirstices Moiden, Carthy and Moldaver 
JJ.A.
T ab le  4.8 Optional elem ents in Canadian judgm ents, taken from the Canadian Guide to the Uniform 
Preparation o f Judgm ents, English version (2002).
8.1
bates and p i s e  »l 
healing, W W tef
dates
(any label tk t  difFemniittes it ftom 
the judgment date)
Appeal heard on October 6, 7 aM 8, 199'J, in 
Vancouver, B.C.
Written reasons: Janumy 11,1998
8.2
Case erigm or jtilteial 
histoiy
On appeal 5 m  :?En app31 & : 
or
On judicial review from:
/En révision judiciaire de ;
On appeal from: à  'loir first 
murder by Justice James M, Cbnmlly, with a jury, 
dated January 31, 2001 (2001 BCSC 34, Docket: 
CC981332, Registry: Vancmrvei).
8.3 Dispasitmm
Held:/Arrêt : 
or
Disposition:/Dispositif :
Held: For the reasons given, the appealb dismissed 
with costs.
8.4 Reasons
(any consistent aid meaningful 
heading deemed appmpAte by the 
court)
Reasons for iudgtnent 
or
By the Court;
8.5 Names o f ceiM tl
Appeamc8s:/0nt compam :or 
Solicitors:/Pracunum : or 
Counsel :/Avo cats :
Appearances:
Mr, Robert W. Smith, For the Appfent 
Mr, Marcel Trudel For the Respondeat
8.6 Appendices Appendix n:/Amxe in ]  : or Schedule [n]:
Appendix A: Eidubit #3
8.7
Cover and hackbig 
sheets (none)
15
Also, the Guide prescribes that the text o f  the judgment should be set out in 
paragraphs, each paragraph numbered using consecutive Arabic numerals placed 
between square brackets.
The ninety judgments which make up the sub-corpus o f  judgments issued by the Cowr 
6/g gweAec all contain the mandatory elements and many o f  the optional elements. 
Headings -  or labels, as the Guide calls them -  introducing the elements, however, 
may be different. The Guide itself leaves a certain ifeedom  to judges as far as these 
headings are concerned. For instance, as regards reasons, the Guide prescribes: "The 
reasons begin with any consistent and meaningful heading deemed appropriate by the 
court, such as 'Judgment', 'Memorandum o f  Judgment', 'Reasons for Order', or 'By 
the Court'" (Canadian Citation Committee:2002). The judgments in the sub-corpus 
have indeed different headings marking the sequence o f  moves.
Given these standards, it can be assumed that the translators did not consider it 
appropriate to change the sequence o f  these elements with which also the English- 
speaking Canadian reader would be familiar and which mark the same moves in both 
the STs and the TTs. Judgments in this Court can be written in French and/or English, 
so the genre conventions are the same. This is a case o f  standardisation, very different 
from the situation o f  the first scenario.
The absolute formal correspondence between the STs and the TTs found above will 
not be a feature o f  the next case study, in which the STs are translated as summaries.
4.2.2 The TT as a sum m ary o f  the ST (Case study 3)
Sometimes, as we have seen in previous case studies, there may be cases in which the 
translator chooses not to adopt a formal correspondence between ST and TT. In this 
section one o f  these cases is analysed.
For a particular purpose, the translator may choose or be asked to write a summary o f  
the ST rather than reproducing it completely. For judgments, this purpose can be to 
convey the essential points o f  the ST to a lay readership. This is what has been done in 
the sub-corpus o f  Canadian judgments which is analysed in this section. In this case, 
in contrast to the guidelines for the macrostructure o f  judgments (as in 4.2.1), there is
no guidance on producing French-language summaries for English-language 
judgments, hence the variation.
Before moving to the analysis, it is worth recalling some concepts already mentioned 
in Chapter 2 (particularly in section 2.4.5): a text originally written for an expert can 
be translated to produce a TT aimed at a legal expert or a lay readership. A ST written 
by a legal expert for a legal expert (for instance by a judge for a judge) creates what 
Stolze defines a "fachinterne Kommunikation" (1999:126), while a communication 
between an expert and an "interested layman" is a "fachexteme Kommunikation" 
(1999:131). This change ftom communication between experts to communication 
between expert and layman can produce a change in terminology but also in the 
overall structure o f  the text, the macrostructure, as w ill be apparent ftom the analysis 
o f  the judgments in the subcorpus. Both these changes will be analysed below. Before 
dealing with the changes, the judgments included in the sub-corpus and the purpose o f  
the summaries w ill be described. The first group o f  summaries in the sub-corpus is 
published on the website o f  a French-speaking association o f  lawyers based in N ova  
Scotia, Canada, the AJEFNE. This association and the summaries published on its 
website are described in the next section. Later, another website containing the 
translation o f  a judgment as a summary will be described.
One o f  the main purposes o f  AJEFNE is to promote legal knowledge among the 
Acadian and other French-speaking com m unities in Canada, especially to create 
awareness o f  their rights. In order to do so, the association's website contains a range 
o f  material: statute laws, documents explaining different legal procedures and 
citizens' rights and summaries o f  20 judgments.
These judgments have been specifically chosen by the association for their importance 
for and impact on the Acadian and French-speaking community, because the AJEFNE 
considers it important that these judgments, having relevance for the linguistic rights 
o f  these communities, are widely known^^. The AJEFNE decided to write a summary 
o f  the judgments rather than a full translation because, given the length o f  judgments
E-mail and telephone contact was made with the two writers o f  the summaries, Nathalie Bordeau and 
Jeanne-Françoise Caillaud, who kindly answered my questions on why these particular judgments were 
chosen and what the purpose o f the translations/summaries was.
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in Canada, only a few people would take the time to read them and so only a few  
people would be aware o f  judicial decisions which have a potential impact on their 
life. So, TTs in the form o f  summaries rather than whole translations serve better the 
purpose o f  disseminating knowledge in this case, especially to a largely lay audience. 
Members o f  the public are the target readers but, according to one o f  the TT producers 
(personal communication), even some lawyers can benefit from their reading.
Fourteen out o f  those twenty summaries have been analysed^^ -  together with their 
respective STs -  in order to see how the TTs' purpose influenced the change o f  
macrostructure.
In the following pages two tables (4.9 presented in three parts -  4.9a, 4.9b and 4.9c -  
and table 4.10 presented in two parts -  4.10a and 4.10b) show the macrostructure o f  
the original judgments and that o f  the summaries. The judgments have been issued by 
different courts: some are federal, some are provincial and the different role these 
courts play is reflected in the different moves, marked by different headings. For ease 
o f  reference, STs are numbered sequentially as la , 2a, 3a, etc. and TTs as lb , 2b, 3b, 
etc, respectively. Bold characters reproduce headings as they are in judgments. 
Normal characters are a description o f  different parts o f  the judgments.
The STs o f  the six summaries which have been omitted from the analysis were in French and 
therefore not relevant here.
Table 4.9a M acrostructure o f  14 Canadian judgm ents issued in English, a sum mary o f  which has been 
published on the AJEFNE's website in French. Bold characters reproduce headings as they are in
judgm ents. N orm al characters are a description o f different parts o f the judgm ents.
la 2a 3a 4a 5a
R. V.  Beau lac, 1999 
Supreme Court o f  
Canada
Doucet V.  Canada, 
2004
Suprem e Court o f  
Canada
Doucet-Boudreau v. 
Nova Scotia (M inister  
o f Education), 2003 
Suprem e Court o f 
Canada
R. V.  M acKenzie, 
2004
Nova Scotia Court o f  
Appeal
R. V.  Potvin, 2004 
Court o f  Appeal for 
Ontario
Citation Citation Citation Citation Citation
Name o f  the parties Name o f  the parties Name o f the parties Name o f  the Court, 
name o f the parties, 
name o f  the judges
Name o f  the Court 
Name o f solicitors
Judgment Date Name of the Court and 
Judgment Date
Judgment Date Judgment Date Judgment Date
Indexing o f main 
points discussed in the 
case
Indexing o f  main 
points discussed in the 
case
Indexing o f  main 
points discussed in the 
case
Short history o f  the 
judicial decisions
Short history o f the 
case and previous 
judicial decisions
Short history o f the 
case and previous
judicial decisions
Held:
(Court's decision)
Held:
(Court's decision)
Held:
(Court's decision)
Held: (Court's 
decision)
List of citations: 
cases, statutes and 
regulations, authors
List o f  citations: 
cases, statutes and 
regulations, authors
List o f citations: 
cases, statutes and 
regulations, authors
Counsel: (Names o f  
solicitors)
k r  ^ e
decision
RMiMm * e
decision
Reasons for 
judgment
1. General 
Introduction and 
Procedural History
The facts I. Background and 
Judicial History
2. Relevant 
Constitutional and 
Legislative Provisions
Issue II. Issues Issues I. The right to a trial 
in the offieial 
language o f the 
accused
3. Legislative 
Interpretation
Legislative and 
regulatory provisions
HI. Charter 
Provisions
4. Procedural 
Considerations
Analysis IV. Analysis II. Trial proeeedings 
HI. Analysis
5. The Remedy Remedy
6. Summary Costs
7. Disposition JUDGMENT V. Disposition IV. Conclusion
APPENDIX
(Extracts o f  statute
laws)
Reasons:
Names o f  solicitors Names o f  solicitors
Length in words: 
14.021
Length in words: 
26,015
Length in words: 
25,947
Length in words: 
12,486
Length in words: 5,180
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Table 4.9b M acrostructure o f  14 Canadian judgm ents issued in English, a sum mary o f  which has been 
published on the AJEFNE's website in French. Bold characters reproduce headings as they are in
judgm ents. N orm al characters are a description o f different parts o f  the judgm ents.
6a 7a 8a 9a 10a
R. V.  Deveaux, 1999 
Supreme Court o f 
Nova Scotia
Schneider, v. R., 2003 
Suprem e Court o f  
Nova Scotia
R. V.  Schneider, 2004  
Nova Seotia Court o f 
Appeal
Charlebois v. Mowat 
et ville de M oncton, 
2001
Court o f  Appeal o f  
New Brunswick
Charlebois v. Saint 
John (City), 2005  
Supreme Court o f  
Canada
Citation Citation Citation Citation Citation
Name o f  the Court, 
name o f the pmtie^ 
name o f the judge, 
pk^e
Name o f  the Court, 
name o f  the parties,
name o f the judge
Name o f the Court, 
name o f  the parties, 
name o f  the judge
Name o f  the Court, 
name o f the parties, 
name o f appealed case
Name o f  the Court, 
date, name o f  the 
parties, name o f  the 
judges
Date o f  hearing. 
Judgment Date
Date o f  hearing. 
Judgment Date
Date o f  hearing. 
Judgment Date
Held: (C ourt’s 
decision)
D ^  o f  hœrm& 
Judgment Date
Name o f  the judges
Counsel: (Nam es o f 
solicitors)
Counsel: (Names of 
solicitors)
Counsel: (Nam es o f 
solicitors)
Decision Short history o f  the 
œ æ  ^ d  p ^ ^ m #  
judicial decisions
Held:
(Court’s decision)
List o f  citations: 
cases, statutes and 
regulations, authors 
Name o f  solicitors
I. Introduction I. Introduction
II. General 
Considerations
HI. Background
1. Introduction
II. Issues IV. Relevant 
Constitutional and 
Legislative Provisions
Fa#s
Account o f  previous
trial
Introduction
Background
V. Issues 2. Issues
Issues HI. Analysis VI. Analysis
VII. Application of 
the Charter to 
M unicipalities-  
Paragraph 32(1 )(h)
VIII. Provincial 
Governm ent’s 
Obligation to 
Legislate
3. Analysis
4. The Scope o f  
Section 22
The Law IX. The Remedv
Decision Analysis
Disposition
IV. Disposition X. Disposition 5. Disposition
Appendix
Relevant
Constitutional and 
Legislative Provisions
Information sheet Name o f  solicitors
Length in words: 2,260 Length in words: 7,030 in wmds:
10,361
Length in words: 
18,277
Length in words: 
14,360
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Table 4.9c M acrostructure o f 14 Canadian judgm ents issued in English, a sum m ary o f  which has been 
published on the AJEFNE's website in French. Bold characters reproduce headings as they are in
11a 12a 13a 14a
Mahe v. Alberta, 1990 
Supreme Court o f Canada
Re M anitoba Language 
Rights, 1985
Supreme Court o f  Canada
Société des Acadiens et 
Acadiennes du Nouveau- 
Brunswick Inc. v. Canada, 
2008 s e e  IS, 2008 
Suprem e Court o f Canada
Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec 
(Attorney General), 2005  
Suprem e Court o f  Canada
Citation Citation Citation Citation
Name o f  the parties 
Judgment Date
Full style o f cause (In the 
m atter o f...)
Name o f  the parties, name o f
the court which previously 
tried the case place and date 
o f previous hearing
Name o f the Court, 
Judgment Date, name o f  the 
parties, name o f  the judges
List o f  main points discussed
in the case
List o f main points discussed 
in the case
Questions to be answered
List o f  main points discussed 
in the case
List o f main points discussed 
in the case
Short history o f the case and
previous judicial decisions
Short history o f the case and 
previous judicial decisions
Short history o f  the case and 
previous judicial decisions
Held:
(Court’s decision)
Held:
(Court’s decision)
Held:
(Court’s decision)
Legal provisions
List o f citations:
cases, statutes and regulations,
authors
Legal provisions 
List o f  citations: 
cases, statutes and 
regulations, authors
statutes and regulations
judicially
considered
cases judieially considered
List o f  citations:
cases, statutes and
regulations, authors
Constitutional Questions 
The Parties and Interveners
Reasons for judgment: 
Overview
The parties to the dispute 
Issues before the Federal 
Court
Order by the Federal 
Court
Background to the events 
Issue before the Federal 
Court o f  Appeal
I. O verview
Facts
Judgments o f the Alberta 
Courts
The Reference 
M anitoba's Language 
Legislation
Legal Challenges to 
M anitoba's Language 
Legislation
II. Origin and Role o f 
Seetion 23 o f  the Canadian 
Charter
HI. Relevant Constitutional 
and Statutory Provisions
Standard o f review
Analysis Analysis IV. Facts
V. Judicial History
VI. Analysis
Remedies
Conclusion Conclusions
Answer to the questions
Disposition VII. Disposition
VIII. Conclusion
Costs
Name o f solicitors Name o f  solicitors Name o f  solicitors
Length in words: 18.687 Length in words: 21,113 Length in words: 4,245 Length in words: 12,199
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Table 4.10a Macrostructure o f  14 summaries o f  Canadian judgments taken from the AJEFNE's 
website
lb 2b 3b 4b 5b 6b 7b
DECISION 
DE LA COUR 
SUPRÊME  
DU CANADA
ENTENDUE  
EN COUR 
FÉDÉRALE
DECISION
DE LA COUR  
SUPRÊME 
DU CANADA
DECISION
DELACOUR
D'APPEL DE 
LA
NOUVELLE-
ÉCOSSE
DECISION 
DELACOUR 
D'APPEL DE 
L'ONTARIO
DECISION
RENDUE
PAR LA
COUR
SUPRÊME
DE LA
NOUVELLE.
ÉCOSSE
DECISION
RENDUE
PAR LA
COUR
SUPRÊM E
DE LA
NOUVELLE
ÉCOSSE
Date o f the 
judgm ent
Date o f  the 
judgment
Date o f  the 
judgm ent
Date o f  the 
judgm ent
Date o f  the 
judgm ent
Date o f the 
judgm ent
Date o f the 
judgment
Name o f  case Name o f  case Name o f  case Name o f  case Name o f  case Name o f case Name o f  ease
Faits Faits Faits Faits Faits Faits Faits
Décision de la 
Cour d'appel
Demandeur
Fondements:
- du défendeur
du
demandeur :
Proeédure :
- le juge de 
première 
instance :
le
défendeur : 
la Cour  
d'appel :
le
défendeur :
Déeision de la 
Cour suprême 
de la 
Nouvelle- 
Écosse :
Fondements:
du
dem andeur :
- du défendeur
Demandeur Demandeur
Problèm e de 
droit
Problème de 
droit
Problèm e de 
droit
Problèm e de 
droit
Problèm e de 
droit
Problème de 
droit
Problème de 
droit
Décision de la 
Cour suprême 
du Canada
La Cour 
fédérale du 
Canada :
La Cour 
suprême du 
Canada :
Décision de la 
Cour d'appel 
de la 
Nouvelle- 
Écosse :
Cour d'appel 
de l'Ontario :
Cour suprême 
de la 
Nouvelle- 
Ecosse b
Cour
surprême de 
la Nouvelle- 
Êcosse
Commentary 
(no heading)
Commentary 
(no heading)
Commentary 
(no heading)
Commentary 
(no heading)
Commentary 
(no heading)
Commentary 
(no heading)
Date o f  posting 
o f summary, 
name of 
summary's 
producer
Date o f posting 
o f summary, 
name o f  
summary's 
producer
Date o f  posting 
o f summary, 
name o f  
summary's 
producer
Date o f  posting 
o f summary, 
name o f  
summary's
producer
Date o f  posting 
o f summary, 
name o f  
summary's 
producer
Date o f  posting 
of summary, 
name of  
summary's 
^ w b œ r
Date o f posting 
o f summary, 
name o f  
summary's
producer
641 words 
(4.57% of 
original)
525 words 
(2.02% of 
original)
566 words 
(2.18% o f  
original)
425 words 
(3.40% o f  
original)
423 words 
(8.16% o f  
original)
273 words 
(12.07% of 
original)
228 words 
(3.24% o f  
original)
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Table 4.10b  
website
Macrostructure o f  17 summaries o f Canadian judgments taken from the AJEFNE's
8b 9b 10b 11b 12b 13b 14b
DECISION
RENDUE  
PAR LA 
COUR
D'APPEL DE 
LA
NOUVELLE-
ÉCOSSE
DECISION
RENDUE
PAR LA 
COUR
D'APPEL DU 
NOUVEAU
BRUNSW ICK
DECISION  
RENDUE 
PAR LA 
COUR  
SUPRÊM E  
DU CANADA
DECISION 
RENDUE  
PAR LA 
COUR 
SUPRÊME 
DU CANADA
DECISION
RENDUE  
PAR LA 
COUR 
SUPRÊME 
DU CANADA
DECISION 
RENDUE 
PAR LA  
COUR 
SUPRÊME 
DU CANADA
DECISION 
RENDUE 
PAR LA 
COUR 
SUPRÊME 
DU CANADA
Date o f  the 
judgm ent
Date o f  the 
judgm ent
Date o f  the 
judgm ent
Date o f  the 
judgm ent
Date o f  the 
judgm ent
Date o f the 
judgm ent
Date o f  the 
judgment
Name o f case Name o f  case Name o f case Name o f case Name o f  case Name o f  case Name o f  case
Faits Faits Fmk Faits Faits Faits Faits
Demandeur Cour du Banc 
de la Reine et 
Cour d'appel :
Fondements:
- demandeurs:
- du défendeur
La Cour du 
banc de la 
reine et la 
Cour d'appel :
Demandeurs: 
Défendeur :
Demandeurs: 
La Cour 
supérieure :
La Cour 
d'appel :
Problèmes de 
droit
Problème de 
droit
Problèm e de 
droit
Problèm e de 
droit
Problèm e de 
droit
Problème de 
droit
Cour suprême 
du Canada :
La Cour 
suprême du 
Canada :
La Cour 
fédérale :
La Cour 
d'appel 
fédérale :
La Cour 
suprême :
Cour d'appel 
de la 
Nouvelle- 
Écosse
Cour d'appel 
du Nouveau- 
Brunswick
La Cour 
suprêm e du 
Canada :
Commentary 
(no heading)
Date o f  posting 
of summary, 
name o f  
summary's
producer
Date o f  posting 
o f summary,
name of
summary's
producer
Date o f  posting 
o f summary, 
name o f  
summary's 
producer
Date o f  posting 
o f summary, 
Mme o f  
summary's
producer
Date o f  posting 
o f summary, 
name of  
summary's 
producer
Date o f  posting 
o f summary, 
name o f  
summary's 
producer
Date o f  posting 
o f summary, 
name o f  
summary's 
producer
275 words 
(4.57% o f  
original)
372 words 
(2.65% o f
original)
274 words 
(1.91% o f  
original)
572 words 
(3.06% o f  
original)
462 words 
(2.19% o f  
original)
574 words 
(13.52% of 
original)
440 words 
(3.60% o f  
original)
As can be seen from tables 4.9a, 4.9b and 4.c, the macrostructure o f  the judgments is 
not identical but very similar, i.e. highly standardised. A s already noted in 4.2.1 and 
particularly in tables 4.7 and 4.8 above, there are some mandatory and optional 
elements which o f  course recur. Most o f  the judgments analysed for this case study 
are issued by the Supreme Court o f  Canada (nos. la, 2a, 3a, 10a, 11a, 12a, 13a and 
14a).
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From tables 4.10a and 4.10b it can be seen that the summaries are between 228 and 
641 words long, accounting lor between 1.91% and 13.52% o f  their respective STs^^. 
The TTs do not attempt to reproduce the original macrostructure, but rather produce a 
macrostructure o f  their own, which is almost consistent in all the Iburteen 
summaries^^:
c/e /a Cowr... ("Judgment by the ... .  Court'');
date;
reference name;
("Facts");
("Appellant") or ("Appellant's cause o f
action");
(/w ("Respondent's cause o f  action");
ûflg ("point o f  law").
For upper courts, information on previous trials on the same case is given, as in 
summary lb: f/g /a Cowr ("Judgment by the Court o f  Appeal");
3b: /gy wgg f/g ̂ rgmzgrg zTtyfaMcg ("the trial judge");
10b: CowA" (/w FoMc afg /a Rgmg gf Cowr 6/'a;c^g/ ("Court o f  Queen's Bench and Court 
o f  Appeal") or
13b: Za Cowr Fg^/gra/g, Za Cowr <7'a^g/yg<7gra/g ("The Federal Court", "The Federal 
Court o f  Appeal").
Some sum m aries have a short commentary at the end.
[21] below is the full summary ( lb  in Table 4.10a above) o f  judgment R. v. Beaulac,
1999 (judgm ent la  in Table 4.9a above) w hich shows the typical macro structure o f  the 
14 summaries included in the sub-corpus (emphasis and typos in the original):
O f course word counts in STs and TTs are rarely identical in any translation because o f  the 
differences in languages, but these data can neverthless be useful to register.
N athalie Bordeau -  one o f the two T T ’s producers -  told me that she wrote the sum m aries according 
to the model she was taught at university (personal communication). Jeanne-Françoise Caillaud, the 
second TT producer continued to use the same model.
124
[21]
Arrêt Beaulac
DÉCISION DE LA COUR SUPRÊME DU CANADA 
du 20 mai 1999 
Affaire Beaulac 
Faks:
M . B eau lac  est a c c u sé  en 1988 de  m e u r tre  au  p rem ie r d eg ré . Il su b it a lo rs  tro is  
procès devant la Cour suprême de la Colombie-Britannique concernant ce meurtre. 
L e p rem ie r p ro cè s  est d éc la ré  nu l ; le seco n d  p ro cè s  est in f irm é  p a r  la C o u r d'appel 
q u i o rd o n n e  u n  n o u v eau  p ro cès . L o rs  du  tro is iè m e  p ro cè s , l'accusé fo rm u le  u n e  
au tre  d e m a n d e  re la tiv e  à  u n  p ro cè s  d ev an t u n  ju g e  et u n  ju ry  p a rla n t les deux  
langues officielles du Canada, en vertu du par. 530 (4) du Coa(g cn/MmeZ. 
Cependant, le juge rqette sa demande et le procès a lieu en anglais. M. Beaulac est 
déclaré coupable. Celui-ci interjette appel.
Décision de la Cour d'appel :
La Cour d'appel de la Colombie-Britannique rejette l'appel de l'accusé et confirme 
la décision rendue par le juge sur la question linguistique en se fondant sur 
l'aptitude de l'accusé à parler l'anglais.
Demandeur :
L e demandeur se p o u rv o it en C o u r su p rêm e  du  C an ad a . Il so u tien t qu'en v ertu  du  
par. 530 (4) du Coc/g cnmzMg/, il dispose du droit à un procès devant un juge et un 
jury parlant les deux langues officielles du Canada.
Problème de droit :
1) D an s le c a s  d'un nouveau p ro cès  , la d em an d e  d o it-e lle  ê tre  fo n d ée  su r le par. 
530 (1) ou sur le par. 530 (4) du Coê/g cnmmg/ ?
2) Le critère retenu par la Cour d'appel justifie t-il le rejet de la demande de 
l'accusé ?
Décision de la Cour suprême du Canada :
La Cour suprême du Canada annule l'arrêt de la Cour d'appel de la Colombie- 
Britannique.
1) Dans un premier temps, la Cour suprême du Canada s'est posée la question à 
savoir lequel des par. 530 (1) ou 530 (4) pouvait s'appliquer dans le cas d'un 
nouveau procès. Selon le par. 530 (1), l'accusé a un droit absolu à l'accès égal aux 
tribunaux désignés dans la langue officielle qu'il estime être la sienne, pourvu qu'il 
présente une demande en temps opportun. Il s'agit d'un droit substantiel et non d̂ un 
droit procédural. Le par. 530 (4), quant à lui, s'applique lorsqu'une demande n'est 
pas présentée à temps. Dans ce cas, le juge dispose d'un pouvoir discrétionnaire de 
faire droit à une demande s'il est convaincu que cela est dans les meilleurs intérêts 
de la justice. La Cour suprême du Canada affirme que le par. 530 (4) doit 
s'appliquer dès lors que l'on doit tenir compte de circonstances particulières lors 
d'un nouveau procès. Par conséquent, en appliquant au cas de l'espèce le par. 530 
(4), la Cour suprême du Canada doit rechercher si le critère retenu par la Cour 
d'appel pour rejeter la demande de l'accusé est légitime.
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2) En se fondant sur le par. 530 (4), l'accusé peut être débouté de sa demande si le 
ministère public apporte la preuve que cette demande n'est pas dans les meilleurs 
intérêts de la justice. La Cour d'appel, pour rejeter la demande, s'est fondée 
exclusivement sur l'aptitude de l'accusé à parler l'anglais. La Cour suprême du 
Canada affirme que ce critère n'est pas valable et ne peut justifier un rejet dans le 
cadre d'une telle demande. Par ailleurs, elle ^oute qu'aucune preuve n'a été 
apportée indiquant que la demande de l'appelant nuirait au bon déroulement du 
procès. Ainsi, en l'absence de motifs pertinents justifiant le refus de faire droit à la 
demande, l'accusé a le droit d'obtenir un procès devant un juge et un jury parlant 
les deux langues officielles du Canada.
En utilisant son pouvoir discrétionnaire, la Cour suprême du Canada vient de 
rendre un arrêt ayant un intérêt fondamental. Par cette décision, la Cour suprême 
du Canada pose le principe selon lequel toute privation du droit prévu au par. 530 
(4) doit être exceptionnelle et doit être justifiée. Cette décision assure efficacement 
le respect des droits de la minorité.
In order to facilitate a contrastive analysis o f  ST and TT, in [22] below, the move- 
structure o f  the English ST, i.e. the judgment in the case R. v. Beaulac ( la  in table 
4.9a) has been identified, based on the terminology proposed by Bhatia (1993:118-36) 
already used in 4.1.4 when analysing French judgments. It can be seen here that some 
o f  the moves are split into two or three, in that they alternate with other moves. Also, 
the history o f  the case and the decision appear twice, the first time briefly and the 
second time m ore in detail:
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[22] M acrostructure of the ST: judgm ent in the case R. v. Beaulac
Move 1: Identifying the .Move 2: Arguing the case M ove 3: Pronouncing Move 4: Additional
case judgm ent information on the case
Citation
Name o f the parties
Judgment Date
Indexing o f main points 
discussed in the case
Sub-move (a): Giving a
(short) history o f the
Short history o f the case 
and previous judicial 
decisions
Held:
(Court’s decision)
Sub-move (b): Deri vine 
rat/o
List o f  citations: 
cases, statutes 
regulations, authors
and
Reasons for the decision
Sub-move (a): Giving a 
(detailed) history o f the
case:
1. General
Introduction and 
Procedural History 
Relevant
Constitutional and 
Legislative 
Provisions 
Legislative 
Interpretation  
Procedural 
Considerations
2 .
3.
4.
Sub-move (c): Presenting
the appellant’s and the 
respondent’s arguments:
5. The Remedy
4
Sub-move lb): Deriving 
ratio decidendi:
Summary
7. Disposition
Names o f  solicitors
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Example [23] shows the sequence o f  moves found in [22] above, i.e. the French 
summary o f  [22]. We can see that the TT has moves o f  its own and that it summarises 
sub-moves which are split in the ST. The TT  em phasises those parts which the text 
producer considers most important for the purpose, in particular the appellant's 
arguments, the questions o f  law and the decision. The sequence o f  m oves is linear, 
without any moves interacting with each other:
[23] M acrostructure o f the TT: French sum m ary o f the judgm ent in the case R. v. 
Beaulac
DECISION DE LA COUR SUPREME DU  
CANADA
Judgment Date
Name o f case
Faits
Decision de la Cour d'appel
Demandeur
Problème de droit
Décision de la Cour Suprême du Canada
Commentary (no heading)
Date o f  posting o f  summary, name o f  
summary's producer
M ove 1: Identifying the case
M ove 2: Arguing the case
Sub-move (a): Giving a short history o f 
A e M K
Sub-move (b): Presenting the appellant's 
arguments
Sub-move (c): The questions o f  law
M ove 3: Pronouncing judgm ent
M ove 4: Commentary on the decision
M ove 5: Information on the TT
Three parts o f  the summaries are particularly interesting because -  more than the rest 
o f  the text -  they serve the purpose o f  the translation, which is to the disseminate in 
the best possible way the knowledge o f  some judicial decisions having to do with the 
linguistic minorities o f  Canada, the French-speaking communities in particular. These 
three parts are the appellant's arguments, the points o f  law and the commentary. In a 
long text it can be difficult to detect the important legal issues at stake and so the TT 
producers -  for each summary -  have decided to highlight the appellant's arguments 
in a section called Dg/MéZMéi/gMr and the questions o f  law discussed at the trial and on
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which the Court has given its decision in afg afm/A In the ST, mention is
made o f  both the appellant's and the respondent's arguments, but the summary only  
reports the former, which advocate -  here, as in the other 13 judgments analysed in 
this section -  a wider recognition o f  the linguistic minorities' rights. Moreover, in the 
above text the two points o f  law discussed in the trial are introduced under the heading 
Fm6/gmg é/g é/mzY in an interrogative form -  as in all 14 summaries analysed -  and 
presented as points 1) and 2). These are the main questions in the trial to which the 
court gave an answer and which the TT producer has detected in a 14,021-word long 
judgment. In the ST the Court presents the points o f  law in a less schematic way: it 
starts by citing the statute laws and the previous judgments that can be applied to the 
case, then gives the interpretation o f  the statute laws and the case law made in 
previous cases and in Parliam ent (during the debates leading to the enactm ent o f  the 
statute laws) and finally gives the Court's own interpretation. Then it weighs the 
parties' arguments, establishes the points o f  law to which it has to answer and then 
applies the law (previously selected and interpreted) to the points o f  law. The first 
point o f  law is presented in a question: "Should an Application Be Made Under 
Section 530(1) or Section 530(4) o f  the Criminal Code in the Case o f  a N ew  Trial?" 
(as noted above, this question is presented as such in the TT). However, the second 
point is much less easy to detect and is not in an interrogative form. So, the TT helps 
the readers detect this second point, which is less apparent in the ST.
Returning to the TT, the answers to the points o f  law can be found in the section 
immediately following Fro6/g?Mg,y é/g (/rok, i.e. in the section entitled Dgg/.yzoM <̂ g /a 
Cowr .ywprgmg 6/w which presents the answers as 1) and 2) and so creates a
link with the preceding section.
The third part o f  the summaries which is important for the purpose o f  the translation is 
the final commentary in the TT, which is not presented as such and has no heading to 
introduce it. It stresses why the decision is irnportant for the respect o f  the minorities 
and thus w hy -  although indirectly -  the ST has been "translated". The commentary in
[23] above contains the following new elements if  compared with the ST: it underlines 
that the judgment is very important ("MM arygf MM zMfgrg/ ybMé/a/MgM/aZ") and
praises the decision ("Cg% a ĝ/.yzoM aĵ .yMrg g//?gagg/MgMr /g rgjpgg/ 6/g.y é/g /a 
MMMonfg"), so evaluative comments are added.
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Similar new elements can be Ibund in another TT commentary (in [24] below, extract 
from summary 3b, table 4.10a, full summary in Appendix 12):
[24]
Cette decision est une victoire incontestable pour la population irancophone. La Cour 
suprême du Canada élargit les compétences du juge afin de protéger de façon utile et 
efficace la population francophone. C'est une décision d'une importance fondamentale 
pour les années à venir.
This commentary was not part o f  the original judgment. It is made up o f  three 
sentences: it claims victory for the French-speaking community (first sentence), 
underlines why the judgment is important and why it has been chosen for publication 
(second sentence), and labels it as a milestone (third sentence). Even the second 
sentence, which is partly informative ("La CoMr é/w g/ézrgzY /gĵ
co/MpgrgMgg.y (/w ywgg"), has some praising elements (wn/g, ^ c zrc g ) which were o f  
course not present in the TT.
A sim ilar w histleblow ing perspective is adopted by the producer o f  extract [25] below 
(taken h-om summary 6b, table 4.10a, full summary in Appendix 13), who denounces 
zMgga/z/gj  ̂ rggZ/g.y ("real inequalities") between the two official languages o f  Canada. 
The term "inequality" was not in the ST and so it is a new elem ent o f  the TT :
[25]
Cette décision est importante car elle met en avant l'article 23 de la C/zarZg qui 
reconnaît un droit général à l'instruction dans la langue de la minorité. Cet article est 
donc invoqué pour réparer les inégalités réelles existantes entre les deux langues 
officielles du Canada.
Unlike the previous commentaries, the last commentary discussed in this section  
contains a new element whose characteristics have already been discussed above, in 
section 4.1.5. Sometimes the ST can be outdated and so the TT producer can feel the 
need or can be briefed to introduce some updating elements within the translation (in 
this case in the form o f  summary) or using paratext. This is what has been done in the 
following TT commentary (extract [26], taken from summary 4b, table 4.10a, full 
summary in Appendix 14), contained in the body o f  the text, as the previous cases:
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[26]
L'affaire Mackenzie est une affaire délicate qui touche directement le problème relatif 
aux droits linguistiques. C'est pourquoi cette affaire est toujours en cours dès lors que 
le demandeur envisage de saisir la Cour suprême du Cana& afin de faire reconnaître 
une violation des art. 15, 16 et 19 de la CAar/g.
Example [26] above is an extract o f  the translation (as a summary) o f  a judgment 
issued by the Nova Scotia Court o f  Appeal. The judgment can be appealed again and 
be brought before the Supreme Court o f  Canada. The commentary "updates" the ST in 
this case by saying that aAer the judgment was issued, the respondent before the Nova  
Scotia Court o f  Appeal is considering an appeal to the Supreme Court.
The summaries analysed in this section show that the purpose o f  translation can and 
does influence the translation strategy in the production o f  the TT. The absence o f  
formal correspondence between ST and TT (a summary in this case) has been a choice 
made to serve a specific purpose: to create the widest possible awareness o f  legal 
rights for the French-speaking communities o f  Canada. The arguments in favour o f  
the linguistic minorities o f  Canada and the points o f  law discussed in the different 
legal cases have been emphasised in the TTs. Moreover, in most o f  the TTs a 
commentary has been added to point out why the judgment is important. This 
commentary can also be linked to the purpose o f  the TT, because it often gives to the 
linguistic minorities o f  Canada a view on how the relevant judgment has improved 
their rights and how this can affect their lives.
The next section deals with another summary with a different purpose.
The Conseil du statut de la fem m e
The é/w é/g /a ygzMMzg is a government consultation and study council
aiming at promoting and defending the rights and interests o f  women in Quebec. The 
CoMĵ g/Z asked a translator to write a summary (in French) o f  a judgment issued in 
English by the Supreme Court o f  British Columbia. The judgment is in fact relevant 
for w om en's interests, as will become apparent. The analysis o f  this summary will 
look at how the change o f  purpose between the ST and the TT can determine a 
structural difference and so a change in the move-structure between the original 
judgment and the summary. Also, the translation o f  a term will be analysed, always 
bearing in mind the perspective o f  the purpose o f  the TT.
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A summary o f  the facts behind the case may be helpful here: a Canadian citizen called 
Ken Wiebe created a website called B.C. Fathers, which allegedly provides 
information and peer support for fathers involved in child custody disputes. In these 
issues, passions run high and disputes can be very acrimonious. On his website, Wiebe 
shows some strong images, including a swastika formed o f  4 Fs (for females) and uses 
the term “fem inazism ” . These im ages w ere cited by a report called “School Success 
by Gender: A  Catalyst for Masculinist Discourse" written by Pierrette Bouchard 
(quoted in the judgment as the “Bouchard report") as examples o f  internet “hate 
messages". The report had been commissioned by Status o f  W om en Canada, a federal 
government agency funding, among other things, research on issues related to gender 
equality. Ken W iebe sued the authors and the Canadian M inister R esponsible for the 
Status o f  Women to which the agency Status o f  Women Canada belongs. Ken 
W iebe’s claim  was dism issed and the judgm ent by the Suprem e C ourt o f  B ritish 
Columbia was published on the website o f  the éZw j/a/wr zZg Zayg/M/Mg, together
with a French summary.
The m acrostructures o f  the tw o texts have been analysed and their different features 
have been recorded in the following sections. B efore dealing w ith macrostructures, 
however, it is worth describing the summary’s purpose in order to have a useful 
perspective on the analysis. In order to establish the purpose o f  the summary (also 
referred to as TT in this and the following sections), I made contact with the TT’s 
producer. Responding to a specific question about the purpose o f  the summary and 
w hether the purpose had been specifically explained to him in the b rie f  he^’ replied 
(by email, on 18.02.10):
Although [the Conseil du statut de la femme ] [...] did not explicitly tell me, the 
purpose of the summary is obvious. The Conseil du statut de la femme is a 
statutory board whose mission is to defend and promote the advancement of 
women’s rights. In this respect, this decision by the B.C. Supreme Court was a 
victory, especially because the case directly involved feminists from Laval 
University in Quebec City. Therefore, the Conseil wished to diffuse as widely as 
possible the French summary of the decision.
Vincent Rochette
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So, the purpose o f  this summary is similar to that o f  the summaries published on the 
website o f  Z cZg,y ywnjrgj yzYZMçm̂ yg éZg /a  7VoMvg//g-Fcoj .̂yg
analysed above: to make the public aware o f  these decisions. A  summary, rather than 
the publication o f  the original judgment or a translation o f  the whole text was 
considered to be more effective in reaching a wide readership, because it is more 
“accessible" to a lay (French-speaking) readership. However, there are some 
important differences between this summary and the ones analysed in the previous 
case study:
1) The target readership is different: the French-speaking com m unities in 
Canada for the first summaries and (French-speaking) w om en for this 
one or, at the least, people with w om en’s interests at heart.
2) A s far as the summaries posted by the AJEFNE are concerned, they 
make the readers aware o f  certain language rights they may have: TT 
readers can assert them in the future or go to court if  their rights -  
recognised in a judicial decision -  are not respected. The publication o f  
the judgment issued by the Supreme Court o f  the British Columbia in 
the Wiebe v. Bouchard case can be read as a way to underline/boost a 
legal victory, rather than as a way to promote the readers’ rights.
3) The judgments translated as summaries and published on the 
AJEFNE’s website were already available in French as full-text
translations (at least those issued by the Supreme Court o f  Canada).
The summary o f  the judgment posted by the CoMjg/7 (Zzz (Zg /a
yèm/Mg is the only available TT in French. The only other possibility to 
the read the judgment is to read the whole judgment in English.
The purpose o f  the ST in the Wiebe v. Bouchard case is certainly different from that 
o f  the TT: a court has to deal with a specific question. In this case, plaintiff Ken
Wiebe claimed the authors o f  the report had defamed him and the court had to decide
whether this was a valid claim. Eventually the judge found that there was indeed 
defamation, but that the necessary requirements for a successful defence o f  fair
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comment had been satisfied, and so decided to dismiss the p laintiffs claim. The 
purpose o f  a judgment (the ST in our case) is thus to give an answer to a question.
In the next sections an analysis o f  the macrostructures o f  the ST and o f  the TT will 
help to establish whether the change o f  purpose between ST and TT is reflected in the 
translation.
TTzg ongzMaZyzzâ zMgzzr azzéZ /Zze .yzzzMzzzazy -  CZzazzgg q /
The original judgment is 10,034 words-long, the summary has 1,640 words (16.34%  
o f  original).
The biggest condensation regards the parts o f  the judgment describing (and including 
extracts of) the Bouchard report and the precedent judicial cases quoted in support o f  
the parties’ and the Court’s arguments, typical o f  Common Law judgments. The Court 
has to detail its analysis o f  the Bouchard report (which according to the claimant is 
defamatory) in order to decide whether there is defamation. Also, the Court has to 
give reasons for its decision and so describes the basis on which it was taken: mainly 
precedent judicial cases. It seems that the producer o f  the summary did not deem it 
necessary to detail such legal cases.
The cover o f  the original judgment contains: the names o f  the Court, the judge, the 
parties and the counsels, together with the citation^^, the date on w hich the judgment 
was drafted, the docket number^^, the Registry^"  ̂and finally the date and place o f  trial.
The first page o f  the summary includes: The Court’s and the parties’ names, the date 
o f  the judgment. Also, in a heading, it gives a very short description o f  the 
controversy: “poMZ".yMzYg ezi éZz^zzzarzoM’’ (“action for defamation’’) and a small 
presentation o f  the parties: “Ze /zZézzgMézzzr Fez? ILzeZzg, zzM /zorre-g/ezzzZar^Z (Zzz zzzovezzzezzr 
zM6z.yczzZzzzzĵ rg ezz CoZozzzZzze-Fz-zrazzzzzqzze’’ (“plaintiff Ken Wiebe, a standard-bearer for
“  As mentioned in Table 4.7 above, the citation includes - in a very concise form - the nam e o f  the 
parties involved, the year in which the judgment was draAed, the jurisdiction and the court in which the 
case was heard. It is the way in which court cases are identified when cited. In this case, the citation 
was: Wiebe v. Bouchard, 2008 BCSC 249.
A Court's case tracking system.
"The Registry processes, records and directs the Aow o f  all documents filed by the parties, and 
records all events which take place during the life o f  a case" (http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court- 
cour/administration/index-eng.asp).
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the masculinist movement in British Columbia") and zZazzĵ
Ze (ZoMzmMe (Ze Z'ééZMcarZozz" (“some feminist researchers in the education field").
Then, always on the first page o f  the summary, there is a zzo/e ZzzrroéZMcrZve 
(“introductory note") giving a summary o f  the controversy, the judge’s and the court’s
name and two other items w hich are o f  interest and w hich will be analysed below.
Finally, the author o f  the summary is mentioned, 
q/zZze/zzZZyzzzZgzzzezzr
The original judgment is made up o f  76 num bered paragraphs and one appendix. 
Reading is made easier by a series o f  headings w hich sum up the content o f  the 
following paragraphs: The plaintiffs website; The Defendants' publication; The 
alleged defamination (.yZc); The tort o f  defamation; Was the plaintiff defamed?; 
Defences.
The summary also includes a number o f  headings:
Fz-Zzzczqazzxyhrz/ĵ  (“Main facts’’);
I. Fz"érezzZzozz.y zZe.y/zaz'/zeA (“Parties’ claims’’);
II. gz/gĵ rZozzĵ  ezz ZzYzgg (“Issues in disputes’’);
III. AZbrẐ  zZe Za Cozzz"/zozzz- z-ezzcZẑ eyzzgezzzezzr (“Reasons for the Court's judgment’’);
IV. Dz'jpoj ẑYiy (“Operative part o f  the judgment")
V. Cozzzzzzezzrazfg (“Comment").
The last page contains a link to the original judgment and mentions the publisher o f  
the summary (Cozz.ygzZ zZzz éZg Zayêzzzzzze).
The “translator" has decided not to reproduce the ST’s headings but has created a new  
macrostructure which, in his words, “reflects the pattern that was given to me while 
doing my methodology courses at Laval University" (email, 18.02.10). Part o f  this 
macrostructure is the introductory note, on the first page o f  the summary, which is 
analysed below.
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77?g ' Wio/e zM/mzZMc/zve ' zzz /Zze .yMZMZMz3z;y
Two points in the introduction to the sum m ary are o f  particular interest. The first is a 
recurring element in the translations o f  the corpus: an informative element originating 
between the date o f  the ST and the m om ent at w hich the TT is produced is added, 
often as paratext, as already noted in section 4.1.5 above: in an introduction to the TT 
or in a final section called “Subsequent developm ents" at the end o f  the TT. This new 
element updates the ST for different reasons. In the present case, the translator felt the 
need to add that “T azz/orzj'arzoM zZe ^ozzrvoz éZgvazz/ Za Cowr zZ’qqpeZ zZe Za CoZomZzzg- 
FrzYaMzzzqzze a z-ecezMZMezzr ere (“Leave to appeal the decision before the Court
o f  Appeal o f  British Columbia was recently dismissed").
I asked the translator who produced the TT  the following question (question and 
answer h"omtwo emails, dated 13.02.10 and 18.02.10):
De Leo. In the “Vo/e zzzrroüfzzcrzve" there is some new information on the case.
You write that “L'autorisation du pourvoi devant la Cour d'Appel de la Colombie- 
Britannique a récemment été rejetée". Has this new information been given to 
you so that you could add it or was your own initiative?
Translator. The fact that leave to appeal the decision was not granted was 
instrumental in the decision of the Conseil to ask me to summarize the decision.
Until it was clear that the case was not going to be appealed, the decision was not 
“final" and therefore not a precedent per se. As soon as the Conseil learned that 
leave had not been granted, they asked me to summarize the decision.
This new element (new because it was not in the ST) informs the readers that the 
decision is final and is consistent with the purpose o f  the TT (to reach the widest 
possible audience to report a legal victory by the Cozzĵ ezZ (Zzz ĵ rarzz/ zZg ZayêzzzzMg). The 
decision to add this introduction was the translator’s and was not part o f  the brief.
A second element in the “ZVioZg Z/zZrozZMcZZvg" is particularly interesting: it is o f  lexical 
nature and therefore will appear in Chapter 5, together with other examples o f  lexical 
incongruencies.
The aim o f  this section was to see whether -  within the second scenario o f  this thesis -  
the macrostructures o f  judgments are kept in the TTs as they are in the STs or whether 
some changes can be detected. In order to perform this analysis, a subcorpus o f
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Canadian judgments was selected and studied together with their respective 
summaries. Two case studies have been conducted on this sub-corpus. The first one 
looked at ninety judgments issued by the Cowr zZg PweZzec and translated into English 
and the second one analysed the translation in form o f  a sum m ary (w ritten in French) 
o f  EAeen Canadian judgments (issued in English).
The analysis did not produce consistent results: the translations o f  the 90 judgments 
issued by the Cowr (Zg gMeZzgc exactly reproduce the ST macrostructures. The high 
degree o f  standardisation noted in this case study is not surprising in this scenario, 
given that the genre conventions were the same for English and French and the moves 
in the ST and TT reflected this similarity. However, the second study found a 
variation between the ST and the TT macrostructures. This variation goes beyond the 
norm al shift one can expect from condensations typically found in summaries: the 
change o f  purpose between STs and TTs influences such variation and so the TT 
producers add some inform ative elements, em phasise and clarify those parts o f  the 
judgment which are considered most important for the purpose and add some 
appreciative words on the courts’ decisions, to underline how they promote the 
linguistic minorities’ rights (in the first summaries posted on the AJEFNE’s website) 
or to boost a legal victory (as in the summary posted by the CoM.ygz/ (Zw .yWw/ cZe Zoi 
yg/MZMg).
In order to try to find an answer to the first research question over the two scenarios o f  
this thesis, the three case studies o f  Chapter 4 have looked at the translation o f  
conventionalised macro structural m oves w hich had been identified in the Literature 
Review both in French and Canadian judgments. Four cues help to identify these 
moves in the texts included in the sub-corpora o f  French judgments and a number o f  
labels have the same role in Canadian judgments. The structure on the next page is 
similar to that presented in Figure 3.1, but this time it is populated with the numbers o f  
analysed judgments which make the sub-corpora for the three case studies analysed in 
Chapter 4. A  similar structure will present the sub-corpora used for the three case 
studies analysed in Chapter 5, where examples o f  lexical incongruency will be 
analysed in texts with reference to systemic values and will then be evaluated in 
context.
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First Research Question
Case Study 1 (Scenario 1) 
M acrostructures o f French  
judgm ents in translation
F R —^  EN
Sub-corpora:
247 judgm ents issued by 
the Cour de Cassation  
in which the fbllowing French 
locutions were found and 
analysed in translation: 
attendu que, found in 247 
judgments of the above sub­
corpus (228 arc taken from the 
Institute for Translational Law's 
website and 19 are taken from 
the Queen Mary Case 
Translation Programme) 
mais attendu que, found in 170 
judgments of the above sub­
corpus (158 are taken from the 
Institute for Translational Law's 
w ebsite and 12 are taken  from  
the Queen Mary Case 
Translation Programme)
28 judgm ents issued by the
Cour d Appel
in which the following French
locutions were found and
analysed in translation:
sur ce / . . . / par ces motifs, found
in 13 judgments of the above
sub-corpus (taken from the
Queen Mary Case Translation
Programme)
Case Study 2 
(Scenario 2) 
M acrostructures of 
judgm ents issued by 
the Court o f Q uebec 
in translation  
FR EN
Sub-corpus:
90 judgm ents issued  
by the Court of 
Q uebec taken from  the 
website of the
Case Study 3 
(Scenario 2) 
M acrostructures of 
judgm ents issued by 
Canadian courts in 
translation (as a 
sum m ary)
EN — FR
Sub-corpus:
14 sum m aries taken 
from the website o f  the
(fg /a Aoz/vgf/g-jÉco.ys'g
1 sum m ary taken 
from the website of the 
Comg// (A/ .yZaZwZ a(g /a
/g/M/Mg
Figure 4.1 -  Sub-corpora o f  judgments used in the three case studies analysed in Chapter 4 to
answer the first Research Question
4.3 The contribution o f the research on the m acrostructures o f  judgm ents in 
translation
The analysis o f  case studies 1, 2 and 3 presented in Chapter 4 has confirmed that the 
research question is indeed related to translation challenges that the producers o f  the 
TTs do not always overcome, especially in the first scenario o f  two countries in which  
different legal systems are in force and two different languages are spoken. The
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implications o f  the linguistic cues used to signal certain macrostructural moves in 
French judgm ents are undervalued in the m ajority o f  the translations studied, w hich 
tend to reproduce a macrostructure sim ilar to that o f  the ST, w ith the consequent loss 
o f  those cues across languages. The cohesive ties in French judgments are not merely 
formal relations, but can be said to create a semantic relation which creates unity in 
the text and which in turn contribute to the coherence o f  the text (Halliday and Hasan, 
1976:6). The translations o f  these ties in cases where they are successfully identified -  
represented in the STs by a number o f  locutions analysed in Chapter 4 -  can be 
considered as one o f  those instances in which a rise in the level o f  cohesive  
explicitness in the TL text can be observed and which is not due to differences in the 
grammatical systems o f  the languages, as noted in Blum-Kulka’s explicitation 
hypothesis (1986:292). Instances o f  explicitation and “amplifications" (Nida, 1964) 
are observed in the TTs o f  the sub-corpus, although in a limited number o f  
translations. Translation choices such as explicitations and additions can be assumed 
to clarify the m eaning carried in the ST for the TT  readers.
The second scenario, i.e. plurilingual countries with a mixed legal system, can be 
considered to be less problematic, at least as far as Canada is concerned, also for some 
mandatory elements on the drafting o f  judgments (c f  Tables 4.7 and 4.8) in the two 
official languages, which have tried to standardise the m oves o f  Canadian judgments 
in both English and French.
As expected, the translation brief influences the production o f  the TTs. In some cases 
the purpose o f  translation has led the translators to produce TTs in the form o f  
summaries, for the reasons examined above. In other cases, so-called “new" elements 
have appeared in the TTs in order to update the informative content o f  the ST or to 
explain some ST elements.
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Chapter 5 -  Corpus analysis 2: Lexical incongruencies and Lexical 
equivalence
In Chapter 2 (specifically in section 2.5) some difficulties o f  translating the legal 
lexicon were discussed. The fact that most legal texts contain system-bound terms 
may create lexical incongruencies in translation: a term in the ST may not have a 
lexical counterpart in the TL because o f  a conceptual gap in the legal system o f  the 
target culture. The reason for this is that the original term refers to a concept 
belonging to a legal system which is different from the one in force in the country or 
region where the TL is spoken and in which the TT will be read.
Lexical incongruencies in translation are analysed in three case studies in Chapter 5. 
As for the case studies which dealt with the translation o f  macrostructures, these case 
studies will be analysed across two different scenarios. The two scenarios chosen here 
are the following:
1) Two countries in which different legal system s are in force and tw o different 
languages are spoken: language A into language B, legal system 1 to legal system 2
(Italy and U SA/England).
2) Plurilingual countries with tw o legal systems or a mixed legal system: language A 
into language B, legal system la  to legal system lb  (Federal and provincial level in 
Canada).
The translation o f  the names o f  particular courts can be useful to analyse how  
translators overcome some o f  these inter-systemic challenges and o f  course courts 
have a central role in legal system s and in judgments, so their translation is crucial. 
The translations o f  ZrzZzMMa/e and Prg/Mra, two Italian courts, are analysed in the first 
case study, belonging to the first scenario (section 5.1). Two more case studies, 
belonging to the second scenario, deal with lexical equivalence in the names o f  
Canadian Courts (sections 5.2).
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5.1 Scenario 1 - Translation o f Tribunale and Pretura (C ase study 4) -  
Italian  #^US English
This case study deals with the translations o f  Tr/ZzMMo/g and fre/Mm.
The sub-corpus used for this case study includes 21 judgments issued by an Italian 
TrzZzMMo/e and other judgments issued by Italian appellate courts (Cor/e (ZW/zpe/Zo or 
Corte di Cassazione) in w hich the term  Tribunale occurs. The total num ber o f  tim es 
the term appears in the sub-corpus is 73. The translations are all part o f  the Queen 
Mary Case Translation Programme. The STs are judgments on cases involving two or 
more parties having a commercial dispute. The court weighs the different parties’ 
claims and then reaches a decision which is binding lor the parties.
The purpose o f  the TTs is the same as that already analysed in detail in section 4.1.1. 
Briefly, the Queen M ary Case Translation Program m e has translated into English a 
large number o f  judgments on international commercial law issued in different 
languages by different courts in different countries. The purpose is to inform actors o f  
international commerce on how courts consider different aspect o f  commercial 
litigation. The Queen Mary Case Translation Programme is a joint-venture between a 
North-American university and a British one. Thus, as already noted in 4.1.6, it is not 
possible to make a sharp distinction between American and British English 
conventions in the corpus, i.e. to establish whether the TTs were intended for an 
American or a British audience. In this case study, given the terminology found in the 
corpus, the audience seems closer to the US readership, as w ill become clearer in the 
next sections.
Table 5.1 shows the relative ftequency o f  each solution found by the translators for 
TrZZzMMaZe.
T able 5.1 Translations o f in the sub-corpus o f  Italian judgments (N = 73)
Tribunale Num ber o f tim es solution  
appears
Relative frequency |7N
Tribunal 21 2& 77%
Tribunale 16 21.92%
D istrict Court 11 15.07%
Tr/ZzMnaZe [District Court] 11 15.07%
The Court/this Court 10 13.70%
1st instance Tribunale di [name 
o f  city]
2 2.74%
Tribunale [Circuit Court o f First 
Instance]
1 1.37%
Courts o f [name o f  city] 1 1.37%
73 100%
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The most popular translation o f  TnZzMMaZe into English is the American term “District 
Court" Cr=22, either on its own or in brackets following TrzZzMMa/e), closely followed  
by Tribunal (j'=21). Sometimes, within the same judgment, Zr/ZzMMa/g is translated in 
different ways: the Italian term is transferred to the TT on first mention and then 
translated as “tribunal" or as “this Court" later in the text. As already noted in section  
2.5.4, the choice o f  translating Tribunale as TnZzMMa/e [District Court] is a translation 
strategy often used with system- or culture-bound terms, in which a combination o f  
two (or more) translation techniques is used, in this case in the form o f  transference 
(or loan word) followed by “explanation". This is called a couplet, i.e. a text-bound 
solution to a systemic problem.
The aim o f  section 5.1 is to analyse whether the choice made by the majority o f  
translators is appropriate in the context. In order to do so, a componential analysis o f  
the terms ZrzZzMMaZe and “District Court" will be conducted, taking into account the 
position o f  TF/ZzMMaZe in the Italian legal system and comparing it with the solutions 
found by translators in the TTs.
CczmpoMgM/ZaZ aMaZy.yZ.y
As described in Chapter 2, the “boundaries between the meanings o f  concepts o f  
different legal systems are incongruent" (Sarcevic 1997:232). In order to have a 
clearer idea o f  such boundaries, a componential analysis was carried out (see below) 
to compare the meaning components o f  TrZZzMMaZe and “District Court" as the most 
common equivalent in a contrastive way, to reveal those components which are 
common and those which do not coincide. This componential analysis w ill help 
evaluate the adequacy o f  this translation solution in context.
Seven meaning components (i-vii) o f  ZrZZzMMaZe and “District Court" are presented 
below and compared, and later summarised in table 5.2:
i) Federal/State jurisdiction o f courts
In the United States, as typically happens in federal states, some cases are decided by 
state courts, others by federal courts, according to the type o f  offence in criminal law
142
or the value or the matter at stake or according to other circumstances in civil law. 
Rules prescribing the federal jurisdiction for some cases (rather than a state 
jurisdiction) are laid out in the Constitution. A District Court is a federal court i.e. a 
court having federal jurisdiction. Cases tried in the District Court include cases in 
which the United States are a party, cases where the complaint is based on federal law, 
cases in which the parties are domiciled in different states and cases in which the 
matter in issue exceeds $10,000 (Zweigert & Kotz, 254-5).
Italy is, o f  course, not a federal state and so there is no such dual jurisdiction. There is
only one law, the Italian law, unlike in the USA w here there are federal laws and state 
laws.
ii) Jurisdiction degree
Both the District Court and the ZrzZzMMa/e are first-instance^^ courts, that is courts by
w hich a case is first tried.
iii) Territorial com petence
In the U SA  each state has one or more District Courts and each District Court has a 
certain judicial district, i.e. a territory for w hich it is competent, which can be a w hole 
State or a portion o f  a State (such portions are called northern, southern, middle 
districts).
In Italy the territorial competence o f  each Zr/ZzMMa/e is called czrcoMéZaricz. In Italy 
(and so in Italian) there is also the term (District), but it refers to the
territorial competence o f  a Cczrig 6F/4j?qcZZo (Court o f  Appeal) which is, o f  course, a 
court o f  second instance. Each contains several cZrcoMéZari so that, for
instance, the district o f  Bari (i.e. the Bari Court o f  Appeal’s district) contains 22 
rriZzMMaZz (so 22 cZrcoMéZari). Any appealed judgment issued by any o f  these 22 
rriZzMMaZZ would be brought before the Bari Court o f  Appeal.
Translating ZFzZzMMaZg by “District Court’’ is potentially a problem, because a back- 
translation o f  “District Court’’ into Italian (Corie D/lyZygrZMa/g) would be misleading, as 
an Italian reader would think that a District Court is a Curie éZW/7peZ/u.
Sometimes first-instance courts are called “trial courts" in English. The definitim  o f  “trial court" by 
Zmv is the following: “The court o f  original jurisdiction where all evidence is first
received and considered; the Arst court to consider litigation. Used in contrast to appellate court" 
(Black, 1990:1506).
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iv) Judicial vs. adm inistrative jurisdiction
The territorial circuits -  state and districts -  o f  a District Court reflect the political- 
administrative territories. For example, there is a District Court in Colorado. Colorado 
is both a State and a territorial circuit for the local District Court.
The territorial circuit o f  a Tribunale does not reflect the adm inistrative subdivisions. 
Italy is politically subdivided into .Reg/onf, fm v m ce, CzrcoWan -  the
territories covered by each TrzZzMMa/g -  do not coincide with any o f  the above political 
subdivisions.
v) M onocratic judge or panel o f  judges
Usually only one judge decides a case in a DzAVncV Conr/, but in some cases there is a 
panel o f  three judges presiding over the trial. The m ost im portant cases (in term s o f  
value for civil cases, o f  the gravity o f  the crime for criminal cases) are tried by a
panel.
The same applies to a
vi) Presence/absence o f a jury
Most o f  the time, a District Court has a jury.
A  never has a jury.
vii) C ivil/crim inal com petence
Conrt.5' settle civil and criminal proceedings.
So do
Table 5.2 Com ponential analysis o f  the term s District Court and Tribunale. V = M eaning components 
which coincide. X = M eaning components which do not coincide
i
Federal
i i
First
instance
court
iii
Territorial
ju risd iction
iv
R eflects the 
adm inistrative 
subdivision
V
Single 
judge or 
panel of 
judges
vi
Jury
vii
Both civil 
and
crim inal
proceedings
Tribunale X V C / r c o M r / o f f o X 4 X V
District
Court
4 D istrict V 4 4 i
In order to compare further the concepts o f  and District Court, the concepts
o f  intersection and inclusion can be invoked (c f  2 .5 .6), as used by Felber (1984:152- 
6) and then by Sarcevic (1997:238). When comparing two concepts for the purpose o f
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choosing the appropriate term for a translation, there is Intersection when A and B 
(being the source concept and the target concept respectively) contain common 
features but also additional ones not shared by the other concept; there is inclusion 
when concept A contains all o f  the features o f  concept B and also one or more 
additional characteristics (Sarcevic 1997:238).
Elaborating on Elber, Sarcevic (1997:238) created three categories o f  equivalence 
based on the concepts o f  Intersection and Inclusion: near equivalence, partial 
equivalence and non-equivalence^^.
Intersecticm
Figure 5.1 -  Partial equivalence based on intersection (Sarcevic 1997:238)
On the basis o f  the contrastive lexical analysis carried out before on 7y/6wMa/e/District 
Court, the category w hich seems to apply here is that o f  partial equivalence, w hich is 
illustrated above in Figure 5.1. In the present case, it appears that an intersection 
occurs between the concepts o f  District Court and Characteristics ii, v and
vii are shared by the two concepts, while i, iii, iv and vi are not.
Looking at the meaning components o f  tw o terms is only one way to assess if  a term 
is appropriate, the context being also and probably more important. Also the 
classification o f  the source term's characteristics as either essential (ej^^e^rW/a) or 
accidental (acczc^MWm) as developed by Dahlberg and mentioned by Picht and 
Draskau (1985:48) (see section 2.5.3) depends on the context, by which could be 
meant co-text; e.g., if  the co-text o f  the term "District Court" in English mentions a 
jury, then is not a good choice, at least as it stands alone. What is essential
in one context may be accidental in another. In the case o f  Tn6zzW e and its chosen 
translation, legal systems (in Italy and the USA) and adequacy at text level are the 
main points to consider.
Cf. section 2.5.6.
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Let us consider the context in which these judgments and their translations are posted 
on the Internet. As explained in section 3.2.2, the project which created the website 
from w hich these translated judgm ents are taken intends to create a global 
jurisconsoltorium and to contribute to the uniform interpretation o f  the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale o f  Goods (CISC), the uniform 
international sales law o f  countries that account for two-thirds o f  all world trade. The 
project gives many hundreds o f  examples o f  international judicial precedents, given  
that since 1996 courts have looked at judgments across the border before taking their 
decisions, to make these more uniform and to shape a sort o f  supranational 
(commercial) law.
The purpose o f  these translations is to serve as a reference forjudges and lawyers. The 
former would refer to them to issue new judgments in line with precedents set by their 
foreign colleagues, while the latter would read how foreign courts settled some 
commercial disputes in order to prepare their case in Court and anticipate future 
judgments.
In the latter case, for example, a company lawyer may want to know how a particular 
TnZzzzWe responds to a certain kind o f  dispute. A s indicated in the discussion o f  
meaning component iii above, the territorial circuit o f  a is a czTcoMt/anb,
which is much smaller than a (//.yrrerro (the latter being the territorial circuit o f  a Coz-re 
6/V ^ g//o ). This is important because not all interpret the law in the same
way: within the same two can have a different precedent on a
similar matter^^. Also, the precedents set within a czTcoWano can be different from 
those set in the to which this czrcoW ano belongs. So translating as
"District Court" could create some misunderstandings: confusion is possible because 
"District Court" could be back-translated as Coz'/e Dz.y/z-errwa/e, which is oAen used in 
Italian by lawyers as a synonym o f  Coz-re because -  as said before -  a
(̂ /.yrz-grro is the territorial competence o f  a Coz"/e We could then have this
syllogism:
O f course, i f  the case is appealed, as it oAen is in Italy, the Co/Ve will be competent within
the whole (//.yZreZZo and so its precedents will be uniform within the (//.yZreZ/o. Precedent judgments in 
Italian law (as opposed to those issued in Common Law) are not binding (apart ifom those issued by the 
Co/Ve but particularly in smaller courts (and smaller c/rcoM&rn), with a limited number
o f  judges, it is important to take them into consideration.
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= District Court 
District Court = Cor/e (/zj/z-errwa/c 
Therefore 7z"z6zzzza/e = Coz-re ẑ zĵ Zrerrzza/e (that is, Coz-re z/ WjDpg//o).
So we would infer that a 7z"z6zzzzzz/e is the same as a Coz-re which, o f  course,
it is not. A caution (as paratext, in a translator's note, for example) to underline this
difference could have avoided any potential confusion.
However, other characteristics which do not coincide (in i, iv and vi above) should not 
create any problems given the purpose o f  the TTs: the need is to publish the courts' 
decisions and distinctions such as courts' federal/centralised jurisdiction, match or
lack o f  m atch between administrative and judicial subdivisions and the 
presence/absence o f  jury do not seem to be crucial points here.
It is interesting to note that in those judgments issued by appellate courts which have 
been analysed, 7z"z6zzzzzz/g has never been translated as "District Court", but as "1st 
instance 7z-z6zzzza/g di [city] " or as "7z"z6zzzza/g [Circuit Court o f  First Instance]", which  
seem to be the most adequate translations among those found in the sub-corpus, 
because they immediately signal what is probably the most important characteristic o f  
a Tz-zZzzzzza/c, i.e. being a court in which a case is first tried ("Court o f  First Instance"). 
It is, o f  course, particularly important in appellate courts judgments to distinguish a 
7z"z6zzzzzz/e from the Court issuing the judgment ("Coz-/e
Having discussed the purpose for and the "setting" in which these TTs are published 
and having evaluated some o f  the solutions according to such purpose and "setting", 
let us see some solutions in context. Two solutions are analysed below: two are in-text 
and two have been found in footnotes (paratext).
In [27a] below some extracts Aom a judgment issued by the Coz-re z/z
Mz/zzzzo, an appellate court, are presented: ZrzTzzzzzzz/e appears four times (whole 
judgment in Appendix 15a; typos in original; instances o f  rz-z6zzzzzz/e underlined for 
ease o f  reference):
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[27a]
6. SVOLGIMENTO DEL PROCESSO
7. Con atto di citazione notificato il 20 febbraio 1990 la S.p.A. Bielloni Castello
8. conveniva avanti il Tribunale di Milano la EGO S.A. di diritto Aancese con sede
9. in Oyonnax, chiedendo che fosse accertata I'avvenuta risoluzione owero
[ • • • ]
29. Esperito il corso istruttorio, il Tribunale con sentenza del 3 0  novembre 1994-26
30. gennaio 199S, ritenuta I'inesistenza di una rinegoziazione dell'accordo di vendita
31. circa i termini temporali della sua esecuzione, lo dichiarava risolto di diritto per
32. fatto e colpa dell'attrice in ragione dell'inAuttuoso decorso del termine di 15
33. giomi intimato con la prima diffida del 17 novembre 1989, e condannava perô
34. I'attrice a restituire I'acconto, mentre ne respingeva inflne I'istanza di risarcimento
35. e disponeva la parziale compensazione delle spese processuali.
[. ..]
57. A tenore della quale, peraltro, si pone in modo conclusivo non variato
58. I'accertamento, già espresso dai tribunale. circa la legittimita dell'occorsa
59. risoluzione del contralto,
[...]
172. P.Q.M.
173. La Corte d'Appello di Milano, definitivamente pronunciando sull'appello
174. proposto da Bielloni Castello S.p.A. con citazione del 17/10/1995 contro S.A.
175. EGO nonché sull'appello incidentale avverso la sentenza resa Aa le parti dal
176. Tribunale di Milano in data 3 0  novembre 1994-26 gennaio 199S, cosi
177. provvede in sua parziale rifbrma:
The Corte d'Appello who issued the above judgment makes reference to the court o f  
first instance, Tz6zzzza/g, which issued the first judgment on the case. [27b] below  
(whole judgment in Appendix 15b, translations o f  Tribunale are underlined for ease o f  
reference) shows that in the TT, Tribunale was translated as "Courts o f  Milan" when 
first mentioned, as "Tribunale di Milano" the second time, as "Tribunale o f  Milan" the 
third time and as "Court o f  Milan" the last time.
[27b]
5. Description of the trial
6. On 20 February 1990, Bielloni Castello [seller] filed, before the Courts of
7. Milan, an action against Ego S.A. [buyer], a French company, with relevant
8. place of business in Oyonnax. The [seller] alleged that the [buyer] breached
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9. the contract
27. The Tribunale di Milano on 30 November 1994 - 26 January 1995, rendered its
28. decision in which, not acknowledging any agreed modification o f the terms of
29. delivery, declared that the [seller] breached the contract. This Court of First
30. Instance based its decision on the unsuccessful expiration of the 15-day term
31. given in the first notice to the [buyer] on 17 November 1989, and condemned the
32. [seller] to return the down payment to the [buyer], not granting any damages to
33. the [buyer] and setting off the legal fees.
51. The Appellate Court affirms that which has already been stated by the Tribunale
52. of Milan about the breach of contract, but not by virtue of the national law, but
53. due to application of the CISG.
[ • • • ]
137. In witness whereof
138. The Court of Appeal of Milan, deciding on the appeal filed by the [seller]
139. against the [buyer] on 17 October 1995, and on the partial appeal against the
140. decision entered by the Court of Milan on 30 November 1994 - 25 January
141. 1995, orders as follows:
The first translation o f  Tribunale as "Courts o f  Milan" can be said to be a 
generalisation strategy using a superordinate term (Baker, 1992:26-7), in that "Courts 
o f  Milan" is not a lexical equivalent for any particular court name. This generic term 
can be a good translation solution in that the translator does not choose to adopt a 
foreign concept in the absence o f  an adequate lexical equivalent. In [27b], however, 
this choice is potentially confusing, because it is not very clear that "Courts o f  Milan" 
in line 6-7 and “Court o f  Milan" in line 140 indicate the same court as "Tribunale di 
Milano" on line 27 and "Tribunale o f  Milan" in line 51-52. Also, the choice to choose 
"Tribunale di Milano" and "Tribunale o f  Milan" in the same text is puzzling. The 
translation in lines 27-30 can be o f  interest, in that it "explains" the role o f  a 
aAer it has translated it by borrowing the Italian term: "The Tribunale di Milano on 30 
November 1994 - 26 January 1995, rendered its decision in which, not acknowledging 
any agreed modification o f  the terms o f  delivery, declared that the [seller] breached 
the contract. This Court o f  First Instance based its decision o n ...". "This Court o f  First 
Instance" is not in the ST: the translator may have deemed useful to "explain" the
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function o f  the Italian court. Similar solutions (generalisation strategy and borrowing 
plus "explanation") are adopted in other translations discussed below.
The second most popular translation choice for 7T/6zzWg in the sub-corpus was 
"tribunal". Tribunal in English law indicates some special courts, such as 
administrative tribunals, employment tribunals, etc., also called "court-substitutes" 
(Bailey, Ching, Gunn & Ormerod, 2002:52). The TTs in this sub-corpus adopt an 
American terminology when translating TrzZzzzWe, as mentioned above, so the 
"American perspective" is probably more relevant here: in the U SA  "tribunal" is a 
general name A)r a court o f  law (Black, 1990:1506) and so, as in the case o f  "Courts 
o f  Milan" above in [27b], is not a lexical equivalent for any particular court name. 
Here again, a generic term can be a good translation solution because the translator 
does not choose to adopt a foreign concept (in the form o f  an American Court's name) 
in the absence o f  an adequate lexical equivalent. As noted above, the case o f  such 
lexical gaps is quite common in legal texts.
An extract o f  one o f  the translations in which "tribunal" is used for follows
below. [28a] is an extract o f  the ST (instances o f  underlined for ease o f
reference):
[28a]
Su ricorso della Fondmetall International AB con sede in Kyrgogatan 44-S-411 15 Goteborg 
(Svezia) il Présidente del Tribunale di Monza ingiungeva in data 20.7.88 alia s.p.a. Nuova 
Fucinati con sede in Monza di consegnare alia ricorrente mille tonnellate metriche di 
ferrocromo 'Lumpy' cosi come ordinate con scrittura del 3.2.88 (al prezzo di L. 545 al Kg.).
Avverso il decreto, notificato il 25.7.88 proponeva opposizione la s.p.a. Nuova Fucinati 
convenendo I'altra parte avanti a questo Tribunale con citazione notificata il 29.9.88.
[28b] presents the translation o f  [28a] (translations o f  underlined for ease o f
reference):
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[28b]
On July 20*̂ , 1988, upon petition of [buyer], whose place of business is in Kyrgogatan 44-S- 
41115 Goteberg (Sweden), the President of the Tribunal of Monza ordered [seller], whose 
place of business is in Monza, to deliver to the [buyer] 1000 tons of ironchrome "Lumpy" as 
ordered in the contract of February 3, 1988 (at the price of Lira 545 per kilo).
[Seller] objected to this injunctive order, notice of which was given on July 25, 1988, and 
sued the [buyer] in this Tribunal with notice of summons given on September 29, 1988.
A different solution to fill the gap is to borrow the ST term and to add some paratext 
in the form o f  a translator's note to explain to readers the borrowed term. This is what
has been done in two instances in the subcorpus, where Tribunale was transferred to 
the TT  and the translator decided to add a footnote in order to explain the meaning o f  
the term. In the first translated judgment (Tribunale di Pavia, 27 5'.r/. v.
Txe/a 29 December 1999, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edU/cases/991229i3.html#cd) 
the translator^^ added this note:
[29]
123. Tribunale: Regional or District Court, having original jurisdiction over
124. disputes involving amounts exceeding ITjE 20,000,000. Art. 9U^ c.p.c.
The aim o f  translators' notes has been described by the Chartered Institute o f  
Linguists as "to provide necessary information for the reader (for culture-bound 
notions for instance) if  this information cannot be provided within the body o f  the 
translation (because it would be too cumbersome, or because it would break the flow  
o f  the text)" (CIOL website). The use o f  the above footnote seems to be justified, in 
that such an explanation would appear as cumbersome within the body o f  the 
translation. In describing the use o f  a loan word plus in-text explanation. Baker 
considers this strategy
very useful when the word in question is repeated several times in the text. Once 
explained, the loan word can then be used on its own; the reader can understand it 
and it is not distracted by further lengthy explanations". (Baker, 1992:34)
Charles Sant 'Elia, taken from the Queen Mary Case Translation Programme. 
This should be 9 (I)
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As far as the terms used in the footnote are concerned , the term "District Court" has 
already been discussed. The use o f  "Regional Court" is surprising, because -  as 
already explained in meaning component iv above -  there is no relationship between 
the territorial competence o f  a and the area covered by an Italian
Besides, there is no court called "Regional Court" in the U SA  (or Britain), so it is 
doubtful that this explanation could help the reader clarify the role o f  a Tribunale. The 
solution to introduce a new term in the absence o f  system-based equivalents may be a 
good one, but in this case the chosen term seems inadequate, as already noted.
In the second translated judgment (Tribunale di Vigevano, Rheinland Versicherungen
V. Atlarex, 12 July 2000, http://cissw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000712i3.html#cd. TT 
made in Spring 2001), Tz-ẑ zzzzzz/e was defined in a footnote in the A llow ing way by 
one translator^^:
[30]
Regional Court (Province of Pavia), having original jurisdiction over matters 
involving a value exceeding Lire 20,000,000 pursuant to Art. 9 I Code of Civil 
Procedure, and having appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Pretura (District 
Court), pursuant to Art. 341 I, II Code o f Civil Procedure.
In this Aotnote, the translator assimilates a Tz-zTzzzzzzz/e to a Regional Court; the 
inadequacy o f  this assim ilation has been discussed above. Another elem ent here is the 
mention o f  the Province o f  Pavia. A s already explained, there is no relationship 
between the political subdivisions (a Province, in this case) and the territorial 
competence o f  a Tz-zTzzzzzzz/e. To add more confusion, "Province o f  Pavia" A llow s  
"Regional Court". By definition, a Pz-zzvzzzczzz (Province) cannot coincide with a 
/(cgzozzc (Region) in Italy. Hence, a Aotnote that should provide necessary 
inArmation or clarifications Ar the reader turns out to be misleading.
The reArence to the competence on disputes involving amounts exceeding Italian lire 
20,000,000 -  contained in each o f  the Aotnotes -  and the reArence to Pz'c/zzz'zz in the 
second Aotnote lead us to another point which will be analysed in the last paragraph 
o f  the last section.
Francesco G. Mazzotta, taken from the Queen Mary Case Translation Programme.
52
Up until 1998 there was in Italy a court called fre/w m , which used to try minor civil 
and criminal cases as a first-instance court^'.
Now adays Tribunali have taken over the functions w hich used to be covered by 
fz-g/wre and so the functions o f  the two courts, be A re and aAer 1998, can be summed
up as in the following table:
Table 5.3 Functions o f Pretura  and Tribunale for civil cases before and after 1998
Civil law Before 1998 Since 1998
Cases worth up to Lire 50M  
A lso competent on certain
m atters prescribed by Section 
9 (1) o f  the Coz/Ae <7/ 
frocez/z/m czvz/e [Civil
procedure code], no matter 
w hat the value
freZzzrzz
TrzAzzMzz/e
Cases worth m ore than Lire 
50M^^
TrzAzzzzzz/g
The difArent translations chosen by translators in the sub-corpus Ar the term frefwrzz 
are shown in table 5.4 below. The term presents problems Ar the translator because 
parts o f  its Auctions are now covered by the which in itself is problematic
as we have seen.
Table 5.4 Translations o f Pretura  in the sub-corpus o f  Italian judgm ents
Pretura Frequency of solution
Pretura [District Court] 3
Pretura 3
Pretura [District C ourt o f First 
Instance]
I
District Court o f  first instance I
Pretura [Court o f  First Instance] I
This Court I
12
Just as Ar 7Tz6zzMzz/e (cA. table 5.1), difArent Aanslations o ffr e /w m  are Aund within 
the same text. Here again some translators chose Dzjyfncf Cowrf, which seems 
inappropriate because the territorial jurisdiction o f  a fz-erzzrzz is -  as Ar a TrzZzzzMzz/c -  a 
cAcoMzfzzno rather than a A comparative componential analysis between
frefwrzz and District Court would provide similar results as TT/ZzMMzz/g. The use o f  a 
couplet, a loan A llow ed by a small explanation o f  the court's Auction -  fre/zzm
M ^or cases would be tried by TF/AwMzz//. used also to be the appellate court Ar A e
The amount o f  ITl 20M mentioned in the Aotnote quoted in section 3.4.1 was later increased to
ltl50M  and remained in Arce until A e fA-eZz/ra was dissolved.
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/Cowr/ q / -  is probably the best solution, because it allows the court 
issuing the judgment to be identiAed and its Auction to be brieAy explained. A even  
clearer explanation could have been "Court o f  A st instance trying minor 
civil/criminal cases". Overall, w e can see that the use o f  couplets is widespread.
In this section a number o f  Italian judgments have been analysed, together with their 
English TTs. The analysis tried to establish how the translators try to All the lexical 
gap existing between the SL and TL. In order to do so, the translation into English o f  
TTzZzzzzzzz/e and Fremrzz was analysed and the different solutions chosen by the 
translators examined in terms o f  adequacy A r the TT's purpose with the help o f  a 
comparative componential analysis o f  7Tz6zz/zzz/e and its English counterparts. The 
most hcquent solution ("District Court") may actually not be the most appropriate. 
Lexical issues are also the A cus o f  the next section, dealing with Canadian judgments.
5.2 Scenario 2 - Lexical equivalence in the nam es o f  Canadian C ourts -  
French < ►English
The second scenario in this case study is that o f  plurilmgual countries with two legal 
systems or a mixed legal system: language A  into language B, legal system 1 a to legal 
system lb. The country chosen Ar this scenario is Canada, which has difArent legal 
systems as Ar as provinces are concerned, but which is uniAed at Aderal level. The 
translation o f  the name o f  a court, Cozzr zfzz Czzzzzzzfzz has been analysed m the
subcorpus o f  Canadian judgments.
5.2.1 Translation o f Cour suprême du Canada (Case study 5)
The Supreme Court o f  Canada was established in 1875 by the Supreme Court Act as a 
general court o f  appeal Ar Canada. The territorial competence o f  the Supreme Court 
o f  Canada is the whole territory o f  Canada, thus including the English-speaking 
provinces and Quebec, the only French-speaking provmce. The name o f  the Court is, 
o f  course, mentioned m the 1875 Act, both in its English version (Supreme Court o f  
Canada) and its French version (Cozzr ĵ zzprezzze z/zz Czzzzzzüfzz).
The Supreme Court o f  Canada and the LexUM laboratory in the University o f  
Montreal's Faculty o f  Law together created a website where all decisions rendered by
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the Supreme Court o f  Canada since 1948 (and many rendered be Are 1948) are 
published (http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/index.htmn. Decisions published in the 
Supreme Court Reports from 1970 to date are available in both English and French
(that is in the original language and also officially translated). D ecisions published 
prior to 1970 are available in the language o f  publication only.
The Court's names mentioned in all the judgments written in English and French (and 
provided on the website) are, o f  course, those originally given to the Court when this 
was created in 1975, as stated above. "The Supreme Court o f  Canada" is a A ll lexical 
equivalent o f  Cowr z7w CzzMzzz/zz because the two languages (English and
French) describe the same system (and m this case, the same Court). In Chapter 2 
(section 2.5.6) two classiAcations o f  concepts were described, one by the
wW Fenvzz/rwMgxjpmc/ze and one by Sarcevic. 
According to the Berlin /m A w / (Lane 1982:par. 7) a source concept and a target 
concept can be identical (=), sim ilar (±) or not equivalent ( f ) . Sarcevic (1997:238) 
challenges this classiAcation and proposes the categories o f  near equivalence, partial 
equivalence and non-equivalence. The characteristics o f  the source concept (The 
Supreme Court o f  Canada) and those o f  the target concept (Cozzr z/zz Czzfzzzz7zz)
are identical in the deAnition given by the W/zYzz/, according to which -  in order to be 
identical -  all the essential Aatures o f  the source concept should match up with those 
o f  the chosen target concept, while only a A w  o f  the accidental ones may not. I 
assume this to be a minimum requirement, in that two concepts sharing (across 
languages) all the essential Aatures and all the accidental ones are identical as well, as 
in the case o f  the translation o f  Cozzr xzzprê/?zg z/zz Czz/zzzzTa. As Ar as Sarcevic's 
classiAcation is concerned, none o f  the tA ee equivalence types seems to be adequate, 
because the maximum degree o f  equivalence she sets (near equivalence) would be 
inappropriate to describe what is in Act a A ll equivalence. So Sarcevic's system could 
be revised and A ll equivalence added to her classiAcation.
The situation at provincial level is diAèrent, as will be illustrated below.
5.2.2 A C ourt’s nam e at provincial level (Case study 6)
In section 4.2.2 a summary (written in French) o f  a judgment issued in English by the 
Supreme Court o f  British Columbia was analysed. As indicated, the translator wrote
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an introductory note on the cover o f  the summary. One o f  the most interesting 
elements o f  such a note in the case W iebe v. Bouchard is the Act that the transAtor 
translates the "Supreme Court o f  British Columbia" with a caique, namely as "Cowr 
zA /zz Co/omZzze-FnYzzMMZ ẑze", but also explains that this court is equivalent to 
the Cozzr xzz^grzezzre z7zz {gzzeZzec, "c 'gj/-d-z/zrg zzzz rnZzzzMzz/ zA /zrezzzzère zm/zzMce ẑ zzzzr 
zzMg yzznWzc/zoM ybr/ éZe/zz/zze" ("i.e., a trial court having a very wide jurisdiction"). 
Accordmg to the translation brief the TT has been translated in order to be published 
on a Quebec-based website to promote and deAnd the rights and interests o f  women  
in Quebec. So, its addressees are mamly readers living in Quebec. The parallel 
between the court m British Columbia and that in Quebec is, o f  course, Ar the benefit 
o f  the readers Aom Quebec. A  translation into French aimed at a French or Belgian or 
Swiss public would not probably have contained such an explanation, but maybe 
would have identiAed a local court considered to be equivalent to the Canadian court. 
Also, the summary is aimed at the public and not at legal experts. It is communication  
between an expert and interested laymen (in Stolze's words, 1999:131), ayac/zgjc/emg 
Fo/MZMzzMzWzoM (1999:131), hence the need to add the explanation. This is an example 
o f  how the purpose o f  the TT -  and most particularly the TT addressees -  can 
inAuence even lexical choices.
In this case study, the translation o f  two terms Aom English to French was analysed. 
The Arst term makes reArence to the Canadian Aderal legal systems, common Ar the 
whole o f  Canada. The second term makes reArence to a Canadian province, which 
has its own law and judicial organisation. The analysis o f  the subcorpus showed that 
there is a 100% match between the chosen source term and the target counterpart, 
while the translation o f  the second term -  the name o f  a provincial Court -  has 
required the use o f  a caique with a small explanation.
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Case Study 4 (Scenario 1) 
Translation o f Tribunale  
and P retura
IT EN
Sub-corpus:
21 judgm ents issued by 
an Italian Tribunale  and 
other judgm ents issued 
by Italian appellate 
courts (Corfg or
Cor/g (f; Cof^azfOMg) in which 
the term Tr/Aẑ na/g is also 
present. The total number of 
times the term appears in the 
sub-corpus is 73
Second Research Question
Case Study 5 (Scenario 2) Case Study 6 (Scenario 2)
Translation o f “Cour Translation of “The
Suprêm e du C anada” Suprem e Court of British
F R — EN C olum bia”
E N — ^  FR
Sub-corpus:
50 judgm ents issued by The Sub-corpus:
Suprem e Court o f Canada, 1 judgm ent issued by The
taken from  a w ebsite called Suprem e Court o f British
“Judgments of the Supreme Court Colum bia, taken from the
of Canada” website of the Conjgf/ r/w .ytatut
rip. In fp.mmp
Figure 5.2 -  Sub-corpora o f  judgm ents used in the three case studies analysed in Chapter 5 to answer
the second Research Question
5.3 The contribution o f  the research on lexica! incongruency  
The analyses o f  case studies 4, 5 and 6 in Chapter 5 have confirmed the problematic 
nature o f  the search for equivalence in the translation o f  lexical items, especially in the 
first scenario. The case studies belonging to the second scenario seem again to be less 
problematic, at least when translating terms describing Canadian federal institutions. 
In those cases where lack o f  equivalence or partial equivalence across languages was 
found, the adequacy o f  the translation strategies proposed by Baker (1992) -  as 
identified in many cases in legal translation -  can only be evaluated in context, by 
looking at co-text and according to the translation brief: There are no instances o f  lack 
o f  equivalence or partial equivalence in the translation o f  the names o f  Canadian 
federal institutions, because SL and TL terms indicate the same objects, as in the 
translation o f  Cour Supreme du Canada as "The Supreme Court o f  Canada", thence 
the translation o f  lexical items is less problematic in this case.
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion
The idea for this research came from my professional experience as a &eelance 
translator. Translating judgments seemed to be an intimidating job, possibly because 
o f  the very nature o f  these particular texts, which can have very serious consequences 
for the parties concerned, or simply because they were in some way "difficult" to 
translate; the com plexity o f  their macro structure, their conventionalised patterns o f  
discourse raised issues concerning the full textual implications o f  such structures. 
Moreover, as acknowledged in many studies o f  legal translation, it was difficult to 
deal with those terms which identified legal institutions which had no equivalents in 
the legal system o f  the target country and consequently had no lexical counterparts in 
the TL.
I would turn to books on legal translation for help, but most o f  the time these searches 
would end in disappointment, especially for the topic o f  macrostructures: those 
conventionalised expressions and language patterns remained somewhat arcane, as if  
only experts could interpret them. W hilst studies on the m acrostructure o f  judgm ents 
has been conducted monolingually, little is known about the translation o f  moves in 
this genre.
Both these factors, the challenges they create for translators and the little research 
done on them have led to this thesis on the translation o f  judgments.
6.1 The Research Q uestions, the scenarios and the case studies
This research project focuses on two main themes, which are summed up in the
Research Questions:
a) What happens to the macrostructures o f  judgments in different translation 
scenarios? Judgments often exhibit conventionalised moves: are these kept in the 
TTs?
b) What happens if  a particular legal concept expressed in the ST has no 
corresponding concept in the legal system o f  the target culture? How are lexical 
gaps dealt with in the context o f  judgments in different translation scenarios?
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The two scenarios created for this thesis are:
1. Two countries in which different legal systems are in force and two 
different languages are spoken: language A into language B, legal system 1 
to legal system 2.
2. Plurilingual countries with a mixed legal system: language A into language
B, legal system 1 a to legal system 1 b.
Given the Research Questions, a text corpus o f  judgments was built, designed to 
match the two scenarios described above in terms o f  genre and language 
combinations. The SL and the TL o f  the corpus had to be among the ones I can read
m ore easily (Italian, English and French).
As discussed in Chapter 3, two o f  the sources for the sub-corpora are academic (The 
Queen M ary Case Translation Program m e and The Institute for Translational Law), 
one is judicial (the Supreme Court o f  Canada), one is parliamentary (the National 
Assem bly o f  Quebec), one has been created by an association o f  lawyers and the last 
one has been created by a Canadian association, the (/w 6^ /a Fem/Mg.
The six case studies analysed in Chapters 4 and 5 are the following:
For the first Research Question
1) Macrostructures o f  French judgments in English translation -  FR > EN  
(Scenario 1)
2) Macrostructures o f  Quebec judgments in translation -  FR > EN (Scenario 2)
3) Macrostructures o f  Canadian federal and provincial judgments "translated" as 
summaries -  EN > FR (Scenario 2)
For the second Research Question
4) Translation o f  the names o f  two Italian courts (Tn6zzMa/g and Fre/wm) - IT > 
EN (Scenario 1)
5) Translation o f  the name o f  one Canadian federal Court (Cow/- .ywprgTMe 6/w 
CoMa&z) - FR > EN (Scenario 2)
6) Translation o f  the name o f  one Canadian provincial Court (Supreme Court o f  
British Columbia) - EN > FR (Scenario 2).
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6.2 New perspectives introduced in this thesis
There are a number o f  new perspectives introduced in this thesis. The two scenarios o f  
this research project follow a number o f  studies performed by comparatist lawyers and 
jurilinguists (see Gémar, 2002 in particular), who have looked at legal systems in 
force in different countries. The adm inistrative distinction between centralised and 
federal states is a crucial one: centralised countries are always mono-systemic, while 
federal states sometimes have two legal systems or a mixed system (Sarcevic 
1997:14). W hat had not been identified before in the literature is the different 
scenarios that a translator can face, on the basis o f  i) these systemic legal differences;
ii) the different languages involved in the translation he/she has to perform, and iii) 
the different languages involved in countries with more than one official language. 
The two translation scenarios o f  this study have been devised following these 
premises.
Case study 1 presents an analysis o f  the conventionalised macrostructure o f  French 
judgments, which to my knowledge has never been analysed before in translation. It 
also deals with some instances o f  "updating": if  a translation is commissioned for 
informative purposes and the ST is outdated, some updating o f  the content may be 
required if̂  for instance, the translation o f  a judgment issued by a court o f  first 
instance has subsequently been quashed by a court o f  appeal. Case studies 2 and 3 
deal with the macrostructure o f  Canadian judgments in translation. Case study 2 
analyses judgments issued by the Court o f  Quebec and translated into English, 
producing highly standardised TTs, while case study 3 looks at federal and provincial 
Canadian English judgments "translated" into French as summaries according to the 
translation brief This perspective on the condensation o f  judgments in translation is 
also deemed to represent new research. The outcomes will be discussed in 6.3.
Case studies 4, 5 and 6 deal with lexical incongruency. Most o f  the literature on legal 
translation Ibcuses on lexicon, and some on the names o f  institutions (Humbley, 2006, 
in particular). Case studies 4, 5 and 6 deal with the translation o f  the names o f  
particular courts: the translation o f  TnFwMa/g and Fre/wra, two Italian courts, into 
English is the subject o f  case study 4, which belongs to the first scenario. Case studies 
5 and 6, which belong to the second scenario, deal with lexical equivalence in the
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names o f  Canadian courts: Cowr 6/w CaMaûfa, a federal Court, is analysed in
English translation in case study 5, while case study 6 looks at the French translation 
o f  the name o f  a provincial court, the "Supreme Court o f  British Columbia". AAer 
considering the systemic differences inherent in the terms analysed, case studies 4, 5 
and 6 look at such terms in the context o f  the relevant text sub-corpora, focusing on 
the co-text o f  the lexical items analysed. The adequacy o f  the translations found were 
evaluated according to the translation purpose and -  where possible -  the translation 
brief
6.3 Tentative claim s and im plications for practice
The analyses o f  the case studies in chapters 4 and 5 conArm that the two research 
questions are indeed related to challenges that the producers o f  the TTs do not always 
overcome, especially in the Arst scenario o f  two countries in which different legal 
systems are in force and two different languages are spoken. The implications o f  the 
linguistic cues used to signal certain macrostructural moves in French judgments are 
undervalued in the majority o f  the translations studied. The second scenario, i.e. 
plurilingual countries with a mixed legal system, can be considered to be less 
problematic, at least as far as Canada is concerned, also for some mandatory elements 
on the draAing o f  judgments (cf. Tables 2.2 and 2.3) in the two official languages, 
which have tried to standardise the moves o f  Canadian judgments in both English and 
French. As expected, the translation brief inAuences the production o f  the TTs.
A better understanding o f  the signiAcance o f  linguistic cues in signalling move 
changes in the macrostructure in French judgments has implications for practice. The 
cohesive ties in French judgments are not merely formal relations, but can be said to 
create a semantic relation which creates unity in the text and which in turn contribute 
to the coherence o f  the text (Halliday and Hasan, 1976:6). The translations o f  these 
ties in cases where they are successfully identiAed -  represented in the STs by a 
number o f  locutions analysed in Chapter 4 -  can be considered as one o f  those 
instances in w hich a rise in the level o f  cohesive explicitness in the TL text can be 
observed and which is not due to differences in the grammatical systems o f  the 
languages, as noted in Blum-Kulka's explicitation hypothesis (1986:292). Instances o f  
explicitation and "ampliAcations" (Nida, 1964) are observed in the TTs o f  the sub-
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corpus, although in a limited number o f  translations. Translation choices such as 
explicitations and additions can be assumed to clarity the meaning carried in the ST 
for the T f  readers.
This study also conArms the problematic nature o f  the search for equivalence in the 
translation o f  lexical items, especially in the first scenario. The case studies belonging 
to the second scenario seem again to be less problematic, at least when translating 
terms describing Canadian federal institutions.
The obvious implication for practice is a careful co-text analysis in the translation o f  
lexical items. The adequacy o f  the translation strategies proposed by Baker (1992) to 
deal with partial equivalence -  as identiAed in many cases in legal translation -  can 
only be evaluated in context, as attempted in Chapter 5.
The terms describing Canadian federal institutions are less problematic to translate 
because they indicate the same objects, such as in the translation o f  Cour Supreme du 
Canada as "The Supreme Court o f  Canada"
6.4 Future W ork
Further research could be performed by developing the work begun here, following a 
number o f  paths using a similar corpus design to that used in the current study. The 
present corpus, i.e. parallel texts having the same combinations o f  languages and the 
same scenarios as those presented here, can be extended. A s indicated in Chapter 3, it 
is not easy to gain access to translated judgments but other sources may remain to be 
identiAed. Another possible direction would be to compile new corpora with different 
combinations o f  languages but the same scenarios as those presented in this thesis, or 
to compile new corpora with different scenarios from those presented in this thesis. 
These different scenarios could be, for example: plurilingual countries with one legal 
system: language A into language B, legal system 1 to legal system I (such as 
Switzerland, Belgium and Finland); or two countries in which different legal systems 
are in force and the same language is spoken: language A  into language A, legal 
system 1 to legal system 2. Translations Aom, say, British English to American 
English would be rare, but a study o f  paratext accompanying, say, English judgments
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published in the USA (whether on paper or on US websites) could be the subject o f  a 
future study. A Anal suggestion for a further research could be that o f  a comparative 
corpus o f  original judgments and translated judgments in the same language and 
jurisdiction. In C hapter 4, some com parative points were m ade by referring to some 
genre conventions for judgments in England and Wales. However, the scope o f  this 
thesis did not allow for a thorough analysis o f  such conventions, nor a comparative 
analysis between the English translations o f  French judgments and untranslated 
English judgments, nor an analysis between English/French Canadian TTs and 
French/English untranslated Canadian judgments.
This study has attempted to widen the scope o f  the analysis o f  legal translation in two 
main ways. Firstly, it has moved beyond the most common aspect o f  translation 
analysis in legal texts by considering the macrostructure o f  STs and the treatment o f  
ST linguistic cues in the TTs. Secondly, it has extended the study o f  lexical problems 
by introducing the broader context o f  what are here called 'scenarios' and by taking 
into consideration the co-text surrounding the terms or names studied.
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Appendix la
]. 04-17.726
2. Arrêt n° 389 du 2 avril 2008
3. Cour de cassation - Première chambre civile
4. Rejet
5.
6. De/MaMüfewr A) à /a . .yoczgtg Zog/co/M
7 . A )  à  / a  . . f o c z e Z g  C 7 T  e t  a w t r e
9. Attendu, selon l'arrêt attaqué (Aix-en-Provence, 1er avril 2004), que la société de
10. droit français Logicom a commandé des produits de téléphonie à la société CCT
11. Marketing Ltd (la société CCT), dont le siège est à Hong-Kong ; qu'après qu'il eut été
12. constaté que des appareils livrés ne fonctionnaient pas, les parties sont convenues
13. qu'ils seraient retournés au fabricant puis renvoyés à l'acheteur, à charge pour ce
14. dernier de payer 30 % du prix FOB avant que les réparations ne soient entreprises ;
15. que la société CCT n'ayant pas procédé aux réparations convenues, la société
16. Logicom l'a assignée en indemnisation de ses préjudices ;
17. Sur le premier moyen, pris en ses deux premières branches :
18. Attendu que la société Logicom fait grief à l'arrêt de limiter, sur le fondement du droit
19. de Hong-Kong, la réparation de son dommage à la somme de 7 995 dollars US et de
20. rejeter toutes ses autres demandes, alors, selon le moyen :
2 7 .  7 V  g w e  / a  C o M v e M t z o M  (T e F 7 e » M e  (Tw 7 7  ( 3 v n /  7 9 ^ 0 ,  r e / a t z v e  à  7(3 v e /z Z e  7 » r e r M (3 t7 o M (2 7 e
2 2 .  (T e /M arcT 7(3»(T 7 .ye.y  ' ( z p p /z ^ M e  .y w r  7 e  t e r r z / o z r e  (Te T T o M g - F o M g ,  g w 7  »  'e f Z  '« M e  r é g z o »
2 3 .  (3(T m 7M Zj^/r(377ve j / ? é c z ( 3 7 e  (T a M f 7 ' o r ( T r e  ZM ZerM e (T e 7(3 7 ^ ^ w 6 7 7 ^ w e  z 7 e  C T z z w e  » e  (T 7fp(3f(3M Z
2 4 .  (T '(3w cM M e a w /O M O /M z e  e / z  (T rozZ  z M te r M (3 t7 o » (3 7 /7 w 6 7 7 c ,  7(3 F ^ w 6 7 7 g w e  (T e C T zzM e M ' ( ^ ( 3 » f  (3W
2 5 .  (T e /M ew r(3 M / é /M Z f (3 w e w M e  r é j ^ e r v e  o z z  r e .y r n e ^ 7 o M , 7 o r .ÿ  (T e  7(3 r é r r o e e j ^ j ' z o M  (T e 7 7 ( 3 M g - F o M g
2 6 .  (3 e o m p r e r  (Tw 7 e r y w 7 7 7 e Z  7 9 9 7  g w a z z /  (3 7 '(3 p p 7 7 c(3 Z z o M  (T e c e ^ / e  e o M v e M 7 z o »  7 M te r » (3 7 7 o » (3 7 e
2 7 .  .Ywr 7 e  Z e r r z /( 3 7 r e  (T e e e / t e  r é g / o »  /M Z e m e ,  g'M ' e «  (Tée7(T (3M t g^zze 7(3(T 7te C o M v e M /z o M  (7 e
2 (5 . F 7 e M » e  M e j  ' ( 3 ^ 7 7 g M e r ( 3 7 t  / ) ( »  (3 7 7 (9 M g -Æ (3 M g , ( 3 «  f e w 7  g w  7 7  f  ' (3 g 7 r (3 zr  (7 'w M e  r é g z o M
2 9 .  (3(T /M 7M 7j'fr(3Z7ve j /7 é c z ( 3 7 e ,  7(3 c o w r  ( T ' ( 3 ^ e 7  (3 v 3 o 7 é  7 e f  / z r z M c / p e j  (7w  (7 r o 7 r  3M /erM (3t30M (37,
3 0 .  eM A^e3M 67e 7(3 C o M v e M t /O M  ( 7 e  F /e M M e  (7z3 2 3  /M(33 7 9 6 9  e t  7(3 C o M v e M t z o M  ( 7 e  F z e M M e  (7w  
3 7 .  7 7  (3 v r7 7  7 9 ( 5 0  ;
3 2 .  2  V  g z 3  'z3Me C o M v e M t z o M  3 M terM (3 t3 0 M (3 7 e  e j t  (3^ c^ 73C (367e j 'e 7 o M  7e.y 3M (73C(3t30M j: g w e  / p o r t e n t
3 3 .  7e.y 3M .ytrz33M eM tf 3M terM (3t30M (333%  7(3 e o M c e r M (3 M t , g z z  ' e »  r e te M (3 M t g z z e  7(3 j ^ o e z é t é  L o g z e o m
3 4 .  (7 e v (3 3 t  ( ÿ z p o r t e r  7(3 / z r e z / v e  ( 7 e  7 ' ( 3 ^ 7 3 e ( 3 t 3 0 M  à  T T o M g -Æ o M g  ( 7 e  7(3 C o M v e M t z o M  ( 7 e  F /e M M e
3 5 .  (Tw 7 7  (3 v r z 7  7 9 8 0 ,  r e 7 ( 3 t f v e  à  7(3 v e n t e  3 M te r n (3 tfO M (3 7 e  (7 e  m (3rc72(3M (73ae& , (3W s e w 7  m o t i f
3 6 .  g z 3  7 7  /  e j f o r t ( 3 i t  ( 7 'w n  e e r t i / 3 C ( 3 t  (7 e  c o M t w m e  / ? r o ( T 3 3 i t /3 ( 3 r  7(3 j o e i é t é  C C T  g w e  7 (3 (7 ite
3 7 .  C o n v e n t i o n  i n t e r n ( 3 t i o n ( 3 7 e  n e  j  ' ( 3 p p 7 i^ 3 3 e r (3 i t  /? (3 ÿ  (3 T T o n g - F o n g ,  g z3 (3 n (T  7 (3 (7 ite
3 8 .  C o n v e n t i o n  f  7 7 n /3 0 j^ (3 it  (3W f w g e  ̂ ( 3 n ç ( 3 i . y  g 'w i  ( 7 e v ( 3 i t  e n  f o i r e  ( ^ 7 i e ( 3 t i o n  (7w  m o m e n t  g z z e
3 9 .  7(3 j ' o e i é t é  L o g i c o m  (3 V (3 it  r e v e n ( 7 i g '3 3 é  e x p r e f . y é m e n t  (3 t i t r e  j 9 r i n c ^ ( 3 7  f o n  c 3 ^ 7 i c ( 3 t i o n ,
4 0 .  .y ' (3 g i .9 J (3 n t  ( 7 e  / z o j ' t e j  t é i ^ / z o n i g ' z / e . y  f o 6 r i ^ w é . y  (3 T T o n g - Æ o n g  (3 n n  ( 7 i .y t r i6 w t e 3 3 r f r ( 3 n ç ( 3 i .y ,  
4 7 .  7 ' ( 3 r r é t  ( 3 t t ( 3 g 'n é  (3 v i o 7 é  7 e j' ( 3 r t ic 7 e .y  7 e r  e t  j ' n i v ( 3 n t j  ( 7 e  7(3 C o n v e n t i o n  ( 7 e  F i e n n e  (7w
4 2 .  7 7  ( 3 v r i7  7 9 8 0 , -
43. Mais attendu qu'aux termes de l'article 93 de la Convention de Vienne du
44. 11 avril 1980 (CVIM), tout Etat contractant peut décider que ce traité
45. s'appliquera à l'une ou plusieurs de ses unités territoriales, dans lesquelles des
46. systèmes de droit différents sont en vigueur dans les matières qu'elle régit, par
47. une déclaration faite au secrétaire général des Nations Unies désignant
48. expressément les unités territoriales auxquelles elle s'appliquera ; qu'il résulte
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49. des pièces versées aux débats, et, notamment de la note du ministre des affaires
50. étrangères et européennes du 18 janvier 2008, qui a interrogé les autorités
51. chinoises sur le point en litige, que la République populaire de Chine a déposé, le
52. 20 juin 1997, auprès du secrétaire général des Nations Unies, une déclaration
53. énonçant, pour les conventions auxquelles la Chine était partie à cette date, celles
54. devant s'appliquer au territoire de Hong-Kong ; que la CVIM, qui ne Agure pas
55. sur cette liste, n'a fait l'objet d'aucune déclaration à cette An par la Chine alors
56. qu'avant la rétrocession à cet Etat par le Royaume-Uni de ce territoire, cette
57. Convention ne s'y appliquait pas ; qu'ainsi, la République populaire de Chine a
58. accompli auprès du dépositaire de la Convention, une formalité équivalente à
59. celle prévue par son article 93 de sorte que, ce traité n'étant pas applicable à la
60. région administrative spéciale de Hong-Kong, l'arrêt se trouve légalement justiAé
61. de ce chef :
62. Sur le même moyen, pris en ses trois dernières branches, ainsi que sur le
63. second moyen :
64. Attendu que les griefs énoncés ne sont pas de nature à permettre l'admission du
65. pourvoi ;
66 PAR CES MOTIFS
67. REJETTE le pourvoi
69. Président : M. Bargue
70. Rapporteur : M. Pluyette, conseiller
71. Avocat général : M. Domingo
72. Avocat(s) : la SCP Tangier et Caston, la SCP Baraduc et Duhamel, la 
73 SCP Piwnica et Molinié
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Appendix lb
1. Cour de Cassation [Supreme Court], 1st Civil Chamber
2. Case No. 04-17726 [appeal on a point o f law] dated 2 April 2008
3. Zram/aZzoM [JA Ty TVat/za/ze [**1
4 REPUBLIC OF FRANCE
5. In  th e  n am e  o f  th e  F ren ch  P eo p le
6. The Supreme Court, 1st Civil Chamber, has rendered the following decision.
7. I. I Facts]
8. The French Company L... [Buyer] ordered telecommunication products Aom
9. Company C... M... Ltd [Seller] of Hong Kong. AAer discovering that the delivered
10. eq u ip m en t d id  n o t w ork , th e  p a rtie s  ag reed  th a t it should be sen t b ack  to  th e  [S eller]
11. and then returned to the [Buyer] with the [Buyer] bearing 30 % of the FOB price until
12. the repairs had taken place. Since [Seller] has not carried out the agreed repaus,
13. [Buyer] sued for damages.
14. II. [Proceedings before the Court of Appeal (Aix-en-Provence, 1 April 2004)]
15. The Court of Appeal awarded damages to [Buyer] limited to US $7,995 according to
16. the law of Hong Kong and rejected all other claims. [Buyer] appeals to the Supreme
17. Court.
18. 111. [Appeal before the Supreme Court]
1 9 .  O zz  t / z e f z r . y t  g r o z z W  o f c o z z c e r z z z z z g  t / z e f z r f t  t w o  j^z/Zzzzzzj'jzozzj.'
20. A [Arguments put forward by the Buyer]
21. Buyer alleges that:
22. The Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods of 11 April 1980
23. (hereinaAer CISG or the Convention ) applies to the territory of Hong Kong, which is
24. only a special administrative region under the sovereignty of the Republic of China
25. without any autonomy under public international law. Besides, the Republic of China
26. has not declared any reservation or restriction concerning the application of this
27. international convention to the territory of this internal region since the retrocession of
28. Hong Kong on 1 July 1997. In deciding that the CISG did not apply to Hong Kong on
29. the sole ground that it is a special administrative region, the Court of Appeal violated
30. the principles of international law, i.e., both the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969
31. on the Law of Treaties and the CISG.
32. An international convention is applicable according to the indications of the relevant
33. international instruments. In ruling that the [Buyer] would have to prove the
34. applicability o f the CISG only because of a (7e Cozẑ zzme f)!] produced by the
35. [Seller] whereAom resulted a ruling that the CISG was not applicable to Hong Kong
36. even though the Convention required the French judge to apply it, given that the
37. [Buyer] expressly demanded its application in its main submission and given that the
38. telephone sets were produced in Hong Kong for a French retailer, the appealed
39. decision violated articles 1 gZ jgg'. CISG.
40. B [Ruling of the Supreme Court]
4L According to Art. 93 CISG, any Contracting State in which different systems of
42. law are applicable in relation to the matters dealt with in the Convention may
43. declare that the Convention is to extend only to one or more of its territorial units
44. by way of notiAcation to the Secretary General of the United Nations stating
45. expressly the territorial units to which the Convention extends. From the
46. documents supplied during the pleadings and notably Aom the note of the
47. Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of 18 January 2008, who questioned
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48. the Chinese authorities on this point, results that the People's Republic o f China
49. deposited with the Secretary General o f the United Nations a declaration
50. announcing the conventions to which China was a party at that date which should
5 1. apply to Hong Kong. The CISG did not Agure on that list, nor had the CISG
52. applied to Hong Kong before the retrocession o f this territory to the People's
53. Republic of China by the United Kingdom. Thereby, the People's Republic of
54. China has effectuated with the depositary of the Convention a formality
55. equivalent to what is provided for in Art. 93 CISG. Consequently, the CISG is
56. not applicable to the special administrative region of Hong Kong. For this reason,
57. the decision of the Court of Appeal is legally JustiAed.
58. Ozz Z/zggrozzzz(7 qqpga/ gozzggnzzzzg r/zg /(ZfZ Z/zrgg .yzz6/zzz.yfzozz.y af/(Zg/zg<T
59. /zgrgq/Igr.
60. The complaints are not of a nature to permit the admission of the appeal.
61. FOR THESE REASONS:
62. The Court
63. DISMISSES the appeal;
64. Orders the [Buyer] to pay the court fees; and
65. Rejects the claims based on Art. 700 of the new Code o f Civil Procedure.
66. So held and decided by the Supreme Court, 1st Civil Chamber, and pronounced by the
67. president at the public hearing of the second of April two thousand and eight.
69 FO O T N O T E S
70. *A11 translations should be veriAed by cross-checking against the original text. For
71. purposes of this translation. Company L... of France is referred to as [Buyer] and
72. Company C... M... Ltd of Hong Kong is referred to as [Seller].
73. DeAnition of terms: Cgrfz/zcaf <Tg CozzZzzzzzg = Statement of a foreign lawyer 
concerning
74. the existence, the content or the interpretation of foreign law. If before a court, a
75. foreign law has to be applied according to conAict-of-law rules, the pleader can
76. submit such a certiAcate to the French judge. The French judge verifies the sense and
77. content o f the foreign law autonomously.
78. ** Nathalie Hofmann is a law student at Humboldt University Berlin studying at the
79. University of Geneva in the "CertiAcat du droit transnational" program during the
80. academic year 2007-2008 and a member of the Geneva team at the 15th Willem C. V
81. is International Commercial Arbitration Moot.
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Appendix 2a
1. Cour de cassation - Premiere Chambre civile
2. 02 octobre 2001
3. Stés L... et C...
4. Contre
5. Boucherie D..., Ets. B... et autres
6. Audience publique du 2 octobre 2001
7. Cassation
8. M. LEMONTEY, président
9. Arrêt n ° l 436 F-P
10. Pourvoi n°B 99-13.461
11. REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE AU NOM DU PEUPLE FRANÇAIS LA COUR DE
12. CASSATION,
13. PREMIÈRE CHAMBRE CIVILE, a rendu l'arrêt suivant :
14. Sur le pourvoi formé par :
15. 1°/ la Compagnie canadienne d'assurances générales L..., anciennement dénommée
16. Compagnie d'assurance c... Canada, dont le siège est (...), Montréal (Québec),
17. 2°/ la société C... Import Export Inc, ayant son siège à (...), Yamachiche (Québec),
18. en cassation d'un arrêt rendu le 10 lévrier 1999 par la cour d'appel de Paris (8e
19. chambre civile, section D), au profit :
20. 1°/ de la Boucherie D..., dont le siège est (...), Paris
21. 2°/ des Etablissements B..., société anonyme, dont le siège est (...), Paris
22 . (.. .)
23. défendeurs à la cassation ;
24. Les demanderesses invoquent, à l'appui de leur pourvoi, les deux moyens de
25. cassation annexés au présent arrêt;
26. LA COUR, composée selon l'article L. 131-6, alinéa 2, du Code de l'organisation
27. judiciaire, en l'audience publique du 3 juillet 2001, où étaient présents: M.
28. Lemontey, président, M. Ancel, conseiller rapporteur, M. Renard-Payen,
29. conseiller, Mme Petit, avocat général, Mme Collet, greffier de chambre;
30. Sur le rapport de M. Ancel, conseiller, les observations de Me C...-R..., avocat de
31. la Compagnie canadienne d'assurances générales L... et de la société C... Import
32. Export Inc, de la SCP B... et P... de la V..., avocat de la Boucherie D..., de la SCP
33. P... et D..., avocat de la Compagnie d'assurances E... Assurances, aux droits de
34. laquelle vient la compagnie A..., de Me O..., avocat des Etablissements B..., les
35. conclusions de Mme P ..., avocat général, et après en avoir délibéré conformément
36. à la loi ;
37. Attendu que l'importation en France en provenance du Québec, le 7 novembre
38. 1993, de viande de cheval, qui s'est révélée contaminée, a provoqué une épidémie
39. de trichinellose; que, sur l'action de victimes de cette épidémie, l'arrêt attaqué a
40. condamné l'importateur, la société Aançaise Boucherie D ..., le distributeur, la
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41. société française B ... , et le fournisseur, la société québécoise C ..., ce dernier par
42. application &  l'article 35, 1 , de la Convention de Vienne du 11 avril 1980 sur les
43. contrats de vente internationale de marchandises, à indemniser les victimes ;
44. Sur le second moyen, pris en ses quatre branches, ci-après annexé :
45. Attendu que, s'agissant d'un contrat de vente internationale conclu entre des
46. ressortissants d'Etats parties à la Convention de Vienne du 11 avril 1980 sur les
47. contrats de vente internationale de marchandises, la cour d'appel ajustement
48. énoncé que la vente litigieuse était régie par cette convention en application de son
49. article 1, 1, a) ; que ce seul motif justifie la décision attaquée quant au droit
50. applicable, indépendamment des motifs surabondants critiqués par le moyen ;
51. Mais sur le premier moyen :
52. Vu l'article 16 du nouveau Code de procédure civile ;
53. Attendu que la cour d'appel a fait application d'office de la Convention de Vienne
54. du 11 avril 1980, sans inviter les parties à un débat contradictoire sur ce point ;
55. En quoi elle a violé le texte susvisé ;
56. PAR CES MOTIFS :
57. CASSE ET ANNULE, dans toutes ses dispositions, l'arrêt rendu le 10 février 
1999,
58. entre les parties, par la cour d'appel de Paris ; remet, en conséquence, la cause et
59. les parties dans l'état où elles se trouvaient avant ledit arrêt et, pour être fait droit,
60. les renvoie devant la cour d'appel de Paris, autrement composée ;
61. Condamne les défendeurs aux dépens ;
62. Vu l'article 700 du nouveau Code de procédure civile, rejette les demandes ;
63. Dit que sur les diligences du procureur général près la Cour de Cassation, le
64. présent arrêt sera transmis pour être transcrit en marge ou à la suite de l'arrêt cassé;
65. Ainsi fait et jugé par la Cour de Cassation, Première chambre civile, et prononcé
66. par le président en son audience publique du deux octobre deux mille un.
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Appendix 2b
1. Supreme Court 2 October 2001
2. Lombard and Confranca v. Boucherie Debeaux, Ets. Barbaud et a l
3. [21
4. FRENCH REPUBLIC
5. In the name of the French People
6. M. LEMONTEY, président
7. Ruling no. 1436 F-P
8. Appeal no. B 99-13.461
9. THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS, First Civil Chamber, has rendered the
10. following judgment :
11. ON THE APPEAL brought by:
12. 10/ the Canadian general insurance company Lombard, formerly named
13. Compagnie d'assurance continental Canada, whose headquarters is 2001, rue
14. University, 113A 2A6, Montréal (Québec),
15. 20/ the Cofranca Import Export Inc company, having its headquarters at
16. Yamachiche 210 Canton Sud, Québec, Canada Gox 3LO, represented by Cabinet
17. Raymond Chabot-Fafard-Gagnon Inc, bankruptcy assignee of Cofranca, whose
18. headquarters is Tour de la Banque Nationale 600, rue de la Gauchetière Ouest
19. Bureau 1900 Montréal (Québec) H3B 4L8, reversing a ruling entered on 10
20. February 1999 by the Court of Appeals of Paris (8th Civil Chamber, section D),
21. in favor of :
22. [...]
23. de^ndants on the appeal;
24. The defendants invoke, in support of their appeal, the two grounds o f reversal
25. annexed to the present ruling;
26. THE COURT, composed pursuant to article L. 131 -6, paragraph 2, of the Code
27. de l'organisation judiciaire, at the public hearing o f 3 July 2001, where were
28. present:
29. Mr. Lemontey, président, Mr. Ancel, reporter conseiller, Mr. Renard-Payen,
30. conseiller, Mrs. Petit, attorney general, Mrs. Collet, chamber clerk ;
31. On the report of Mr. Ancel, conseiller, the observations of Maffre Copper-Royer,
32. attorney for the Compagnie canadienne d'assurances générales Lombard and for
33. the CoÂ-anca Import Export Inc company, of the SCP Bachellier et Potier de la
34. Varde, attorneys for Boucherie Debeaux, of the SCP Parmentier et Didier,
35. attorneys for Compagnie d'assurances Elvia Assurances, to whose rights comes
36. Allianz, of Odent, attorney for the Etablissements Barbaud, the briefs of
37. Mrs. Petit, attorney general, and aAer having deliberated upon them in
38. accordance with the law ;
39. WHEREAS, the importation into France from Québec, on 7 November 1993, of
40. horse flesh, which proved to be contaminated, provoked an epidemic of
41. trichinosis; that, on the action of victims of that epidemic, the challenged ruling
42. ordered the importer, the French company Boucherie Debeaux, the distributor,
43. the French company Barbaud, and the supplier, the Quebec company Cofranca,
44. this latter by application of Article 35(1) of the Vienna Convention on Contracts
45. for the International Sale of Goods of 11 April 1980 [CISG], to indemnify the
46. victims;
47. On the second grounds, taken in its four branches, hereafter annexed:
48. WHEREAS, one is dealing with an international sales contract formed between
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49. nationals of States parties to the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the
50. International Sale of Goods of 11 April 1980 [CISG], the Court of Appeals has
51. rightly held that the disputed sale was governed by that Convention by operation
52. of its Articles 1 and 2(a); that this sole reason justifies the challenged decision as
53. far as regards the applicable law, independently of the superabundant reasons
54. criticized in the appeal ;
55. But on the first grounds, in light of Article 16 o f the new Code of Civil
56. Procedure:
57. WHEREAS, the Court of Appeals made application of the Vienna
58. Convention of 11 April 1980 [CISG], without inviting the parties to a hearing 
and
59. argument on that point ;
60. by which it violated the abovementioned text ;
61. FOR THESE REASONS:
62. QUASHES AND NULLIFIES, in all of its provisions, the ruling entered on 10
63. February 1999, between the parties, by the Court of Appeals of Paris;
64. RESTORES, as a consequence, the suit and the parties to the state in which they
65. were before the said ruling and, to so grant the demand, remands them before the
66. Court of Appeals of Paris, otherwise composed;
67. ORDERS the defendants liable for court costs;
68. In light of Article 700 of the new Code of Civil Procedure,
69. REJECTS the demands;
70. HOLDS that on the actions of the attorney-general before [this] Court, the
present
71. ruling shall be transmitted to be transcribed in the margin or following the
72. quashed judgment;
73. SO DONE AND ADJUDGED by the Supreme Court of Appeals, First Civil
74. Chamber, and announced by the président at its public hearing of the second of
75. October two thousand one.
7T FOOTNOTE
78. Charles Sant 'Elia has a B.A. in Political Science and Italian Literature from New
79. York University and studied Political Science at the Universita degli Studi di
80. Firenze.
81. He received his J.D. from Pace University School of Law and is admitted to the
82. Bar of the States of New York and Connecticut. In addition to translations of
83. French case texts for the cisgw3 database, he has translated Italian decisions and
84. texts on linguistics into English.
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Appendix 3a
1. Cour de Cassation
2. Chambre commerciale
3. Audience publique du 10 décembre 1973 Cassation
4. N° de pourvoi : 72-14359N° de pourvoi : 72-14523N° de pourvoi : 72-14408
5 PDTM . MONGUILAN
6. RPRM. PORTEMER
7. AV.GEN.M. LAMBERT
8. Demandeur AV. MM. COLAS DE LA NOUE, COPPER-ROYER, GARAUD
9. Défenseur LABBE
10 REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE 
11 AU NOM DU PEUPLE FRANÇAIS
12. VU LA CONNEXITE JOINT LES POURVOIS NUMEROS 72-14 359, 72-14
13. 408 ET 72-14 523, SUR LE MOYEN UNIQUE, PRIS EN SA PREMIERE
14. BRANCHE DU POURVOI N° 72-14 359, LE PREMIER MOYEN PRIS EN SA
15. PREMIERE BRANCHE DU POURVOI 72-14 408, ET LE MOYEN UNIQUE
16. DU POURVOI 72-14 523 : VU LES ARTICLES 1832 ET 1855 DU CODE
17. CIVIL, ATTENDU QUE, SELON LES ENONCIATIONS DE L'ARRET
18. INFIRMATIF ATTAQUE, SAILLOFEST, ENTREPRENEUR, AYANT
19. CONSTRUIT 11 CHALETS POUR UNE EXPOSITION ORGANISEE AU 1
20. ER ETAGE DE LA TOUR EIFFEL, ET SOUTENANT AVOIR TRAITE AVEC
21. UNE SOCIETE DE FAIT CREEE ENTRE LA SOCIETE REGION ALPES
22. 2000 (LA REGION), ACTUELLEMENT EN LIQUIDATION DES BIENS, ET
23. CHASTAGNOL, GRAMA ET LA SOCIETE D'EXPLOITATION ET DE
24. SERVICE DES RESTAURANTS DE LA TOUR EIFFEL (S O S E R ), A
25. DEMANDE A CES DERNIERS, QU'IL CONSIDERE COMME DEBITEURS
26. SOLIDAIRES DU PRIX DES TRAVAUX, LE PAIEMENT DU SOLDE LUI
27. RESTANT DU, ET DE DOMMAGES ET INTERETS ;
28. ATTENDU QUE POUR FAIRE DROIT A CETTE DEMANDE L'ARRET
29. RETIENT QUE L'OPERATION PUBLICITAIRE QUE CONSTITUAIT
30. L'EXPOSITION A ETE DES L'ORIGINE CONÇUE, AVEC LE CONCOURS
31. DE LA SOCIETE LA REGION, QUI PRENAIT LA CHARGE DES 
CHALETS,
32. ENTRE LA S O S E R, QUI METTAIT A LA DISPOSITION DE LA REGION,
33. AVEC SES ENTREPRISES DE RESTAURATION LA PLATEFORME DU
34. 1ER ETAGE DE LA TOUR EIFFEL, ET CHASTAGNOL QUI PRENAIT LE
35. TITRE DE COMMISSAIRE GENERAL ;
36. QUE CE DERNIER A EN FAIT ASSUME CE ROLE QUI LUI CONFERAIT
172
37. AUX YEUX DE TOUS LA RESPONSABILITE AU PREMIER CHEF DE
38. L'ENSEMBLE DE L'OPERATION ET QU'A L'EGARD DU PUBLIC ET DES
39. TIERS SON CENTRE D'INFORMATION ETAIT PLACE SOUS L'EGIDE A
40. LA FOIS DE LA SOCIETE LA REGION ET DU GUIDE DES LOISIRS EN
41. MONTAGNES DE FRANCE, DONT, DANS LA BROCHURE
42. PUBLICITAIRE, IL S'EST DECLARE LE DIRECTEUR ;
43. QUE GRAMA FIGURE LUI AUSSI DANS CETTE BROCHURE COMME
44. L'UN DES ANIMATEURS ET PRESENTATEURS DU CENTRE
45. D'INFORMATION DES MONTAGNES DE FRANCE ET QU'IL A LUI-
46. MEME RECONNU SA QUALITE D'ORGANISATEUR DANS LE PROJET
47. DE CONVENTION DU 27 FEVRIER 1970 QU'IL A SIGNE AVEC
48. SAILLOFEST ET LE GERANT DE LA SOCIETE LA REGION ;
49. QUE LES DIFFERENTS DOMAINES INTERESSES A L'OPERATION
50. PUBLICITAIRE SONT RAPPELES, AU MEME TITRE QUE LES CHALETS,
51. EN TETE DE CETTE BROCHURE EDITEE PAR LE SERVICE DE PRESSE
52. DE S O S E R SOUS LES RUBRIQUES : PATINOIRE, BRASSERIE, CAFE
53. CONCERT, URBANISME EN MONTAGNE ;
54. QUE MALGRE L'ABSENCE DE PRODUCTION PAR LES PARTIES DU
55. BILAN DE L'OPERATION IL EST CONSTANT QUE SA REALISATION A
56. NECESSITE DES DEPENSES ET PROCURE DES RECETTES, ET QUE SUR
57. LE PLAN DE LA PUBLICITE SES PARTICIPANTS ETAIENT
58. SUSCEPTIBLES, SOUS UNE FORME QUELCONQUE, ET A PLUS OU
59. MOINS LONGUE ECHEANCE, D'EN TIRER UN BENEFICE ;
60. QUE L'ARRET DECLARE QU'EST AINSI ETABLIE L'EXISTENCE DE LA
61. SOCIETE DE FAIT ALLEGUEE PAR SAILLOFEST, CREEE EN VUE DE 
LA
62. DELIBERATION DE L'OPERATION PUBLICITAIRE PRECITEE ET DONT
63. CHACUN DES QUATRE PARTICIPANTS SE PROPOSAIT DE TIRER UN
64. BENEFICE ;
65. ATTENDU CEPENDANT QU'IL NE RESULTE D'AUCUNE DE CES
66. CONSTATATIONS ET APPRECIATIONS LA VOLONTE NON
67. EQUIVOQUE DE CHASSAGNOL, GRAMA ET DE LA S O S E R , DE
68. METTRE EN COMMUN AVEC LA SOCIETE LA REGION LES BIENS ET
69. ACTIVITES RELATES PAR L'ARRET, D'ATTENDRE LEUR BENEFICE
70. D'UNE EXPLOITATION COMMUNE DONT LES RESULTATS
71. DEVRAIENT ETRE PARTAGES, ET, EN CAS DE DEFICIT, DE
72. CONTRIBUER AUX PERTES ;
73. QUE, DES LORS, EN STATUANT COMME ELLE L'A FAIT LA COUR
74. D'APPEL N'A PAS DONNE DE BASE LEGALE A SA DECISION ;
75. PAR CES MOTIFS, ET SANS QU'IL Y AIT LIEU DE STATUER SUR LA
76. SECONDE BRANCHE DU MOYEN UNIQUE DU POURVOI N° 72-14 359,
77. NI SUR LA SECONDE BRANCHE DU PREMIER MOYEN NI SUR LE
78. SECOND MOYEN DU POURVOI N° 72-14 408, CASSE ET ANNULE MAIS
79. SEULEMENT DU CHEF DE LA DECISION RENDUE SUR LE FOND LE 17
80. JUIN 1972, ENTRE LES PARTIES, PAR LA COUR D'APPEL DE PARIS ;
81. REMET, EN CONSEQUENCE, QUANT A CE, LA CAUSE ET LES PARTIES
82. AU MEME ET SEMBLABLE ETAT OU ELLES ETAIENAVANT LEDIT
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83. ARRET ET, POUR ETRE FAIT DROIT, LES RENVOIE DEVANT LA COUR
84. D'APPEL D'ORLEANS.
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Appendix 3b
1. Case:
2. Com. 356 Case Saillofest/Region Alpes Partial Annulment Appeals nos. 72-
3. 14.359, 72-14.408 and 72-14.523
4. Date:
5. 10 December 1973
6. The Court
7. Having considered Articles 1832 and 1855 of the Civil Code
8. Whereas, according to the findings of the judgement of annulment under appeal,
9. Saillofsst, a contractor, having built 11 chalets for an exhibition organised on the
10. first floor of the Eiffel Tower, and claiming that it had contracted with a de facto
11. company existing between Region Alpes 2000 (the "Region"), a corporation now
12. in liquidation, and Chastagnol, Grama and the Société d'Exploitation et de
13. Services des Restaurants de la Tour Eiffel ("S.O.S.E.R."), claimed from the
14. latter, which it considers joint and several debtor in respect of the works, 
payment
15. of the outstanding balance and interest;
16. Whereas in order to admit this claim the judgement finds that (1) the exhibition,
17. which was a publicity campaign, was conceived from the beginning, with the
18. participation of the Region, which took on the cost of the chalets, by S.O.S.E.R.,
19. which made available to the Region its catering businesses and the platform of
20. the first floor of the Eiffel Tower, and Chastagnol, who took the title o f general
21. organiser; (2) the latter in fact assumed this role, which publicly gave him the
22. prime responsibility for the entire operation; (3) as far as the public and third
23. parties were concerned his information centre was under the patronage of both
24. the Region and the Guide to French Leisure and Mountains, of which, in the
25. publicity brochure, he claimed to be the director; (4) Grama also appears in this
26. brochure as one o f the persons who animate and present the Centre of
27. Information for French Mountains and himself recognised his role as organiser in
28. the draft agreement of 27 February 1970 which he signed with Saillofest and the
29. manager of the Region; (5) the various areas involved in the publicity operation
30. are set out, in the same way as the chalets, at the head of this brochure, edited by
31. the press service of S.O.S.E.R., under the titles: skating rink, restaurant, café-
32. concert, planning regulations in the mountains; (6) despite the failure by the
33. parties to produce accounts of the operation, it is evident that its realisation
34. necessitated expenses and produced receipts and because of the publicity the
35. parties were likely, in one way or another, and sooner or later, to earn profits; (7)
36. the judgement finds that there is thus established the existence of the de facto
37. company as claimed by Saillofest, which was crated for the publicity operation
38. set out above, and from which each of the four participants expected to earn
39. profits;
40. But whereas (1) there is no evidence from any of these findings and
41. interpretations of a clear intention on the part of Chassagnol, Grama and
42. S.O.S.E.R. to share in common with the Region the property and activities set
out
43. in the judgement, to expect profit from a joint enterprise whose results were to be
44. shared, and, in case of a deficit, to contribute to the losses; (2) by finding as it
45. did, the court of appeal did not give legal basis to its decision;
46. FOR THESE REASONS............
47. ANNULS but only.........
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Appendix 4a
I. Tribunal de commerce d'Aix-en-Provence 07 janvier 2003
2. StéC... C... SL
3. contre
4. Step... A... I...
5. REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
6. AU NOM DU PEUPLE FRANÇAIS
7. TRIBUNAL DE COMMERCE D'AIX EN PROVENCE
8. ROLE : 2002 005972 JUGEMENT DU 07/01/2003
9. COMPOSITION DU TRIBUNAL LORS DE L'AUDIENCE des débats et du 
délibéré
10. du 21/10/2002
II. PRESIDENT : Monsieur Joseph BRISSAC
12. JUGES : Monsieur Patrice CAILLAT, Madame Nathalie ROBIN
13. GREFFIER D'AUDIENCE : Me Elisabeth ANDRE
14. (LORS DES DEBATS SEULEMENT)
15. PRONONCE PAR LE PRESIDENT A L'AUDIENCE DU 07/01/2003 EN LA
16. CAUSE DE C... C... SL ITALIA (...) ELDA
17. COMPARAISSANT PAR Me C... F...-M...
18. DEMANDEURS, SUIVANT ASSIGNATION
19. CONTRE
20. F... A... I... (SARL) (...) AIX EN PROVENCE
21. COMPARAISSANT PAR SCP B... L...
22. Attendu que néanmoins le Tribunal se doit de constater que, pour sa part, la
23. société F... A... I... SARL verse aux débats différents courriers qui lui ont été
24. adressés par certains de ses clients, desquels il résulte clairement que les
25. chaussures litigieuses souffraient de défauts, trouvant notamment leur
26. manifestation dans leur décollement.
27. Attendu que, pour ce faire, la société F... A... I... SARL se réfère notamment à
28. des courriers en date des 24 octobre 2001, 15 novembre 2001, 17 décembre 
2001 ,
29. 21 décembre 2001 et 3 janvier 2002.
30. Attendu que par ailleurs elle verse encore aux débats un document émanant de la
31. société C... C... SL daté du 28 novembre 2001, duquel il résulte que ladite société
32. a mentionné l'existence de paires de chaussures dé^ctueuses dans les
33. marchandises qu'elle a livrées à la société F... A... I... SARL.
34. Attendu qu'enfin cette dernière verse également aux débats une lettre émanant de
35. Monsieur F... T..., représentant de la société C... C... SL datée du 21 juin 2002, 
de
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36. laquelle il résulte qu'effectivement une partie des marchandises n'était pas
37. conforme à la commande.
38. Attendu qu'enfin le Tribunal se doit de retenir que la société C... C... SL a
39. effectivement accordé deux avoirs à la société F... A... I... SARL, du chef des
40. marchandises litigieuses.
4L Attendu que tous ces éléments démontrent dès lors suffisamment que,
42. contrairement à ce que soutient la société C ... C... SL, une partie des
43. marchandises livrée par elle à la société F... A... I... SARL n'était effectivement
44. pas conforme à la commande en ce qu'elle souffrait de différentes malfaçons, et
45. notamment de décollement.
46. Attendu qu'enfin la société F... A... I... SARL a renvoyé à la société C... C... SL
47. 1566 paires de chaussures, représentant la somme de 39.995,64 euros.
48. Attendu qu'en l'espèce il est dès lors établi que c'est bien la marchandise non
49. conforme que la société F... A... I... SARL a réexpédié à la société C... C... SL.
50. Attendu qu'il s'ensuit qu'en l'état de ces éléments un compte est à faire entre les
51. parties, le Tribunal devant d'ores et d^à rejeter comme iryustifiées et donc
52. inopérantes toutes les demandes, fins et conclusions plus amples ou contraires de
53. ces dernières du chef du principal en litige.
54. Attendu que dès lors le Tribunal se doit de retenir que les trois factures de
55. marchandises livrées par la société C... C... SL à la société F... A... I... SARL
56. totalisent la somme de 67.137.86 euros.
57. Attendu qu'il y a lieu par ailleurs de retenir que les deux avoirs accordés par la
58. société C... C... SL à la société F... A... I... SARL, portant les 188 et 189,
59. totalisent la somme de 464.28 euros.
60. Attendu qu'il y a lieu de rajouter à cette somme celle de 39.995,64 euros.
61. représentant le montant des retours effectués à juste titre par la société F... A...
1 . . .
62. SARL à la société C... C... SL.
63. Attendu que par exploit du 15 mai 2002, la société C... C... SL, société de droit
64. espagnol, a fait assigner la société F... A... I... SARL pour :
65. S'entendre condamner à payer à la société C... C... SL, société de droit espagnol
66. les sommes de :
67. 67.137,86 euros à titre de sommes dues augmentés des intérêts au taux légal à
68. compter de la date de l'assignation.
69. 5.000 euros sur le fondement de l'article 700 du Nouveau Code de Procédure
70. Civile.
71. S'entendre condamner aux entiers dépens.
72. Conformément aux dispositions de l'article 455 du N.C.P.C., se référant
73. expressément pour l'énoncé des moyens des parties à l'acte introductif d'instance
74. et aux écritures qu'elles ont échangées, le Tribunal rappellera l'objet des
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75. demandes ainsi qu'il suit.
76. Attendu que la société C... C... SL, société de droit espagnol, par ses conclusions
77. déposées lors de l'audience des plaidoiries, demande au Tribunal de :
78. Débouter la société F... A... I... SARL de toutes ses demandes, fins et
79. conclusions.
80. Condamner la société F... A... 1... SARL à payer à la société C... C... SL, société
81. de droit espagnol les sommes de 67.137,86 euros à titre de sommes dues
82. augmentés des intérêts au taux légal à compter de la date de l'assignation.
83. 5.000 euros sur le fondement de l'article 700 du Nouveau Code de Procédure
84. Civile.
85. S'entendre condamner aux entiers dépens.
86. Attendu que la société F... A... I... SARL, par ses conclusions déposées lors de
87. l'audience des plaidoiries, demande au Tribunal de :
88. Débouter la société C... C... SL, société de droit espagnol de ses demandes, fins 
et
89. conclusions.
90. La condamner à enlever son matériel, sous astreinte de 150 euros par jour de
91. retard à l'expiration du délai d'un mois suivant la signification du jugement à
92. intervenir.
93. La condamner à payer à la concluante une somme de 10.000 euros de dommages
94. et intérêts pour le préjudice commercial subi. Condamner la même à payer à la
95. concluante une somme de 2.000 euros sur la base de l'article 700 du N.C.P.C.
96. La condamner aux entiers dépens.
97. Attendu que le Tribunal constate qu'il résulte de l'examen des faits de la cause
98. soumise à son appréciation que la société C... C... SL. société de droit espagnol, a
99. effectivement livré à la société F... A... I... SARL. différents lots de chaussures
100. pour un montant de 67.137,86 euros, suivant factures en dates
respectives
101. des 6 septembre, 13 septembre et 21 septembre 2001 portant les numéros
102. 146, 149 et 159.
103. Attendu qu'à ce jour la société C... C... SL soutient qu'elle est créancière
104. de la totalité de cette somme correspondant à des marchandises fournies
105. et livrées, alors que pour sa part la société F... A... I... SARL fait valoir
106. qu'une partie des marchandises livrées n'était pas conforme à la
107. commande.
108. Attendu que certes la société C... C... SL conteste le bien-fondé de cette
109. affirmation de la société F... A... 1... SARL, en faisant notamment valoir
110. que cette dernière n'y fait nullement allusion dans les courriers qu'elle lui
111. a adressés les 12 décembre et 17 décembre 2001, ainsi que le 15 janvier
112. 2002 .
113. Attendu qu'il s'ensuit que, déduction faite de ces sommes, la créance de 
la
114. société C... C... SL sur la société F... A... I... SARL, suite à la livraison
115. litigieuse, s'élève à la somme de 26.977,94 euros, étant précisé que le
116. Tribunal ne peut en l'espèce retenir la demande de remise exceptionnelle
117. formulée par la société F... A... I... SARL auprès de la société C... C... SL
118. par lettre du 12 décembre 2001, puisqu'il n'est pas établi par celle-là que
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119. celle-ci ait accepté ladite remise.
120. Attendu qu'il s'ensuit que, compte-tenu des avoirs et marchandises non
121. conformes retournées à la société C... C... SL, la société F... A... I...
122. SARL reste lui devoir une somme de 26.977.94 euros, correspondant aux
123. marchandises effectivement livrées et par ailleurs vendues par la société
124. F... A... I... SARL.
125. Attendu qu'il convient en conséquence de condamner la société F... A...
126. I... SARL à payer cette somme à la société C... C... SL, et ce avec 
intérêts
127. au taux légal à compter du 15 mai 2002, date de l'assignation 
introductive
128. d'instance.
129. Attendu qu'en revanche la demande reconventionnelle de la société F...
130. A... ï... SARL sera rejetée en tous points comme injustifiée.
131. Attendu qu'il est par ailleurs constant que la société F... A... I... SARL,
132. qui reste débitrice de la société C... C... SL, doit être condamnée à lui
133. payer une somme qu'il convient de ramener à 1.000 euros sur le
134. fondement des dispositions de l'article 700 du N.C.P.C. ainsi qu'à
135. supporter les dépens de l'instance.
136. PAR CES MOTIFS :
137. Le Tribunal, après en avoir délibéré conformément à la loi, statuant en
138. premier ressort et contradictoirement.
139. Rejetant comme injustifiées toutes les demandes, fins et conclusions plus
140. amples ou contraires des parties, y compris la demande 
reconventionnelle
141. de la société F... A... I...L SARL, condamne cette dernière à payer à la
142. société C... C... SL la somme principale de 26.977,94 euros qu'elle reste
143. lui devoir du chef de la marchandise fournie et livrée conforme à la
144. commande, et ce avec intérêts au taux légal à compter du 15 mai 2002,
145. outre une somme de 1.000 euros sur le fondement des dispositions de
146. l'article 700 du N.C.P.C.
147. Condamne également la société F... A... I... SARL à supporter les dépens
148. de l'instance.
149. Président et le Greffier.
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Appendix 4b
1. Commercial Court of Aix-en-Provence
2. Plaintiff o f Spain [Seller] v. Defendant o f France [Buyer]
3. 7 January 2003 [2002 005972]
4. TrawWzoM]j![[ PzMCzg l**j
5. [...]
6. [Buyer] refers to documents concerning different deliveries sent to the company
7. by certain clients, which clearly show that the shoes in dispute had defects, i.e.,
8. that they fell apart.
9. [Buyer] specifically refers to deliveries on 24 October 2001, 15 November 2001,
10. 17 December 2001, 21 December 2001 and 3 January 2002.
11. In addition, [Buyer] presented a document from [Seller] dated 28 November
12. 2001, which shows that the said company mentioned that some pairs of shoes in the
13. delivery to [Buyer] were defective.
14. [Buyer] also referred to a letter from Mr. F.T., the representative o f [Seller], dated
15. 21 June 2002, which includes the statement that that some of the goods did not
16. conform to the order.
17. The Court finds that [Seller] granted two discounts to [Buyer] for the defective goods
18. involved in the present dispute.
19. All these elements sufficiently show that, contrary to the allegations by [Seller], 
some
20. of the goods delivered by [Seller] to [Buyer] were not in conformity with the order
21. because they had certain defects, specifically, they fell apart.
22. [Buyer] returned to [Seller] 1,566 pairs of shoes in the value of EUR 39,995.64. It
23. was therefore established that that [Buyer] returned to [Seller] the non-conforming
24. goods.
25. It follows that under these circumstances, an accounting must take place between the
26. parties. For being unfounded and inoperative, the Court had already rejected all
27. arguments, claims and conclusions that were outside the scope of or contrary to the
28. principal dispute.
29. The Court finds that the three invoices for the goods delivered by [Seller] to [Buyer]
30. amount to a total sum o f EUR 67,137.86. It can also be found that the two discounts
31. granted by [Seller] to [Buyer], i.e., discounts no. 188 and 189, amount to a total sum
32. of EUR 464.28. It is possible to add to this sum EUR 39,995.64 representing the
33. invoice concerning the goods rightfully returned by [Buyer] to [Seller].
34. In its complaint dated 15 May 2002, [Seller] filed a lawsuit against [Buyer]
35. requesting the Court to order [Buyer] to pay to [Seller] the sum of EUR 67,137.86
36. representing the payments due and interest at the statutory rate applicable on the date
37. of filing the lawsuit;
38. a payment of EUR 5,000 pursuant to Art. 700 of the New Code of Civil Procedure;
39. and the costs.
40. In accordance with Art. 455 of the New Code of Civil Procedure, referring
41. specifically to the statements of the parties in the written submissions and the
42. documents, the Court considered the arguments as follows.
43. [Seller], in its arguments presented during the oral hearings, requested the Court to
44. rule as follows:
45. The Court should dismiss all arguments, claims and conclusions of [Buyer];
46. The Court should order [Buyer] to pay [Seller] the sum of EUR 67,137.89
47. Representing the payments due and an interest at the statutory rate on the date of
48. filing the lawsuit;
49. EUR 5,000 should be paid pursuant to the New Code of Civil Procedure;
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50. The Court should order the opposing party to pay all other costs.
51. [Buyer], in its oral submissions, requested the Court to rule as follows. The Court
52. should:
53. Dismiss all arguments, claims and conclusions of [Seller];
54. Order [Seller] to take away the goods, and order it to pay a late fee of EUR 150 per
55. day if [Seller] fails to do so within one month after this judgment is made;
56. Order [Seller] to pay a sum of EUR 10,000 in damages and interest for the
57. commercial damage suffered; and order it to pay a sum of EUR 2,000 pursuant to
58. Art. 700 of the New Code o f Civil Procedure;
59. Order the opposing party to pay all other costs
60. The Court Ands that examination of the facts shows that [Seller] delivered to [Buyer]
61. certain lots of shoes in a value of EUR 67,137.86, with related invoices nos. 146, 149
62. and 159 dated 6 September, 13 September and 21 September 2001, respectively.
63. [Seller] states that it is today owed the total payment relating to the goods provided
64. and delivered, whereas [Buyer] argued that some of the goods did not conform to the
65. order.
66. [Seller] disputes the veracity of this statement by [Buyer], pointing out that the latter
67. did not refer to the non-conformity in its letters of 12 December, 17 December 2001
68. and 15 January 2002.
69. Following allowable deductions, the debt [Buyer] owes to [Seller] arising out of the
70. delivery in dispute amounts to EUR 26,977.94, given that in this case the Court
71. cannot allow an extraordinary discount requested by [Buyer] from [Seller] in its letter
72. of 12 December 2001, because it is not proved that the latter had agreed to grant the
73. said discount.
74. It follows that, considering the discounts and the non-conforming goods returned to
75. [Seller], [Buyer] still owes a sum of EUR 26,997.94 representing the goods delivered
76. and sold by [Buyer].
77. Therefore, [Buyer] must pay the latter sum to [Seller] along with interest at the
78. statutory rate from 15 May 2002, i.e., the date of filing the suit.
79. On the other hand, the counterclaim by [Buyer] is rejected in its entirety for being
80. unfounded.
81. It is also established that [Buyer], that remains to be the debtor of [Seller], must pay a
82. sum that is reduced to EUR 1,000 based on the provisions in Art. 700 of the New
83. Code of Civil Procedure, and it must bear the costs of the proceedings.
84 FOR THE ABOVE REASONS
85. After deliberations in accordance with the law and in a contradictory proceeding, the
86. Court ruled on first instance as follows:
87. For being unfounded and inoperative, the Court rejects all arguments, claims and
88. conclusions that are outside the scope o f or contrary to the principal dispute,
89. including the counterclaim of [Buyer]; and
90. Orders the latter to pay to [Seller] the principal amount of EUR 26,977.94
91. representing the goods provided and delivered to [Buyer] in conformity with the
92. order, along with interest at the statutory rate from 15 May 2002, in addition to a sum
93. of EUR 1,000 pursuant to the provisions o f Art. 700 of the New Code of Civil
94. Procedure.
95. The Court orders [Buyer] to pay the costs of the proceedings.
96. Signed by the President and the Clerk.
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Appendix 5a
]. Cour de cassation - Première Chambre civile
2. 26 mai 1999
3. Société K... S... GmbH
4. Contre
5. Société Th... D... Service et autres
6. Audience publique du 26 mai 1999
7. Rejet
8. M. LEMONTEY, président
9. Arrêt n° 994 D
10. Pourvoi n°P 97-14.315
11. REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE AU NOM DU PEUPLE FRANÇAIS
12. LA COUR DE CASSATION, PREMIÈRE CHAMBRE CIVILE, a rendu l'arrêt
13. suivant :
14. Sur le pourvoi formé par la société K... S... GMBH, dont le siège social est (...),
15. Neunkirchen (Allemagne),
16. en cassation d'un arrêt rendu le 21 novembre 1996 par la cour d'appel d'Aix-en-
17. Provence (2ème chambre), au profit :
18. 1°/ de la société Sts Th... D... Service, dont le siège est (...), Toulon,
19. 2°/ de la société Da... France, dont le siège est (...), Fontenay-aux-Roses,
20. 3°/ de la société La L... de Banque, dont le siège est (...), Lyon, défenderesses à la
21. cassation ;
22. La demanderesse invoque, à l'appui de son pourvoi, le moyen unique de cassation
23. annexé au présent arrêt ;
24. LA COUR, composée selon l'article L. 131-6, alinéa 2, du Code de l'organisation
25. judiciaire, en l'audience publique du 7 avril 1999, où étaient présents - M. Lemontey,
26. président, M. Durieux, conseiller rapporteur, M. Renard-Payen, conseiller, M. Gaunet,
27. avocat général, Mme Aydalot, greffier de chambre ;
28. Sur le rapport de M. Durieux, conseiller, les observations de la SCP B... et D ...,
29. avocat de la société K... S... GMBH, de Me C h..., avocat de la société Sts Th... D...
30. Service, les conclusions de M. Gaunet, avocat général, et après en avoir délibéré
31. conformément à la loi ;
32. Donne acte à la société K... S... du désistement de son pourvoi à l'égard des sociétés
33. Da... France et L... de banque ;
34. Sur le moyen unique :
35. Attendu que la société Th... D... Service (STS) a commandé, le 5 août 1992, 196 tôles
36. laminées à la société de droit allemand K... S... ; que la livraison a eu lieu entre le 28
37. octobre 1992 et, pour la plus grosse partie, le 4 décembre 1992 ; que la STS a dénoncé
38. le contrat par lettre du 1er décembre 1992 au motif notamment que les produits
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39. n'étaient conformes à la commande ni en quantités, ni en qualité ; que, par acte du 15
40. décembre 1992, elle a assigné en résolution de la vente ;
41. Attendu que la société K... S... fait grief à l'arrêt attaqué (Aix-en-Provence, 21
42. novembre 1996) d'avoir écarté la fin de non-recevoir par elle invoquée sur le
43. fondement des articles 38 et 39 de la convention de Vienne du 11 avril 1980 alors,
44. selon le moyen, que la cour d'appel, qui a établi le délai entre les contrôles effectués
45. par la STS les 9 et 11 novembre 1992 et la dénonciation imprécise de la " non-
46. conformité en qualité, dimensions et quantités prévues " faite par cette société le 1er
47. décembre 1992, n'a pas tiré les conséquences légales de ses propres constatations en
48. violation des textes susvisés ;
49. Mais attendu que la cour d'appel n'a fait qu'user de son pouvoir souverain
50. d'appréciation en retenant, après avoir rappelé la chronologie des faits, que
51. l'acheteur avait fait vérifier la marchandise dans un délai rapide et normal
52. compte tenu de la manipulation lourde que les plaques nécessitaient et
53. avait avisé son vendeur des non-conformités dans un délai raisonnable au
54. sens de l'article 39, alinéa 1, CVIM ; que le moyen ne peut être accueilli ;
55. PAR CES MOTIFS :
56. REJETTE le pourvoi ;
57. Condamne la Société K... S... GmbH aux dépens ;
58. Ainsi fait et jugé par la Cour de Cassation, Première chambre civile, et prononcé par 
le
59. président en son audience publique du vingt-six mai mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-dix-
60. neuf.
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Appendix 5b
1. Cour de Cassation - Première Chambre Civile 26 mai 1999
2. [Supreme Court - First Civil Part 26 May 1999]
3. Karl Schreiber GmbH v. Thermo Dynamique Service et al.
4. Traw/ofzo» [2] 6y C/zar/gx ' E/za [**]
5. CIV. 1 D.G 
6 COUR DE CASSATION
7. Public Hearing of 26 May 1999
8. M. LEMONTEY, Chief Justice
9. Appeal No. P97-14.315
10. French Republic
11. In the Name of the French People
12. The SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS, First Civil Part, has rendered the following
13. judgment.
14. On the appeal brought by the company Karl Schreiber GmbH [seller], whose principal
15. office is Postrach, 1540 5908 Neunkirchen (Germany), appealing a judgment entered
16. on 21 November 1996 by the Court of Appeals of Aix-en-Provence (2nd chamber), in
17. favor of:
18. - Thermo Dynamique Service company [buyer], whose principal office is 215 Route
19. de Marseille, 83000 Toulon,
20. Damstahl France company, whose principal office is 28, avenu Maréchal Foch, 92260
21. Fontenay-aux-Roses, and Lyonnaise de Banque company, whose principal office is 8
22. rue de la République, 69001 Lyon, respondents to the appeal.
23. [Seller] invokes, in support of its appeal, the sole grounds for setting aside the
24. judgment, annexed to the present judgment.
25. The COURT, assembled pursuant to article L. 131-6, paragraph 2, of the Code of
26. Judicial Organization, at the public hearing of 7 April 1999, where were present, M.
27. Lemontey, Chief Justice, M. Durieux, Rapporteur Appellate Judge, M. Renard-Payen,
28. Appellate Judge, M. Gaunet, Attorney General, Mme Aydalot, Clerk of the Chamber.
29. By the report of M. Durieux, Appellate Judge, the observations of SCP Baraduc and
30. Duhamel, attorney for [seller], of Maître Choucroy, attorney for [buyer], the
31. conclusions of M. Gaunet, Attorney General, and after having deliberated pursuant to
32. the law,
33. Informs [seller] of the discontinuance of its appeal with respect to DAMSTAHL
34. FRANCE and LYONNAISE DE BANQUE.
35. On the sole grounds of appeal:
36. WHEREAS [buyer] had or&red, on 5 August 1992, 196 rolled metal sheets from
37. [seller]; delivery took place between 28 October 1992 and, for the greater part, 4
38. December 1992; [buyer] revoked the contract by letter of 1 December 1992
39. principally for the reason that the goods did not conform to the order, neither in
40. quantity, nor in quality; by its behavior on 15 December 1992 it had established an
41. avoidance of the sale;
42. WHEREAS [seller] challenges the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Aix-en-
43. Provence, 21 November 1996, for having set aside the plea invoked by [seller] on the
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44. basis of Articles 38 and 39 CISG, according to [seller's] grounds, that the Court of
45. Appeals, which found the time between inspection tests performed by [buyer] on 9
46. and 11 November 1992 and the imprecise reporting of the "non-conformity in the
47. agreed quality, dimensions and quantities" made by the [buyer] on 1 December 1992,
48. did not draw the proper legal conclusions from its own assertions, in violation of the
49. aforementioned provisions;
50. WHEREAS we find that the Court of Appeals only used its sovereign discretion
51. in maintaining, after having recalled the chronology of the facts, that the buyer
52. /zaaf inspected the goods in a prompt and normal period of time, bearing in mind
53. the handling that the [goods] required and that [buyer] Aaù/ alerted [seller] o f the
54. non-conformities within a reasonable time in the meaning of Article 39(1) CISG;
55. NOW THEREFORE the grounds for appeal cannot be accepted.
56. FOR THESE REASONS:
57. a) REJECTS the appeal; and
58. b) Orders [seller] to pay the costs.
59. So done and adjudged by the SUPREME COURT of APPEALS, First Civil Part, and
60. pronounced by the presiding Chief Justice during its public hearing on the twenty-
61. sixth May nineteen hundred ninety-nine.
62 FOOTNOTE
63. All translations should be verified by cross-checking against the original
64. text. For purposes of this translation, the Plaintiff-Respondent of France is
65. referred to as [buyer]; the Defendant-Appellant of Germany is referred to
66. as [seller]. Amounts in French currency (FFgMcA ̂ a»cj) are indicated as
67. [/].
68. ** Charles Sant 'Elia has a B.A. in Political Science and Italian Literature from
69. New York University and studied Political Science at the University degli
70. Studi di Firenze. He received his J.D. from Pace University School of Law and
71. is admitted to the Bar of the States of New York and Connecticut.
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Appendix 6
1 Neutral Citation Number: [2008] EWCA Civ 1186
2 Case No: B2/2008/0249
3 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
4 COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
5 ON APPEAL FROM THE BIRMINGHAM COUNTY COURT
6 His Honour Judge Macduff OC
7 Claim no 7BM72256
8 Roval Courts of Justice
9 Strand. London. WC2A 2LL
10
11 Date: 30/10/2008
12 Before:
13
14 SIR ANTHONY CLARKE MR
15 LORD JUSTICE RIX
16 and
17 LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK
18
19 Between :
20
BIRMINGHAM CITY COUNCIL Appellant/
Claimant
- and -
MARNIE SHAFI
and Respondents/
TYRONE ELLIS Defendants
21
22 
23
24
25 Jonathan Manning and Justin Bates (instructed by the Legal Services Department of the
26 Birmingham City Council) for the Appellant
27 Maya Sikand (instructed by McGrath & Co) for the First Respondent
28 Ramby de Melio and Mr Tony Muman(instructed by McGrath & Co) for the Second Respondent
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33 Introduction
34 1. This appeal relates to the circumstances in which it is appropriate for local authorities to use
35 the civil law in order to control the activities of those who create disturbances and indulge in
36 criminal activities on streets within their areas. There were originally three defendants in this
37 action, Junior Cadogan, Mamie Shaft and Tyrone Ellis. On 17 August 2007 the appellant,
38 Birmingham City Council (The councif), sought and obtained without notice injunctions
39 against all three defendants in wide terms. They were subsequently continued, subject to
40 slight amendments, until trial. The claim against Junior Cadogan was ac^ourned, with the
41 result that he played no part in the trial and has played no part in this appeal. The trial of the
42 action as between the council as claimant and Mamie Shaft and Tyrone Ellis as defendants
43 came before His Honour Judge Macduff QC (now Macduff J), whom we will call The judge',
44 on 3 and 4 December 2007. In addition to written material the judge heard both oral evidence
45 and oral submissions. By an order dated 10 January 2008 the judge dismissed the claims and
46 discharged the injunctions. This appeal is brought against that order with the permission of
47 the judge.
48 2. The judge held that the court had no jurisdiction to grant the injunctions sought and that, even
49 if it did, he would have refused to grant them against Mamie Shaft ('MS') and Tyrone Ellis
50 ('TE') on the facts of this case. The council submits that the judge was vvrong on both counts.
51 It is convenient to consider the issues that arise in this appeal under these headings: the
52 orders, the council's case, the facts found, the legal principles, and jurisdiction and discretion.
53 The orders
54 3. The orders are in very similar terms. It is therefore convenient to focus on just one. We take
55 that against TE. So far as relevant to this appeal, it was in these terms:
56 "The court ordered that the Defendant shall not (whether by himself
57 or by instructing, encouraging or allowing any other person)
58 1) be in any public place in the City of Birmingham with any
59 of the following people: Courtney Jones, Courtney Moore,
60 Junior Hollingshead, John Shaft, Nelson Junior Nelson,
61 Kristopher Boyd-Clarke, Tristan Miles, Sheldon Wint,
62 Junior Cadogan, Hassan Ali;
63 2) enter that part of the City of Birmingham shown on the
64 attached plan and delineated in red;
65 3) assault, harass, intimidate or attempt to do any of the same
66 to any person lawfully present in the City of Birmingham"
67 The plan attached showed a considerable part of the city. Because TE lives within what
68 would otherwise have been part of the excluded area it was necessary to remove from the
69 exclusion a small area which would enable him to go to and from his home. It meant
70 however that he could not go into most o f the area around his home. A power of arrest under
71 section 27 o f the Police and Justice Act 2006 was attached to the whole of the order quoted
72 above.
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73 The council’s case
74 4. The judge set out the council’s case and the background to it in his judgment at [4] to [9]. It
75 may be summarised in this way. In recent years there has unhappily been an increase in
76 violent crime in many of Britain’s major cities including Birmingham. It is the council’s case
77 that there has been an insidious and worrying gang culture in some parts of the city which has
78 been accompanied by an increase in serious crime. There are two main gangs, known as the
79 Burger Bar Gang and its rival the Johnson Crew, and there are a number of subsidiary gangs
80 which have allegiance to one or other of the main gangs. For example, a gang known as the
81 Birmingham’s Most Wanted ('BMW’) is loyal to the Burger Bar Gang. The gangs consist of
82 young men, who commit crimes both individually and jointly, and are, it is said, responsible
83 for much of the crime committed in the city. The crimes include armed robbery, drug
84 dealing, other serious drug related offences and the possession, display and use of firearms. It
85 is the council’s case that the increase in crime has led to an increasing level of fear in the
86 community.
87 5. The gangs are territorial, so that a gang member is safe (or feels safe) within his own territory
88 but is (or feels) at risk in other territories. Within his own territory a gang member may feel
89 safe to carry weapons, engage in violence and seek reprisals against rivals. Residents are
90 often too frightened to co-operate with the police or give evidence. As a result the police are
91 often faced with a wall of silence and, as the judge put it in describing the council’s case at
92 [9], where witnesses do come forward, they are intimidated into silence or worse. Members
93 of gangs carry weapons for both offensive and defensive reasons. Again as the judge put it,
94 within the community there is a perception that the criminal law is inadequate to control the
95 situation. Gang members regard themselves as untouchable.
96 6. Historically the authorities have sought to rely upon the criminal law. The council has also
97 sought and obtained anti-social behaviour orders ('ASBOs’) in the magistrates courts.
98 However more recently it has resorted to the civil law by seeking injunctions under section
99 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 ('the 1972 Act’), as it did in this case. It has done so
100 as part of a multi-agency initiative in order to try to curb the activities of some of those said to
101 be responsible for the wave o f violent crime and thus to stop it or at least to mitigate the
102 impact of the growing urban gang culture. In addition to the council, the agencies include the
103 West Midlands Police, the Birmingham Anti-social Behaviour Unit and the West Midlands
104 Probation Service. In a sentence, as the judge put it at [15], it is thought that the behaviour
105 described above cannot be adequately controlled by normal policing and prosecutions in the
106 Crown Courts and in the magistrates courts, so that the injunction route is seen by the police
107 and the council as a potentially valuable weapon in their armoury.
108 7. One advantage of this approach is that it can be based on evidence which could not be
109 adduced at a criminal trial. As the judge put it at [8], much of the evidence available to the
110 council is derived from police intelligence. It cannot be proved by first hand sworn evidence
111 because the gangs are practised in intimidation of potential witnesses, with the result that,
112 where police officers and community leaders have been informed of relevant events, those
113 who could give evidence about them are unwilling to do so for fear of reprisals.
114 8. This action is one of many. The judge said at [10] that claims had already been issued against
115 some 30 or 40 individuals and that the council intended to issue many more claims with a
116 view to obtaining injunctions against all known gang members and to bring an end to their
117 activities within the city. It is we think important to note that actions are only brought against
118 adults. Where the council seeks an order against a gang member who is under 18 it does so
119 by application for an ASBO in the magistrates court. That is notwithstanding the fact that the
120 order sought is in each case in identical terms. We return to this below because it strikes us as
121 a curious distinction which has not been fully explained on behalf of the council.
122 9. As appears from the terms of the orders, they are not limited to anti-molestation orders of the
123 kind set out in paragraph 3 of the order quoted above, but operate by preventing the defendant
124 from associating with certain named individuals in any public place within the city and from
125 entering a large part of central Birmingham, sometimes very close to his home. Before the
126 judge the council sought two further orders. The first was to prohibit MS and TE from
127 wearing green clothing, green being the colour of the gang to which they were said to belong,
128 and the second was to prohibit each from associating with any group larger than two
129 including himself.
130 10. The particulars of claim in the cases of MS and TE are identical save for paragraph 16, where
131 the basic allegation is the same but the particulars are different. Paragraph 16 alleged in each
132 case:
133 "The defendant has repeatedly behaved in a manner which is criminal
134 and tortious, and which, in particular, constitutes a public nuisance
135 and amounts to deliberate and flagrant breaches of the criminal law."
136 11. The particulars of claim further asserted in paragraphs 17.and 18 that permanent injunctive
137 relief pursuant to section 222 of the 1972 Act restraining each defendant’s behaviour was
138 likely to achieve the promotion or improvement of the economic, social or environmental
139 well-being o f the council’s area or alternatively that it was expedient for the promotion or
140 protection of their area that the defendant be restrained from committing tortious and criminal
141 acts. It was further alleged in paragraph 21 that each defendant’s conduct would continue
142 unless restrained by law and, in particular (albeit without prejudice to the generality of the
143 foregoing), that the criminal law was not an effective remedy in the circumstances and that
144 "his repeated arrests and convictions had failed to ameliorate his behaviour".
TM facts found
146 12. The judge identified two classes o f evidence before the court, first the general evidence and
147 secondly the evidence specific to MS and TE. However, as to the evidence as a whole, he
148 noted at [13] that much of it came from police intelligence, sometimes from parties who could
149 not be identified. Some of the intelligence was categorised as extremely reliable but some
150 much less so. As to the general evidence relied upon by the council, some was in the form of
151 statements read by consent and some was oral evidence. The statement evidence included a
152 statement from Ian Coghill, who is Director of the council’s Community and Safety and
153 Environmental Services. The critical oral evidence came from Detective Sergeant Borg of the
154 West Midlands Police, whose statement was also put in evidence. Oral evidence also came
155 from a Street Warden Team Leader, a Police Constable and an Anti-social Behaviour Officer.
156 In addition, both MS and TE gave oral evidence, as did Mrs Yasmin Shall who is the mother
157 of MS. We note in passing that no problem arose in this case by reason of the fact that the
158 defendants were not told who was the source of the information given to or obtained by the
159 police.
160 13. As we read his judgment, the judge accepted the council’s description of the underlying
161 situation and the problems presented by the gangs described above. In [15] he stressed the
162 following. Some gang members carry guns and many carry other weapons. There are
163 outbreaks of fighting and public disorder. In June 2007 there were about 30 firearm
164 discharges in the city, an average o f one a day. At the highest level there are organised crime
165 groups, orchestrating serious crime, with little street presence. Then there are the Johnson
166 Crew and Burger Bar Gangs and other street gangs loyal to one or other of those. These street
167 gangs engage in street crime and cause fear in the community as described above. At the
168 lowest level are feeder groups where young people are recruited, often from schools, for what
169 the judge described as the second tier groupings.
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170 14. It is in our view unfortunate that, for whatever reason, the cases of MS and TE have become
171 the first such cases in which there has been a test of the injunction approach. That is because
172 they are on any view, as the judge held at [16], at the lower end of the scale. The specific
173 evidence of course varies from case to case but the judge said that in some cases there is
174 evidence that a defendant has himself committed robberies, discharged firearms or engaged in
175 what he described as violent and wicked conduct. Some defendants have large and serious
176 criminal records. On the other hand, as here, some defendants are implicated in crime and
177 gang activities to a much lesser extent.
178 15. The judge summarised the evidence against MS at [18-20]. He was said to be a member of
179 the BMW gang, a feeder gang for the Burger Bar Gang. Most members are between 15 and
180 21. They wear green clothing, particularly bandanas and hoods. They meet in Birmingham
181 City Centre but are also active in Winson Green, Ladywood and elsewhere. They commit
182 public order offences, robberies and shop thefts. MS was bom on 5 June 1989 and was thus
183 just 18 when this action was brought on 16 August 2007. MS admits that he is a member of
184 the BMW gang but says that it is a small group which writes and performs music. He denies
185 that he was a part of any general criminal activity. At [19] the judge quoted the part of the
186 statement from DS Borg’s statement in which he. said that MS "has been found to be regularly
187 involved in criminal and anti-social behaviour including violent crimes with the use of
188 weapons’’.
189 16. However the judge, in our opinion correctly, added that that is a general statement of little
190 value unless supported by other evidence. The supporting evidence comes from police
191 intelligence and moreover from category A1 intelligence, which is the most reliable category,
192 being described as "always reliable, witnessed by law enforcement agencies or reliable
193 technical evidence’’. The supporting evidence was fourteen pieces of police intelligence
194 between August 2005 and July 2007, during most of which period MS was o f course 16 or 17.
195 The judge summarised the evidence as follows at [ 19] :
196 "All these intelligence logs are categorised A1 or B l. On fourteen
197 occasions Shaft has been seen in the company of known members of
198 BMW. Often he and his companions (some of whom had previous
199 convictions) were reported to be wearing green bandanas. Usually
2 0 0  the group consisted of only four or five persons, sometimes fewer.
201 On one occasion, one of his companions was found in possession of
2 0 2  an imitation firearm; on another, there was a report that a knife had
203 been seen, although none was found when the group was searched.
204 On another occasion. Shaft was removed from a West Midlands bus
205 for disorderly behaviour; on another occasion he had suffered a stab
206 wound to his leg, believed to have been inflicted by a member o f a
207 rival gang. At least three of these incidents occurred outside what is
208 now the area from which he is excluded by interim order. On none
209 of these fourteen occasions was Shaft himself seen to be engaged in
2 1 0  criminal conduct although there was an element of suspicion in two
2 1 1  instances (where, for example, he was wearing a top garment with its
212 hood tip in hot weather). Oh no occasibn was he in possession o f any
213 knife or offensive weapon, nor any other incriminating object.’’
214 MS had two previous convictions, one for having in his possession an article which had a
215 blade or was sharply pointed. At the time DS Borg made his statement there were three
216 outstanding prosecutions pending against him but the judge records at [2 0 ] that by the time of
217 the trial they had all been discontinued.
218 17. The judge considered the evidence relating to TE at [21 ]. He described it as similar to that in
219 the case of MS. He too was a member of BMW and DS Borg described his involvement in
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220 precisely the same words as he used in the case of MS. We have quoted them above. TE was
221 born on 3 April 1989 and was therefore about two months older than MS. According to
222 police intelligence TE came to police notice on twelve occasions between November 2006
223 and August 2007. The judge said that the evidence of at least four of them was of no value in
224 the present context. For example on 2 March 2007 he was stopped by police officers when he
225 was wearing a green bandana and on other occasions he was stopped when with others. The
226 judge described the overall evidence thus:
227 "He associates with other people (usually in a small group) who,
228 according to good police intelligence, are members o f the BMW
229 gang. On two occasions, the person he was with had possession of a
230 weapon (not a firearm). On another two occasions, he was in the
231 vicinity of a recent disturbance, giving rise to the possible inference
232 that he had been involved. When stopped, he had been less than
233 cooperative with the police. On another occasion he was in a group
234 of youths who were misbehaving in a public place. He had four
235 previous convictions, three of which were for possession of offensive
236 weapons. With one exception these go back to 2003. The most
237 recent conviction was for having in his possession a bladed knife in
238 the Birmingham city centre on 9 November 2006.”
239 18. At [91] the judge rejected the defendants’ evidence that BMW was simply a small group of
240 music lovers and said that he was satisfied that they both owed allegiance to it. He also said
241 that he was satisfied that members of the gang, acting together, had in the past committed acts
242 which were both criminal and amounted to a public nuisance but he rejected the submission
243 that there was evidence on which he could conclude beyond reasonable doubt that either MS
244 or TE had so participated. It is submitted on behalf of the council that the judge applied the
245 wrong standard of proof. The judge’s approach can be seen from this sentence in [91 ]:
246 "Take 6  April 2007 as an example. On that date the Defendant
247 Tyrone Ellis was seen by police officers in Corporation Street
248 following a disturbance in the nearby Bull Ring Shopping Centre. It
249 may be that, on the balance of probabilities I might just conclude that
250 he had participated in the disturbance. However, I certainly could
251 not be sure, and thus the evidence in respect of that particular day is
252 of no value at all.’’
253 We return below to the correct approach to the standard of proof.
254 19. We should also refer to [92] of the judgment, where the judge said that, whatever matters
255 would require proof, he would not make the orders. He correctly said that whether to do so
256 involved the exercise of a discretion and added this:
257 "First and foremost, there is no evidence to show that the Defendants
258 or either of them have behaved in the past in a way which would
259 justify making such an order. It may be that in some of the other
260 cases, where the Defendants are members of the senior echelons and
261 the evidence can establish frequent participation in gang violence (for
262 example) an order would be justified.”
263 At [93] and [94] the judge made some observations about the detail of the orders which are
264 not directly relevant to the issues in this appeal.
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265 The legal principles
266 20. We were referred to a number of statutory provisions that impose duties upon the council with
267 regard to the maintenance of law and order and the reduction of crime and disorder. They
268 include sections 6(1) and 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and section 4 of the Local
269 Government Act 2000. The obligations include a duty to formulate and implement a strategy
270 for the reduction of crime and disorder, a duty to exercise the council’s functions with due
271 regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those functions on crime and disorder (and the
272 misuse of drugs and alcohol) and a duty to prepare a sustainable community strategy for
273 promoting the well-being of the relevant area. To that end the council has produced a series
274 of strategies. It has for example created a group known as the Birmingham Reducing Gang
275 Violence Group.
276 21. We entirely accept that the applications for these injunctions and other similar applications in
277 other cases are born of the council’s determination to deal effectively with the very difficult
278 situation described by the judge. We also applaud the council’s multi-agency approach to the
279 problems. The question is, however, what is the correct approach in principle to the exercise
280 by councils of their power under section 222 of the 1972 Act. Sections 111 and 222 provide,
281 so far as relevant, as follows:
282 "111(1) Without prejudice to any powers exercisable apart from this
283 section but subject to the provisions of this Act, a local authority
284 shall have power to do any thing (whether or not involving the
285 expenditure, borrowing or lending o f money or the acquisition or
286 disposal of any property or rights) which is calculated to facilitate, or
287 is conducive or incidental to, the discharge of any of their functions.
288
289 222(1) Where a local authority consider it expedient for the
290 promotion of the interests of the inhabitants of their area -
291 (a) they may prosecute or defend or appear in any legal
292 proceedings and, in the case of any civil proceedings, may
293 institute them in their own name, . . .”
294 22. It is common ground that the council is a "local authority” and that it has power under section
295 222 to seek ir^unctive relief from the courts, at any rate in some circumstances. Section 37(1)
296 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 provides:
297 37(1) The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or
298 final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it
299 appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so.”
300 Taking the language o f section 222 at its widest, therefore, it might be thought that the only
301 remaining question for the judge was whether it was just and convenient to grant the
302 injunction sought. However, the authorities show that it is not as simple as that because it has
303 long been recognised that the court’s power to grant relief by way of iryunction is to be
304 exercised only in support o f some legal or equitable right. This gives rise to special
305 considerations in cases where the interests of the public as a whole, or at any rate a section of
306 the public, are affected or where rights enjoyed by the public are infringed. It is likely to be
307 in cases of that kind that the local authority will wish to take action for the benefit of those
308 who live within its area.
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309 23. At common law a local council could not bring an action for interference with public rights
310 unless it had itself suffered special damage peculiar to itself. Proceedings for the enforcement
311 of public rights could only be brought by the Attorney General, either acting ex officio or
312 through a private citizen known as a 'relator’ who was authorised to bring proceedings on
313 behalf of the Attorney General and in his name: see Cz(y CowMcz/ v .B&g /(eW
314 2 6̂/ [1984] 1 AC 754 per Lord Templeman at pages 770-771. The purpose of section 222, as
315 was recognised by the House of Lords in that case, was to enable local authorities in such
316 cases to bring and defend proceedings in their own names without the involvement of the
317 Attorney General. Accordingly, in their skeleton argument for this appeal Mr Manning and
318 Mr Bates were right to recognise that the power vested in local authorities by section 222 of
319 the 1972 Act reflects the power available to the Attorney General at common law to bring
320 proceedings in support o f public rights. It is necessary, therefore, to have regard to the nature
321 and extent of that power in order to determine whether this is a case in which the court can
322 properly grant an injunction at the suit of a local authority under that section.
323 24. It is thus common ground that section 222 does not give councils substantive powers. It is
324 simply a procedural section which gives them powers formerly vested only in the Attorney
325 General. This appeal raises essentially two questions. They are, first, whether this is the type
326 of case in which the court, acting in accordance with established principles, or any logical
327 extension of them, can grant iryunctions of the kind sought against the defendants and,
328 secondly, if so, whether it should do so in the exercise of its discretion.
329 25. The courts have considered the correct approach to the exercise of this power in the public
330 interest in two principal contexts: the restraint of breaches o f the criminal law and the
331 su p p ress io n  o f  p u b lic  nuisances. W e w ill co n s id e r in ju n c tio n s  in  aid of th e  c rim in a l law  firs t
332 because it is plain from the way in which this case was both pleaded and presented that a
333 principal plank of the council’s case is that an injunction is required in aid of the criminal law,
334 or at least in order to prevent the commission of criminal offences in the future. However, we
335 recognise that the council also seeks to justify the injunctions on the basis that they are
336 necessary to avoid the commission of public nuisances in the future. We will therefore
337 briefly consider public nuisance separately before discussing the impact and interpretation of
338 the legislation which introduced the ASBO and its effect upon the proper approach of the
339 court to an injunction.
340 ZM aW f/ze crzzMzzzaZ /mv
341 26. The underlying approach is that described by Lord Templeman, with whom the other
342 members of the appellate committee agreed, in the .B&g case, which was one of the Sunday
343 trading cases, at page 776A-F :
344 "The right to invoke the assistance of the civil court in aid of the
345 criminal law is a comparatively modern development. Where
346 Parliament imposes a penalty for an offence. Parliament must
347 consider the penalty is adequate and Parliament can increase the
348 penalty if it proves to be inadequate. It follows that a local authority
349 should be reluctant to seek and the court should be reluctant to grant
350 an injunction which if disobeyed may involve the infringer in
351 sanctions far more onerous than the penalty imposed for the offence.
352 In Gozzngr v Uzzzozz q/' foxz [1978] AC 435 Lord
353 Wilberfbrce said at p 481, that the right to invoke the assistance of
354 the civil courts in aid of the criminal courts is "an exceptional power
355 confined, in practice, to cases where an offence is frequently repeated
356 in disregard of a, usually, inadequate penalty ... or to cases of
357 emergency . . .” In my view there must certainly be something more
358 than infringement before the assistance of civil proceedings can be
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359 invoked and accorded for the protection or promotion of the interests
360 of the inhabitants of the area."
361 27. Lord Templeman accepted that it would not always be necessary for the use of the criminal
362 law to be attempted before recourse was had to the remedy of iiijunction. He put it in this
363 way at page 776F-G:
364 "It was said that the council should not have taken civil proceedings
365 until criminal proceedings had failed to persuade the appellants to
366 obey the law. As a general rule a local authority should try the effect
367 of criminal proceedings before seeking the assistance of the civil
368 courts. But the council were entitled to take the view that the
369 appellants would not be deterred by a maximum fine which was
370 substantially less than the profits which could be made from illegal
371 Sunday trading. Delay while this was proved would have
372 encouraged widespread breaches o f the law by other traders, resentful
373 of the continued activities of the appellants.”
374 28. Subsequent cases show that iryunctions may be granted even where it cannot be shown that
375 criminal penalties would be inadequate. The leading case is ZoMofoM Co/pom/zoM v
376 [1992] 3 All ER 697, in which an injunction was granted to restrain
377 Bovis from causing a noise nuisance outside certain hours specified in a notice served by the
378 council under section 60 o f the Control o f Pollution Act 1974. It was a criminal of^nce
379 "without reasonable excuse” to contravene the notice. A number of informations were laid
380 against Bovis but they were ac^oumed and the injunction was sought in the meantime. Bovis
381 appealed to this court contending that an injunction should not be granted unless it was first
382 established that the defendant had committed an offence and that the defendant was
383 deliberately and flagrantly flouting the law, neither of which could be established.
384 29. The appeal failed. The basis of the decision is most clearly stated by Bingham LJ. He first
385 expressed the view that there may well have been bases on which the injunction could have
386 been supported other than in support of the criminal law: see eg at page 713d. However he
387 said at page 713g that the proceedings were in fact framed as being in support of the criminal
388 law. On that basis he considered a number of classes o f case: see page 714b-g, where he
389 identified such different types of case by reference to GeMemZ v C/zaWyy [1971] 1
390 WLR 1614, CowMc/Z v [1979] 1 WLR 213 and RorowgA
391 CowMczZ V Ra/Z [1986] 1 WLR 353. He noted that in the case there had been no
392 resort to the criminal law but an injunction was granted because of the risk of irreversible
393 damage. He also referred to the speech of Lord Diplock in Gowngr in which he expressed the
394 view that injunctions of this kind should not be granted save where the criminal law had
395 manifestly failed or where there was a risk of grave and irreparable harm. However Bingham
396 LJ noted that at page 491 in the same case Viscount Dilhorne disavowed the suggestion that
397 these were the only types of case in which the civil courts could and should come to the aid o f
398 the criminal law by granting injunctions at the instance o f the Attorney General, and thus by
399 inference at the instance of a local authority under section 222 of the 1972 Act. All depends
400 upon the circumstances.
401 30. At page 714g-j Bingham LJ identified the guiding principles as follows:
402 "The guiding principles must I think be: (1) that the jurisdiction is to
403 be invoked and exercised exceptionally and with great caution: see
404 the authorities already cited; (2 ) that there must certainly be
405 something more than mere infringement of the criminal law before
406 the assistance of civil proceedings can be invoked and accorded for
407 the protection or promotion of the interests of the inhabitants of the
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408 area: see CowMczZ v ... [at] 776 and PĴ /c/zavoM
409 DC V MzW/aM(7 (%/?ecza/ 2/(7 ( 1986) 8 6  LGR 83 at
410 87; (3) that the essential foundation for the exercise of the court's
411 discretion to grant an injunction is not that the offender is
412 deliberately and flagrantly flouting the law but the need to draw the
413 inference that the defendant's unlawful operations will continue
414 unless and until effectively restrained by the law and that nothing
415 short of an injunction will be effective to restrain them: see
416 IFj/cAavoM ... at 89.''
417 31. On the facts Bingham LJ said (at page 715a-b) that the question was whether the local
418 authority could show anything more (and he would interpolate substantially more) than an
419 alleged and unproven contravention of the criminal law and whether the inference could be
420 drawn that noise prohibited by the notice would continue unless Bovis were effectively
4 2 1 restrained by law and that nothing short of an injunction would effectively restrain them. The
422 essence of the decision can be seen from the next passage in Bingham LJ's judgment at pager
423 715b-d:
424 “1 am in no doubt that these questions must be answered in favour of
425 the local authority. The conduct which the local authority seek to
426 restrain is conduct which would have been actionable (if not at the
427 suit of the local authority) in the absence of any statute. Even if the
428 conduct were not criminal, it would probably be unlawful. The
429 contrast with the planning and Sunday trading cases is obvious. 1 see
430 no reason for the court pedantically to insist on proof o f deliberate
431 and fragrant breaches of the criminal law when, as here, there is clear
432 evidence of persistent and serious conduct which may well amount to
433 contravention of the criminal law and which may, at this
434 interlocutory stage, be regarded as showing a public and private
435 nuisance. It is quite plain that the service o f the notice and the threat
436 of prosecution have proved quite ineffective to protect the residents.”
437 32. The essential basis of the conclusions of O'Connor and Taylor LJJ was to much the same
438 effect. There is a passage in the judgment of O'Connor LJ at pages 709e-710c to the effect
439 that the injunction was necessary to prevent the nuisance in circumstances in which, on the
440 one hand Bovis had refused to say what its "reasonable excuse” was for contravening the
441 notice on the basis that it did not have to do so until the hearing of the informations and, on
442 the other hand, it asserted that the council could not establish the commission of the offence.
443 At page 7I6f\ affer referring to the view of the members of the appellate committee in the
444 case that great caution should be exercised before granting injunctions of the kind
445 sought and that something more was required than a bare infringement of the criminal law,
446 Taylor LJ said that there was there something more, namely a nuisance gravely affecting the
447 local inhabitants. He added at page 717a that every disturbed night or weekend involved
448 irreversible damage and there would be delay before the criminal proceedings including any
449 appeal were completed. He thus concluded that the criminal proceedings were likely to be
450 ineffective to protect the inhabitants and that it was just to grant an interlocutory injunction.
451 33. The principles summarised by Bingham LJ have been followed and to some extent broadened
452 in later cases. For example, in LoWo» Romwg/z q/'R(3rA7»g & D(3geM/za/M v unreported,
453 30 July 1999, Brooke LJ, with whom May and Laws LJJ agreed, said this, with regard to
454 Bingham LJ's principles:
455 "The application of those principles means that if the court is
456 satisfied that nothing short of an injunction will be effective to
457 restrain a defendant's unlawful operations it may grant an irijunction
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458 even though he has not yet been subjected to the maximum penalty
459 available under the criminal law.”
460 34. In Romz/g/z CowMCzV v DczM [2005] EWCA Civ 979, [2005] BLGR 797, this court
461 adopted Bingham LJ's principles but Waller LJ expressed the view at [75] to [77] that the
462 court had slightly broadened the principles in for/.ymozz//z Cz/y CozzMczZ v Rzc/zarùk [1989] 1
463 CMLR 673. See also the judgment of Clarke LJ in Dezzz at [44]. In the for/.y/MOzz//z CzZ)/
464 CozYMCzZ case at [38] Kerr LJ had expressed the "broad test” as being that ir^unctions are only
465 permissible to restrain a threatened breach of the criminal law if in the particular
466 circumstances
467 "criminal proceedings are likely to prove ineffective to achieve the
468 public interest purposes for which the legislation in question has been
469 enacted”.
470 35. Further, as Waller LJ observed at [77] in /Zem, Kerr LJ also cited with approval a passage
471 from the judgment of Millett J in Jl^c/zavoM Dzj/nc/ Coz/MczZ v AZzÆMdk Z/cZ
472. [1988] 1 CMLR 397, where Millett J commended a council for moving for a gwza /zme/
473 injunction in these words:
474 "If they have good grounds for thinking that in any given case
475 compliance with the law will not be secured by prosecution, they are
476 entitled to apply for an injunction. Counsel for the defendant
477 criticised the council for threatening to seek a gzzza /zme/ injunction
478 even before any threatened breach of the law had occurred and when
479 therefore no prosecution was possible. In a proper case 1 do not
480 consider that that is a ground for criticism but R)r commendation. It
481 must be an eminently sensible and convenient manner of
482 proceeding.”
483 36. Those cases suggest a somewhat broader approach than some of the earlier ones, although, in
484 our judgment the essential principles remain those summarised by Bingham LJ, in so far as
485 the injunction is sought in aid of the criminal law, if  by that is meant or includes a case where
486 the injunction is sought to prevent the defendant from committing criminal offences. As
487 appears below, it is our view, first that these principles are subject to any legislation which is
488 designed to deal with the very situation which an injunction is sought to control and secondly
489 that the ASBO legislation is designed to do just that.
490 f  ẑ6 Zzc
491 37. The council puts its case on the alternative basis that, quite apart from the fact that the
492 irjunction will restrain the commission of criminal offences, it is justified on the basis that it
493 will also restrain the commission o f a public nuisance. There is we think considerable force
494 in the point that, where it is sought to restrain a public nuisance, the principles which the court
495 should apply should be less restrictive than in the case where it is sought to restrain the
496 commission of a crime. However, the cases have not to date clearly differentiated between
497 the principles to be applied in the two classes o f case where the same facts are relied upon in
498 support of each. As noted above, the point was touched on by Bingham LJ in RovM at page
499 713d, although in the event the appeal was disposed of on the basis that the irjunction was
500 sought in aid o f the criminal law. The relevant principles were treated as those applicable to
501 that state of affairs, although all the members of the court plainly thought that the fact that the
502 claimant had at least an arguable case that Bovis was committing a public nuisance was a
503 telling factor in favour of granting the injunction.
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504 38. Some consideration was given to the point in Cz/y Cozz/zczZ v ZazM [2001] EWCA
505 Civ 1248, [2002] 1 WLR 607, where this court allowed an appeal from an order striking out
506 an action seeking an irjunction restraining a defendant from entering a housing estate. The
507 injunction was sought on the basis of evidence that drug dealing was taking place publicly on
508 the estate, that the defendant was associating there with well-known drug dealers and that he
509 had been arrested on suspicion of drug-dealing. The court held that that arguably amounted
510 to a public nuisance and that since the council considered (in the terms of the condition
511 precedent in section 2 2 2 ) that it was expedient for the promotion of the interests of the
512 inhabitants of their area, it was entitled by reason of that section to seek an injunction its own
513 name restraining the commission of the public nuisance whether or not it was also a criminal
514 offence: see in particular per Schiemann LJ at [14] to [17] and Keene LJ at [26] and [27].
515 39. The decision is, however, of limited assistance here because, as Keene LJ made clear at [27],
516 the court was considering only the power of the council to bring the claim under section 2 2 2 .
517 It was not considering upon what principles the court should decide whether to grant an
518 injunction to restrain a public nuisance. We also note in passing that the decision itself was
519 academic because, by the time the appeal was heard, the defendant had been sentenced to
520 three years imprisonment and the council no longer sought the injunction.
521 40. Nevertheless Zaz» is instructive. In particular both Schiemann and Keene LJJ, who have
522 considerable experience in this area, seem to us to provide some support for the council's
523 case. Schiemann LJ said at [13]:
524 "However, it is within the proper sphere of a local authority's
525 activities to try and put an end to all public nuisances in its area
526 provided always that it considers that it is expedient for the
527 promotion or protection of the interests of the inhabitants of its area
528 to do so in a particular case. Certainly my experience over the last 40
529 years tells me that authorities regularly do this and so far as I know
530 this had never attracted adverse judicial comment. I consider that an
531 authority would not be acting beyond its powers if it spent time and
532 money trying to persuade those who were creating a public nuisance
533 to desist. Thus in my judgment, the county council in ^//or»ey
534 GcMcW V f  L4 gzvarne.y Z/aZ [1957] 2 QB 169 was not acting beyond
535 its powers in seeking the Attorney General's fiat in trying to put a
536 stop to the nuisance by dust in that case and thus exposing itself to
537 potential liability in costs. It follows that, provided that an authority
538 considers it expedient for the promotion and protection o f the
539 interests of the inhabitants o f its area, it can institute proceedings in
540 its own name with a view to putting a stop to a public nuisance.''
541 For this purpose he accepted Romer LJ's description of a public nuisance in the ZL/f ^warrzcj
542 case (at page 184) as a "nuisance ... which materially affects the reasonable comfort and
543 convenience o f life of a class of Her Majesty's subjects''.
544 41. Keene LJ said much the same at [25-27]. At [25] and the first sentence of [26] he recognised
545 that in both and ZovM there was a relevant statutory duty on the local authority and
546 added that that was an element identified by the court as important because the local authority
547 was not seeking to rely on public nuisance. It is submitted with force on behalf of the council
548 in this case that here, by contrast, the council is relying upon public nuisance. Keene LJ
549 added at [26]:
550 "Where there is evidence of a public nuisance, it was historically
551 always the case that the Attorney General could seek an injunction to
552 restrain the nuisance and, before the passing of the Local
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553 Government Act 1972, a local authority could sue so long as it
554 obtained the Attorney General's fiat.''
555 He then said that the effect of section 222(1) was to allow the local authority to sue in its own
556 name without needing the consent of the Attorney General. At the end o f [27] he said that,
557 once it was established that a public nuisance was established, which was of course a question
558 of fact, the court would have to exercise its discretion on the basis o f the "well-known
559 principles applicable to such injunctions''. We suspect that he would have said the same if the
560 local authority was alleging not the fact of a public nuisance but the threat of one.
561 42. It is true that Keene LJ does not suggest that those principles are the same as those applied in
562 cases like and Zovz.9. On the other hand, as we said earlier, the question what those
563 principles were did not arise in Zam. So the relationship between the principles in Z&jg and
564 Zovz.9 (and later cases) on the one hand and the classic public nuisance case on the other
565 remains to be worked out. It is not in our opinion necessary to take the matter further in this
566 appeal, partly because of the judge's conclusions of fact to which we return below, but, more
567 importantly, because of what appears to us to be the significance of the ASBO legislation to
568 which we now turn.
569 TTzc
570 43. In ZZem, which was a very unusual case on its facts. Waller LJ considered the decision of this
571 court in CowMczZ v ToMgwe [2004] EWCA Civ 140, [2004] 2 Ch 36, where a
572 local authority was seeking orders which would enable it to enter land in order to rescue
573 animals which were at risk of being cruelly treated. It was ultimately decided that there was
574 no power to fill gaps in the criminal law but, in the course of his judgment, Peter Gibson LJ
575 quoted at [29] this statement by Hoffmann J in CAze/ v M [1989]
576 1 WLR 20 at 23:
577 "The recent and detailed interventions of Parliament in this field
578 suggest that the court should not indulge in parallel creativity by the
579 extension of general common law principles.''
580 That principle was applied in the context of animal cruelty in TZem; see per Waller LJ at [6 6 -
581 70]. See also per Clarke LJ at [48].
582 44. The significance of the principle stated by Hoffmann J in this appeal is this. The terms of the
583 irjunction sought in this action are typical o f an ASBO and, as already indicated, on the facts
584 of this case they are identical or almost identical to the terms of an ASBO. We have already
585 referred to what is in our view a striking feature of the council's approach in this case, namely
586 that it seeks ASBOs against those under 18 and injunctions in i&ntical terms against those
587 over 18. Parliament has laid down a number of specific requirements which apply to ASBOs,
588 some of which may not apply to irjunctions granted at common law. In so ^r as it may be
589 said that it is easier to obtain an irjunction than an ASBO, the granting o f an irjunction in
590 such circumstances would in our view be to infringe Hoffmann J's principle. In any event, it
591 appears to us that where, as here. Parliament has legislated in detail to deal with a particular
592 problem, the courts should in general leave the matter to be dealt with as Parliament intended
593 and, save perhaps in exceptional circumstances, refuse to grant injunctive relief of the kind
594 which can be obtained by an ASBO.
595 45. We recognise that there is a general principle that, where a claimant in a civil action has two
596 available rights or remedies, he is in general entitled to choose which to rely upon. However,
597 the principle to which we have referred is an exception to that general principle and applies in
598 the kind o f case contemplated by Hoffmann J, of which this seems to us to be an example.
599 We recognise that it may be said that in v M  Hoffmann J
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600 was considering what he regarded as an unprincipled extension of the common law in a field
601 in which Parliament had already legislated and that in this case the jurisdiction to grant an
602 injunction in aid of the criminal law (and indeed to restrain a public nuisance) is already
603 established. However, it seems to us that the thought which underlies Hoftinann J's principle
604 applies here. Parliament has recently legislated to restrain anti-social behaviour in a
605 particular way and subject to particular safeguards. In our view the court should have that
606 fact well in mind in deciding how to exercise its discretion whether or not to grant an
607 injunction in a particular case.
608 46. We turn therefore to the nature of an ASBO. The ASBO first appeared in the Crime and
609 Disorder Act 1998 ('the CDA 1998'), which has been amended in some important respects
610 since it was first enacted. Section 1(1) provides, so far as relevant, as follows:
611 "(1) An application under this section may be made by a
612 relevant authority if it appears to the authority that the following
613 conditions are fulfilled with respect to any person aged 10  or over,
614 namely -
615 (a) that the person has acted .... in an anti-social manner, that is
616 to say, in a manner that has caused or was likely to cause
617 harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the
618 same household as himself; and
619 (b) that such an order is necessary to protect relevant persons
620 from further anti-social acts by him.''
621 47. It is not in dispute that the council is a relevant authority. As we see it, the critical features of
622 section 1 are that the defendant must have acted in an anti-social manner in the past and that
623 an order must be necessary to protect the public from further anti-social acts in the future.
624 That is precisely the case made against MS and TE. By subsections (3) and (4), a magistrates
625 court may make an order (ie an ASBO) if it is proved that those conditions are satisfied. By
626 subsection (5), the court must disregard any act of the defendant which he shows was
627 reasonable in the circumstances. By subsection (6 ), the prohibitions that may be imposed are
628 those which are necessary for protecting persons from further anti-social acts by the
629 defendant. By subsection (7) an ASBO has effect for "a period (not less than two years)
630 specified in the order or until further order''.
631 48. Subsections (1), (4) and (6 ) are o f particular importance because of the decision of the House
632 of Lords on two critical points relating to ASBOs in Z v Crow» a/
633 [2002] UKHL 39, [2003] 1 AC 787. The first was that the proceedings are civil
634 proceedings and that hearsay evidence is admissible. The second was that, notwithstanding
635 that the proceedings are civil proceedings, magistrates courts should apply the criminal
636 standard of proof to the requirements in section l(l)(a) but not (b). Lord Steyn put it thus at
637 [37], after a reference to the speech of Lord Nicholls in Z? re ZZ (S'exW
638 [1996] AC 563 at 586D-H:
639 "But in my view pragmatism dictates that the task of magistrates
640 should be made more straightforward by ruling that they must in all
641 cases under section 1 apply the criminal standard. If the House takes
642 this view it will be sufficient for the magistrates, when applying
643 section 1(1 )(a) /o 6 c .ywrc that the defendant has acted in an anti-
644 social way, that is to say, in a manner that caused or was likely to
645 cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the
646 same household as himself. The inquiry under section 1(1 )(b),
647 namely that such an order is necessary to protect persons from further
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648 anti-social acts by him, does not involve a standard of proof: it is an
649 exercise o f judgment or evaluation. This approach should facilitate
650 correct decision-making and should ensure consistency and
651 predictability in this comer of the law. In coming to this conclusion I
652 bear in mind that that the use of hearsay evidence will often be of
653 crucial importance. For my part, hearsay evidence depending on its
654 logical probativeness is quite capable of satisfying the requirements
655 of section 1( 1).”
656 Lord Hope reached the same conclusions at [77] to [83]. So too did Lord Hutton at [113] and
657 [114] and Lord Hobhouse and Lord Scott at [116] and [117] respectively.
658 49. The whole topic of the standard of proof in civil cases has recently been revisited by the
659 House of Lords in re DoAer/y [2008] UKHL 33 and 7» re Z [2008] UKHL 35.
660 It was not however suggested by counsel in this appeal that the reasoning in those cases
661 affects the decision of the House in We agree that it does not, with the result that
662 the decision in AfbCawM governs the position in ASBO proceedings. It follows that, if these
663 orders had been sought from a magistrates court as ASBOs, the court would have to have
664 been sure in each case that MS or TE (as the case might be) had acted in the way alleged and,
665 if it was sure, would then have had to decide whether an order was necessary.
6 6 6  50. The judge approached the standard of proof in that way and concluded that he could not be
667 sure on the evidence in either case. He further said that, whatever the standard of proof  ̂ he
6 6 8  would not have granted the injunction, no doubt because he did not think that it was necessary
669 to do so. It is submitted on behalf of the council that he was wrong to approach the standard
670 of proof in that way in the context of an application for an irjunction (as opposed to an
671 ASBO). It would in our opinion be startling if that were so. In the passage quoted above,
672 Lord Steyn said that the approach to the standard o f proof which he identified should facilitate
673 correct decision-making and should ensure consistency and predictability in this comer of the
674 law. By 'this corner of the law' he was, as we see it, referring to orders restraining anti-social
675 behaviour of the kind that can be restrained by an ASBO. He was not intending to apply the
676 criminal standard of proof to other types of injunction, whether in aid of the criminal law or to
677 restrain a public nuisance or otherwise.
678 51. The questions whether an irjunction should be granted in this action on the one hand or
679 whether an ASBO should be granted in identical or near identical terms on the other are
680 surely questions which arise in what Lord Steyn would regard as the same comer o f the law.
681 It would be bizarre, not to say irrational, if the standard of proof in answering the two
682 questions were different.
683 52. Suppose two identical cases in which A is under 18 and B is over 18. In one case an ASBO is
684 sought against defendant A in the magistrates court and in the other defendant B is over 18
685 and an irjunction is sought against him in the High Court or a county court. The orders
6 8 6  sought are in identical or near identical terms. It would again surely be bizarre, not to say
687 irrational, if the standard of proof in the two cases were different. What then is the solution?
6 8 8  In our view the natural solution is for the High Court or county court to decline to grant an
689 injunction but to leave the council to seek an ASBO in both cases. That approach seems to us
690 to be consistent with Hoffmann J's principle.
691 53. If, exceptionally, the High Court or the county court does find it necessary to consider
692 whether to grant an irjunction in circumstances in which the relief sought is identical or
693 almost identical to an ASBO, it should follow the approach set out by Lord Steyn and the
694 House of Lords in A/cCa»»: see further [63] and [64] below. In expressing those views we do
695 not wish in any way to undermine the general principle adverted to on behalf of the council
696 and approved in the recent House of Lords cases of Az Zg Do/zcr/y and Zz rg Z that the
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697 standard of proof in civil cases is proof on the balance of probabilities. This will be true of
698 the ordinary case of the kind which Schiemann and Keene LJJ had in mind in Zam in which a
699 council seeks an injunction to restrain a public nuisance.
700 54. We return to the ASBO. The CDA 1998 provides a number of safeguards for defendants.
701 For example, section IE imposes consultation requirements. The combined effect of section
702 1(1) and 1(3) of the CDA 1998 and section 127(1) of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 is that
703 the behaviour relied upon to prove the first limb of the statutory test must have occurred no
704 more than six months prior to the date of the complaint. Moreover, under section 4 of the
705 CDA 1998 the defendant has a right of appeal to the Crown Court, which is by way of
706 rehearing. All these factors seem to us to point to the conclusion stated above, namely that,
707 save perhaps in exceptional circumstances, the court should not in principle grant an
708 injunction but leave the matter to be dealt with by way of application for an ASBO. While
709 the High Court or a county court is no doubt capable of ensuring that the application is fairly
710 heard and determined, given the detailed statutory scheme laid down by Parliament, the
711 appropriate course is for the court to decline to grant an injunction but to leave the council to
712 its remedy in the magistrates court if it can establish it.
713 55. It is submitted on behalf of the council that the above approach is not consistent with the
714 statutory scheme because there is no statute which describes the ASBO as an exclusive
715 statutory code and because section 222 itself is aimed at public nuisances. Moreover, by
716 section 91 of the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 ('the 2003 Act') Parliament provided an
717 ancillary power of arrest specifically where an injunction was granted under section 2 2 2  to
718 prohibit conduct which was capable of causing a nuisance or annoyance to a person: see
719 section 91(2). By section 91(3) the power existed where the court thought that either (a) such
720 conduct consisted of or included the use or threatened use of violence or (b) there was a
721 significant risk of harm to such person.
722 56. Section 91 o f the 2003 Act was repealed and re-enacted by section 27 of the Police and
723 Justice Act 2006 ('the 2006 Act'), which also includes powers of remand and bail which had
724 not been included in section 91. It is observed on behalf of the council that the language of
725 section 27 borrows heavily from that of sections 153 A and 153 C of the Housing Act 1996,
726 which created an anti-social behaviour injunction ('ASBÏ') and was inserted into the Housing
727 Act by the 2003 and 2006 Acts. It is submitted that, given the explicit references to nuisance,
728 annoyance, violence and harm in section 27 of the 2006 Act, it is difficult to conceive of a
729 case where a section 222 injunction could be granted with a power of arrest but an ASBO
730 would not be available, yet the clear Parliamentary recognition and intention that section 222
731 injunctions would be available in such circumstances renders it impossible to argue that the
732 use of section 222 is an improper means of circumventing the will of Parliament. It is
733 submitted that the judge was wrong to conclude otherwise.
734 57. There is undoubted force in those submissions. However, as is pointed out on behalf of the
735 respondents, section 91 was only introduced in 2003 at the same time as sections 153A, 153B
736 and 153C were inserted into the Housing Act 1996 by section 13 of the 2003 Act. An ASBI
737 is defined by section 153A(1) as an injunction that prohibits the defendant from engaging in
738 "housing-related anti-social conduct of a kind specified in the injunction”. It is submitted that
739 both section 91 of the 2003 Act and section 27 of the 2006 Act were designed to complement
740 proceedings instituted under section 222 for an ASBI and were not intended to complement
741 any injunction granted under section 2 2 2  or enlarge the scope of the injunction which could
742 be granted under section 2 2 2 .
743 58. We see the force of that submission because, if it was throughout intended that anti-social
744 behaviour injunctions were within the powers in section 222, it is difficult to see why it was
745 necessary to make specific provision for ASBIs in the housing context. We do not, however,
746 construe section 91 or section 27 as so limited as a matter of construction. We construe them
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747 as wide enough to give the court power to add a power of arrest if the statutory criteria are
748 satisfied.
749 59. However, that conclusion does not seem to us to affect the conclusions which we reached
750 earlier. Those sections do not themselves extend the jurisdiction contained in section 222.
751 Moreover, as shown in the decided cases to which we have referred, section 222 was
752 essentially intended to confer on local authorities the procedural power, in the public interest,
753 to seek injunctions which had previously been vested only in the Attorney General at
754 common law. The discretion of the court whether or not to grant an injunction derives from
755 section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. In this case, as already stated, the council seeks
756 injunctions in aid of the criminal law (in the sense discussed above) or to prevent a public
757 nuisance. However, the principles upon which such an injunction is to be granted remain to
758 be determined. As stated above, as we see it they have been worked out to a considerable
759 extent in the first class of case and in the classic case of public nuisance, but they remain to be
760 worked out in a case which has elements of both and they also remain to be worked out where
761 what is sought is in effect an ASBO. The critical factor in the present case is in our opinion
762 that, whether the council seeks an irjunction in aid of the criminal law or on the basis o f an
763 alleged public nuisance, the essential remedy sought is an ASBO.
764 60. It is in this context that Hoffmann J's principle (or something closely analogous to it) falls to
765 be respected. Thus we conclude, for the reasons we have given, that the court should not
766 indulge in parallel creativity by the extension of general common law principles. Hoffmann J
767 did not of course have the ASBO in mind but it seems to us that, where (as here) a council
768 seeks an injunction in circumstances in which an ASBO would be available, the court should
769 not, save perhaps in an exceptional case, grant an injunction but leave the council to seek an
770 ASBO so that the detailed checks and balances developed by Parliament and in the decided
771 cases will apply.
772 61. The Judicial Studies Board has issued a detailed Guide for the Judiciary on ASBOs which is
773 now in its third edition. It sets out the position in some detail and makes reference to a
774 number o f the decided cases, of which there are now quite a number. It is those cases which
775 at present set out the position in what Lord Steyn described as this comer of the law in the
776 sense explained above. Good sense seems to us to lead to the conclusion that we should not
777 now develop a separate but parallel jurisprudence in respect of identical orders. Put another
778 way, we conclude that in such circumstances, save in an exceptional case, it would not be just
779 and convenient for the court to exercise its discretion to grant an injunction under section 37
780 of the Supreme Court Act 1981.
781 Jurisdiction and discretion
782 62. As we said earlier, the judge held that the court had no jurisdiction to grant the orders sought.
783 For the reasons we have given, we do not agree that the court had no jurisdiction to grant the
784 irjunctions but we do think that it would be wrong in principle for the court to exercise its
785 discretion by doing so. This is not an exceptional case in which the High Court or county
786 court should grant an irjunction against MS and TE in aid of the criminal law. It should in
787 principle leave the council to seek an ASBO. The same or similar considerations lead to the
788 conclusion that the court should not, in the exercise of its discretion grant an irjunction to
789 restrain future anti-social behaviour in the form of a public nuisance. We would therefore
790 dismiss the appeal on that basis.
791 63. The judge found himself in a position in which (as we think wrongly) a trial had taken place.
792 It appears that no-one suggested at the outset that the appropriate course was not to embark
793 upon a trial but to leave it to the council to proceed by way of an ASBO if it wished. For the
794 future, we think that in a case of this kind, where the injunctive relief sought is to all intents
795 and purposes identical or almost identical to an ASBO, the appropriate course is for the court
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796 to refuse to grant an irjunction and to leave the council to apply for an ASBO if it wishes.
797 Indeed, we would not expect the council to seek an injunction in such a case, save perhaps in
798 exceptional circumstances.
799 64. In the present case a trial in fact took place and we can understand why the judge considered
800 and expressed a conclusion on each of the issues debated before him. It was therefore
801 necessary for him to consider the correct approach to the standard of proof. Given that the
802 order sought was essentially the same as an ASBO, the judge was in our view correct to apply
803 the same standard of proof as would be applied in proceedings for an ASBO. For the reasons
804 we have given, the only principled approach, in the light of the ASBO legislation and the
805 pragmatic reasoning of Lord Steyn in AfcCaM» (as set out in the passage quoted at [48]
806 above), was to adopt the same approach as was adopted by the House of Lords in JWcCa/zM.
807 The judge was accordingly correct to hold that he had to be sure that MS and TE had acted in
808 the anti-social way alleged
809 65. Since writing the above we have read Moore-Bick LJ's judgment expressing a different view
810 on the standard of proof. We entirely understand his approach but adhere to our view that
811 Lord Steyn's reasoning should be applied in this case, essentially for narrow pragmatic
812 reasons and for reasons of fairness. The difference between our view and that of Moore-Bick
813 LJ is a very narrow one. We again stress that in reaching this conclusion we do not in any
814 way seek to depart from the principles in Zz re Do/zer/y and Zz re Z (CZz/(Z"eẑ . In particular
815 we recognise that there may be cases in which the relief sought is not identical or almost
816 identical to an ASBO and where the facts are much more complicated than they are here. In
817 such cases, subject of course to argument in a particular case, we see no reason why the
818 ordinary civil standard of proof should not apply.
819 6 6 . In this case, even if the approach set out above were for some reason held to be wrong, we
820 would nevertheless dismiss the appeal. This was not an exceptional case of the kind the court
821 had in mind in, say, Zovz.y. In any event, on the facts, the judge not only held that he could
822 not be sure that MS or TE had participated in acts which were either criminal or amounted to
823 a public nuisance, he also said at [92], in a passage quoted at [19] above, that, "whatever
824 matters would require proof, he would not make the or&rs. In that passage he said that there
825 was no evidence to show that either MS or TE had behaved in the past in a way that would
826 justify making such an order. It was not suggested that, if that was so, there was any proper
827 basis for making the order. The judge had read the evidence and saw the witnesses.
828 Whatever the correct approach to standard of proofs we see no basis upon which this court
829 could properly interfere with that exercise of discretion on the part of the judge.
830 CONCLUSION
831 67. For the reasons we have given, these appeals must be dismissed. It would have been wrong in
832 principle for the court to exercise its discretion to grant these irjunctions because the
833 appropriate course was for the council to apply for ASBOs. In any event the judge was
834 correct to conclude that the relevant question was whether he was sure that MS or TE had
835 acted in an anti-social way, that is to say, in a manner that caused or was likely to cause
836 harassment, alarm or distress. He was entitled to conclude that he could not be sure. Further,
837 he was entitled to conclude, in the exercise of his discretion, that it was not necessary or
838 appropriate to make the orders against these respondents.
839 6 8 . In reaching these conclusions we do not wish to minimise in any way the problems identified
840 by the council. However, we are confident that the courts have ample powers to deal with
841 them. The difficulty for the council here was that, as was submitted on behalf of the
842 respondents, the case against these individuals was very thin on the facts. There is no reason
843 why an ASBO should not be made against those against whom the evidence is sufficient,
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844 which must be true in many cases. Moreover, there may be exceptional cases where it would
845 be appropriate to grant an injunction. This is not such a case.
846 Lord Justice Moore-Bick :
847 69. I agree that this appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by Sir Anthony Clarke MR
848 and Rix LJ with which I agree, save in one respect, namely, the standard of proof to be
849 applied in proceedings for an injunction of the kind that were before the judge.
850 70. The council’s application for an injunction was based on allegations that the defendants were
851 members of a gang of youths who on various occasions had harassed, intimidated and
852 sometimes assaulted members of the public going about their lawful business in the centre of
853 Birmingham and that they were likely to continue behaving in that way unless restrained by
854 an order of the court. Although it was an important part of the council’s case that the
855 defendants had behaved in that way in the past, it was not necessary for it to prove that as a
856 condition of obtaining the relief it sought. ^Tiat was essential, however, if  the council was to
857 have any prospect of persuading the court to grant an injunction against the defendants, was
858 that it should establish facts from which the court could be satisfied that there was a sufficient
859 likelihood that, unless restrained, the defendants would behave in that way in the future.
860 71. The recent decisions o f the House of Lords in Zz re DoZer/y [2008] UKHL 33 and Zz re Z
861 (CZZzZ-eẑ  [2008] UKHL 35 make it clear that, save in a few exceptional cases, the standard
862 of proof in civil proceedings is proof on the balance of probabilities. It follows that, insofar as
863 it is necessary for a claimant seeking an irjunction to establish the existence of certain facts in
864 order to obtain relief, he must in principle do so on the balance of probabilities.
865 72. Anti-social behaviour orders ("ASBOs”) are the creature of statute and the statutory
8 6 6  provisions relating to them require certain facts to be proved before an order can be made: see
867 sections 1(1 )(a) and 1(4) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. In many respects ASBOs are
8 6 8  very similar to injunctions, but there are some important differences between them,
869 principally the fact that the breach of an ASBO is a criminal offence punishable by up to five
870 years’ imprisonment. It was the fact that ASBOs have a flavour of the criminal law about
871 them that the question arose whether proceedings for such orders are to be classified in
872 domestic law as criminal or civil proceedings. However, it has now been finally established
873 by the decision of the House of Lords in Z v Cmwzz Cozzr/ a/ MazzcZe.ÿ/e/' [2002]
874 UKHL 39, [2003] 1 AC 787 that they are civil in character. Ordinarily that would have led to
875 the conclusion that it is sufficient to establish on the balance of probabilities the existence of
876 the facts necessary to enable the court to make an order, but their Lordships held, essentially
877 for pragmatic reasons, that the criminal standard of proof should apply, a course which Lord
878 Steyn, in the passage of his speech cited by the Master of the Rolls and Rix LJ, considered
879 would "ensure consistency and predictability in this corner of the law”.
880 73. In vWcCawzz the House was concerned only with the legislation relating to ASBOs and not
881 with the court’s general jurisdiction to grant relief by way of injunction. Accordingly, when
882 Lord Steyn referred to "this corner o f the law” I think he meant proceedings under section 1
883 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. He did not, in my view, intend to include in that
884 expression all applications to restrain by irjunction in the exercise of the court’s general
885 jurisdiction conduct of an anti-social kind that could, if the requirements of section 1( 1) of the
8 8 6  Act were satisfied, be controlled by an ASBO.
887 74. The Master o f the Rolls and Rix LJ have come to a different conclusion on this point, largely
8 8 8  because they consider that it would be irrational if the standard of proof were to differ
889 depending on whether the application before the court was for an ASBO or an injunction.
890 However, in my view the apparent anomaly is not as surprising as it may seem at first sight,
891 because the formal requirements of the proceedings, the persons by whom proceedings may
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892 be commenced and the procedure by which the applications are made differ significantly. In
893 particular, the nature of the legislation and the requirement that applications for ASBOs be
894 made to the magistrates’ courts were held to provide good reason for the adoption,
895 exceptionally, of the criminal standard to the proof of the facts which must be established
896 before an order can be made, despite the fact that the proceedings are civil in nature. There is
897 no comparable reason, however, why proceedings for an irjunction to restrain conduct that
898 involves intimidation, harassment or assault should require proof to the criminal standard of
899 the facts relied on in support of the claim. The anomaly to which the Master of the Rolls and
900 Rix LJ draw attention arises only because in this case the conduct which the council seeks to
901 prevent may in principle be amenable to being restrained by an ASBO (if the necessary
902 conditions can be satisfied) or by the grant of an irjunction. However, that will often not be
903 the case, as, for example, where the person adversely affected lives in the same household:
904 see section 1 ( 1 )(a) of the Act.
905 75. It is not uncommon for a claimant to seek an irjunction on the basis of allegations that the
906 defendant has acted in a way that involves a breach of the criminal law as well as an
907 infringement of his private rights. Fraud and other examples of dishonesty provide some of
908 the commoner examples, though the relief sought in such cases is not usually directed to
909 restraining further acts of a similar kind. However, in Zz re Z (CZZcZ-ez  ̂ the House of Lords
910 made it clear that, apart from a few exceptions, the same standard of proof applies in all civil
911 proceedings. It is not affected by the seriousness of the allegation or the gravity of the
912 consequences, if  it is proved, although regard must always be had to the inherent probabilities
913 when reaching a decision. Since the present proceedings involved nothing more than a claim
914 for an injunction, the civil standard of proof applied, unless the case can be brought within
915 some other, hitherto unidentified, exception to the ordinary rule.
916 76. In my view it is desirable in the interests of consistency of principle that exceptions to the
917 general rule concerning the standard of proof in civil proceedings should be confined to those
918 cases in which there are strong grounds for departing from it. For the reasons I have given 1
919 do not think that there are sufficient reasons for recognising a new exception in cases of this
920 kind, the precise scope of which is not easy to define. Civil proceedings for an injunction
921 cannot as a class form an exception to the general rule and I do not think that proceedings by
922 local authorities for irjunctions in aid of the criminal law or to restrain a public nuisance can
923 do so either. The Master of the Rolls and Rix LJ consider that, because of the anomaly to
924 which he refers, the criminal standard of proof should apply in any proceedings for an
925 irjunction in which the claim is based on allegations that correspond to the requirements of
926 section 1(1 )(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. In my view, however, that is to introduce
927 an unnecessary element of uncertainty into an area of the law which has recently been
928 clarified by the decisions in Zz re DoZer/y and Zz re Z (CZZfZ-ez .̂ The anomaly to which the
929 Master of the Rolls and Rix LJ refer is a product of the particular circumstances of this case;
930 in my view it is not one which justifies the recognition of any new exception to the general
931 rule relating to the standard of proof in civil proceedings. However, I agree that the fact that
932 the principles which apply in proceedings for an ASBO differ in the respects mentioned
9 3 3  earlier from those that apply in proceedings for an irjunction is an additional reason for
934 declining to grant relief by way of injunction where the ASBO procedure is available.
935 77. For these reasons I think the judge was wrong to direct himself that he needed to be .yz/re that
936 the defendants had committed the acts on which the council based its claim for an injunction.
937 In my view it was sufficient for him to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities o f facts that
938 demonstrated a sufficient likelihood that they would commit breaches of the criminal law in
939 the future, unless restrained from doing so, to justify granting an injunction. Equally, insofar
940 as it may have been necessary or desirable for the council to prove that the defendants were
941 persistent offenders (see the comments of Bingham L.J. in Cz(y q/' ZoWozz CorqomZozz v
942 ZovM Cozz.y/rzzcZozz [1992] 3 All ER 697, to which the Master of the Rolls and Rix LJ
943 have referred), it was sufficient for it to establish that on the balance of probabilities. Having
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944 said that, I agree with the Master of the Rolls and Rix LJ that, even if all those matters had
9 4 5  been established in this case, it would have been wrong for the court to exercise its discretion
946 in favour of granting an injunction when it was open to the council to proceed by way of an
947 application for an ASBO.
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Appendix 7a
1. Cour de cassation - Chambre commerciale
2. 13 février 2007
3. StéS...TC(K...L...)
4. Contre
5. stéNo... ga...etGe...
6 . Joint le pourvoi n° H 05-13.412, formé par la société Ge..., et le pourvoi n° J 05-
7. 10.424, formé par la Société 1... de transports en commun, qui attaquent le même arrêt
8 . ;
9. Attendu, selon l'arrêt attaqué (Lyon, 18 décembre 2003), qu'en octobre 1995, la
10. société P... service a livré à la Société ... de transports en commun (la S...TC),
11. devenue depuis lors la société K... L..., des distributeurs automatiques de monnaie ;
12. que ces machines ont révélé des dysfonctionnements auxquels la Société f... auto...,
13. distributeur en France des produits de la société allemande No... ga..., auprès de
14. laquelle s'était fournie la société allemande P... service, a tenté de remédier sans
15. succès, malgré l'aide du fabriquant, la société Ge... ; qu'après une expertise judiciaire,
16. le tribunal a, notamment, prononcé la résolution du contrat liant la S...TC à la société
17. P... service, au tort de cette dernière, qu'il a condamnée à payer des dommages-
18. intérêts à la S...TC, et a déclaré les actions dirigées par la S...TC et la société P...
19. service contre les sociétés No... ga... et Ge... irrecevables comme tardives en
2 0 . application du droit allemand ;
21. que la cour d'appel a partiellement confirmé ce jugement mais a dit la Convention de
22. Vienne du 11 avril 1980 applicable dans les rapports entre les sociétés No... ga... et
23. Ge..., d'une part, et la S...TC, d'autre part, sans accueillir les demandes de cette
24. dernière contre les premières ;
25. Sur les deux moyens du pourvoi n° H 05-13.412, réunis :
26. Attendu que la société Ge... fait grief à l'arrêt d'avoir dit que la Convention de Vienne
27. est applicable dans les rapports entre les sociétés P... service et No... ga... et Ge...,
28. d'une part, et les sociétés No... ga... et Ge... et la S...TC, d'autre part, et d'avoir rejeté
29. les demandes de la société Ge..., alors, selon le moyen :
30. 1 / que l'article 7-2 de la Convention de Vienne du 11 avril 1980 dispose que les
31. questions relatives aux matières régies par elle mais qui ne sont pas tranchées par la
32. Convention seront réglées selon les principes généraux dont elle s'inspire ou, à défaut
33. de ces principes, conformément à la loi applicable en vertu des règles du droit privé,
34. la société Ge... invitant la cour d'appel à constater que les questions relatives à la
35. prescription n'étaient pas traitées dans la Convention de Vienne et les conditions
36. générales de vente de la société No... ga... régissant le contrat stipulant l'application
37. du droit allemand ;
38. qu'en décidant que le droit allemand inclut la Convention de Vienne du 11 avril 1980
39. sur la vente internationale de marchandises qui a été ratifiée par l'Allemagne et par la
40. France, que cette Convention faisant ainsi partie intégrante du droit français et du
41. droit allemand, le présent litige entre dans son champ d'application dès lors que les
42. conditions générales de vente de la société No... ga... ne les ont pas écartées, la
43. référence au droit allemand applicable donnant en conséquence tout son crédit à
44. l'affirmation selon laquelle c'est la Convention de Vienne qu'il y a lieu d'appliquer,
45. sans préciser en quoi la référence faite à la loi allemande n'était pas faite à la seule loi
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46. interne et partant n'excluait pas les dispositions de la Convention de Vienne, la cour
47. d'appel a privé sa décision de base légale au regard des articles 1.1 et suivants et 7 et
48. suivants de ladite Convention, ensemble l'article 3 du code civil ;
49. 2 / que la société Ge... taisait valoir les dispositions de l'article 7 de la Convention de
50. Vienne selon lesquelles les questions concernant les matières régies par la Convention
51. mais qu'elle ne tranche pas seront réglées selon les principes généraux dont elle
52. s'inspire ou, à défaut de ces principes, conformément à la loi applicable en vertu des
53. règles du droit privé, qu'il en résultait que la Convention de La Haye du 15 juin 1955
54. relative au droit applicable à la vente à caractère international d'objets mobiliers
55. corporels était applicable par application de la règle française de conflits, l'article 3
56. disposant que la vente est régie par la loi interne du pays où le vendeur a sa résidence
57. habituelle au moment où il reçoit la commande, soit en l'espèce la loi allemande ; que
58. la société Ge... précisait que l'article 3 de la loi allemande du 5 juillet 1989 portant
59. intégration de la Convention de Vienne dans le droit allemand disposait que "en
60. matière de prescription des droits conférés à l'acheteur par l'article 45 de la
61. Convention de 1980, en cas de non-conformité des marchandises, à condition que la
62. non-conformité ne repose pas sur des faits connus du vendeur, ou dont il aurait dû
63. avoir connaissance et qu'il n'a pas communiqués à l'acheteur, les articles 477 et 478
64. du code civil allemand sont à appliquer par analogie, avec cette restriction que le délai
65. prévu à l'article 477, alinéa 1er, phrase 1, du code civil commence à courir à partir du
6 6 . jour où l'acheteur a dénoncé la non-conformité au vendeur conformément à l'article 39
67. de la Convention" ; qu'en énonçant que le droit allemand inclut la Convention de
6 8 . Vienne du 11 avril 1980 sur la vente internationale de marchandises qui a été ratifiée
69. par l'Allemagne et par la France pour en déduire que cette Convention fait partie
70. intégrante du droit français et du droit allemand, le présent litige entrant dans son
71. champ d'application, dès lors que les conditions générales de vente de la société No...
72. ga... ne les ont pas écartées, la référence au droit allemand applicable donnant tout son
73. crédit à l'affirmation selon laquelle c'est la Convention de Vienne qu'il y a lieu
74. d'appliquer, sans rechercher si la référence faite dans les conditions générales à la loi
75. allemande n'emportait pas application de l'article 3 de la loi allemande du 5 juillet
76. 1989, portant intégration de la Convention de Vienne en droit interne allemand, lequel
77. prévoit que la prescription est de six mois, et partant s'il n'y avait pas là une clause
78. d'exclusio juris, la cour d'appel n'a pas légalement justifié sa décision au regard des
79. articles 1.1 et suivants, 7 et 8  de la Convention de Vienne du 11 avril 1980, ensemble
80. l'article 3 du code civil et l'article 3 de la loi allemande du 5 juillet 1989 ;
8 1 .3 /  que l'acheteur qui constate un défaut doit le dénoncer au vendeur dans un délai
82. raisonnable à partir du moment où il l'a constaté ou aurait dû le constater, la
83. dénonciation devant être faite dans un délai de deux ans à compter de la remise des
84. marchandises à l'acheteur, dans les conditions de l'article 39 de la Convention de
85. Vienne du 19 mai 1980 ;
8 6 . qu'en retenant que la mise en service des premières machines est intervenue le 24
87. octobre 1995, que le 26 octobre 1995 la société S...TC a émis plusieurs réserves sur la
8 8 . non-conformité des machines à l'usage pour lequel elles étaient destinées à raison des
89. dysfonctionnements constatés lors de leur utilisation, la cour d'appel n'a pas, par de
90. tels motifs, constaté que la dénonciation avait été faite conformément aux dispositions
91. des articles 38 et suivants et a privé sa décision de base légale au regard desdits textes
92. ;
93. 4 / que l'acheteur qui constate un défaut doit le dénoncer au vendeur dans un délai
94. raisonnable à partir du moment où il l'a constaté ou aurait dû le constater, la
95. dénonciation devant être faite dans un délai préfix de deux ans à compter de la remise
96. des marchandises à l'acheteur, dans les conditions de l'article 39 de la Convention de
97. Vienne du 19 mai 1980 ; qu'en relevant que la mise en service des premières
98. machines est intervenue le 24 octobre 1995, que le 26 octobre 1995 la société S...TC a
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99. émis plusieurs réserves sur la non-conformité des marchandises à l'usage pour lequel
1 0 0 . elles étaient destinées à raison des dysfonctionnements constatés lors de leur
101. utilisation, que l'article 47 prévoit que l'acheteur peut accorder un délai
1 0 2 . supplémentaire de durée raisonnable au vendeur pour lui permettre d'exécuter
103. ses obligations, étant précisé que pendant ce délai, l'acheteur ne perd pas son
104. droit d'agir contre le vendeur, puis en affirmant que la société S...TC a laissé à
105. la société Ge... le temps de remédier aux dysfonctionnements, notamment en
106. lui permettant de tester un nouveau logiciel, de sorte que pendant ce délai la
107. prescription était suspendue cependant que le délai de l'article 39 est un délai
108. préfixe, la cour d'appel a violé les textes susvisés ;
109. 5 / que l'acheteur qui constate un défaut doit le dénoncer au vendeur dans un
1 1 0 . délai raisonnable à partir du moment où il l'a constaté ou aurait dû le
1 1 1 . constater, la dénonciation devant être faite dans un délai préfix de deux ans à
1 1 2 . compter de la remise des marchandises à l'acheteur, dans les conditions de
113. l'article 39 de la Convention de Vienne du 19 mai 1980 ; qu'en affirmant que
114. la prescription peut aussi être interrompue par la reconnaissance de sa
115. garantie par le vendeur, ce qui résulte des correspondances échangées entre la
116. société P... service et la S...TC, pour en déduire que l'action introduite le 23
117. octobre 1996 et le 16 janvier 1997 à l'encontre des sociétés No... ga... et Ge...
118. n'a été ni prématurée ni tardive cependant que le délai préfixe ne peut être
119. interrompu, la cour d'appel a violé les textes susvisés ;
120. Mais attendu que la cour d'appel n'a pas rejeté les demandes de la société
121. Ge... ; que le moyen manque en fait ;
122. Sur le premier moyen du pourvoi n° J 05-10.424 :
123. Attendu que la S...TC fait grief à l'arrêt d'avoir rejeté sa demande en
124. restitution du prix des machines défectueuses formée à l'encontre du
125. fabricant, la société Ge..., et du vendeur intermédiaire, la société No... ga...,
126. alors, selon le moyen :
127. 1 / que, selon l'article 81.2 de la Convention de Vienne, la partie qui a
128. exécuté le contrat totalement ou partiellement peut réclamer restitution à
129. l'autre partie de ce qu'elle a fourni ou payé en exécution du travail ; qu'a privé
130. sa décision de base légale au regard de ce texte la cour d'appel qui a
131. condamné le seul vendeur français à restituer le prix payé par la S...TC et
132. débouté cette dernière à l'égard du fabricant et du revendeur allemand, après
133. avoir pourtant constaté que la Convention de Vienne s'appliquait dans leurs
134. rapports et retenu les manquements de ces deux derniers à l'égard de
135. l'acquéreur;
136. 2  / qu'en ne répondant pas au moyen fondé sur les dispositions de la
137. Convention de Vienne et selon lequel le fabricant qui fournit une
138. marchandise non conforme est tenu, comme le vendeur intermédiaire, de
139. toutes les conséquences qui résultent de cette non-conformité, la cour d'appel
140. a violé l'article 455 du nouveau code de procédure civile ;
141. Mais attendu qu'ayant relevé que la S...TC réclame le remboursement des
142. sommes qu'elle a dû verser à la société P... service au titre du contrat pour les
143. livraisons de matériel et qu'en conséquence la société P... service doit être
144. condamnée à payer à la S...TC la somme de 1 105 177,64 francs, soit 160
145. 860,70 euros, en restitution de ces sommes, la cour d'appel a fait ressortir que
146. la demande de la S...TC n'était pas dirigée contre l'autre partie au contrat de
147. vente et a ainsi implicitement mais nécessairement écarté le moyen de la
148. S...TC fondé sur la nécessaire condamnation in solidum des sociétés ayant
149. concouru à la réalisation du dommage ; que le moyen n'est pas fondé ;
150. Et sur le second moyen du pourvoi n° J 05-10.424 :
151. Attendu que la S...TC reproche encore à l'arrêt d'avoir rejeté sa demande au
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152. titre du préjudice dû pour mauvaise exécution du contrat à l'encontre du
153. vendeur intermédiaire, la société No... ga..., et du fabricant, la société Ge...,
154. alors, selon le moyen :
155. 1 / que l'application de la Convention de Vienne aux relations entre deux ou
156. plusieurs parties implique l'exclusion du droit français ; qu'en reprochant à la
157. S...TC de ne pas avoir û)ndé sa demande de dommages-intérêts dirigée à
158. rencontre des sociétés No... ga... et Ge... sur le terrain quasidélictuel tout en
159. admettant par ailleurs que la Convention de Vienne s'appliquait dans leurs
160. rapports, la cour d'appel a violé par refus d'application des dispositions des
161. articles 45 b) et 74 à 77 de la Convention de Vienne ;
162. 2 / que dès lors qu'elle constatait que la S...TC était bien fondée à solliciter
163. réparation des pr^udices subis par elle du fait des manquements commis par
164. les sociétés allemandes en application de la Convention de Vienne à son
165. égard, la cour d'appel n'a pas tiré les conséquences légales de ses
166. constatations en déboutant la S...TC de sa demande, en violation des
167. dispositions des articles 45 b) et 74 à 77 de la Convention de Vienne ;
168. 3 / que le juge tranche le litige conformément aux règles de droit qui lui sont
169. applicables ; qu'à supposer l'action de l'acquéreur quasidélictuelle, a méconnu
170. l'article 12 du nouveau code de procédure civile la cour d'appel qui, pour
171. rejeter la demande de dommages-intérêts pour retard dans l'exécution du
172. contrat, a retenu que l'acquéreur n'avait pas fondé son action sur le fondement
173. quasidélictuel lorsqu'il lui appartenait de statuer après avoir donné elle-même
174. ce fondement juridique à la demande ;
175. Mais attendu, en premier lieu, que la cour d'appel, devant laquelle la S...TC
176. sollicitait l'application de l'article 10 du marché prévoyant expressément la
177. sanction de retards pris dans l'exécution, a pu retenir, sans encourir les griefs
178. des deux premières branches, que cette réclamation ne pouvait être faite qu'à
179. la société P... service avec laquelle elle était seule liée par le contrat en vertu
180. de la clause pénale convenue ;
181. Attendu, en second lieu, que la cour d'appel, si elle pouvait rechercher elle-
182. même la règle de droit applicable au litige, n'en avait pas l'obligation dès lors
183. que le demandeur avait précisé le fondement juridique de sa prétention ;
184. D'où il suit que le moyen n'est fondé en aucune de ses branches ;
185. PAR CES MOTIFS:
186. REJETTE les pourvois ;
187. Condamne la société Ge... et la société K... L... aux dépens ;
188. Vu l'article 700 du nouveau code de procédure civile, rejette les demandes ;
189. Ainsi fait et jugé par la Cour de cassation, chambre commerciale, financière
190. et économique, et prononcé par le président en son audience publique du
191. treize février deux mille sept.
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Appendix 7b
1. Cour de Cassation [Supreme Court] - Commercial chamber
2. 13 February 2007 
3. Zy Mz/ZaZe Z/b/ZzaMM [**]
4. Zc/Zecf Zy Zzzzŵy Meyer [***]
5 [I. P R O C E E D IN G S B E F O R E  T H E  C O U R T  O F F IR S T  IN STA N CE]
6. According to the first instance judgment (Lyon 16 March 2001):
7. In October 1995, Service Company P... [Seller] [of Germany] delivered automatic
8. banknote-to-coin change machines to Public Transport Company (S...TC) [Buyer] [of
9. France].
10. The machines showed malfunctions. Despite the assistance by the manufacturer of the
11. machines. Company Ge..., the machines could not be successfully repaired by
12. Company F... The latter company is a retailer of the products of the German Company
13. No... GA... in France and which was assigned by [Seller].
14. After an expert opinion, the Court ordered [Seller] to pay damages to [Buyer] and,
15. applying German law, the Court declared the claims of [Buyer] and [Seller] against
16. Companies No... GA... and Ge... inadmissible due to expiration of the period of
17. limitation.
18 [II. PR O C E E D IN G S B E F O R E  T H E  C O U R  D 'A P P E L  DE LYON]
19. The Court of Appeal (Lyon 18 December 2003) partly confirmed this judgment but
20. held the Vienna Convention on International Sale of Goods of 11 April 1980 (CISG)
21. to be applicable to the relations between Companies No... GA... and Ge..., on one
22. side, and [Buyer], on the other side, without granting the claims of the [Buyer] against
23. Companies No... GA... and Ge...
24 [HI. T H E  A PPE A L  T O  T H E  C O U R  DE CA SSA TIO N ]
25. Appeal no. H 05-13.412, filed by Company Ge..., and appeal Appeal no. J 05-10.424,
26. filed by [Buyer]: appeals on points of law directed at the same judgment.
27. [IV. ISSUES CONSIDERED]
28. [A] The grounds of Appeal no. H 05-13.412, combined
29. Company Ge... [the Manufacturer of the machines] complains about the decision of
30. the Court of Appeal, having considered the CISG as applicable in the relations
31. between [Seller] and Companies No...GA... and Ge..., on one side, and between
32. Companies No... GA... and Ge... and [Buyer], on the other side, and having rejected
33. the claims of Company Ge...
34. The grounds for appeal presented by Company Ge... are:
35. Art. 7(2) CISG provides that questions concerning matters governed by the
36. Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with
37. the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in
38. conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.
39. Company Ge... [the Manufacturer of the machines] requested the Court of Appeal to
40. rule that questions concerning prescription are not governed by the CISG and that the
41. general sales conditions of Company No... GA... [the intermediary] which are
42. applicable to the contract stipulate German law;
43. The Court of Appeal ruled that:
44. German law includes the CISG which was ratified by Germany and France and that
45. the Convention forms an integral part of German and French law;
46. The present dispute is within the scope of application of the CISG; and
47. The parties had not opted out of it by way of the general sales conditions of Company
48. NO...GA...
49. Company Ge... alleged that the Court of Appeal, in fact, held that the reference to
50. German law affirmed the applicability of the CISG, without explaining why this
51. reference to German law would not refer to domestic German law only, excluding the
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52. CISG. It is Company Ge...'s position that the Court of Appeal thereby deprived its
53. decision of a legal basis according to the Articles 1(1) c/ and 7 e/ .yeg. of the
54. Convention combined with Art. 3 of the French Civil Code;
55. Company Ge... refers to the provisions of Art. 7 CISG according to which questions
56. concerning matters governed by the Convention which are not expressly settled in it
57. are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in
58. the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the
59. rules o f private international law, and alleges that, in consequence, the Hague
60. Convention on the Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods of 15 June 1955
61. was applicable according to the French conflict-of-laws rule.
62. Company Ge... alleges that:
63. Art. 3 of the 1955 Hague Convention provides that the sale shall be governed by the
64. domestic law of the country in which the vendor has his habitual residence at the time
65. when he receives the order, in the present case, by German law.
66. Art. 3 of the German law of 5 July 1989 which incorporates the CISG into German
67. law provides that "in matters of prescription the rights conferred to the buyer in Art.
68. 45 of the CISG, in case of non-confbrmity of the goods, under the condition that the
69. non-conformity is not based of facts known by the seller, or on a fact he should have
70. known and has not communicated to the buyer. Articles 477 and 478 of the German
71. Civil Code are to be applied by analogy, with the restriction that the delay provided
72. by Art. 477 sect. 1 phrase 1 of the German Civil Code starts to run from the day the
73. buyer notified the seller of the non-confbrmity according to Art. 39 of the CISG."
74. The Court of Appeal declared that German law included the CISG which was ratified
75. by Germany and France and that the Convention formed an integral part of German
76. and French law; that the present dispute entered its scope of application and that by
77. way of the general sales conditions of Company No...GA... the parties had not opted
78. out of it; that, in consequence, the reference to German law in fact affirmed the
79. applicability of the CISG. This ruling was in error because the Court of Appeal did
80. not examine whether the reference to German law in the general conditions would not
81. result in the application of Art. 3 of the German law of 5 July 1989 incorporating the
82. CISG into German law. Art. 3 of that law provides that the prescription period is six
83. months. Therefore, it is Company Ge...'s position that, even if there were no clause
84. exc/wj'fo the Court of Appeal has not legally justified its decision with regards to
85. Arts. 1(1) g/. .ygg., 7 and 8 of the CISG combined with Art. 3 of the French Civil Code
86. and Art. 3 of the German law of 5 July 1989.
87. The buyer who discovers a lack of conformity must give notice to the seller within a
88. reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it, and the
89. notification must be within a period of two years from the date on which the goods
90. were actually handed over to the buyer according to the conditions of Art. 39 CISG.
91. Given that the initial operation of the first machines occurred on 24 October 1995,
92. that on 26 October 1995 [Buyer] has made several reservations concerning the non-
93. conformity of the machines for the purpose for which they were destined because of
94. malfunctions discovered during their operation, the Court of Appeal has not declared
95. that the notification was made in accordance with the provisions o f Articles 38 e/ .ygg.
96. CISG and has therefore deprived its decision o f a legal basis with regards to the
97. mentioned provisions.
98. [...] Art. 47 provides that the buyer may fix an additional period of time of reasonable
99. length for performance by the seller of his obligations and specifies that during that
100. period the buyer is not deprived thereby of any right to sue the seller.
101. In confirming that [Buyer] has given time to Company Ge...[the Manufacturer
102. of the machines] to cure the malfunctions, notably in letting it test a new
103. software, and in concluding that the prescription period would have been
104. suspended although the time period of Art. 39 is a fixed period, the Court of
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Appendix 8a
1. COUR D'APPEL DE PARIS
2. 5è chambre, section A
3.
4. La société de droit allemand dénommée "H. H... GmbH & Co" (société H.)
5. estime avoir vendu 100.000 mètres linéaires de tissu à la SARL française
6. MG... (société MG), laquelle n'en a pris que partiellement livraison. La société
7. H. a dès lors attrait le 7 septembre 1999, la société MG devant le tribunal de
8. commerce de Paris aux fins, dans le dernier état des prétentions formulées
9. devant les premiers juges, de l'entendre condamner à :
10. - lui verser le prix, à hauteur de 330.486 francs, du solde du tissu non retiré
11. (après déduction des quantités entre temps revendues à d'autres clients, mais à
12. des conditions financières moins favorables),
13. - prendre livraison des 28.990 mètres restants, sous astreinte "définitive" de
14. 10.000 francs par jour de retard à décompter quinze jours après la "notification"
15. de la décision,
16. - lui payer 242.315,30 francs de dommages et intérêts en réparation du dommage
17. résultant d'une revente à un prix inférieur, outre 20.000 Aancs de frais
18. irrépétibles.
19. La société MG, qui soutenait à titre principal, l'inexistence d'un contrat de vente
20. au sens de la Convention de Vienne, a, dans le dernier état de ses demandes
21. devant le tribunal, reconventionnellement sollicité 50.000 francs de dommages
22. intérêts pour procédure "abusive et téméraire" et 25.000 francs de frais non
23. compris dans les dépens. Subsidiairement, elle a requis la résolution du contrat
24. aux torts exclusifs de sa contradictrice et la condamnation de cette dernière à lui
25. verser 1.000.000 francs de dommages intérêts pour inexécution de ses
26. obligations contractuelles.
27. Par jugement contradictoire du 13 septembre 2001, le tribunal a rejeté toutes les
28. demandes et a condamné la société H. à verser 2.286,73 euros de Âais
29. irrépétibles à la société MG.
30. Appelante le 22 janvier 2002, la société H., dans le dernier état de ses écritures
31. signifiées le 21 mai 2003, invite la Cour à tirer toutes conséquences "de droit et
32. de fait" du refus de la société MG de produire aux débats les factures de ses
33. achats de tissu entre septembre 1998 et juin 1999, nonobstant les sommations de
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34. communiquer qu'elle lui a antérieurement notifiées. Elle estime en effet que, les
35. cours des tissus ayant fortement chuté postérieurement à la commande litigieuse,
36. la société MG s'est "vraisemblablement" fournie ailleurs à meilleur prix en
37. cherchant à se dégager de la commande souscrite auprès de la société H.
38. L'appelante expose qu'elle est représentée en France par Monsieur L., son agent
39. commercial et que ce dernier, accompagné du directeur commercial de la
40. mandante, ont visité la société MG le 9 septembre 1998 en y rencontrant
41. Monsieur I . . Elle prétend qu'au cours de cette rencontre, un contrat de vente a
42. été conclu portant sur 100.000 mètres de tissu "lycra" au prix de 11,40 francs le
43. mètre, livrables entre novembre 1998 et février 1999, par lots de 25.000 mètres
44. chacun.
45. Elle précise avoir adressé le 28 septembre 1998, non une offre, mais une
46. confirmation de cette commande à la société MG, laquelle ne l'a pas contredite et
47. n'avait pas à l'accepter au sens de l'article 15 de la Convention de Vienne, la
48. rencontre des volontés s'étant faite antérieurement, lors de la réunion du 9
49. septembre 1998.
50. Elle indique que la société MG n'a pas appelé les quantités aux dates prévues, à
51. l'exception d'un lot de 1.718 mètres à livrer chez une société tierce, o^et d'une
52. facture émise le 15 mars 1999 faisant expressément référence au solde de 98.772
53. mètres restant à livrer. La société H. précise que cette première facture a été
54. payée.
55. Invoquant les usages antérieurs entre les deux partenaires selon lesquels la
56. société MG ne formalisait pas d'écrit pour ses commandes, celles-ci étant prises
57. par l'agent commercial de la société FI., lequel en confirmait par écrit la teneur à 
58: la société MG après avoir transmis la commande à sa mandante en Allemagne.
59. L'appelante en déduit qu'au moment de la vente litigieuse, l'échange des
60. consentements des parties s'est opéré selon les usages antérieurs entre les parties,
61. qui n'avaient jamais été démentis jusque là. Cependant la retransmission de
62. l'ordre d'achat par l'agent commercial à la société H. n'a cette fois là, pas été
63. nécessaire du fait de la présence lors du rendez-vous, du directeur commercial de
64. la firme allemande, lequel a immédiatement enregistré la commande au nom de
65. celle-ci. Elle conteste que la livraison de 1.718 mètres de tissu puisse être
66. considérée comme une fourniture d'échantillons ainsi que l'a fait le tribunal,
67. alors au surplus que la facture correspondante a été payée sans protestation ni
68. réserve.
69. Elle estime sans fondement le prétendu reproche de défaut de délivrance que lui
70. oppose aujourd'hui la société MG en ce que, selon l'appelante, c'est l'intimée qui
71. ne s'est pas exécutée de son obligation de retirement en n'appelant pas les lots
72. aux échéances convenues.
73. La société H. prie la Cour d'ordonner la communication par la société MG de
74. "l'intégralité des factures d'achat de tissu pour la période de septembre 1998 à
75. juillet 1999 et des comptes fournisseurs pour la même période". A défaut, elle
76. l'invite à en tirer toutes conséquences de fait et de droit. Pour le surplus elle
77. conclut à l'infïrmation du jugement entrepris et renouvelle, en les libellant en
78. euros, les demandes antérieurement formulées devant les premiers juges en
79. sollicitant 3.000 euros de frais irrépétibles.
80. Intimée, la société MG réplique, dans ses ultimes conclusions signifiées le 25
81. avril 2003, que la visite "impromptue" du 9 septembre 1998 à l'occasion de
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82. laquelle le directeur commercial de la société H. se déplaçait pour la première
83. fois dans ses locaux, avait eu pour objet de lui présenter un nouveau tissu "lycra-
84. croisé" en lui proposant une offre portant sur 100.000 mètres. Elle dément
85. formellement avoir passé commande à ce stade, mais avoir au contraire reçu le
86. 28 septembre suivant, non une confirmation de commande, mais la proposition
87. chiffrée, rédigée en langue allemande, de l'offre envisagée lors de la réunion
88. précédente, accompagnée d'un calendrier prévisionnel de livraison. Elle précise
89. ne pas avoir donné suite dans un premier temps à cette proposition, mais, après
90. relance de l'agent commercial, avoir passé commande d'un simple échantillon
91. afin de réaliser des essais de résistance, de coloration et de coupe sur ce produit
92. de technologie nouvelle issu des dérivés pétroliers. Elle allègue que les tests
93. n'ayant pas été concluants et devant l'absence de réactivité de la clientèle, elle a
94. déônitivement renoncé à la proposition initiale.
95. Elle estime, par ailleurs, que la demande de production de pièces, au demeurant
96. nouvelle à ses yeux, en cause d'appel, ne présente pas d'intérêt pour la solution
97. du litige pendant.
98. La société MG fait valoir :
99. - que celui qui réclame l'exécution d'une obligation doit la prouver autrement
100. que par des documents émanant de lui-même,
101. - que s'il y avait eu vente, le caractère international de celle-ci la
102. soumettrait à la Convention de Vienne du 11 avril 1980, dont l'article 18
103. dispose que la formation du contrat nécessite la manifestation de
104. l'acceptation de l'offf e proposée,
105. - qu'en l'espèce l'offre a été matérialisée par le document du 28 septembre
106. 1998, lequel ne respectait pas l'emploi obligatoire de la langue Aançaise en
107. application de la loi du 4 août 1994,
108. - qu'en application de l'article 18 de la Convention internationale précitée,
109. le silence ou l'inaction ne peuvent pas valoir à eux seuls acceptation, alors
110. que le défaut de traduction en français permettait à la société MG d'estimer
111. qu'il s'agissait de "la matérialisation de l'offre présentée oralement le 8
112. septembre" précédent, l'expression allemande "AuAragsbestàtigung"
113. pouvant se traduire par "confirmation de commande" ne lui étant pas
114. opposable comme étant exprimée dans une langue qu'elle ne comprenait
115. pas et ne constituant, au demeurant pas une acceptation de commande au
116. sens de l'article 18.1 de la Convention de Vienne,
117. - qu'elle n'a jamais manifesté expressément, ni implicitement,
118. d'acceptation de l'offre, le silence ne valant pas à lui seul, acceptation
119. d'une offre de vente internationale de marchandises,
120. - qu'au demeurant, la société H. ne s'est pas acquittée aux dates précisées
121. dans l'offre du 28 septembre 1998, de sa propre obligation de délivrance
122. résultant du contrat de vente qu'elle allègue.
123. Subsidiairement, si l'existence d'un contrat de vente était reconnue, la
124. société MG invoque alors les dispositions de la vente sur échantillons de
125. l'article 1587 du Code civil, applicable à la commande des 1.718 mètres de
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126. tissu et soutient que la facture du 15 mars 1999, uniquement rédigée en
127. langue allemande, est insuffisante pour justifier d'une obligation plus
128. étendue, son règlement n'ayant de valeur juridique que pour la seule partie
129. exécutée.
130. Elle fait dès lors valoir;
131. - que la vente n'est pas parfaite tant que l'acheteur n'a pas agréé
132. l'échantillon,
133. - que la vente "franco" sous-entend que la livraison est faite par le vendeur
134. dans le cadre de son obligation de délivrance en application de l'article
135. 1614 du Code civil, de sorte que, selon l'analyse de l'intimée, ce n'était pas
136. à la société MG d'exécuter une prétendue obligation de retirement, mais à
137. la société H. d'exécuter son obligation de délivrance si, comme elle le
138. prétend, elle avait estimé qu'il y avait eu vente parfaite le 28 septembre
139. 1998.
140. La société MG conclut à la confirmation du jugement entrepris et sollicite
141. 3.000 euros de frais non compris dans les dépens.
142. Subsidiairement, invoquant le bénéfice de l'article 1587 du Code civil, elle
143. demande le rejet de toutes les prétentions de la société H ..
144. SUR CE,
145. Considérant qu'en application de l'article 1315 du Code civil, il appartient
146. à la société H. de prouver l'obligation qu'elle allègue, qui aurait été
147. souscrite à son profit, par la société MG ;
148. Que la société allemande soutient qu'un contrat de vente de 100.000
149. mètres de tissu aurait été verbalement conclu entre elle-même et la société
150. française, ce que cette dernière conteste formellement ;
151. Que dans le cadre des preuves qui doivent être rapportées dans ce litige, la
152. connaissance des éventuels achats de tissu par la société MG, auprès
153. d'autres fournisseurs, ne serait nullement de nature à prouver la vente
154. alléguée par l'une des parties et niée par l'autre ;
155. Qu'en conséquence, la demande de la société H. de voir ordonner la
156. communication par la société MG de "l'intégralité des factures d'achat de
157. tissu pour la période de septembre 1998 à juillet 1999 et des comptes
158. fournisseurs pour la même période" ne sera pas accueillie, la production de
159. ces pièces étant sans incidence sur la solution du litige pendant ;
160. Considérant que la vente alléguée concerne des parties dont l'établissement
161. respectif se situe dans deux Etats différents et que, tant l'Allemagne que la
162. France, sont des Etats contractants de la convention de Vienne du 11 avril
163. 1980, laquelle, aux termes de son article 4, régit exclusivement la
164. formation du contrat de vente et les droits et obligations qu'un tel contrat
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165. fait naître entre vendeur et acheteur, à l'exclusion notamment de la validité
166. des clauses du contrat et des effets qu'il peut avoir sur la propriété des
167. marchandises vendues;
168. Considérant que la rencontre des volontés au cours de la réunion du 8
169. septembre 1998 est formellement contestée par la société MG et que, pour
170. établir la véracité de ce qu'elle prétend, la société H. produit les
171. témoignages, sous forme d'attestations, de son agent commercial et de son
172. directeur commercial ;
173. Que compte tenu des liens reliant ces deux témoins à l'une des parties au
174. procès, les attestations correspondantes ne présentent pas un caractère
175. suffisamment probant pour établir la réalité de l'échange allégué des
176. consentements ;
177. Qu'en l'absence de la démonstration incombant à la société H., celle-ci ne
178. rapporte pas la preuve de la réalité de la vente qu'elle allègue, qui aurait
179. été verbalement conclue lors de l'entretien précité ;
180. Considérant que la société H. invoque aussi les usages et les habitudes qui
181. se sont établis entre les parties, pour en déduire que le même processus
182. avait été observé antérieurement, consistant à envoyer une confirmation de
183. commande à la société MG après que celle-ci ait verbalement commandé
184. les marchandises souhaitées auprès de l'agent commercial de la société H.
185. à l'occasion des visites de ce dernier dans les locaux de la société MG ;
186. Mais considérant que si l'article 9.1 des dispositions générales de la
187. Convention internationale précitée, stipule que les parties sont liées par les
188. usages auxquels elles ont consenti et par les habitudes qui se sont établies
189. entre elles, les articles 14.1 et 18.1, concernant plus particulièrement la
190. formation du contrat, disposent qu'une offre doit être suffisamment précise
191. et que si l'acceptation du destinataire peut résulter de son comportement
192. indiquant qu'il y acquiesce, son silence ou son inaction ne peuvent, à eux
193. seuls, valoir acceptation ;
194. Considérant qu'il n'est pas contesté que le tissu objet de la discussion du 8
195. septembre 1998 dans les locaux de la société MG à Paris, était d'une
196. conception technique entièrement nouvelle et très différente de celle des
197. tissus antérieurement achetés par la société française auprès de la firme
198. allemande;
199. Que dans ces conditions la société H. n'est pas fondée à invoquer les
200. usages antérieurs entre les parties, puisqu'il apparaît que ceux-ci avaient
201. été élaborés à l'occasion de transactions portant sur des tissus de
202. conception classique et ancieime, alors que la discussion du 8 septembre
203. 1998 avait porté sur la présentation d'un tissu de conception entièrement
204. nouvelle, qui n'avait jamais été antérieurement vendu à la société MG ;
205. Considérant au surplus, qu'il n'est pas contesté que la "confirmation de
206. commande" du 28 septembre 1998 adressée par l'agent commercial de la
207. société H. à la société MG, était exclusivement rédigée en langue
208. allemande, ni que celle-ci n'était pas suffisamment comprise par les
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209. représentants de la société française destinataire ;
210. Qu'il s'en suit qu'il n'est pas d'avantage établi que les intéressés avaient été
211. en mesure de comprendre qu'une confirmation de commande leur était
212. adressée et, compte tenu de leur méconnaissance de la langue allemande,
213. qu'ils étaient fondés à estimer qu'il s'agissait de précisions concernant
214. l'offre envisagée au cours des discussions lors de l'entretien précédent ;
215. Considérant aussi, qu'il n'est pas contesté que la société MG n'a jamais
216. expressément acquiescé à ladite offre et que la société H. ne rapporte pas
217. non plus la preuve d'un comportement de la société MG qui aurait pu
218. valoir acquiescement au sens de l'article 18.1 de la Convention de Vienne ;
219. Considérant par ailleurs que, contrairement à ce que soutient la société H.,
220. la commande ultérieure de 1.718 mètres du tissu litigieux, au demeurant
221. intervenue postérieurement à l'échéancier de livraison visé dans la
222. prétendue confirmation du 28 septembre 1998, ne constitue pas une
223. exécution partielle de la vente supposée de 100.000 mètres ;
224. Que le règlement de la facture correspondante ne permet pas davantage
225. d'en déduire que la société MG s'était obligée à acheter une quantité
226. supérieure du produit concerné ;
227. PAR CES MOTIFS,
228. Confirme le jugement entrepris en toutes ses dispositions,
229. Y ajoutant,
230. Condamne la société "H. H... GmbH & Co" aux dépens d'appel et à verser
231. à la SARL MG, 3.000 euros de frais irrépétibles,
232. Admet Maître P... au bénéfice de l'article 699 du nouveau Code de
233. procédure civile.
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Appendix 8b
1. Court of Appeals of Paris 10 September 2003
2. Société H. H... GmbH & Co. v. SARL MG...
3. Translation [*] by Melody Matthews [**]
4. [PARTICULARS OF THE CASE]
5. Court of Appeal of Paris. 5th Chamber, Section A. RG no. 2002/02304. Appeal
6. from a decision rendered on 13 September 2001 by the Court of Commerce of
7. Paris, 4th Chamber. RG no. 1999/75600. Date of final order: 11 June 2003.
8. Nature of the decision: Judgment. Decision: Affirmed.
9. APPELLANT. Société H. H... GmbH & Co. [Seller], represented by its legal
10. counsel having its principal office in [...], Stadtlohn, Germany, represented by
11. SCP. G-K.-G, solicitor, assisted by Master J-F, M., attorney at the bar of Paris.
12. RESPONDENT. SARL MG... [Buyer], represented by its legal counsel having
13. its principal office in [...], Paris, represented by Master P., solicitor, assisted by
14. Master J-P. C., attorney at the bar of Paris, Association C. and R.-C.
15. COMPOSITION OF THE COURT. During the pleadings: Mr. Picque, the
16. magistrate, has, in accordance with Article 786 of the new Code of Civil
17. Procedure, heard the pleadings of the attorneys who made no objection. During
18. the deliberation: Président: Mrs. Riffault-Silk, Conseillers: Mr. Faucher and Mr.
19. Picque. During the pleadings and entry of the ruling; Greffier (clerk): Mrs.
20. Klein.
21. PLEADINGS before a public audience on 30 June 2003. RULING pronounced
22. publicly by Mrs. Riffault-Silk, Président, who signed the transcript of the
23. judgment with Mrs. Klein, Greffier.
24. [POSITION OF THE PARTIES]
25. The German company, "H" [Seller], claims to have sold 100,000 linear meters of
26. material to the French company, "MG" [Buyer], who (it is claimed) took only
27. partial delivery. [Seller] has since 7 September 1999, brought [Buyer] before the
28. Court of Commerce of Paris seeking, in the last stage of claims made before the
29. judges of first instance, an order directing [Buyer] to:
30. Pay the price of up to 330,486 French francs [f], for the sale of material, the
31. delivery of which was refused (after deducting the quantities resold to other
32. clients in the meantime under less favorable financial conditions);
33. Take delivery of the remaining 28,990 meters, under "definitive" penalty of
34. 10,000 f  for each late day starting 15 days after "notification" of the decision;
35. Pay 242,315.30 f  in damages as reparation for the harm resulting from an
36. inferior resale price, as well as 20,000 f  legal costs and expenses.
37. [Buyer], whose principal defense is the nonexistence of a contract for sale within
38. the meaning of the CISG, has, in the final stages o f its claims before the Court,
39. counterclaimed asking for 50,000 fin  damages for "improper and reckless"
40. proceedings and 25,000 f  for legal expenses not included in the costs awarded.
41. In the alternative, it has requested cancellation of the contract due to total
42. liability of [Seller] and the ordering of [Seller] to pay to it 1,000,000 f  in
43. damages for failure to perform its contractual obligations.
44. In a contrary judgment of 13 September 2001, the Court rejected all these claims
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45. and directed [Seller] to pay 2,286.73 Euros in legal costs and expenses to
46. [Buyer].
47. Appealing on 22 January 2002, [Seller], in the final part of its written
48. notifications served on 21 May 2003, invites the court to draw all inferences "of
49. law and of fact" against [Buyer] for [Buyer]'s refusal during the pleadings to
50. produce the bills for purchases of material between September 1998 and June
51. 1999, in spite of the request for discovery that had been previously delivered to
52. [Buyer]. [Seller] claims, in effect that the price of material having seriously
53. fallen subsequent to the legal action, [Buyer] has "seemingly" found itself
54. another supplier at a better price in 5seeking to extricate itself from the order it
55. made with [Seller].
56. The [Seller] states that it is represented in France by Mr. L., its commercial
57. agent and that he, accompanied by the commercial director of the [Seller], had
58. visited [Buyer] on 9 September 1998 where he met Mr. I. The [Seller] claims
59. that during this meeting, a contract for sale was concluded for 100,000 meters of
60. lycra material at the price of 11.40 f  per meter, to be delivered between
61. November 1998 and February 1999, in lots of 25,000 meters each. The [Seller]
62. specifies having addressed on 28 September 1998, not an offer, but a
63. confirmation of this order from [Buyer], who did not contradict it and who did
64. not have to accept it within the meaning of Article 15 of the CISG, the meeting
65. of minds having previously occurred during the meeting o f 9 September 1998.
66. [Seller] points out that [Buyer] did not send for the quantities on the expected
67. dates, with the exception of one lot of 1,718 meters to deliver to a third
68. company, the subject of a bill issued on 15 March 1999 making express
69. reference to the sale of 98,772 meters remaining to be delivered. Invoking the
70. previous practices between the two partners according to which [Buyer] did not
71. formalize its orders in writing, these being taken by the commercial agent of
72. [Seller], who confirmed in writing the terms to the [Buyer], after transmitting the
73. order to his principal in Germany. The [Seller], deduces that at the moment of
74. the sale in question, the exchange of the parties' consent operated according to
75. the previous practices between the parties, which had never yet failed. However,
76. this time, the retransmission of the order of purchase by the commercial agent of
77. [Seller] was unnecessary due to the presence during the meeting, of the
78. commercial director of the [Seller], who had immediately registered the order in
79. the name of the [Seller]. [Seller] contests that the delivery of 1,718 meters of
80. material could be considered as a furnishing o f samples as the Court had
81. considered it, because the surplus of the corresponding bill was paid with neither
82. protest nor reserve.
83. [Seller] claims without foundation the supposed offense of the defect in delivery
84. to which [Buyer] objects in that, according to the [Seller], it is the [Buyer] who
85. did not perform his obligation to take possession by not sending for the lots on
86. the agreed upon dates.
87. [Seller] asks the Court to order [Buyer] to produce "the whole of the bills for
88. purchase of material for the period o f September 1998 to July 1999 and the
89. supplier accounts for the same period". Alternatively, [Seller] invites the Court
90. to draw all inferences of law and of fact. As for the surplus, [Seller] seeks a
91. reversal of the judgment, and renews its previous claims (though now in Euros)
92. formulated before the judges of first instance, asking for 3,000 Euros in legal
93. costs and expenses.
94. [Buyer], replies, in its plea of defense, served on 25 April 2003, the
95. "impromptu" visit of 9 September 1998, the occasion on which the commercial
96. director of [Seller] visited [Buyer]'s offices for the first time, had as its goal to
97. present to [Buyer] a new material, "crossed lycra", with the purpose o f proposing
2 2 2
98. an offer for 100,000 meters. [Buyer] formally denied having placed an order at
99. this time, but having on the contrary received on the following 28 September,
100. not a confirmation of order but a detailed proposition, written in the
101. German language, of an envisaged offer during the preceding meeting,
102. accompanied by a provisional schedule for delivery. [Buyer] specifies in
103. the first place, not having followed up on this proposition but, after contact
104. with the commercial agent, having ordered a mere sample in order to
105. succeed at its attempts to resist the color and cut of the product o f this new
106. technology derived from petroleum. [Buyer] alleges that the tests, having
107. not been conclusive and in the face of the absence of reaction from clients,
108. it definitively renounced the initial proposition. [Buyer] claims,
109. furthermore, that the request for the production o f documents, new to its
110. eyes, as grounds of appeal, is not in the interest of a solution to the
111. pending litigation.
112. [Buyer] asserts that:
113. He who claims the performance of an obligation must prove it in another
114. way than by documents produced by himself;
115. If there had been a sale, the international character of such would subject it
116. to the CISG of 11 April 1990, in which Article 18 states that the formation
117. of a contract necessitates the manifestation of acceptance of a proposed
118. offer;
119. In the present case, the offer had been materialized in the document of 28
120. September 1998, which did not respect the obligatory use of the French
121. language in accordance with the law of 4 August 1994;
122. In accordance with Article 18 of the CISG, silence or inaction cannot
123. bring about acceptance, whereas the defect in translation into French
124. permitted [Buyer] to believe that the matter concerned "the materialization
125. of the orally presented offer of 8 September". The German expression,
126. "Auffragsbestatigung", which could translate as "confirmation of order"
127. was not opposable as it was expressed in a language that [Buyer] did not
128. understand and did not constitute, an acceptance within the meaning of
129. Article 18(1) of the CISG.;
130. [Buyer] did not manifest expressly or implicitly acceptance o f an offer
131. since mere silence does not constitute acceptance of an offer for the
132. international sale of goods;
133. [Seller] did not fulfill its own obligation on the specified dates in the offer
134. of 28 September 1998, of delivery resulting from a sales contract that it
135. alleges.
136. In the alternative, if the existence of a sales contract is found to exist,
137. [Buyer] invokes the provisions of Article 1587 of the Civil Code on sale
138. by samples, applicable to the order of 1,718 meters of material and
139. maintains that the bill of 15 March 1999, drawn up only in the German
140. language, is insufficient to justify a more extensive obligation, its
141. regulation having legal value only for the executing party.
142. [Buyer] consequently asserts that:
143. A sale [by sample] is not complete where the buyer has not approved the
144. sample;
145. The "franco" sale took into account that the delivery is made by the seller
146. in the context of its obligation o f delivery in accordance with Article 1614
147. of 141. the Civil Code, in the way that, according to the analysis of the
148. [Buyer], it was not for [Buyer] to perform a supposed obligation of taking
149. possession, but for [Seller] to perform its obligation of delivery, if, as it
150. claims, there had been a perfected sale on 28 September 1998.
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151. [Buyer] seeks the affirmation of the judgment and asks for 3,000 Euros in
152. legal expenses not included in the awarded costs. In the alternative,
153. invoking the protection of Article 1587 of the Civil Code, [Buyer] asks the
154. Court to reject the claims of [Seller].
155. [RULING OF THE COURT]
156. Whereas in accordance with Article 1315 of the Civil Code, it is for
157. [Seller] to prove the obligation that it alleges was undertaken by [Buyer];
158. The [Seller] maintains that a contract for sale for 100,000 meters of
159. material had been verbally concluded between itself and the [Buyer],
160. which the latter formally contests;
161. In the context o f the burdens of proof in this litigation, the knowledge of
162. eventual purchases of material by [Buyer] from other suppliers would not
163. be of the nature of proving the sale alleged by one of the parties and
164. denied by the other;
165. As a consequence, [Seller]'s request to have production ordered from
166. [Buyer] of "the whole of the bills for purchase of material for the period of
167. September 1998 to July 1999 and the furnished accounts for the same
168. period" will not be granted, the production of these documents being of no
169. aid in the litigation.
170. Whereas the alleged sale concerns parties whose respective establishments
171. are located in two different countries and Germany and France are both
172. Contracting States of the CISG, which in terms of Article 4, governs
173. exclusively the formation of a sales contract and the rights and obligations
174. bom from such a contract between a buyer and seller, to the notable
175. exclusion of the validity of clauses in a contract and the effects that it can
176. have on the ownership of goods for sale;
177. Because the meeting of minds during the course o f the meeting on 8
178. September 1998 is formally contested by [Buyer], to establish the veracity
179. of that which [Seller] claims, [Seller] must produce the proof, in the form
180. of attestations of its commercial agent and director;
181. Taking into account the links joining these two witnesses to one o f the
182. parties to the action, the corresponding attestations are not of a character
183. sufficiently probative to establish the reality of an alleged exchange of
184. consent;
185. In the absence o f the demonstration incumbent on [Seller], there is no
186. proof of the reality of the sale alleged, which would have been verbally
187. concluded at the aforementioned meeting.
188. Whereas [Seller] invokes the practices and habits which were established
189. between the parties to show that the same process had been observed as
190. previously, consisting of sending a confirmation of order to [Buyer] after
191. it had verbally ordered the desired goods from the commercial agent of
192. [Seller] on the occasion o f his visits at the offices of [Buyer];
193. While Article 9(1) of the general provisions of the CISG, stipulates that
194. the parties are bound by the usages to which they consented and by the
195. habits they have established between them. Articles 14(1) and 18(1),
196. concerning particularly the formation of a contract, state that an offer must
197. be sufficiently precise and that the acceptance of the buyer must result in
198. behavior indicating acquiescence, his silence or inaction cannot equal
199. acceptance;
200. It is not contested that the material discussed on 8 September 1998 in the
201. offices of [Buyer] in Paris was of an entirely new technique and very
202. different from the previous materials purchased by the [Buyer] from the
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203. [Seller];
204. In these circumstances, [Seller] is not founded in invoking the previous
205. practices between the parties, since it appears that this had been elaborated
206. in the context of transactions concerning materials of classic and ancient
207. conception; whereas the discussion on 8 September 1998 concerned the
208. presentation of an entirely new material, which had never previously been
209. sold to [Buyer].
210. Whereas the surplus, that it is not contested that the "confirmation of
211. order" of 28 September 1998 addressed by the commercial agent of
212. [Seller] to [Buyer], was written exclusively in the German language, nor
213. that this was not sufficiently understood by the representatives of the
214. [Buyer];
215. It follows that moreover it has been proven that [Buyer] was unable to
216. understand that a confirmation of order had been sent, and in light of
217. [Buyer]'s ignorance of the German language, [Buyer] was justified in
218. claiming that the matter concerned details about an envisaged offer during
219. the course o f discussions of the preceding meeting;
220. Also, it is not contested that [Buyer] never expressly acquiesced to the
221. aforesaid offer and [Seller] does not present proof that [Buyer]'s behavior
222. could have been considered as acquiescing within the meaning of Article
223. 18(1) of the CISG.
224. Also, it is not contested that [Buyer] never expressly acquiesced to the
225. aforesaid offer and [Seller] does not present proof that [Buyer]'s behavior
226. could have been considered as acquiescing within the meaning of Article
227. 18(1) of the CISG
228.
229. Whereas otherwise, contrary to the contention o f [Seller], the subsequent
230. order of 1,718 meters of the material in question, which occurred after the
231. schedule of delivery in the supposed confirmation of 28 September 1998,
232. does not constitute a partial performance of a supposed sale of 100,000
233. meters. Payment of the corresponding bill does not permit the inference
234. that [Buyer] was obliged to buy a larger quantity of the product in
235. question.
236. FOR THESE REASONS,
237. The Court affirms all provisions of the judgment, and orders [Seller] to
238. pay costs of appeal and to pay to the [Buyer] 3,000 Euros in legal costs to
239. Master P... in accordance with Article 699 o f the new Code of Civil
240. Procedure.
241. FOOTNOTES
242. * For purposes of this translation. Plaintiff-Appellant of Germany is
243. referred to as [Seller]; Defendant-Respondent of France is referred to
244. as [Buyer]. European monetary amounts are indicated as Euros;
245. monetary amounts in the currency o f France (French francs) are
246. indicated as [f].
247. ** Melody Matthews, Research Assistant of the Institute of
248. International Commercial Law at the Pace University School of Law, is a
249. J.D. candidate at the Pace University School of Law.
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Appendix 9a
1. Cour d'appel de Grenoble 13 septembre 1995
2. M o n s ieu r C . . . , R ...
3. C o n tre
4. Société française de f... international F... F... " S.F.F. " (SA)
5. Chambre commerciale
6. M. BERAUDO président
7. n° 492
8. R. G. n° 93/4126
6. REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE AU NOM DU PEUPLE FRANÇAIS
7. E N T R E :
8. Monsieur C... R ..., demeurant (...) à VILLARD-BONNOT, exerçant sous
9. l'enseigne T... APPELANT d'un jugement rendu par le Tribunal de
10. Commerce de GRENOBLE en date du 9 juillet 1993 suivant déclaration
11. d'appel du 27 août 1993,
12. Représenté par Maître R ..., Avoué, Assisté de Maître RO ..., Avocat,
13. E T  :
14. La SOCIÉTÉ FRANÇAISE DE F... INTERNATIONAL F... F... " S.F.F. "
15. (SA), dont le siège est (...), à ASNIERES
16. INTIMEE
17. Représentée par la SCP PE... et PO ..., Avoués,
18. Assistée de Maître E ..., Avocat,
19. COMPOSITION DE LA COUR :
20. Lors du délibéré :
21. Monsieur BERAUDO Président,
22. Monsieur BAUMET Conseiller,
23. Monsieur FALLET Conseiller,
24. DEBATS :
25. A l'audience publique du 15 juin 1995, Monsieur BERAUDO, Président,
26. chargé du rapport, assisté de Madame COMBE, Greffier, a entendu les 
avoués
27. en leurs conclusions et les avocats en leurs plaidoiries, les parties ne s'y étant
28. pas opposées, conformément aux dispositions de l'article 945-1 du Nouveau
29. Code de Procédure Civile,
30. 11 en a rendu compte à la Cour dans son délibéré et l'arrêt a été rendu à
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31. l'audience publique du MERCREDI 13 SEPTEMBRE 1995.
32. La Cour statue sur l'appel inteijeté par Monsieur R... C... à rencontre d'un
33. jugement réputé contradictoire rendu le 9 juillet 1993 par le Tribunal de
34. Commerce &  GRENOBLE.
35. Monsieur C ..., établi à BRIGNOUD, importe sous l'enseigne T... des produits
36. alimentaires italiens pour les revendre en France. A cette fin, il est en
37. relations d'affaires avec la Société 1..., établie à MORETTA en Italie.
38. Selon Monsieur C ..., ces relations ont une ancienneté de vingt ans. La
39. SOCIÉTÉ FRANÇAISE DE F... INTERNATIONAL F... F... fait état, dans
40. ses conclusions " de relations commerciales occasionnelles de fournisseur à 
4L importateur ". Dans une télécopie du 17 novembre 1992, la Société I... écrit
42. ceci : "... nous devons croire que votre façon de travailler n'est pas celle du
43. bon commerçant, lequel vous étiez par le passé
44. En octobre 1992, alors qu'un de ses clients importants, la Société C A ...,
45. exploitant un magasin à ECHIROLLES, organise une quinzaine commerciale
46. italienne. Monsieur C... passe commande à la Société I .. . .
47. Par télécopie du 6 octobre, la Société I... lui fait connaître qu'elle n'a pas
48. l'autorisation d'exécuter la commande en raison de l'absence de Monsieur 1...
49. pour quelques jours.
50. Le 12 octobre 1992, Monsieur C... passe une commande complémentaire.
51. Le 13 octobre, la Société I... adresse à Monsieur C... une télécopie indiquant
52. qu'elle a cédé, quinze jours plus tôt, à une Société d'affacturage ses créances à
53. l'exportation et qu'elle ne peut rien lui vendre jusqu'à ce que son nom soit
54. agréé par la Société cessionnaire des factures.
55. Elle précise que le délai d'agrément devrait durer 10 ou 15 jours.
56. Le 20 octobre 1992, la Société CA... adresse à Monsieur C... la lettre
57. suivante.
58. " Nous sommes actuellement en pleine quinzaine italienne et nous
59. connaissons des problèmes de livraison. Nos commandes passées ne sont pas
60. honorées. Vous nous dites avoir des problèmes avec un de vos fournisseurs,
61. Monsieur I .. . , mais nous sommes au regret de vous faire savoir que ceci n'est
62. pas de notre ressort. Pour l'heure, nous manquons de produits italiens et nous
63. risquons d'être attaqués pour publicité mensongère. Nous vous bloquons la
64. somme de 30 000 F pour prqudice et nous pouvons vous garantir que vous ne
65. travaillerez plus avec CA... à date de ce jour. "
66. Monsieur C... suspend alors ses paiements à la Société 1.... La somme de 30
67. 000 F, retenue par la Société C A ..., sera débloquée huit mois plus tard.
68. Les 5 et 10 novembre 1992, la Société I... avise Monsieur C... que les factures
69. n° 3.168 du 10 septembre 1992, d'un montant de 29 123 995 lires et n° 3.365
70. du 28 septembre 1992 d'un montant de 17 365 F, à échéance du 12 novembre
71. 1992, sont cédées à la " BANC A C... ITALIANA ", à qui les paiements
72. devront être faits.
227
73. Monsieur C... en accuse réception dans les termes suivants :
74. " J'accuse réception de votre courrier du 10.11.1992. J'ai pris bonne note que
75. les deux factures que je vous dois ont bien été cédées à la Banque C...
76. Italienne. Par votre lettre du 15 octobre dernier, vous me suspendez les
77. livraisons sous prétexte que ma Société n'était pas garantie.
78. C'est pour ce motif que vous ne m'avez plus livré. J'en suis très surpris, j'ai
79. donc suspendu le règlement de ces deux factures. Je vous ferai passer durant
80. la semaine à venir les avoirs qui me restent dus par votre Société de même
81. que le manque à gagner causé suite à l'arrêt de vos livraisons. Nous avons
82. actuellement des problèmes avec le parmesan râpé, car il n'est pas porté, sur
83. l'emballage, sa composition. Une fois que j'aurai tout établi, je vous ferai
84. parvenir un règlement par chèque du montant qu'il vous restera dû. "Le 3
85. décembre 1992, la Société 1... accuse réception de la lettre du 25 novembre,
86. par la lettre suivante :
87. " Nous accusons réception de votre lettre du 25 novembre 1992. Nous vous
88. répétons que toutes nos créances sont cédées à la BANCA C... ITALIANA, à
89. laquelle nous envoyons cette lettre pour connaissance. Pour n'importe quel
90. renseignement et pour toutes vos exigences, compris les accords pour le solde
91. de nos factures, vous devez vous adresser à la " BANCA C... ITALIANA"
92. (...), et demander M. Vola."
93. Le 5 avril 1993, la Société IF ..., entreprise d'affacturage, charge la SOCIÉTÉ
94. F... DE F... du recouvrement des créances litigieuses. Celle-ci demande, le 27
95. avril à Monsieur C... le paiement de 29 123 995 lires et de 17 365,10 F.
96. Il est constant entre les parties que Monsieur C... a effectué, le 26 mai 1993,
97. un paiement de 16 000 F entre les mains de la SOCIÉTÉ F... DE F ....
98. Devant la Cour, Monsieur C... conclut à la réformation, demande 100 000 F, à
99. titre de dommages et intérêts à la SOCIÉTÉ F... DE F... et 3 000 F au titre de
100. l'article 700 du Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile.
101. Il fait valoir, en substance, que le compte entre les parties doit
102. s'établir comme suit :
103. " - Dû par C... : 2 factures des 10/09/1992 et 28/09/1992........................
104. 119 299,68
105. - règlement du 25 mai 1993, à déduire.................  60 000,00
106. - avoirs à déduire.........................................................14 312,76
107. - avoir à délivrer sur parmesan râpé, à déduire . . .  8 400,00
36 586,92 F
108. 11 indique que le préjudice causé par la brusque rupture des livraisons
109. justifie une indemnité de 36 586,92 F qui annule la créance de la
110. Société 1....
111. 11 demande, en outre, que la SOCIÉTÉ F... DE F... soit condamnée à
112. lui payer 100 000 F, au titre du prgudice commercial causé.
113. La SOCIÉTÉ F... DE F... (S.F.F.) conclut à la confirmation et
114. demande 3 000 F, au titre de l'article 700 du Nouveau Code de
2 2 8
115. Procédure Civile.
116. Sur la rupture des relations commerciales, elle conclut ainsi qu'il suit :
117. " Monsieur C... tente d'invoquer une prétendue rupture abusive des
118. relations commerciales entre la Société 1... et lui-même pour opposer
119. une exception d'inexécution au factor la Société S.F.F.
120. La Cour constatera que la rupture des relations commerciales 1... / C...
121. est intervenue postérieurement aux factures litigieuses, par suite de
122. l'impossibilité pour la Société 1... d'accepter les commandes passées
123. par Monsieur C ..., dans l'attente de la réception de l'agrément de
124. Monsieur C... par la SOCIÉTÉ DE F... IF ....
125. L'exception d'inexécution ne saurait dès lors être accueillie pour trois
126. motifs, d'une part. Monsieur C... ne peut justifier d'une relation
127. contractuelle envers la Société 1..., il s'agissait en réalité uniquement
128. de relations commerciales occasionnelles de fournisseur à
129. importateur, d'autre part et en toutes hypothèses, Monsieur C... ne
130. pourrait opposer au factor que des exceptions relatives à la créance
131. dontlepaiementestréclamé, ce qui n'est pas le cas en l'espèce, enfin,
132. il convient de rappeler que le factor n'est subrogé que dans les droits
133. et actions de son adhérent, mais en aucun cas dans ses obligations. "
134. Sur les avoirs, elle indique que " les avoirs des 13 juillet 1992 et 11
135. août 1992 correspondent à des avoirs antérieurs inclus dans les
136. factures antérieures comme c'est l'usage ". Sur la non conformité de la
137. livraison de parmesan, elle fait valoir l'évolution des griefs se
138. rapportant d'abord à l'absence de mention relative à la composition
139. puis à la date.
140. Dans des conclusions en réponse du 2 mai 1995, la S.F.F. ajoute que
141. " Monsieur C... ne rapporte pas la preuve que le troisième avoir du 22
142. septembre 1992 serait relatif aux factures litigieuses précitées ".
143. Lors de l'audience de plaidoirie du 15 juin 1995, la Cour a fait
144. observer aux parties que le contrat de vente semblait être régi par la
145. Convention de VIENNE du 11 avril 1980 et, conformément aux
146. articles 13, 442 et 444 du Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile, les a
147. invitées à faire connaître leur position sur l'applicabilité de ce texte et
148. les effets de ses dispositions sur les rapports contractuels.
149. Elle a invité également les parties à faire connaître leur position sur le
150. contenu de la Convention d'OTTAWA du 28 mai 1988 relative à
151. l'affacturage international, entrée en vigueur pour la FRANCE et
152. l'ITALIE, le lerm ai 1995.
153. Sur la Convention de VIENNE, Monsieur C... a écrit ceci :
154. " Les principes de responsabilité du vendeur édictés par la
155. Convention de VIENNE me paraissent identiques à ceux de notre
156. droit interne et engager, en conséquence, la responsabilité de la
157. Société italienne I... en ce qui concerne la non conformité des
158. marchandises livrées et la rupture brutale de relations commerciales. "
159. Sur l'opération d'affacturage, il a écrit ceci :
160. " En ce qui concerne le contrat d'affacturage liant 1... à S.F.F., sa
161. validité est liée aux termes d'un contrat qui, me semble-t-il, n'a pas
162. été produit aux débats et à l'éventuelle déclaration prévue à l'article
163. 18 &  la Convention.
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164. Enfin, les précisions édictées à l'article 8 de la Convention, relatives
165. aux créances cédées au cessionnaire, ne me paraissent pas avoir été
166. satisfaites.
167. L'article 9 permet d'opposer au cessionnaire tous les moyens
168. opposables au créancier.
169. La S.F.F. a écrit ceci :
170. " Les parties et notamment Monsieur C... ont fait le choix depuis le
171. début de la procédure de soumettre leur rapport au seul droit français.
172. Si malgré ce choix, il devait être fait application de la Convention de
173. Vienne, l'argumentation de Monsieur C... devrait alors être déclarée
174. irrecevable et mal fondée.
175. Les moyens invoqués par Monsieur C... relèvent du problème de la
176. conformité des marchandises.
177. La Convention dispose que les marchandises doivent être livrées
178. conformes par le vendeur et que leur conformité s'apprécie dans le
179. délai de deux ans à compter de leur livraison.
180. Ce délai est un délai préfïx.
181. En l'espèce. Monsieur C... n'a invoqué le problème de la conformité
182. des marchandises livrées que devant la Cour d'Appel donc plus de
183. deux ans après leur livraison et en tout cas en dehors du délai
184. raisonnable prévu par la Convention de VIENNE (Art. 39), puisque la
185. " non conformité " des marchandises lui est apparue dès leur livraison
186. en 1992 (pièces adverses n° 8 et 6).
187. Ses moyens de défense et demandes reconventionnelles seront donc
188. déclarés irrecevables et mal fondés.
189. Concernant les dispositions de la Convention d'OTTAWA, celles-ci
190. ont été parfaitement respectées comme en témoignent les stipulations
191. du contrat liant la SOCIÉTÉ F... DE F... à la Société I... et les factures
192. précédemment communiquées (factures et pièces adverses 11, 12). "
193. SUR CE, LA COUR:
194. Attendu que le présent litige porte, d'une paît, sur des questions
195. relatives à une vente de marchandises dont la conformité est critiquée
196. par l'acheteur, d'autre part, à une brusque rupture de rapports
197. contractuels entre vendeur et acheteur, en troisième lieu, aux relations
198. entre une entreprise d'affacturage, cessionnaire successif d'une autre
199. entreprise d'affacturage, et le débiteur cédé, en quatrième lieu, à la
200. responsabilité de la S.F.F. dans un prqudice commercial dont
201. Monsieur C... serait victime ;
202. Que, pour préserver la progression logique du présent arrêt, il y a lieu
203. de statuer sur ces questions dans l'ordre suivant :
204. 1. - Droit applicable à l'opération d'affacturage dans les relations entre
205. le cessionnaire successif, la S.F.F., et le débiteur cédé :
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206. 2. - Eventuelle créance de Monsieur C... à rencontre de la Société 1...
207. , pour défaut de conformité des marchandises livrées ;
208. 3. - Eventuelle créance de Monsieur C... pour brusque rupture des
209. relations commerciales par la Société I... ;
210. 4. - Droit de Monsieur C... d'opposer ces créances à la S.F.F.,
211. cessionnaire successif ;
212. 5. - Eventuelle responsabilité de la Société S.F.F. envers Monsieur
213. C... pour prqudice commercial ;
214. Attendu, sur le droit applicable à l'affacturage, que la Société I... et la
215. SOCIÉTÉ INTERNATIONALE F... ITALIA (IF...) ont conclu le 24
216. avril 1992 (la date du 24 avril 1990 figurant sur la traduction est une
217. erreur matérielle évidente) un contrat ayant notamment pour objet le
218. recouvrement à l'étranger, par des correspondants d'IF..., des
219. créances de la Société I... ;
220. Qu'il est donc un contrat international par son objet ;
221. Qu'il l'est, en tout cas, devenu par sa mise en oeuvre à l'égard de
222. Monsieur C ..., établi en FRANCE ;
223. Que ce contrat ne comporte pas de clause expresse stipulant la loi
224. applicable choisie ;
225. Que, cependant, il comporte des références à plusieurs articles du
226. Code Civil italien et que les deux parties sont établies en ITALIE ;
227. Que, par l'effet de l'article 4, point 2 de la Convention de ROME du
228. 19 juin 1980 sur la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles, la loi
229. italienne est applicable comme étant la loi de l'Etat où est établi le
230. débiteur de la prestation caractéristique, en l'espèce, l'entreprise
231. d'affacturage ;
232. Qu'en application de l'article 13, relatif à la subrogation, de la
233. Convention de ROME, la loi applicable à l'obligation du tiers, la
234. S.F.F., qui a désintéressé le créancier, la Société I ..., " détermine si
235. celui-ci peut exercer en tout ou en partie les droits détenus par le
236. créancier contre le débiteur selon la loi régissant leurs relations ",
237. qu'il s'agit de la loi italienne régissant le contrat d'affacturage ;
238. Mais que " la loi de la créance, c'est-à-dire la loi régissant les
239. relations entre le créancier et le débiteur " régit " les droits du solvens
240. contre le débiteur, de la même façon que la loi de la créance cédée
241. régit les droits du cessionnaire contre le débiteur ", si le transfert des
242. créances dans le cadre du contrat d'affacturage s'était réalisé par une
243. cession plutôt que par la subrogation (cf. Paul LAGARDE, le
244. nouveau droit international privé des contrats après l'entrée en
245. vigueur de la Convention de ROME du 19 juin 1980, n° 60, Rev. crit.
246. droit international privé 1991 p. 281) ;
247. Que le droit de la créance cédée est constitué par la Convention de
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248. VIENNE relative à la vente internationale de marchandises ainsi qu'il
249. sera expliqué ci-après ; Que cet instrument est lacunaire quant à la
250. cession du prix par le créancier ;
251. Qu'en l'absence de principes généraux applicables à cette question
252. non envisagée par la Convention, il y a lieu de rechercher, au travers
253. des règles de conflit de lois applicables à la vente internationale de
254. marchandises, contenues dans la Convention de LA HAYE du 15 juin
255. 1955, le droit qui régit les contrats de vente conclus entre Monsieur
256. C... et la Société 1... ;
257. Que, ainsi qu'il sera expliqué ci-après, ce droit est le droit italien
258. comme celui de l'État où est établi le vendeur ;
259. Que, cependant, aucune des parties au présent litige ne fait référence
260. au droit italien ;
261. Qu'il pourrait être fait application, à titre subsidiaire, du droit français
262. ;
263. Mais que, sur l'invitation de la Cour, tant Monsieur C... que la S.F.F.
264. ont accepté d'examiner la valeur de leurs moyens au regard de la
265. Convention d'Unidroit sur l'affacturage international ;
266. Et que le contrat d'affacturage entre dans le champ d'application
267. matériel de la Convention (article 1er) de la Convention ;
268. Qu'en effet, le contrat conclu entre la Société I... et IF... prévoit
269. l'encaissement de créances et le paiement anticipé du fournisseur
270. (article 6 du contrat) ;
271. Et que les créances qui donnent lieu au présent litige entrent
272. également dans le champ d'application géographique de la
273. Convention comme liant un fournisseur et un débiteur établis dans 
des
274. États différents et que " ces États ainsi que l'État où le cessionnaire a
275. son établissement sont des États contractants " (article 2, point 1, a,
276. de la Convention) ;
277. Attendu que l'absence d'objection de la part de la Société S.F.F. et de
278. Monsieur C... à l'application de la Convention d'Unidroit et leur
279. argumentation expresse par rapport à ce texte, dans leurs notes en
280. délibérés des 29 juin et 20 juillet 1995, conduisent la Cour à constater
281. leur accord pour que la Convention, aujourd'hui en vigueur, soit
282. appliquée au présent litige, de façon anticipée, nonobstant les
283. dispositions de son article 21;
284. Attendu, sur une éventuelle créance de Monsieur C... pour défaut de
285. conformité des marchandises livrées, que le jugement de cette
286. question impose la détermination préalable du droit applicable à la
287. vente ;
288. Que la Société S.F.F. fait valoir " que les parties et notamment
289. Monsieur C... ont fait le choix depuis le début de la procédure de
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290. soumettre leur rapport au seul droit français " ;
291. Mais que, pour les contrats de vente internationale de marchandises
292. conclus à partir du 1er janvier 1988, le droit français est formulé par
293. la Convention de VIENNE du 10 avril 1980, dès lors que les
294. conditions d'applicabilité de cette Convention sont réunies ;
295. Que la vente conclue entre Monsieur C... entre dans le champ
296. matériel de cet instrument ;
297. Que le vendeur et l'acheteur sont établis dans des États différents ;
298. Que ces États, la FRANCE et l'ITALIE, sont tous deux parties à la
299. Convention antérieurement à la date de conclusion de la vente ;
300. Que la Convention est donc applicable aux ventes conclues entre
301. Monsieur C... et Monsieur I... ;
302. Qu'au surplus, aucun document ni comportement de Monsieur C... ne
303. permet de déduire, contrairement à ce que fait valoir la S.F.F., d'une
304. part, qu'il aurait usé de la possibilité offerte par l'article 6 de la
305. Convention de VIENNE pour y déroger et, d'autre part, que serait
306. applicable, contrairement à la règle de conflit de lois, à défaut de
307. choix de loi, contenue dans la Convention de LA HAYE du 15 juin
308. 1955, sur la loi applicable aux ventes internationales d'objets
309. mobiliers corporels, la loi du pays de l'acheteur compétente pour régir
310. les seules ventes internes ;
311. Attendu, sur l'absence de conformité des marchandises livrées, que le
312. 20 juillet 1992, Monsieur C... a télécopié à la Société I... pour lui faire
313. connaître que les fromages provolone livrés étaient moisis et avaient
314. un poids de 30 kg au lieu des 20 kg commandés ;
315. Que, par télécopie du même jour, la Société I... l'a invité à rapporter
316. la marchandise litigieuse lors d'un de ses prochains passages en
317. ITALIE et s'est engagée à lui constituer un avoir ;
318. Que, par télécopie du 13 juillet 1992, la Société 1... avait consenti un
319. avoir de 693 600 lires correspondant à six cartons de Ricotta qui
320. avaient été retournés ;
321. Que le montant total de ces avoirs en francs français, 14 312,76 F,
322. consentis par la Société I ..., selon Monsieur C ..., n'est pas critiqué
323. par la Société S.F.F. ;
324. Que cette dernière indique, d'une part, qu'ils " correspondent à des
325. avoirs inclus dans des factures antérieures, comme c'est l'usage " ;
326. Mais qu'elle ne produit aucune facture antérieure établissant une telle
327. déduction ;
328. Qu'elle indique, d'autre part, que " ces avoirs sont inopposables à la
329. concluante prise en sa qualité de factor " ;
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330. Mais que de telles créances, au surplus, certaines liquides et
331. exigibles, par accord des parties, avant la notification de la cession,
332. donnent lieu à compensation par application de l'article 9.2 de la
333. Convention d'OTTAWA ;
334. Que, s'agissant de la créance de 8 400 F alléguée par Monsieur C...
335. sur du parmesan râpé, non étiqueté conformément à la législation
336. française sur la composition et la date de péremption des produits
337. alimentaires, il résulte d'un échange de correspondances intervenu le
338. 25 novembre 1992 entre Monsieur C... et la Société 1... que cette
339. dernière oppose un accord des parties pour que le parmesan râpé soit
340. emballé dans des " sachets anonymes " ;
341. Mais qu'en présence de la réclamation de Monsieur C... cet accord
342. n'est pas établi ;
343. Qu'il convient donc de rechercher la volonté des contractants à partir
344. des indications qu'ils ont pu fournir ;
345. Qu'il est incontestable, en raison des relations suivies entre les parties
346. depuis au moins plusieurs mois, que la Société I... savait que les
347. sachets de parmesan commandés par Monsieur C... devaient être
348. commercialisés en France ;
349. Que cette connaissance l'obligeait, ainsi que le stipule l'article 8 point
350. 1 de la Convention de VIENNE, à interpréter la commande comme
351. portant sur des marchandises devant satisfaire aux règles de
352. commercialisation sur le marché français ;
353. Qu'en omettant de placer sur les sachets les mentions relatives à la
354. composition et à la date de péremption, la Société I... a livré une
355. marchandise non conforme au sens de l'article 35 de la Convention de
356. VIENNE qui vise spécialement l'emballage ;
357. Que la réclamation écrite de Monsieur C... est intervenue dans le
358. mois suivant la livraison ;
359. Qu'elle a donc été faite dans un délai raisonnable au sens de l'article
360. 39 de la Convention de VIENNE ;
361. Qu'en outre, le délai préfïx de deux ans mentionné au 2ème alinéa de
362. cet article ne vise pas une action en justice ;
363. Attendu, sur le montant de la créance de 8 400,00 F, que la Société
364. S.F.F. n'en critique pas le mode de calcul, ni le montant ;
365. Qu'au surplus, celui-ci résulte des mentions relatives au prix figurant
366. sur les factures de la Société I... des 10 et 28 septembre 1992 ;
367. Qu'il s'ensuit que Monsieur C... est créancier de la Société I... des
368. sommes de 14 312,16 F et de 8 400 F;
369. Attendu, sur une éventuelle créance de Monsieur C... pour brusque
370. rupture des relations commerciales par la Société I ..., qu'il résulte de
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371. l'article 9 de la Convention de Vienne que les parties sont liées par les
372. habitudes qui se sont établies entre elles ;
373. Qu'il s'ensuit que la Société 1... qui avait honoré les commandes de
374. Monsieur C... pendant plusieurs mois, depuis juillet 1992, au moins,
375. sans exiger que sa solvabilité soit établie, ne pouvait pas refuser de le
376. livrer, en octobre 1992, au motif qu'il n'était pas agréé par une
377. entreprise d'affacturage ;
378. Que si, comme cela lui est loisible, la Société I... décidait de confier
379. le recouvrement de ses factures à l'étranger à une entreprise
380. d'affacturage, elle devait adopter un comportement transitoire non
381. susceptible de nuire à ses clients ;
382. Que, par exemple, elle pouvait convenir avec IFI... de ne commencer
383. les cessions qu'après l'agrément de ses clients, sans que les relations
384. commerciales soient suspendues ;
385. Attendu, sur le pr^udice de Monsieur C ..., que la retenue d'une
386. somme de 30 000 F pendant huit mois par la Société CA... ainsi que
387. la rupture des relations commerciales avec ce client sont établies par
388. une lettre de la Société C A ..., reproduite plus haut ;
389. Que Monsieur C... a fait une exacte appréciation de son pr^udice en
390. le chiffrant à 36 586,92 F, solde de la créance cédée par la Société 1...
391. ;
392. Attendu, sur le droit de Monsieur C... d'opposer les créances de 14
393. 312,16 F, de 8 400 F et de 36 586,92 F à la S.F.F., Société
394. d'affacturage successive ;
395. Attendu que la créance de 8 400 F se rapporte directement à un
396. contrat dont le prix est réclamé par la S.F.F. ;
397. Qu'aux termes de l'article 9, point 1 de la convention d'Unidroit, " le
398. débiteur peut invoquer contre le cessionnaire tous les moyens de
399. défense dérivant du contrat qu'il aurait pu opposer si la demande avait
400. été faite par le fournisseur " ;
401. Que cette créance née d'un défaut de conformité des marchandises
402. livrées en exécution du contrat cédé peut être opposée à la S.F.F. ;
403. Attendu que la créance de 14 312,76 F correspond à des avoirs
404. consentis par la Société I... - Dans le cadre d'autres contrats que ceux
405. dont le paiement est réclamé à Monsieur CAIATO - certains, liquides
406. et exigibles, par convention des parties, avant la date de cession des
407. contrats objets du présent litige ;
408. Que l'article 9, point 2 de la convention, même interprété
409. restrictivement, autorise la compensation ;
410. Attendu, sur la possibilité pour Monsieur C... de compenser la
411. créance de 36 586,92 F, pour brusque rupture des relations
412. commerciales par la Société 1..., avec la créance de la S.F.F. détenue
413. du fait de la cession d'un autre contrat, que le droit français de
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414. l'affacturage ne permet une telle compensation d'une créance, non
415. liquide, ni exigible au moment du paiement avec subrogation ou de la
416. cession de créance qu'en raison de sa connexité avec les obligations
417. nées du contrat;
418. Mais que le terme de compensation employé dans l'article 9 point 2
419. de la Convention d'Unidroit recouvre des situations plus larges ainsi
420. que cela résulte des termes qui l'accompagnent (" tout droit à
421. compensation relatif à des droits ou actions existant contre le
422. fournisseur en faveur duquel la créance est née" ) et des négociations
423. qui établissent clairement que le paragraphe 2 de l'article 9 vise des
424. droits nés d'opérations indépendantes du contrat de base, objet de la
425. cession à l'entreprise d'affacturage (cf Aces de la conférence p. 291 et
426. s.) ;
427. Que le texte visant un droit à compensation n'exige pas qu'au moment
428. de la notification de la cession les conditions de la compensation
429. soient toutes réalisées ;
430. Qu'il suffit que les droits et actions de nature à donner naissance à un
431. droit à compensation soient nés et aient été invoqués antérieurement à
432. la cession ;
433. Que telle est la situation de Monsieur C... qui a opposé à la Société
434. I . . .  le préjudice que lui causait le défaut de livraison dès le 14 octobre
435. 1992 en précisant qu'il suspendait ses paiements ;
436. Que les notifications de cession de créances n'ont été faites par la
437. Société I... qu'en novembre 1992 ;
438. Que Monsieur C... est donc fondé à compenser la créance de 36
439. 586,92 F de dommages et intérêts pour brusque rupture ;
440. Attendu sur la demande de 100 000 F de dommages et intérêts formée
441. par Monsieur C... contre la S.F.F. pour pr^udice commercial, que le
442. fondement juridique de l'action n'est pas précisé ;
443. Qu'en l'absence de liens contractuels entre Monsieur C... et la Société
444. IF... ou la S.F.F., ayant droit de la première, il y a lieu de déduire que
445. l'action vise à la réparation de la faute délictuelle commise par
446. l'entreprise d'affacturage en obligeant son client, la Société I .. . , à
447. suspendre ses relations commerciales avec Monsieur C ..., à défaut
448. d'agrément et pendant le temps nécessaire à son agrément ;
449. Que ce délit commis en ITALIE est régi par la loi italienne ;
450. Que les parties ne se sont pas expliquées sur les dispositions du droit
451. italien applicables à ce type de comportement ;
452. Qu'il serait possible de les inviter à le faire ;
453. Mais que la Cour considère que le préjudice de Monsieur C... a été
454. convenablement réparé par les dommages et intérêts de nature
455. contractuelle précédemment alloués à la charge de la Société 1... et
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456. opposables à la S.F.F. ;
457. Que la recherche du contenu du droit applicable à l'action de
458. Monsieur C... contre la S.F.F. est donc sans objet ;
459. Que Monsieur C ..., rempli de ses droits à dommages et intérêts, doit
460. être débouté de sa demande de dommages et intérêts ;
461. Attendu, sur la demande de 3 000 F au titre de l'article 700 du
462. Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile formée par Monsieur C ..., qu'il y
463. a lieu d'y faire droit ;
464. PAR CES MOTIFS :
465. LA COUR :
466. Statuant publiquement et par arrêt contradictoire,
467. Après en avoir délibéré conformément à la loi,
468. INFIRME le jugement déféré;
469. DEBOUTE la SOCIETE FRANÇAISE DE F... INTERNATIONAL
470. F... F... de l'ensemble de ses demandes ;
471. LA CONDAMNE à payer à Monsieur C... 3 000 F au titre de l'article
472. 700 du Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile ;
473. LA CONDAMNE aux dépens dont distraction au profit de Madame
474. le Président RAMILLON, Avoué, conformément à l'article 699 du
475. Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile ;
476. PRONONCE publiquement par Monsieur le Président BERAUDO,
477. qui a signé avec Madame COMBE, Greffier.
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Appendix 9b
1. Cour d'appel Grenoble 13 September 1995
2. Caiato v. Limited Company S.F.F.
5. Commercial Chamber
6. Court of Appeals of Grenoble
7. Mr. Beraudo, Esq., presiding
8. No. 492
9. R.G. no. 93/4126
10. FRENCH REPUBLIC
11. In the name of the French People
12. Ruling of Wednesday, 13 September 1995
13. BETWEEN: Mr. Caiato the [buyer], domiciled at Gare de Brignoud in
14. Villard-Bonnot
15. (38190) [France], working under the name Tomatopasta. Appellant o f a
16. judgment rendered by the Commercial Tribunal of Grenoble on 9 July 1993,
17. following an appeal raised on 27 August 1993, represented by M. Ramillon,
18. Esq., attomey-at-law and assisted by Mr. Rossetti, Esq., attorney-at-law;
19. AND the French Factoring Company International Factor France "S.F.F."
20. (Limited Company), the Headquarters of which are in Tour d'Asnières, 4
21. Avenue Laurent Cely, Porte 3, in AsniÈres (92608) Cédex, summoned
22. represented by SCP Perret and Pougnand, attorneys-at-law, assisted by M.
23. Eydoux, Esq., attomey-at-law;
24. COMPOSITION OF THE COURT. During the deliberation: M. Beraudo
25. M. Baumet M. Fallet DEBATES: At the
26. public audience of 15 June 1995, M. Beraudo, responsible for the
27. report, assisted by Mme. Combe, clerk, heard the statement of the issues to be
28. decided and the pleadings of the attorneys; the parties not having objected to
29. such an audience, in accordance with the provisions of Article 945-1 of the
30. New Code of Civil Procedure; An account of the case was given to the court
31. by M. Beraudo in his deliberations, and the ruling was given in public on
32. Wednesday, 13 September 1995. The court gave a verdict on the appeal
33. raised by the [buyer] with regards to the judgment which had been rendered
34. on 9 July 1993 by the Commercial Tribunal of Grenoble, and for which
35. appeal is allowed.
36. [...]
37. [Details of the case]
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38. The [buyer], domiciled in Brignoud (Isère), imports Italian food products
39. under the name Tomatopasta, for resale in France. To this end, he has
40. business dealings with the Invernizzi Company the [seller], established in
41. Moretta, Italy.
42. According to the [buyer], this business relationship dates back twenty years.
43. The Limited French Factoring Company International Factor France reports,
44. in its submissions, "occasional commercial relations between tradesman and
45. importer." In a facsimile of 17 November 1992, the [seller] wrote the
46. following: "... we must conclude that your way of working is not that of the
47. good tradesman, which you were in the past."
48. In October 1992, while the Carrefour Company, an important client of the
49. buyer and which has a store in Echirolles, was organizing a fifteen-day Italian
50. promotion, the [buyer] sent his order to the [seller].
51. By facsimile on 6 October 1992, the [seller] told the [buyer] that it did not
52. have authorization to fulfill the order, because o f the absence of [its principal]
53. Mr. Invernizzi for a few days. On 12 October 1992, the [buyer] sent a
54. supplementary order.
55. On 13 October 1992, the [seller] addressed a facsimile to the [buyer]
56. indicating that it had sold its export receivables to a factoring company fifteen
57. days earlier, and that it could not sell him anything until the company to
58. which the invoices had been assigned, accepted him as debtor. It further
59. specified that the period for such acceptance should take between ten to
60. fifteen days.
61. On 20 October 1992, the Carrefour company sent the following letter to the
62. [buyer].
63. "We are presently in the middle of our 15 day Italian promotion and we are
64. having delivery problems.
65. "The orders we have sent have not been delivered. You tell us that you have
66. been having problems with one of your suppliers, the [seller], but we regret to
67. inform you that this is not our responsibility. At present, we are missing
68. Italian products and there is a risk that we will be pursued for false
69. advertisement.
70. "We are withholding from you the sum of 3 0 ,0 0 0 /for damages and we can
71. guaranty that henceforth you will no longer be working with Carrefour."
72. The [buyer] then suspended his payments to the [seller]. The sum of 3 0 ,0 0 0 /
73. [French francs], which had been withheld by the Carrefour company, was
74. released eight months later.
75. On 5 and 10 November 1992, the [seller] warned the [buyer] that the invoice
76. of 10 September 1992, numbered 3168, for the amount of 29,123,995 77Y
77. [Italian Lira] and the invoice numbered 3365 of 28 September 1992, for the
78. amount of 17 ,365 / both to be paid by 12 November 1992, had been assigned
79. to "Banca Commerciale Italiana," to which the payments would have to be
80. made. The [buyer] acknowledged receipt of the letter, in the following terms:
81. "I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 10 November 1992.
82. "I have taken good note that the two invoices that 1 owe you were assigned to
83. the Banca Commerciale Italiana.
84. "By your letter of last 15 October, you suspended your deliveries to me, under
85. the pretext that my company was not guarantied. It is for this reason that you
86. have ceased making deliveries to me. I was very surprised by this; I thus
87. suspended the payment of these two invoices.
88. "In the course of next week I will send you an overview of the claims still
89. owed to me by your company as well as the loss of profit caused by your
90. discontinuance of deliveries. We are having problems with the grated
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91. Parmesan at this time, since its composition is not marked on the packaging.
92. "Once I have established everything, I will send you a payment by check for
93. the amount still owed to you."
94. On 3 December 1992, the [seller] acknowledged the receipt o f the letter of 25
95. November, with the following letter:
96. "We acknowledge the receipt o f your letter of 25 November 1992. We
97. repeat that all our receivables have been assigned to the Banca
98. Commerciale Italiana, to which we are sending your letter for
99. acknowledgment.
100. "For any information and all demands, including the agreements for the
101. settlement of our invoices, you must address yourself to the "Banca
102. Commerciale Italiana" via Torino no. 38/a Saluzzo, tel. (9175) 45501 fax
103. 45952, and ask for Mr. Vola."
104. On 5 April 1993, the Ifitalia company, a factoring company, appointed the
105. French factoring company to collect the litigious receivables. On 21 April, the
106. latter demanded, the payment of 29,123, 995 liras and 17,365/from  the
107. [buyer]. It is acknowledged by both parties that the [buyer] made a payment
108. of 16,000/ t o  the French factoring company on 26 May 1993.
109. [...]
110. The [buyer] concludes before the court, that the judgment should be 
reviewed,
111. and demands 100 ,000/damages from the French factoring company, and
112. 3,000/ i n  accordance with Article 100 of the New Code of Civil Procedure.
113. He states, essentially, that the balance of account between the parties should
114. be established in the following manner:
115. "Due from the [buyer] payment of 2 invoices of 10 119,299.68
Payment of 25 May 1993, to be 
deducted
Claims to be deducted 14,312.16
Claims for the delivery of grated 
parmesan, to be deducted 8,400.00
36,586.92
116. He indicates that the loss caused by the abrupt cessation o f the deliveries
117. justifies an indemnity of 36,586.92 f  that cancels out the claim of the [seller].
118. He asks, moreover, that the French factoring company be ordered to pay him
119. 100,000 f̂  for the commercial loss caused.
120. [...]
121. The French factoring company (Société Française Factoring, SFF) concludes
122. that the judgment should be confirmed and demands 3,000 f̂  in accordance
123. with Article 100 of the New Code of Civil procedure.
124. On the break-up of the commercial relations, it thus submits the following:
116. "The [buyer] attempts to invoke an alleged abusive discontinuance o f the
117. commercial relations between the [seller] and himself) to raise the defense of
118. non-performance against the factor of the SFF company.
119. "The court will notice that the discontinuance of the commercial relations
120. between [buyer and seller] occurred subsequently to the litigious invoices,
121. following an impossibility for the [seller] to accept the orders sent by the
122. [buyer], while awaiting the receipt of the [buyer] as debtor by the Ifitalia
123. Factoring Company.
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124. "The defense of non-performance should thus not be accepted for three
125. reasons, firstly, the [buyer] could not substantiate a contractual relationship
126. with the [seller];
127. given that, in fact, we were dealing instead uniquely with occasional
128. commercial relations between supplier and importer; and secondly, and in all
129. cases, the [buyer] could only raise against the factor defenses with respect to
130. the claim of which payment is demanded, which is not the event in this case;
131. finally, it can be noted that the factor is subrogated only in the rights and
132. actions of its adherent, but in no way in his obligations."
133. As to the claims, it indicates that "the claims of 13 July 1992 and 11 August
134. 1992 correspond to anterior claims included in earlier invoices as commonly
135. done." Regarding the non-conformity o f the delivery of Parmesan, it
136. highlights the evolution of the grievances regarding first the lack of marking
137. on the packaging as to the composition of the goods and then the marking of
138. the [expiry] date. In the conclusions in response o f 2 May 1995, the SFF adds
139. that "the [buyer] is not able to show that the third claim of 22 September 1992
140. would be relevant to the cited litigious invoices."
141. [...]
142. During the pleadings of 15 June 1995, the Court pointed out to the parties that
143. the sales contract seemed to be governed by the Vienna Convention of 11
144. April 1980 and, in accordance with Articles 13, 442 and 444 of the New Code
145. of Civil Procedure, invited them to make known what their position was with
146. regard to the applicability of this text and the effects of the provisions on
147. contractual relations.
148. The Court also invited the parties to make known their position on the content
149. of the Ottawa Convention on International Factoring, of 28 May 1988, which
150. had entered into force for France and Italy on 1 May 1995.
151. Regarding the Vienna Convention, the [buyer] wrote:
152. "The principles of responsibility of the seller enacted by the Vienna
153. Convention seem to me to be i&ntical to those of our internal law and
154. consequently engage the responsibility o f the [seller] concerning the non-
155. conformity of the goods delivered and the brutal discontinuance of
156. commercial relations."
157. Regarding the factoring operation, the [buyer] wrote:
158. "With regards to the factoring contract linking the [seller] to SFF, its validity
159. is linked to the wording of a contract, that it seems to me, was not produced in
160. the course of the hearing, and to the possible declaration anticipated by 
Article
161. 18 of the Convention.
162. "Finally, the provisions laid down by Article 8 of the Convention, relating to
163. assigned receivables, do not seem to have been satisfied.
164. "Article 9 allows all of the objections which may be asserted against the
165. creditor to be asserted against the assignee."
166. [...]
167. The SFF wrote the fbllowing:
168. "From the beginning of the procedure, the parties and notably the [buyer]
169. chose to subject their case only to French law.
170. "If) notwithstanding this choice, the Vienna Convention has to be applied, the
171. [buyer's] argument should then be declared inadmissible and incorrectly
172. founded.
173. "The arguments invoked by the [buyer] arise from the problem of the
174. conformity of the goods.
175. "The Convention states that the goods must be delivered by the seller in
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176. conformity with the buyer's demands and that their conformity must be
177. assessed within the time limit of two years, which begins to run from the date
178. of delivery.
179. "This time limit is a prefixed time limit.
180. "In this case, the [buyer] did not invoke the problem of the conformity o f the
181. goods delivered until the appeal, thus more than two years have lapsed since
182. their delivery and it is in any event outside the reasonable time limit
183. anticipated by the Vienna Convention (Article 39), since the "non-
184. conformity" of the goods was noticed by him at the time of delivery in 1992
185. (evidence no. 8 and 6).
186. "This defense and these counterclaims should thus be declared inadmissible
187. and poorly founded.
188. "Concerning the provisions of the Ottawa Convention, the latter were
189. perfectly respected as is witnessed by the stipulations o f the contract between
190. SFF and the [seller] and the aforementioned invoices (invoices and evidence
191. 11, 12)."
192. For these reasons, the Court:
193. CONSIDERING THAT this dispute concerns questions relating, on the one
194. hand, to a sale of goods in which the conformity of the goods is contested by
195. the buyer, and on the other hand, to an abrupt discontinuance of the
196. contractual relations between the seller and the buyer, as well as to the
197. relations between a factoring company, the successive assignee of another
198. factoring company, and the assigned debtor, and finally to the responsibility
199. of SFF for a commercial loss in which the [buyer] would be the victim;
200. THAT, to preserve the logical progression of this ruling, there is good reason
201. to rule on these questions in the fbllowing order:
202. Applicable law to the factoring operation in the relations between the
203. successive assignee, SFF, and the assigned debtor;
204. The possible claim of the [buyer] against the [seller], for the lack of
205. conformity of the delivered goods;
206. The possible claim of the [buyer] for the abrupt rupture of the commercial
207. relations by the [seller];
208. The right of the [buyer] to oppose its claims to SFF, successive assignee; and
209. The possible responsibility of the SFF company towards the [buyer] for
210. commercial loss.
211. [Ruling on the questions considered]
212. CONSIDERING, on the law applicable to factoring, that the [seller] and the
213. Société International Factors Italia (Ifitalia) concluded on 24 April 1992 (the
214. date of 24 April 1990, featured on the translation is a clear substantive error)
215. a contract having for object notably the foreign recovery o f the receivables of
216. the [seller] by the correspondents of Ifitalia;
217. THAT it is thus an international contract in nature; that it, in any case,
218. became an international contract by its execution against the [buyer],
219. domiciled in France;
220. THAT this contract does not hold any express clause stipulating the chosen
221. applicable law; that, it does however contain references to several articles of
222. the Italian Civil Code and both parties are domiciled in Italy;
223. THAT by virtue of Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Rome Convention on the
224. Law Applicable to Contractual Relations of 19 June 1980, Italian law is
225. applicable, being the law of the State where the person due to make
226. determining performance under the contract is domiciled, in this case the
227. factoring company;
228. THAT in application of Article 13 of the Rome Convention which relates to
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229. subrogation, the law with regard to the obligation of the third party, the SFF,
230. which paid the creditor, the [seller], "shall determine whether the third person
231. [SFF] is entitled to exercise against the debtor the rights which the creditor
232. had against the debtor under the law governing their relationship and, if so,
233. whether he may do so in full or only to a limited extent," that this refers to
234. Italian law which governs the factoring contract; But that the law governing
235. the claim, in other words "the law governing the relations between the
236. creditor and the debtor "governs" the rights of the solvens against the debtor,
237. in the same manner as the law governing the assigned claim determines the
238. rights of the assignee against the debtor," if the transfer of the receivables
239. within the framework of the factoring contract had been realized by a transfer
240. rather than by a subrogation (see Paul Lagarde, The New Private International
241. Law of Contracts after Entrance into Force of the Rome Convention of 19
242. June 1980 [Le nouveau droit international privé des contrats après l'entrée en
243. vigueur de la Convention de Rome du 19 juin 1980], no. 60, Rev. crit. droit
244. international privé 1991 p. 281); that the law governing the assigned claim is
245. stipulated by the Vienna Convention on the international sale of goods as will
246. be explained hereinafter; that this instrument is silent with respect to the
247. assignment, by the creditor, of the right to payment; that in the absence of
248. general principles applicable to this question, which is not contemplated by
249. the Convention, there is reason to look to the rules on the conflict of
250. applicable laws for the international sale of goods, contained in the Hague
251. Convention of 15 June 1955, to determine the law that governs the sale
252. contracts between the [buyer] and the [seller]; that, as will be explained
253. hereinafter, this law is Italian law, as this is the law o f the State where the
254. seller is domiciled;
255. THAT, however, neither o f the parties in this case refer to Italian law; and
256. that therefore French Law could be applied subsidiarily; However, as has
257. been suggested by the court, both the [buyer] and SFF have accepted to
258. examine the merits of their arguments with regards to the Unidroit
259. Convention on international factoring; And that the factoring contract falls
260. within the scope of material application of the Convention (Article 1); That
261. indeed, the contract concluded between the [seller] and Ifitalia anticipates the
262. collection of the receivables and the anticipated payment of the supplier
263. (Article 6 of the contract); And that the receivables that give rise to this case,
264. also fall within the geographic field of application of the Convention because
265. they link a supplier and a debtor established in different States and that "those
266. States and the State in which the factor has its place of business are
267. Contracting States."
268. (Article 2(1 )(a) of the Convention);
269. CONSIDERING THAT the absence of any objection either on the part of the
270. SFF company or the [buyer] to the application o f the Unidroit Convention and
271. their argumentation expressed with regards to this text in their deliberation
272. notes of 29 June and 20 July 1995, lead the Court to recognise their
273. agreement so that the Convention, today in force, be applied to the case at
274. hand, in an anticipated manner, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 21
275. of the Convention;
276. [...]
277. CONSIDERING, on a possible claim by the [buyer] resulting from the lack of
278. conformity of the delivered goods, that the judgment of this question requires
279. the preliminary determination of the applicable sales law;
280. THAT the company SFF points out "that the parties and notably the [buyer]
281. had from the beginning of the procedure chosen to submit their relations only
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282. to French law;" But that, as the contracts for the international sale of goods
283. were concluded as of 1 January 1988, French law is stipulated by the Vienna
284. Convention of 10 April 1980, as the conditions of applicability of this
285. Convention are met; That the sale concluded between the [buyer] and the
286. [seller] enters the material field o f application of this instrument; That the
287. seller and the buyer are established in two different States; That these States,
288. France and Italy, were both parties of the Convention prior to the date of the
289. conclusion of the sale; That the Convention is thus applicable to the sales
290. concluded between the [buyer] and the [seller];
291. THAT MOREOVER, contrary to what SFF states, no document or behavior
292. by the [buyer] can lead to the deduction, on the one hand, that he would have
293. used the possibility offered by Article 6 of the Vienna Convention to derogate
294. from this article, or that the law of the country of the buyer, applicable to
295. merely domestic sales, would be applicable, contrary to conflict of law rules,
296. in the absence of a choice o f law, as laid down in the Hague Convention of 15
297. June 1955 on the law applicable to the international sale of tangible moveable
298. goods;
299. [...]
300. CONSIDERING, on the lack of conformity of the delivered goods, that on 20
301. July 1992, the [buyer] sent a facsimile to the [seller] to notify them that the
302. delivered Provolone cheeses were mouldy and weighed 30 kg instead of the
303. 20 kg ordered; That, by facsimile the same day, the [seller] offered to take
304. back the contested goods on one of its next trips to Italy, and took up the
305. obligation to allow the [buyer] a claim. That, by facsimile of 13 July 1992,
306. the [seller] had agreed a claim of 693 000 lira, corresponding to six cartons of
307. Ricotta cheese which had been returned; That the total amount of these
308. claims, in French francs, 14,312.76 f, which according to the [buyer] the
309. [seller] had agreed to, is not contested by SFF company;
310. TFIAT the SFF company indicates, on one hand, that they "correspond to the
311. goods cited in earlier invoices, as is commonly done"; but that the SFF had
312. produced no earlier invoice establishing such a fact; that it indicates on the
313. other hand, that "these claims cannot be invoked against SFF in its capacity as
314. factor"; but that, moreover, such claims some liquid and due, by agreement
315. between the parties, before the notification of the assignment, give rise to
316. compensation under Article 9 paragraph 2 of the Ottawa Convention;
317. THAT, concerning the [buyer's] alleged claim of 8,400 f  on the grated
318. parmesan cheese, which had not been labeled in accordance with French Law
319. on the composition and expiry date of food products, it is clear from an
320. exchange o f correspondence of 25 November 1992 between the [buyer] and
321. the [seller], that the latter claims an agreement that the grated parmesan be
322. packaged in "unmarked sachets"; But that, given the complaint of the [buyer],
323. this agreement is not established; That it is thus appropriate to ascertain what
324. the intent of the contracting parties was from the indications which they have
325. been able to provide.
326. THAT it is indisputable, by virtue of the relations pursued by the parties for at
327. least several months, that the [seller] knew that the parmesan sachets ordered
328. by the [buyer] would be marketed in France; That this knowledge imposed
329. the duty on him, according to the provision of Article 8(1) of the Vienna
330. Convention, to interpret the order as pertaining to goods, which have to
331. comply with the marketing regulations of the French market;
332. THAT in omitting to place labels on the sachets as to the composition and
333. expiry date, the [seller] had delivered non-conforming goods in the meaning
334. of Article 35 of the Vienna Convention which particularly regulates
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335. packaging;
336. That the buyer issued the written complaint the month following delivery;
337. That this had thus been done within a reasonable time period in the sense of
338. Article 39 of the Vienna Convention;
339. THAT moreover, the prefixed time period of two years mentioned in the
340. second paragraph of this article does not envisage a legal action.
341. CONSIDERING, on the amount of the claim of 8,400.00 f, that [the SFF]
342. contests neither the method of calculation, nor the sum; That, moreover, this
343. sum results from references to the price featured on the invoices of the [seller]
344. o f 10 and 28 September 1992; That it follows that the [buyer] is owed from
345. the [seller] the sums of 14,312.16 f  and 8,400 f.
346. [...]
347. CONSIDERING, as to a possible claim by the [buyer] for the sudden
348. discontinuance of commercial relations by the [seller], that it results from the
349. application of Article 9 of the Vienna Convention that the parties are bound
350. by the practices that have been established between the two of them;
351. THAT it follows from this that the [seller], who had honored the orders of the
352. [buyer] at least since July 1992, for many months, without demanding that his
353. solvency be established, could not refuse to deliver in October 1992, on the
354. pretext that he had not been accepted as a debtor by a factoring company;
355. THAT if̂  as it is permitted to do, the [seller] decided to entrust the payment
356. of the invoices abroad to a factoring company, it should have adopted a
357. transitional arrangement which would not be liable to harm its clients; that,
358. for example, it could have agreed with Ifitalia only to begin the assignment
359. after the acceptance of its clients as debtors, without suspending commercial
360. relations;
361. CONSIDERING, as to the damages incurred by the [buyer], that the retaining
362. of a sum of 30,000 f  for eight months by the Carrefour company, as well as
363. the abrupt discontinuance of commercial relations with this client are
364. established by a letter from the Carrefour company, reproduced earlier in this
365. text; that the [buyer] made an exact appreciation o f his damages of 36,586.92
366. f, the balance of the claim assigned by the [seller];
367. [...]
368. CONSIDERING, as to the rights of the [buyer] to invoke the claims of
369. 14,312.16 f) 8,400 f  and 586.92 f, against SFF the successor factoring
370. company;
371. [...]
372. CONSIDERING THAT the claim of 8,400 f  relates directly to a contract the
373. payment of which is demanded by SFF; that considering the terms of Article
374. 9, paragraph 1 of the Unidroit Convention, "the debtor may set up against the
375. factor all ^fences arising under that contract of which the debtor could have
376. availed itself if such claim had been made by the supplier;" that this claim
377. resulting from the lack o f conformity of the delivered goods in performance
378. of the assigned contract can be invoked against the SFF;
379. [...]
380. CONSIDERING THAT the claim o f 14,312.76 f  corresponds to the claims by
381. the [seller] -  within the framework of contracts other than those for which the
382. payment is demanded from the [buyer] - some of which are liquid and due, by
383. agreement of the parties, before the date of transfer of the contracts which are
384. the object of this case; that Article 9, paragraph 2 of the Convention, even if
385. interpreted restrictively, authorizes this compensation;
386. [...]
387. CONSIDERING, regarding the possibility for the [buyer] to set-off the
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388. 36,586.92 f  claim, for the abrupt discontinuance of commercial relations by
389. the [seller], against the claim of SFF held by virtue of the assignment of
390. another contract, that the French law of factoring only allows such
391. compensation of a claim, neither liquid, nor due at the time of payment with
392. subrogation or for the assignment o f the claim, where this claim has a
393. connection with the obligations that result from the contract;
394. BUT THAT the term set-off used in Article 9 paragraph 2 of the Unidroit
395. Convention covers broader situations as is clear from the terms that
396. accompany it ("any right of set-off in respect of claims existing against the
397. supplier in whose favour the receivable arose") and from the negotiations that
398. clearly establish that paragraph 2 of Article 9 envisages rights that arise from
399. operations independent of the basic contract, which is the object of the
400. assignment to the factoring company (see Aces de la conference p. 291 et
401. seq.);
402. THAT the text envisaging a right of set-off does not require that all the
403. conditions of the compensation be fulfilled at the moment o f notification of
404. the assignment; That it suffices that the rights and actions which by nature
405. give rise to a right to set-off, arose and were invoked prior to the assignment;
406. That such is the situation of the [buyer] who, in stating that he suspended his
407. payments, invoked against the [seller] the damage that was caused to him by
408. the fact that there had been no delivery since 14 October 1992;
409. THAT the notices o f the assignment of the receivables were not made by the
410. seller until November 1992; That the [buyer] thus has the right to
411. compensation of the claim of 36,586.92 f  for damages for the abrupt
412. discontinuance of business relations;
413. [...]
414. CONSIDERING, as to the demand of 100,000 f  for damages raised by the
415. [buyer] against SFF for commercial damage, that the judicial basis of the
416. action is not given; that in the absence of contractual links between the
417. [buyer] and the Ifitalia company or the SFF, the assignee of Ifitalia, there are
418. grounds to find that the action aims to repair the tortious wrong committed by
419. the factoring company by forcing its client, the [seller], to suspend its
420. commercial relations with the [buyer], in the absence o f acceptance of the
421. buyer as debtor by the factoring company and during the time necessary for
422. such acceptance;
423. that this tort committed in Italy, is governed by Italian law; that the parties did
424. not give their points of view on the provision of Italian law applicable to such
425. conduct; that it would be possible to invite them to do so;
426. BUT THAT the Court considers that the loss caused to the [buyer] was well
427. repaired by the contractual damages already awarded against the [seller], and
428. which can be invoked against SFF; that the examination o f the content of the
429. law applicable to the [buyer's] action against SFF is thus without purpose;
430. that the [buyer], whose right to damages has been satisfied, must be nonsuited
431. of his demand for damages;
432. [...]
433. CONSIDERING, as to the demand of the [buyer] for 3,000 f  under Article
434. 100 of the New Code of Civil Procedure by the [buyer], that there are grounds
435. to allow it;
436. For these reasons:
437. THE COURT: Publicly stating and by contradictory ruling, after having
438. deliberated in conformity with the law:
439. REVERSES the deferred judgment;
440. NONSUITS the Société Française de Factoring International Factor France of
246
441. all its demands;
442. ORDERS IT to pay to the [buyer] 3,000 f  under Article 100 of the New Code
443. of Civil procedure;
444. ORDERS IT to pay the costs, with a deduction for the costs incurred to the
445. President Mrs. Ramillon, in accordance with Article 699 of the New Code of
446. Civil Procedure;
447. PRONOUNCED publicly by the president Mr. Beraudo, who signed with
448. Mme. Combe, the clerk.
450! FOOTNOTE
451. For purposes of this translation, the Plaintiff-Appellant of France is referred
452. to as [buyer]; the Defendant-Respondent of Italy is referred to as [seller].
453. Amounts in French currency (French francs) are indicated as [f].
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Appendix 10
Case:
Date:
Bull. Civ. 1986 Ass. No. 2 p. 2 (83-14.631) Case SA Produits Céramiques de lArÿou 
V. SCI Asnières Normanie
07 February 1986 
Translated by:
Tony Weir 
Copyright:
Professor B. S. Markesinis
Given that the Société de Produits Céramiques de FAnjou (PCA), which supplied bricks for 
the construction o f the walls of the apartment block being constructed by SCI Asnières 
Normandie, criticises the decision below (Paris, 5 May 1983) for holding it liable in part for 
the cracks which appeared in the walls and required it to pay the syndicate of the 
condominium part of the cost of repair whereas, it maintains, (1) although any alleged fault of 
the seller of materials must take into account the contractual specifications insisted on by the 
main contractor, here the ESCA firm, yet the court treated such terms as irrelevant and so 
violated articles 1147 and 1382 Code civil, (2) the court could not, while basing itself on 
liability in tort, invoke the presumption that the professional seller of goods knows o f any 
defects in the materials but should have asked whether the manufacturer really knew of the 
purpose for which they were bought; in the case at hand the sole cause of the cracks was they 
were built into walls whose foundation was inadequate and unstable, (3) the court held that the 
bricks were not of the right quality by reference to quality standards issued after the 
construction was complete and in failing to inquire whether they were not in order at the time 
of delivery it failed to identify the fault of the seller, (4) the judgment ignored arguments to 
the effect that the fragility of the bricks was due not to any inherent lack of quality but to the 
improper use to which they were put by the contractor, amounting to a fault on the part of a 
third party which excludes the liability of the seller; and finally (5) in failing to ascertain 
whether the major cause of the trouble was not solely the lack o f a proper foundation rather 
than the alleged defect in the materials the judgment did not deal, otherwise than by mere 
assertion, with the causal link between the alleged nonconformity of the bricks and the 
damage in suit;
But given that the developer is entitled to all the rights and claims attaching to the thing vested 
in the main contractor, just as the subpurchaser is entitled to those of his seller, and so has a 
direct contractual claim against the manufacturer if the goods delivered fall short of what the 
contract requires; and given that the court of appeal found that by reason of their faulty 
manufacture the bricks supplied by PCA were not as the contract required and that PCA was 
thus in breach o f contract such that SCI Asnières Normandie, as developer, could claim 
damages until the time-bar at common law had run, and that this by itself justified its decision, 
so that none of the arguments in the application for review can be accepted;
For these reasons DISMISSES the application for review
Subsequent Developments
This note on subsequent developments reflects the legal situation as of October 2004.
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Assemblée plénière, 7 February 1986 : Several judgments delivered subsequently, 
principally by the third civil chamber, have confirmed and even extended this solution: Civ 3, 
14 November 1991, Bull no 271 (contractual nature of the action by a site owner against the 
manufacturers and the sellers of materials used for a development), 26 May 1992, Bull no 168 
("a sub-purchaser has all the rights and rights of action attached to a thing which belonged to 
its creator and has a right of action in contract against the contractors founded on a breach of 
their obligations towards the site owner") or, more recently. Civ 3, 12 December 2001 
(pourvoi no 00-14.671), which repeats exactly the solution put forward in 1986.
Translation by Raymond Youngs
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Appendix 11
Case:
Date:
Note:
Cour de cassation, First Civil Chamber, 6 December 2005 (pourvoi no. 03-13.116) 
Bull.civ. 2005.1. no. 462, p. 390
06 December 2005
Note and subsequent developments by Fr??d??ric Goldberg (translation by Raymond 
Youngs)
Translated by:
Tony Weir 
Copyright:
Professor B.S. Markesinis
In view of article 1142 Code civil;
When the award dated 12 April 1997 rendered by MM. Castagnet, Couilleaux and Biotteau, 
who had been appointed to arbitrate a dispute between M. Delaval and MM. Louis and Benoît 
Juliet, was vacated by the court of appeal because their contract of appointment had already 
expired, MM. Juliet sued them for damages in the tribunal de grande instance;
In dismissing the claim the tribunal noted that while the general law applies to suits against 
arbitrators in respect of their task, the special, essentially judicial, nature of their role is such 
that they are not liable for every breach of contract in the absence of personal fault such as 
lack of application, and in particular not for mere failure to act within the time frame agreed 
by the parties, who are in any case bound actively to help take the matter forward;
But since it was the duty o f the arbitrators, who are under a strict obligation to produce an 
award, to seek an extension of time 6-om the court in the absence of agreement or request by 
the parties, and the vacation of their award was due to their failure to do so, the tribunaPs 
decision that they were not liable was made in violation of the text cited above.
For these reasons quashes and annuls ...
Subsequent Developments
As at the 1st August 2007, there has been no judgment by the Cour de cassation to confirm or 
contradict this judgment.
Contrary to American doctrine, the Cour de cassation does not accept the principle of total 
immunity of the arbitrator. The arbitrator is subject to two different regimes, one 
characterising his function as a judge (immunity) and the other (regime of the 
that of a party to an arbitration contract. It is in respect of this role of the arbitrator that the 
Cour de cassation has just made a determination and recognised civil responsibility on the part 
of an arbitrator for breach of a strict duty.
The arbitrator has a general obligation of diligence in the exercise of his commission, and this 
obligation can only be a duty of care (o6/zgatzoM t/e /Moygm), but it implies secondary 
obligations, one of which is a strict duty to deliver the arbitration award during the initial 
period.
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But the preceding case law seems to indicate that the arbitrator's exercise of his commission 
ought not to be unduly disturbed by the fear that liability on his part will arise too easily.
Certain French legal writers have regretted that no mention is made of the role played by the 
parties who sometimes dissociate themselves from the procedure, or tacitly want to suspend it.
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Appendix 12 
Arrêt Doucet-Boudreau
DÉCISION DE LA COUR SUPREME DU CANADA
du 6 novembre 2003 
Affaire Doucet-Boudreau 
Faits :
Des parents francophones de la Nouvelle-Ecosse entament une poursuite judiciaire afin 
d'obtenir de la province de la Nouvelle-Écosse et du Conseil scolaire acadien provincial 
des programmes et des écoles homogènes de langue française sur les fonds publics, au 
niveau secondaire.
Procédure :
>le juge de première instance :
Le juge se prononce sur trois points :
- il déclare que le gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Ecosse a violé l'article 23 de la CAarfg 
qui pose le principe du droit à l'instruction dans la langue de la minorité.
- il ordonne à la province et au Conseil de « faire de leur mieux » pour fournir des 
établissements et des programmes d'enseignement homogènes de langue française dans 
des délais déterminés.
- il se déclare compétent pour entendre des comptes rendus sur les efforts déployés en 
ce sens.
>le défendeur :
La province interjette appel au motif que le juge ne dispose pas du droit de se déclarer 
compétent pour entendre des comptes rendus.
> la Cour d'appel :
Accueille la demande du défendeur. La Cour d'appel se fonde sur la règle de common 
law d u s e l o n  laquelle le juge de première instance ne peut pas rester saisi 
de l'affaire après avoir tranché la question en litige entre les parties. En d'autres termes, 
aucune disposition juridique donne compétence à un juge de première instance de vérifier 
si l'ordonnance a été respectée.
Par ailleurs, en se fondant sur l'article 24 de la CAarfg, la Cour d'appel affirme que même 
si les juges ont un pouvoir en matière de réparations, ils n'ont pas compétence en ce qui a 
trait à l'exécution de ces réparations.
>le demandeur :
Se pourvoit en Cour suprême du Canada. Le pourvoi porte sur la déclaration de 
compétence du juge de première instance pour entendre des comptes rendus.
Problème de droit :
La Cour suprême de la Nouvelle-Ecosse a t-elle le pouvoir de se déclarer compétente 
pour entendre des comptes rendus de la province dans le but de mettre à exécution la 
réparation fondée sur l'article 24 (1) de la C/zarfe ?
La Cour suprême du Canada :
Annule l'arrêt de la Cour d'appel et rétablit l'ordonnance du juge de première instance.
252
Elle affirme qu'une Cour supérieure peut accorder toute réparation qu'elle estime 
convenable et juste eu égard aux circonstances. Se faisant, elle a compétence pour 
vérifier l'exécution de la réparation accordée.
La Cour suprême du Canada étend considérablement les pouvoirs des juges de première 
instance dans cet arrêt. Cependant, il faut noter que cette décision est une décision 
d'espèce. En effet, la position de la Cour se justifie en fonction des faits. Si la Cour admet 
que les juges ont le pouvoir de vérifier l'exécution des comptes rendus, ce n'est qu'en 
raison de la gravité de la situation qu'ont subi les parents francophones.
En s'appuyant sur les facteurs historiques et contextuels de la population francophone, il 
fallait concevoir une réparation protégeant utilement les droits des parents et par 
conséquent contrer l'assimilation en leur permettant d'obtenir, dans des délais déterminés, 
des établissements scolaires dans leur langue.
Cette décision est une victoire incontestable pour la population francophone. La Cour 
suprême du Canada élargit les compétences du juge afin de protéger de façon utile et 
efficace la population francophone. C'est une décision d'une importance fondamentale 
pour les années à venir.
Informations
Date:
17 février 2004 
Auteur :
Nathalie Bourdeau, stagiaire de France
57, rue Portland - bureau 203
Dartmouth
Nouvelle-Écosse
B2Y IHl
Courriel
fowr foM/e zM/bT-ma/fOM re/a/zvg à ce cfocM/MC»/, vcMÎ/Zcz co/M/MMM/g'wcr avec aw
253
Appendix 13
Arrêt Mahé
DECISION RENDUE PAR LA COUR SUPREME DU CANADA
le 15 mars 1990
Affaire Mahé contre Alberta
Faits :
En 1982, des parents francophones réclament une école primaire publique de langue 
française à Edmonton. Le ministre de l'Education et les conseils scolaires refusent. Les 
parents ouvrent alors une école privée et intentent une poursuite en octobre 1983. En 
1984, une école francophone est établie relevant de TEû&MOMro» Ca/Ao/fc
et offrant des classes en français de la maternelle à la sixième ainsi que des 
cours d'immersion en septième et huitième années. Les parents de ses élèves remplissent 
une fonction consultative auprès du conseil scolaire. Les parents sont insatisfaits du 
régime sous lequel fonctionne cet établissement.
Fondements :
Demandeurs :
Les parents estiment que les droits énoncés à l'article 23 de la C/zarfc
cr ne sont respectés ni par le système d'éducation existant actuellement à
Edmonton ni par la loi régissant ce système.
Selon eux, l'expression « établissements d'enseignement de la minorité linguistique » 
comprend la gestion par des conseils scolaires distincts.
Défendeur :
L'intimée pour sa part prétend que le mot « établissements » signifie bâtiments scolaires. 
Selon l'intimée, la minorité francophone de la communauté urbaine d'Edmonton n'a pas 
été lésée dans ses droits puisque ses droits sont respectés par les établissements 
d'enseignement francophones actuels.
La Cour du banc de la reine et la Cour d'appel :
Les deux Cours estiment que l'alinéa 23(3)6) de la C/zorfe accorde à la minorité 
linguistique le droit, lorsque le nombre le justifie, d'établir et de gérer un système scolaire 
indépendant. Cependant, il revient à la province de choisir les moyens institutionnels de 
l'exercice de ce droit. Or, en l'espèce, cette disposition de la CAar/e n'est pas applicable 
car le nombre d'élèves suffisant n'a pas été démontré par les appelants.
Problèmes de droit :
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Y a-t-il violation ou négation des droits de la minorité linguistique de la région 
métropolitaine d'Edmonton à des établissements d'enseignement de la minorité 
linguistique aux termes de l'article 23 de la CAarre?
Le droit à l'instruction dans la langue de la minorité et à des établissements 
d'enseignement de la minorité linguistique conformément aux alinéas 23(3)a) et 23(3)6) 
de la CAarrg accorde-t-il à la minorité, la gestion et le contrôle de l'instruction et des 
établissements d'enseignement?
La Cour Suprême du Canada :
La Cour estime qu'il y a eu violation de l'article 23 de la C6ar/e et accorde à la minorité 
dans la région d'Edmonton la gestion et le contrôle des établissements d'enseignement.
La qualité de l'enseignement dispensé à la minorité linguistique à Edmonton doit être 
égale à celle de l'enseignement donné à la majorité, sans avoir à être identique, et des 
fonds publics adéquats à cette fin doivent être fournis.
La Cour considère que l'expression « nombre suffisant » utilisée à l'article 23 de la 
C6orte est le nombre de personnes qui se prévaudront en définitive du programme ou de 
l'établissement envisagés, c'est-à-dire la demande connue relative au service et le nombre 
total de personnes qui pourraient éventuellement se prévaloir du service. De plus, l'article 
23 a un effet réparateur ne visant pas simplement à garantir le statut quo.
Cette décision est importante car elle met en avant l'article 23 de la C6artg qui reconnaît 
un droit général à l'instruction dans la langue de la minorité. Cet article est donc invoqué 
pour réparer les inégalités réelles existantes entre les deux langues officielles du Canada.
Informations
Date:
20 février 2007 
Auteur :
Jeanne-Françoise Caillaud, stagiaire de France 
57,rue Portland-bureau 203 
Dartmouth 
Nouvelle-Ecosse 
B2Y IHl
Courriel
P o w r  r o w r e  r g / a f z v g  à  c e  v e w / / / e z  c o m /M W M f g w e r  a v e c  a w
cfe fé/^6ôMe 902 432 20^5 ow cow/rze/ e» c6<yMaMr - 7C7 - .
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Appendix 14
Arrêt MacKenzie
DECISION DE LA COUR D'APPEL DE LA NOUVELLE-ECOSSE
du 27 janvier 2004 
Affaire Mackenzie 
Faits :
Nicole Mackenzie a été arrêtée pour excès de vitesse. Elle s'est présenté en Cour 
provinciale sans être représentée et le juge ne l'a pas informée de son droit à un procès en 
français. Le procès ayant eu lieu en anglais, madame Mackenzie a demandé un arrêt des 
procédures en Cour suprême de la Nouvelle-Écosse.
Décision de la Cour suprême de la Nouvelle-Écosse :
La Cour suprême ordonne l'arrêt des procédures en vertu de l'article 530 (3) du Code 
criminel qui pose le principe selon lequel tout accusé doit être informé du droit d'obtenir 
un procès dans la langue officielle de son choix. Selon la Cour suprême de la Nouvelle- 
Écosse, la violation de l'article 530 (3) contrevient aux articles 15, 16 et 19 de la C/zarfe
portant sur les droits à l'égalité et l'accès dans la langue 
officielle de son choix aux tribunaux établis par le Parlement.
La Couronne interjette appel. Tout en affirmant que l'article 530 (3) a été violé, la 
Couronne demande un nouveau procès au lieu d'un arrêt des procédures.
Problème de droit :
Deux problèmes de droit se posent :
1)Le fait de ne pas avoir informé l'accusée de son droit à un procès en français constitue- 
t-il une violation des articles 15, 16 et 19 de la CAar/g ?
2)Est-ce qu'un arrêt des procédures était convenable et juste dans l'hypothèse où il n'y a 
pas eu violation de la CAarrg ?
Décision de la Cour d'appel de la Nouvelle-Écosse :
1) La Cour d'appel considère que les preuves présentées n'étaient pas suffisantes pour 
affirmer une violation des articles 15, 16 et 19 de la CAartg.
2) En affirmant qu'il n'y a pas violation de la C/zarre, l'article 24 relatif à la réparation ne 
s'applique pas. Par conséquent, la décision du juge de première instance de prononcer 
l'arrêt des procédures n'est pas fondée en droit. La Cour d'appel en conclut donc que seul 
l'article 686 (2) du gn/wzMg/ s'applique en l'espèce. En vertu de cet article, 
lorsqu'une Cour d'appel admet un appel en vertu de l'al.(l)a), elle annule la condamnation 
et ordonne un nouveau procès selon le cas.
L'affaire Mackenzie est une affaire délicate qui touche directement le problème relatif 
aux droits linguistiques. C'est pourquoi cette affaire est toujours en cours dès lors que le 
demandeur envisage de saisir la Cour suprême du Canada afin de faire reconnaître une
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violation des art. 15, 16 et 19 de la C/zar ĝ.
In fo rm atio n s
Date:
17 février 2004
Auteur :
Nathalie Bourdeau, stagiaire de France
57, rue Portland - bureau 203 
Dartmouth 
Nouvelle-Écosse 
B2Y IHl
Courriel :
f  ozzz" tozzrg zz^rzzza^zozz rg /a fzvg  à  gg  6/oczz/zzgzzr, vgzzzZ/gz co/zzzzzzzzzzg'zzgr o v g g  zzozz.y az/ 
zzzz/zzgro <̂ g /g /^ /z o z z g  9 0 2  4 2 3 .2 0 ^ 3  ozz /z a r  gozzzrzg/ gzz g/zzyzzazzf -  7C 7 - .
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Appendix 15a
1. Date: 11.12.1998
2. Country: Italy
3. Number:
4. Court: Corte di Appello di Milano
5. Parties: Bielloni Castello S.p.A. v. EGO S.A.
6. SVOLGIMENTO DEL PROCESSO
7. Con atto di citazione notificato il 20 febbraio 1990 la S.p.A. Bielloni Castello
8. conveniva avanti il Tribunale di Milano la EGO S.A. di diritto ffancese con sede
9. in Oyonnax, chiedendo che fosse accertata I'awenuta risoluzione owero
10. dichiararsi, comunque, la risoluzione del contratto con essa stipulato il 27 gennaio
11. 1989 per la vendita di una stampatrice flessografica del prezzo di lire
12. 528.000.000, e deduceva alio scopo di avere, a partire dal mese successivo alia
13. scadenza del termine per la consegna, fissato al 5 settembre 1989, ripetutamente
14. sollecitato il pagamento del prezzo residuo ed il ritiro del macchinario: ma senza
15. esito. e cosi Eno ad una ultima diflida intimata con comunicazione del 6 dicembre
16. 1989.
17. Concludeva pertanto, I'attrice, affinché fosse inoltre e di conseguenza emessa
18. pronuncia di condanna della S.A. EGO al risarcimento del danno subito in misura
19. di lire 200.000.000, od in altra stimata dovuta. Costituitasi in causa, la convenuta
20. opponeva di avere ordinato la stampatrice per la successiva installazione in un
21. nuovo stabilimento da ediEcarsi, il quale programma per ragioni di natura
22. amministrativa estranee alia propria volonta aveva subito un sensibile ritardo, che
23. I'aveva indotta a formulare la richiesta, in un primo tempo - assumeva - accettata
24. dalla controparte, di rinvio della consegna alia Ene del mese di maggio del 1990,
25. onde nell'eccepire un comportamento awersario contrario ai dettato dell'art. 1375
26. cod. civ. chiedeva dichiararsi per contro la risoluzione del contratto per fatto e
27. colpa della Bielloni Castello s.p.a.", con restituzione dell'acconto versatole di lire
28. 105.600.000 ed il risarcimento del danno.
29. Esperito il corso istruttorio, il Tribunale con sentenza del 3 0  novembre 1994-26
30. gennaio 199S, ritenuta I'inesistenza di una rinegoziazione dell'accordo di vendita
31. circa i termini temporali della sua esecuzione, lo dichiarava risolto di diritto per
32. fatto e colpa dell'attrice in ragione deU'inEuttuoso decorso del termine di 15
33. giomi intimato con la prima difEda del 17 novembre 1989, e condannava pero
34. I'attrice a restituire I'acconto, mentre ne respingeva inEne I'istanza di risarcimento
35. e disponeva la parziale compensazione delle spese processuali.
36. Awerso la sentenza ha proposto appello la societa Bielloni Castello con citazione
37. del 17 ottobre 1995, chiedendo in sua parziale riforma la condanna della S.A
38. EGO al denegato risarcimento dei danni. Résisté nel grado I'appellata con
39. gravame incidentale a mezzo del quale sono state rinnovate le anteriori domande
40. conclusive tutte. Precisate dalle parti le rispettive conclusioni di cui in epigrafe, le
41. stesse venivano rimesse dall'istruttore avanti al collegio per la decisione.
42. MOTIVI DELLA DECISIONE
43. È preliminarmente da considerarsi, in ordine alia corretta qualiEcazione del
44. rapporto in causa discusso, che, essendo stato il contratto di vendita concluso nel
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45. gennaio dell'anno 1989, la relativa disciplina dei corrispettivi diritti ed obblighi
46. delle parti doveva e deve essere desunta dalle norme di diritto materiale uniforme
47. adottate sia dall'Italia che dalla Francia quali Stati contraenti délia Convenzione
48. delle Nazioni Unite stipulata a Vienna l'11 aprile 1980 riguardante i contratti di
49. vendita internazionale di merci, ed entrata poi in vigore per entrambi i nominati
50. paesi, infatti, il 1° gennaio del 1988.
51. Non sono perciô pertinenti alla fattispecie, per le questioni qui disputate e salvo
52. quanto in prosieguo precisato, le disposizioni normative ricavate invece, ora
53. esplicitamente (dalle parti contendenti), ora per implicito (è il caso délia sentenza
54. impugnata che, anzi, non ne fa cenno alcuno), dalla legislazione interna italiana -
55. il diritto comune dettato in materia dai codice civile -, poiché trova senz'altro
56. applicazione l'articolo 1-1, lettera a) délia suddetta Convenzione.
57. A tenore délia quale, peraltro, si pone in modo conclusivo non variato
58. l'accertamento, già espresso dai tribunale, circa la legittimità dell'occorsa
59. risoluzione del contratto, ancorché (va qui precisato e rettiEcato alla luce della
60. qualiEcazione iniziale postasi), in dipendenza dell'efEcace, correlativa
61. dichiarazione comunicata dai venditore, a norma degli articoli 61-64.1 e 26
62. dell'Accordo internazionale, ed allo scopo adducendo l'inadempimento
63. imputabile, anche agli effetti di cui ai successivo art 74,
64. alla controparte acquirente: e consistito dunque nella mancata esecuzione
65. dell'obbligo di pagare il prezzo e di prendere in consegna quanto venduto, ex
66. artt.53, 59 e 6 0  délia spéciale disciplina uniforme.
67. Risulta in particolare, converrà al riguardo aggiungere, che il venditore italiano
68. aveva in effetti impartito ai compratore transalpino un termine supplementare per
69. l'adempimento delle obbligazioni essenziali sul medesimo gravanti, ed altresi, in
70. concreto, "di durata ragionevole", giusta la condizione emergente dall'articolo 63.
71.1 délia Convenzione.
72. Ed invero, tenendo conto del termine di consegna/pagamento in origine Essato al
73. 5 settembre 1989, ad una prima difEda del 17 novembre 1989 rivolta alla società
74. EGO per il ritiro del macchinario approntato entro 15 giomi, faceva seguito un
75. comportamento interlocutorio, che ampliava ulteriormente il periodo di tolleranza
76. già concesso - in fatto -, in quanto la società Bielloni Castello con lettera del 6
77. dicembre successivo ribadiva alla controparte il tenore délia precedente
78. intimazione: ed e da intendersi anche in relazione al termine utile ed ultimo di 15
79. giorni, dunque rinnovatamente impartito.
80. Cosicché la dilazione complessiva in concreto accordata dopo la scadenza di
81. inizio settembre veniva ad essere di circa due mesi e mezzo: un periodo perciô, e
82. senza dubbio, di oggettiva, accettabile ragionevolezza ai Eni in esame.
83. Che poi l'interessata e beneEciaria délia proroga in parola fosse per qualche
84. tempo ancora ostacolata da ragioni logistico-organizzative interne, e di
85. qualsivoglia origine, nell'ottemperare aile condizioni convenute (e modiEcate) di
86. ritiro délia merce, e che vi fosse stato puranche un tentativo di componimento, a
87. metà autunno - ma taie evidentemente rimasto, se la stessa società EGO
88. fbrmulava poi nella lettera del 29 novembre 1989 un invito a ricercarlo -, délia
89. controversia insorgente, sono queste vicende che non mate conto vagliare oltre in
90. questa sede.
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91. In effetti, a ffonte della disciplina pattizia, ed in ragione sia del carattere
92. internazionale appunto di essa, che della nécessita inoltre di assicurare il rispetto
93. della buona fede nel commercio internazionale, conclamati dall'art. 7.1 della
94. Convenzione di Vienna, non possono indagarsi circostanze che si assumano
95. impeditive del regolare adempimento delle corrispettive obbligazioni in quella
96. sancite, e dei connessi rimedi per il caso negativo, le quali non trovino il proprio
97. referente normativo, anzitutto, nella stessa autonoma regolamentazione d'insieme
98. istituita: e cio per manifeste esigenze di certezza e di stabiliti nello svolgersi delle
99. transazioni che ne è, manifestamente, precipua denotazione strutturale. Del resto,
100. se poi il summenzionato articolo 7, al suo secondo paragrafb, introduce una
101. sorta di norma di chiusura, demandando cioè alla legge applicabile secondo le
102. regole del diritto internazionale privato le questioni incidenti nella materia
103. regolata e non risolte perô dalla Convenzione stessa, è agevole constatare la
104. inconferenza della situazione sopra accennatasi, ed invocata dalla società
105. EGO a giustiEcazione, alia stregua della legge interna italiana. La quale viene
106. allora in rilevanza come quella propria del paese in cui il compratore ha la sua
107. "residenza abituale", owero la propria sede: e cio in virtù dell'articolo 3 della
108. Convenzione dell'Aja del 15 giugno 1955 sulla legge applicabile alia vendita
109. a carattere internazionale di cose mobili corporali: che - va rilevato qui -
110. aveva sostituito En dalla sua entrata in vigore (per l'Italia dai 1 ° settembre
111. 1964), stante il suo carattere universale (ex art. 7), il previgente articolo 25
112. delle disposizioni sulla legge in generale, venendo cioè a porsi quale nuova
113. regola generale e fondamentale di conEitto nella particolare materia in
114. argomento.
115. Ma le vicende soprawenute, ed illustrate dalla compratrice per spiegare la
116. difEcoltà ad ottemperare all'originaria intesa, non sono allora suscettive di
117. essere riferite utilmente ad una qualche categoria giuridica del nostro diritto
118. (intemo), per l'intrinseca frammentarietà che le dénota: e non cosi alla
119. presupposizione di cui si fa cenno in taluni scritti difensivi e neppure, in
120. ipotesi, alla impossibilità soprawenuta o ad altro istituto di eventuale
121. rilevanza nella vicenda giudiziale; tant'è che, inEne, la difesa dell'acquirente
122. richiama soltanto il principio délia esecuzione di buona fede di cui all'articolo
123. 1375 cit. 11 quale, perô, comunque inteso e valutato, non potrebbe tuttavia
124. surrogare il contesto deEnito e vincolante espresso dalle norme délia
125. convenzione Viennese, che - rammentandosi il dettato dell'articolo 7.1 - in
126. quelle sembra già individuare ed inscrivere una propria elettiva nozione di
127. buona fede, ovvero il ricercato criterio di demarcazione délia possibile,
128. complessiva sua rilevanza nell'ambito regolato.
129. Ciô ritenuto e premesso, viene quindi in esame la riproposta domanda
130. risarcitoria délia società italiana venditrice, una domanda che era stata
131. disattesa dai primi giudici, ma senza apprezzabili e fondati motivi.
132. Ed in proposito sarà opportune sottolineare o ribadire che i riferimenti svolti
133. dall'interessata alla legge materiale interna sono, anch'essi, giuridicamente
134. inappropriati.
135. Ed invero le norme uniformi introdotte in esecuzione dell'accordo
136. internazionale inducono parimenti a rawisare nel delineatone regime dei
137. rimedi un quadro unitario ed organico di disposizioni essenzialmente
138. autosufEcienti allo scopo cui sono deputate, e che non possono quindi, in
139. linea di principio, essere integrate con disposizioni di origine interna: le quali
260
140. di per sé contraddicono la précisa speciEcità delle peculiari, autonome
141. determinazioni cosi sancite in rapporto a tale oggetto.
142. In concreto, poi, non paie refutabile che il macchinario non potutosi
143. consegnare da parte del venditore entro la Ene dell'anno 1989 all'originario
144. compratore fosse stato rivenduto, come risulta dalla documentazione prodotta,
145. all'inizio della successiva estate per un totale prezzo di lire 440  milioni, e
146. cioèalquantoinferiore.
147. Dunque si era trattato, per le caratteristiche anche temporali implicate, di una
148. operazione che ben puô positivamente riportarsi all'articolo 75 della
149. Convenzione: ovvero, in sostanza, di una (ivi prevista) vendita in danno, la
150. quale abilitava cd abilita il venditore a chiedere in causa la differenza Ea il
151. prezzo del contratto risolto e quello della vendita altemativa, e nel presente
152. caso ammontante a lire (528.000.000 440.000.000) 88.000.000. Trattasi
153. insomma di una oggettiva perdita subita, ex art. 74 precedente, che ad ogni
154. modo individua, soprattutto, Tunica assorbente voce di danno che qui rilevi,
155. dovendosi per contro stimare non giustiEcata la sostanziale duplicazione della
156. posta risarcitoria prospettata dalla vendiEice a proprio credito: la prima volta
157. a titolo di perdita assoluta regisEata, e la seconda come guadagno mancato.
158. DeEo altrimenti, non consta che la società Bielloni Castello En dal tempo
159. della fbrmazione del contraEo prevedesse - come ora si pretenderebbe - di
160. stipulare in epoca rawicinata, con un diverso cliente, analogo contraEo di
161. fbmitura, cosicché "in mancanza delTinadempimento della EGO... avrebbe
162. potuto prowedere alia vendita di due macchinari"; non senza osservare cd
163. aggiungere che siffatta assunzione difensiva, per di più, contrasta con
164. Taffermata ricorrenza della stessa vendita in danno di cui sopra.
165. Sulla somma prima determinatasi di speEanza delTappellante principale
166. competono inEne, a norma dell'art. 78 della disciplina uniforme, gli interessi,
167. da computarsi al saggio legale (italiano: in fbrza del rinvio disposto dalla
168. sopra accennatasi norma di chiusura), e con decorrenza dalTefEcacia della
169. dichiarata risoluzione, collocabile alia data del lo gennaio 1990, Eno
170. alTintegrale pagamento del dovuto.
171. [...]
172. P.Q.M.
173. La Corte d'Appello di Milano, deEnitivamente pronunciando sulTappello
174. proposto da Bielloni Castello S.p.A. con citazione del 17/10/1995 contro S.A.
175. EGO nonché sulTappello incidentale awerso la sentenza resa Ea le parti dal
176. Tribunale di Milano in data 3 0  novembre 1994-26 gennaio 199S, cosi
177. prowede in sua parziale riforma:
178. 1) condanna la S.A. EGO ai pagamento di lire 88.000.000 oltre agli interessi
179. legalidalTl/l/1990alsaldo.
180. [...]
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Appendix 15b
1. Corte di Appello di Milano 11 December 1998
2. Bielloni Castello S.p.A. v. EGO 6L/1.
3. 7ran.y/aEon 6y Twrma [**1
4. Dwiy/aEon cûfùeü/ Maria Ramiio [***1
5. Description of the trial
6. On 20 February 1990, Bielloni Castello [seller] fled, before the Courts of
7. Milan, an action against Ego S.A. [buyer], a French company, with relevant place 
of business in Oyonnax. The [seller] alleged that the [buyer] breached the contract 
entered into by the parties on 27 January 1989 for the sale of a printer device
10. [hereinaAer, the "goods"] for the price of flT  [Italian Lira] 528,000,000. The
11. [seller] alleged that without success he has repeatedly urged — ever since the
12. month aAer the term agreed for. delivery (5 January 1989) -  the [buyer] to pay the
13. residual price and to Anally pick up the goods. The [seller] forwarded his last
14. notice on 6 December 1989.
15. The [seller] asked the Court to hold the [buyer] liable for damages in the amount
16. of FIT  200,000,000 or subordinately, in such other amount as the Court would
17. deem most appropriate. The [buyer] counterclaimed that the goods were ordered
18. with the intent to be placed at a subsequent time in certain premises still to be
19. built. The [buyer] alleged that this construction, however, for reasons beyond its
20. conEol, had been substantially delayed. For this reason, the [buyer] asked the
21. [seller] — and deemed the request accepted — to withhold the delivery until May
22. 1990. The [buyer], claiming a violation of the provisions of Article 1375 of the
23. Italian Civil Code [hereinaAer, the "C.C."], asked the Court to rule that the
24. contract was breached by the [seller] and to thereby order the restitution of the
25. down payment advanced by the [buyer] in the amount of FIT 105,600,000 plus
26. damages.
27. The Tribunale di Milano on 30 November 1994 - 26 January 1995, rendered its
28. decision in which, not acknowledging any agreed modiAcation o f the terms of
29. delivery, declared that the [seller] breached the conEact. This Court of First
30. Instance based its decision on the unsuccessful expiration of the 15-day term
31. given in the Arst notice to the [buyer] on 17 November 1989, and condemned the
32. [seller] to return the down payment to the [buyer], not granting any damages to
33. the [buyer] and seAing off the legal fees.
34. The [seller] Aled appeal against this decision on 17 October 1995, asking the
35. Appellate Court to partially modify the decision entered by the Lower Court, and
36. thereby to declare the [buyer] liable for damages. The [buyer] renewed all its
37. allegations already advanced in the Arst trial. The Appellate Court, aAer having
38. asked the parties to precise their conclusions, decides as follows.
39. Reasoning
40. To correctly qualify the relationship between the parties, it is preliminary useful
41. to point out that, being as the contract was entered into by the parties in January
42. 1989, the determination of their right and duties must refer to the United Nations
43. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (hereinaAer, the
44. "Convention"), ratiAed by both Italy and France, and signed in Vienna on 11
45. April 1980, and enacted on January 1, 1988.
46. Therefore, except as speciAed inEa, the Italian substantive law provisions found
47. in the applicable sections o f the C.C. do not apply. These internal provisions,
48. derived sometimes explicitly (by the parties), sometimes implicitly (in the
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49. appealed decision, which actually does not even go that far), again do not apply at
50. the case at bar; Article l(l)(a) of the Convention applies instead.
51. The Appellate Court affirms that which has already been stated by the Tribunale
52. of Milan about the breach of contract, but not by virtue of the national law, but
53. due to application of the CISC.
54. The [seller's] position is strengthened considerably by the intervened breach of
55. the contract (in light of the new qualiAcation given above) depending upon the
56. notice o f the [seller], pursuant to the provisions of Articles 61-64(1) and 26 of the
57. Convention, and pursuant to Article 74 in relation to the breach commiEed by the
58. [buyer]: consisting in the [buyer's] failure to pay the owed price and to pick up the
59. goods, pursuant to Articles 53, 59 and 60.
60. In particular, it appears that the [seller] granted the [buyer] an additional term to
61. fulAll its obligations, and this term had a reasonable length within the meaning of
62. Article 63 o f the Convention.
63. In addition, taking into account the term of delivery/payment (originally agreed
64. for 5 September 1989) aAer a Arst notiAcation dated 17 November 1989 -
65. insEucting the [buyer] to pick up the goods within 15 days — an interlocutory
66. behavior that de facto expanded the tolerance period already granted. On 6
67. December the [seller], in a leEer to the [buyer], restated the content of the
68. previous notice; also relevant is the Anal 15-day term, thus newly granted to the
69. [buyer] by the [seller].
70. Therefore, the total extension granted aAer the deadline of the beginning of
71. September, is two and a half months long, a term undoubtedly reasonable under
72. the circumstances.
73. The fact that (i) the [buyer] who beneAted Eom the extension, was impaired Eom
74. fulAlling the agreed (and modiAed) obligations (to pick up the goods) for some
75. additional time for technical reasons, and that (ii) there was an aEempt to seEle
76. the conEoversy in fall (which obviously failed since the [buyer] was seeking a
77. seElement in its leEer dated 29 November 1989) are considerations which do not
78. deserve aEention at present time.
79. In fact, in light of the mutual agreements, of their international nature, and of the
80. necessity to assure good faith in international transactions (as stated in Article
81. 7(1) of the Convention): for sake of clarity, it is not possible to discuss
82. circumstances which are presumed to be obstacles to the fulAllment of the duties
83. provided under the Convention. Moreover, Art. 7(2) provides that: "questions
84. concerning maEers governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled
85. in it are to be seEled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based
86. or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by
87. virtue o f the rules of private international law". The position o f the buyer is
88. therefore inconsistent with the circumstances described above to the extent of the
89. application of Italian internal law.
90. This substantive law would be relevant as of the country in which a buyer has its
91. "permanent residence", or its relevant place of business. This is to be considered
92. in light o f Article 3 of the Hague Convention of 15 June 1955 on the Law
93. Applicable to International Sales of Goods which, given its universal application
94. (Art. 7) had replaced since its enactment (in Italy, on 1 September 1964) Art. 25
95. of the preamble to the C.C., and therefore represents a general and fundamental
96. conAict o f law provision in this area (contractual obligations).
97. Due to their intrinsic inconsistency, the circumstances alleged by the [buyer], in
98. order to explain its difAculty in fulAlling the obligations [buyer] originally
99. undertook, can hardly be usefully referred to in any legal category of Italian
100. internal law. Thus, no presuppositions mentioned in the [buyer's] pleadings,
101. nor its impossibility to perform, nor any other relevant defenses, are
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102. applicable. In fact, the [buyer] in its defense just mentions the principle of
103. good faith in performance, as provided by Art. 1375 of C.C., which cannot in
104. any way replace the deAnitive and mandatory context o f the
105. Convention's provisions which — as speciAed in Art. 7(1) — adopt an
106. independent notion of good faith.
107. In light of the above, the decision of the Lower Court -  not to grant to the
108. [seller] damages -  does not appear sound.
109. It is also appropriate to stress that, all references to the Italian internal law, (as
110. substantive law) referring to this issue (damages) made by the [seller], do not
111. appear appropriate. The provisions of the Convention should be deemed, in
112. the area of remedies, basically self^sufAcient, and in general cannot be
113. integrated with other internal provisions, which would conEadict the
114. Convention's intended speciAcity.
115. As a maEer of fact, as it appears Eom the documentation Aled, it is
116. incontrovertible that the goods — which were impossible to be delivered by
117. the [seller] to the [buyer] by the end of 1989 -  were sold at the beginning of
118. the subsequent summer E)r an amount equal to FIT 440 million, a sum much
119. inferior to the original amount.
120. Thus, also due to its time Eame, the transaction may fulAll the provisions of
121. Article 75 of the Convention: basically a replacement sale (a negative sale)
122. which allows the [seller] to claim the difference between the contract price
123. and the price in the substitute transaction (in the case at bar equal to FIT
124. 528,000,000 minus 440,000,000) or FIT 88,000,000. As a practical maEer, the
125. transaction constitutes a loss pursuant Art. 74 (which provides the only
126. remedy available), since the amount double-claimed by the [seller] appears
127. unjustiAed (Arst as a net loss and then as consequential damages).
128. In other words, it does not appear that the [seller] was planning (as now
129. [seller] claims) to carry out an equivalent sale with another client ever since
130. the negotiation of the contract, so that "should the [buyer] have defaulted
131. [seller] would have sold two printer drivers." Moreover, this assertion
132. conAicts with the occurrence of the replacement sale described above.
133. The amount to which the [seller] would be entitled to should be increased by
134. the accrued interest at the Italian legal rate, Eom the date o f the breach, 1
135. January 1990, until payment is completed.
136. [....]
137. In witness whereof
138. The Court of Appeal of Milan, deciding on the appeal Aled by the [seller]
139. against the [buyer] on 17 October 1995, and on the partial appeal against the
140. decision entered by the Court of Milan on 30 November 1994 - 25 January
141. 1995, orders as follows:
142. 1) The [buyer] shall be liable for damages towards the [seller] in the amount
143. of FIT 88,000,000, plus interest accruing Eom 1 January 1990 until payment
144. is completed.
145. 2) The [buyer] shall bear the costs of the procedure.
147: FOOTNOTES
148. * For purposes of this translation, the Plaintiff-Appellant of Italy is referred to
149. as [seller]; the Defendant-Respondent of France is referred to as [buyer].
150. Monetary amounts in the currency of Italy [Italian Lira] are indicated as
151. [FIT].
152. ** Alex Turino received his LL.M. in International Comparative Law Eom
153. the Pace University School of Law.
154. *** Angela Maria Romito, Associate of the Institute of International
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92.
Katan, D., 2009b. Culture. In: M. Baker and G. Saldanha, eds., 2009. Rozzr/eb^e 
ezzqyc/opeafza q/"rmWarzozz j r̂Wze.y. 2"̂  ed. Abingdon: Routledge, pp.70-3.
Kenny, D., 2009. Corpora. In: M. Baker and G. Saldanha, eds., 2009. Roz/Rg^^e 
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